ORDER : Vivek Rusia, J. Applicant/defendant has filed this revision under Section 115 r/w Section 151 of the CPC, being aggrieved by the order dated 06.08.2016, passed by the XII Additional Civil Judge, Class-II, Indore in Civil Suit No.71-A/2016 by which, application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC has been rejected. Facts of the case are as under: 2. The Plaintiff-Devi Ahilya Bai Holkar Educational Trust filed a suit for declaration, permanent injunction, eviction, taking possession and recovery of lease rent against the defendants. According to the plaintiff, land in dispute being Survey No.1465, area admeasuring 1.48 acre, situated at Kesar Bagh Road, Indore was owned by the trust and leased out to defendant No.1 to 4, vide registered lease deed dated 15.04.1993 for the period of 50 years. After execution of deed, a premium amount of Rs.11,50,000/- was paid and annual lease rent of Rs.18,000/- per year was agreed to be paid. 3. In the said suit premises, there was a motor garage since the period of Holkar Estate. It is alleged that defendant Nos.1 to 4 has demolished the said garage and sold the land to defendant Nos. 5 and 6 by sale deed dated 14.11.2008. This fact came to their knowledge when the name of defendant No.5 was recorded in the revenue record and the certified copy was obtained on 16.09.2013. 4. It is alleged that defendant Nos.1 to 4 has demolished the said garage and sold the land to defendant Nos. 5 and 6 by sale deed dated 14.11.2008. This fact came to their knowledge when the name of defendant No.5 was recorded in the revenue record and the certified copy was obtained on 16.09.2013. 4. Vide notice dated 15.03.2016, the tenancy was terminated and the suit was filed seeking following reliefs: v & oknh VªLV }kjk izfroknh Øeakd 1 ¼,d½ ls 4 ¼pkj½ ds i{k esa fu"ikfnr ,oa iathd`r yht MhM fnukad 15&4&1993 ianzg@pkj@mUuhl lkS frj;kuos dks oknh }kjk fn;s x;s lwpuk&i= ds vk/kkj ij fujLr ?kksf"kr fd;k tkosA c & izfroknh Øeakd 5 ¼ikap½ ds i{k esa Øeakd 1 ¼,d½ ls 4 ¼pkj½ }kjk fu"ikfnr foØ; &i= Øeakd 1 ¼,d½ v@1318 ¼,d gtkj rhu lkS vV~Bkjg½ fnukad 25&4&2008 ¼iPphl@pkj@nks gtkj vkB½ ls izfroknh Øeakd&5 ¼ikap½ dks oknxzLr lEifRr ds laca/k esa dksbZ fgr] LoRo vFkok vf/kdkj izkIr ugha gq, rFkk ;g nLrkost oknh ds fgrksa ij ca/kudkjd ugha gS] ,slh ?kks"k.kk dh tkosaA l & oknxzLr lEifRr dLck bUnkSj fLFkr dsljckx jksM ds losZ uEcj 1465 ¼,d gtkj pkj lkS iSalB½ jdck 1-49 ¼,d n'keyo pkj ukS½ ,dM 6076-63 ¼N% gtkj fNgRrj n'keyo N% rhu oxZehVj½ ftls ykyckx eksVj xSjkt dgk tkrk gS rFkk ftldk fooj.k okn pj.k Øeakd 1 ¼,d½ eas fd;k x;k gS] fjDr ,oa ewfrZeUr vkf/kiR; Hkwfe ds fodkl dk;kasZ o fuekZ.k lfgr okn VªLV dks izfroknhx.k vFkok rRdkfyu dCtsnkj ls fnyok;k tkosA n & ,slk t;&i= fn;k tkos fd] izfroknhx.k i`Fkd ,oa lfEefyr #i ls yhtjsaV ,oa yht fujLrh fnukad ls feal izkfQV~l ,oa olwyh ;ksX; 3 ¼rhu½ o"kkasZ dh jkf'k #i;s 54]000@& ¼v{kjh #i;s pkSou gtkj½ oknh VªLV dks vnk djs o okn izLrqfr fnukad ls dCtk izkfIr fnukad rd dh {kfriwfrZ jkf'k #i;s 18]000@& ¼v{kjh #i;s vV~Bkjg gtkj½ okf"kZd dh nj ls Hkh vnk djsaA** 5. The lease conditions which are said to have been violated are reproduced below: 1. To pay the said yearly rent on the day and in the usual mode of payment and manner aforesaid. 2. The lease conditions which are said to have been violated are reproduced below: 1. To pay the said yearly rent on the day and in the usual mode of payment and manner aforesaid. 2. To use the demised premises as deemed appropriate by the Lessee with liberty to demolish the 'Motor Garages etc.' and construct the same to let or sublet or to sell the right of possession/occupation of the newly constructed structure and to receive money in any manner from the occupiers of the said premises or part there of Provided However, Lessees shall be entitled to demolish the said 'Motor Garages' only after obtaining written permission from the Lessors to do so. The Lessees failure to obtain prior permission in writing to demolish the said 'Motor Garages' would entitle the Lessors to forthwith forfeit the security deposit without prejudice to their rights under this Lease deed. 3. In the event of Lesses option to transfer and assign their rights and benefits under the Lease Deed, they shall do so under prior written permission from the Lessors and in that eventuality security deposited furnished by the Lessees shall be transferred by the Lessors in favour of the assignees and/or transferees on the same terms and conditions stipulated in the said lease deed. 4. Lessees hereby acknowledge the title of the Lessors and convenants the lease hereby granted to him shall be liable for forfeit in case he or any successors-in-title of the Lessees shall deny or refuse to acknowledge the title to the Lessors. 5. In case of forfeiture of the said lease in accordance with the terms thereof, the Lessors shall be entitled to recover possession or evict the Lessees or any sub-lessee or assignee or any person claiming through the Lessee and in that even shall not be liable to pay." 6. After notice in suit, defendant No. 5 filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 of CPC and prayed for rejection of the suit on the following grounds: (i). That no cause of action has accrued to the plaintiff to file the suit because the lease deed is valid upto the year 2043. (ii). That the suit is barred by limitation. (iii). The suit has not been valued as per the value of the property mentioned in the sale deed dated 14.11.2008 and the plaintiff has not paid proper court fees. 7. (ii). That the suit is barred by limitation. (iii). The suit has not been valued as per the value of the property mentioned in the sale deed dated 14.11.2008 and the plaintiff has not paid proper court fees. 7. The said application was replied by the plaintiff stating that the suit is for eviction and the plaintiff is not party in the sale deed 14.11.2008, therefore, it is required to value the suit on the basis of the valuation in the sale deed. The suit is within limitation as the plaintiff has sought decree of eviction and arrear of rent. 8. Learned Civil Judge, vide order dated 06.08.2016 has rejected the aforesaid application on all objections, hence, the present revision before this Court. 9. Shri Vijay Asudani, learned counsel for the applicant/defendant argued that the lease deed is for 50 years and valid up to year 2043, therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff is premature as no cause of action has accrued. He further submits that petitioner has specifically challenged the sale deed dated 14.11.2008 in which value of the property is Rs.7.00 crore, therefore, the civil Court has no peculiarly jurisdiction to try the suit and the sale deed, executed in the year 2008, which is under challenge, hence, admittedly, the suit is time barred. 10. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance over the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, passed in the case of Laxmidas Bapudas Darbar and Another v. Rudravva (Smt.) and Others, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 409 on the point that the period of fix term lease is ensured and powers are protected and before the expiry of the said period, the suit is not maintainable. He further placed reliance over the judgment of full bench of this Court in the matter of Subhash Chand Jain v. Chairman, MPEB and Others, reported in 2001(1) JLJ 81 on the point that the allegation in the plaint including the substantive relief claimed must be the basis of settling the court fees payable by the plaintiff. The substantive relief asked in the plaint should be the basis for settling correct court fees payable in the case. The substantive relief asked in the plaint should be the basis for settling correct court fees payable in the case. He has further placed reliance over the judgment passed in the case of Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad, reported in AIR 1973 SC 2384 on the point that in a case where suit filed by the son for declaration that the mortgaged decree obtained against his father was not binding upon him, then it is essential for the son to ask for setting aside of the decree as all consequential relief of declaration claimed and to pay ad valorem court fees under Section 7(iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. He submits that in view of the above law, when the petitioner is praying that the sale deed dated 14.11.2008 is not binding on him but he is asking for setting aside of the decree and is liable to pay the ad valorem court fees. He further placed reliance upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, passed in case of Sitaram & Others v. Maharaja Govind Singh Joo Deo & Another, reported in 1979 JLJ 308 where the same proposition of law has been laid down as in case of Shamsher Singh (Supra). 11. Shri B.L. Pavecha, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent submits that essentially the suit is for eviction and the suit has been properly valued under Section 7(xi) (cc) of the Court fees Act, 1870 and the relief of possession claimed from such transferee does not alter the relief. He has further placed reliance over Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 and submits that when the ad valorem court fees is payable under Section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the valuation made by the plaintiff for the purpose of court fees shall govern the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction also. In support of his contention, he has placed heavy reliance over the judgment passed in the case of Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramnathan Chettiar, reported in AIR 1958 SC 245 . He further submits that the scope of interference and revision is discretionary even if the conditions under Section 115 of CPC are fulfilled, then the discretion should be exercised only to prevent substantial valuer of justice. He further submits that the scope of interference and revision is discretionary even if the conditions under Section 115 of CPC are fulfilled, then the discretion should be exercised only to prevent substantial valuer of justice. He has further placed reliance over the judgment passed in the case of Brij Gopal v. Kishan Gopal, reported in AIR 1973 SC 1096 , in the case of Madak Chand Jain, reported in 1999(2) MPLJ 686 and in the case of Ishwar Singh v. State of M.P., reported in 2004(2) MPLJ 479 . 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. ORDER 13. That the defendant No.5 prayed for rejection of the plaint firstly on the point that no cause of action arose for filing the suit, as the lease in question is valid for the period of 50 years. The said objection is liable to be rejected, simply on the ground that vide notice dated 15.03.2016, the plaintiff has terminated the lease in violation of the various terms and conditions of the lease. The plaintiff has specifically alleged the violation of the terms and conditions of the lease by the defendant. These issues are liable to be decided by the learned Civil Judge after taking evidence, therefore, need not to be commented in this revision. 14. But since, the lease deed has been terminated, therefore, the suit for eviction is maintainable because in the lease deed, it is mentioned that the lesser may determine the lease in accordance with law and may enter into the said premises. 15. That, so far as the issue of limitation is concerned, the defendant has raised the objection that the sale deed was registered on 14.11.2008 and the suit was filed after a delay of around five and a half years. The issue of limitation is always a mixed question of fact and law both. In the plaint, the plaintiff has stated that they came to know about the sale deed only when the name of Maharani Usha Devi was deleted and the name of defendant No.5 was recorded and they obtained the certified copy of the revenue record on 16.09.2013. Thereafter, lease was determined after giving notice and suit was filed within a period of 3 years, therefore, prima facie, the suit is within limitation and this issue is also liable to be decided by the trial Court after taking evidence. 16. Thereafter, lease was determined after giving notice and suit was filed within a period of 3 years, therefore, prima facie, the suit is within limitation and this issue is also liable to be decided by the trial Court after taking evidence. 16. That the last issue is regarding the payment of court fees. Admittedly, the plaintiff has executed the lease deed in favour of the defendant No.1 and 2 for the period of 50 years. It is alleged that in violation of terms and conditions of lease deed, defendant No.1 to 4 has sold the suit property to the defendant No.5 and 6 without taking permission from the plaintiff. That in condition No.6, defendant No.1 to 4 were given right to sell only newly constructed structure, after demolishing the existing motor garage only after obtaining prior written permission from the lesser, but the defendant No.1 to 4 has sold the land after demolition of motor garage. 17. As per the provisions prescribed under Section 7(xi) (cc) of the Court fees Act, 1870, the plaintiff is required to value the suit on the basis of lease rent, as law laid down by this Court in case of Subhash Chand Jain (Supra) and Madak Chand Jain v. Fatma Bai, reported in 1999(2) MPLJ 686 . 18. In case of Madak Chand Jain (Supra) in a reference case, the Division Bench of this Court has held that the plaintiff is not liable to value the suit separately for the purpose of jurisdiction and court fees with regard to the ejectment from the encroached portion in a eviction suit for a rented premises. In the case in hand, the plaintiff has valued the suit for eviction on the basis of 12 months' lease rent that is Rs. 18,000/- and for declaration Rs. 1,000/- as prayed that the sale deed dated 14.11.2008 is not binding on the plaintiff. As laid down in the case of Sathappa Chettiar (Supra). That, as per evidence and provisions of Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 to make the value for the purpose of jurisdiction depends upon the value as determinable for computation of the court fees and the computation of the court fees in a suit under Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 depends upon the valuation in the plaint in respect of relief. 19. 19. The Supreme Court in case of Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh and Others, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 112 has held that the suit for declaratory relief and consequential relief in respect of agricultural land have to be calculated in terms of Section 7(iv)(C) and not ad valorem court fees or market value. Para 7 of the said judgment is reproduced below : "7. Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. The difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance, can be brought out by the following illustration relating to 'A' and 'B'-two brothers. 'A' executes a sale deed in favour of 'C'. Subsequently 'A' wants to avoid the sale. 'A' has to sue for cancellation of the deed. On the other hand, if 'B', who is not the executant of the deed, wants to avoid it, he has to sue for a declaration that the deed executed by 'A' is invalid/void and non-est/illegal and he is not bound by it. In essence both may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If 'A', the executant of the deed, seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad-valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If 'B', who is a non-executant, is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if 'B', a non- executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act." 20. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Act. But if 'B', a non- executant, is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act." 20. According to the apex Court where non-executant of the deed seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or is not binding on him. 21. So far as relief of possession is concern in suit, the plaintiff has filed the suit for eviction after determination of the lease deed due to violation of terms and conditions of the lease. The defendant No.1 to 4 who said to have illegally sold the suit property to the defendant No.5 and 6 in violation of the lease deed's condition. The plaintiff has claimed possession as owner and landlord or lesser of the suit premises by way of eviction suit, therefore, the main relief in a suit is eviction, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the division bench of this Court in the case of Madak Chand Jain (Supra), this is a composite suit for eviction on the ground of violation of lease condition by the tenant who sold the leased out property, hence, in such a situation, in such type of composite suit, fixed court fees has rightly been paid under sub-clause (cc) of Clause (xi) of Section 7 of Court Fees Act, 1870 and the suit was properly valued under Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887. 22. Therefore, the plaintiff's suit cannot be rejected on the ground that he has to value the suit as per the condition of the sale deed. The plaintiff is not an executant of the sale deed, therefore, the sale deed is not binding on him. 23. The trial Court has not committed any error of law while rejecting the application under Order 7, Rule 11 . Hence, I do not find any illegality committed by the trial Court while passing the impugned order, therefore, this revision is hereby dismissed.