JUDGMENT : D.P. CHOUDHURY, J. 1. Challenge has been made in this writ application to the impugned orders dated 25.6.1993, 24.4.1995 and 20.5.1998 vide Annexures-1, 2 and 4 respectively passed by the opposite party no. 3 under the provisions of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’). FACTS 2. The unshorn details of the case of the petitioner is that M/s. Hotel Paradise, Dhenkanal was established by the family members of Mr. Sudam Pal and Madhabananda Pal and after the death of Madhabananda Pal the said establishment was closed since pretty long period. The petitioner was neither the employer of the said establishment nor was looking after the affairs of the establishment for the disputed period, i.e., from 1980 to 1987. 3. Be it stated, the opposite party no. 3 without ascertaining the employer of said establishment and the employees of the establishment for the period from 1980 to 1987 issued notice to the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.85,446.20 as determined under Section 7-A of the Act and Scheme made thereunder. The petitioner claims that he has not been offered any opportunity of being heard by the opposite party no. 3 before determining the dues to be paid. He also claims that he is not the employer of the said establishment. So, the petitioner after receipt of notice filed a Review Petition on 9.1.1995 to consider his claim. Opposite party no. 3 rejected the review petition without granting any opportunity to the petitioner of being heard on 24.4.1995 on the ground that it is barred by limitation. It is the case of the petitioner that after receipt of the impugned order passed by the opposite party no. 3 dated 25.6.1993 on 16.12.1994 submitted the review petition within thirty days as per usual practice although the Act and the Scheme thereunder do not provide limitation for filing of review petition. 4. It is further case of the petitioner that due to non-deposit of the amount determined, the opposite party no. 3 and his subordinate officer filed criminal case before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhenkanal. However, the petitioner challenged the impugned order of the opposite party no. 4. It is further case of the petitioner that due to non-deposit of the amount determined, the opposite party no. 3 and his subordinate officer filed criminal case before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Dhenkanal. However, the petitioner challenged the impugned order of the opposite party no. 3 before this Court vide O.J.C. No. 2226 of 1996 which was disposed of on 2.4.1998 with a direction to the opposite party No. 3 to rehear the review application on the question of limitation and at the same time the Court directed the petitioner to appear before the opposite party no. 3 on 29.4.1998 to participate in the proceeding. 5. Be it stated that opposite party no. 3 in pursuance of the order of this Court disposed of the case as if it is a proceeding under Section 7-A of the Act. It is the case of the petitioner that even if the Court has remanded the case to hear of the review application on the question of limitation but the opposite party no. 3 reiterated his own views as taken in earlier impugned orders challenged before this Court. So, the petitioner came in the second round of litigation challenging the said order along with the order passed in the earlier proceeding under Section 7-A of the Act. 6. Per contra, the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 filed the counter refuting the allegation made in the writ petition. The opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 challenged the writ petition being not maintainable on the ground that the petitioner has alternative remedy available by preferring statutory appeal before the E.P.F. Appellate Tribunal as against the impugned order purportedly passed under Section 7-A/7-B of the Act. It is also stated that petitioner is the employer of the establishment and since the establishment failed to comply the provision of the Act during the period from 04/1980 to 09/1987, a show cause notice under Section 7-A of the Act was issued to the petitioner. On several occasions the petitioner refused to receive notice but on 8.1.1988 the petitioner attended the enquiry and took time to produce records. Thereafter due to long absence of the petitioner 27 adjournments were given and finally on 14.2.1990 a notice was published in the daily Oriya newspaper “The Dharitri” for appearance of the petitioner. On several occasions the petitioner refused to receive notice but on 8.1.1988 the petitioner attended the enquiry and took time to produce records. Thereafter due to long absence of the petitioner 27 adjournments were given and finally on 14.2.1990 a notice was published in the daily Oriya newspaper “The Dharitri” for appearance of the petitioner. However, the Advocate for the petitioner appeared on 13.3.1990 and 9.5.1990 and sought adjournments to produce the records. Since after good number of opportunities offered to the petitioner and his Advocate, the petitioner did not appear, then the Assessing Authority assessed the dues basing on the enquiry report of the Enforcement Officer dated 15.12.1989. As the onus of identification of the employees lies on the employer, the petitioner cannot take the plea that it is the duty of the opposite party No. 3 to identify the employees who are entitled to receive provident fund. Since the petitioner has attended the enquiry on 8.1.1988 in the capacity of employer, it is not incumbent upon him to challenge the order on the ground of violation of natural justice. 7. It is the further case of the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 that the review application under Section 7-B of the Act was filed beyond the limitation period of forty-five days for which it was rejected but as per the order of the High Court the authority decided the issue by passing a speaking order on 20.5.1998 wherein he had deliberated all the contentious issues involved in the proceeding filed by the petitioner before him. So, the impugned orders passed by the opposite party no. 3 are legal and proper. 8. The petitioner filed the rejoinder reiterating the contention made in the writ petition but added that as per the order of this Court he did not file the appeal as provided under Section 7(I) of the Act. In O.J.C. No. 2226 of 1996 this Court remitted the matter to the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner for fresh adjudication on the question relating to limitation. But the opposite party no. 3 without adjudicating on the question of limitation has disposed of the matter on merit for which the present writ application is filed challenging the same. 9. In the rejoinder it has also been brought out by the petitioner that the opposite party No. 3 filed criminal cases vide 2(C) C.C. Case Nos. But the opposite party no. 3 without adjudicating on the question of limitation has disposed of the matter on merit for which the present writ application is filed challenging the same. 9. In the rejoinder it has also been brought out by the petitioner that the opposite party No. 3 filed criminal cases vide 2(C) C.C. Case Nos. 153/94, 154/94 and 155/94 against the petitioner due to fault in making payment of E.P.F. contribution and administrative charges for the period in question but the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhenkanal after hearing the matter on merit passed the order of acquittal against the petitioner. In the criminal cases the opposite parties failed to prove the petitioner was the employer of the establishment M/s. Hotel Paradise. So, the petitioner is not liable to pay any amount towards E.P.F. contribution and administrative charges to the opposite party no. 3. 10. Reply is filed by opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 to the rejoinder. Same facts have been reiterated by the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 in the said reply. Be it stated, the petitioner is the managing partner of the above establishment, namely, M/s. Hotel Paradise being in-charge of the said establishment from 8.11.1978. M/s. New Paradise was established in the same place where M/s. Hotel Paradise was established as M/s. Paradise Cabin. M/s. Paradise Cabin was closed due to death of Managing partner Sri Madhabananda Pal and Pramod Kumar Pal took over the said establishment with effect from 8.11.1978 and started the business in the name of M/s. New Paradise after taking over all the materials of said M/s. Paradise Cabin. Accordingly the petitioner filed the Form No. 5A vide Annexure-R-I and in the said Form he has made declaration of eighteen employees engaged with effect from 8.11.1978. A letter was sent by opposite party no. 3 to the petitioner to comply with the provisions of the Act with effect from November 1978. Then the petitioner acknowledging the said letter took time to deposit the P.F. contributions and the said establishment complied up to 03/80 under code no. OR/722 which was assigned to M/s. Paradise Cabin (Hotel). Since the establishment did not comply the provisions of the Act, necessary proceeding under Section 7-A of the Act was started. As the review petition was filed beyond the period of 45 days, it was rejected. OR/722 which was assigned to M/s. Paradise Cabin (Hotel). Since the establishment did not comply the provisions of the Act, necessary proceeding under Section 7-A of the Act was started. As the review petition was filed beyond the period of 45 days, it was rejected. But in view of the order of this Court passed in O.J.C. No. 2226 of 1996, the authority purportedly passed the order under Section 7-A of the Act afresh on 20.5.1998. It is also stated that the acquittal in criminal case has nothing to do with the proceeding under Section 7-A of the Act for which the petitioner is also liable to pay the dues determined by the authority under Section 7-A of the Act. 11. The main points for consideration: (i) Whether the writ application is maintainable? (ii) Whether the petitioner is the employer of the establishment M/s. Hotel Paradise bearing Code No. OR/722 for the period 4/80 to 9/87 under the provisions of the Act? DISCUSSION Point No. (i) : 12. It is admitted fact that a writ application was preferred before this Court vide O.J.C. No. 2226 of 1996 where following order was passed: “2.4.1998 Heard. Petitioner’s application for review was rejected on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Petitioner’s grievance is that before such rejection, no opportunity was granted to him to show as to why petition could not be filed earlier or if there was any reasonable cause for delayed presentation. In view of the undisputed position that such opportunity was not granted, we remit the matter back to the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bhubaneswar for a fresh adjudication of the question relating to limitation. To avoid unnecessary delay, petitioner is directed to appear before the Commissioner on 29.4.1998 without any further notice so that question of maintainability of review application and the cause for delay, if any, can be considered. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits. In view of this order, Annexure-2 is quashed for the purpose of fresh adjudication on the question of limitation. The writ application is disposed of accordingly”. 13. In pursuance of the order the matter was remitted back to the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner to decide on the question of limitation on the review petition filed by the establishment to review the order dated 25.6.1993. The writ application is disposed of accordingly”. 13. In pursuance of the order the matter was remitted back to the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner to decide on the question of limitation on the review petition filed by the establishment to review the order dated 25.6.1993. On going through the order dated 20.5.1998 vide Annexure-4 it appears that the concerned authority disposed of the matter in the manner as if there is open remand by the Court to adjudicate the proceeding under Section 7A of the Act afresh. Ultimately vide Annexure-4 the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner upheld the order dated 17.6.1993 and directed the employer to pay the assessed dues. The order does not disclose about the adjudication on the point of limitation of the review application as directed by this Court in the above writ application. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since the impugned order has been passed afresh instead of following the directive of this Court, such order is not appellable and therefore, it is maintainable in present form. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that since the order dated 20.5.1998 is purportedly passed under Section 7A of the Act and appeal lies against such order under Section 7 (I) of the Act, it can be observed that there is efficacious remedy available to the petitioner to file appeal but not the writ application. It is trite in law that where there is efficacious remedy available on the provisions of the Act, the writ application is not maintainable. At the same time, it is also settled law that even if efficacious remedy is available under the provisions of the Act or the Rules, a party can prefer writ application on the ground that the authority has violated the natural justice or the authority has passed order violating the provisions of law. In the instant case, the petitioner has taken plea that he is not the employer of the establishment M/s. Hotel Paradise which was assessed and the order of this Court in the earlier writ application also has not been complied with as directed. So, even if the appeal provision is there against the impugned order but in the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed, the writ application is also maintainable. Point No. (i) is answered accordingly. Point No. (ii) : 15. So, even if the appeal provision is there against the impugned order but in the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed, the writ application is also maintainable. Point No. (i) is answered accordingly. Point No. (ii) : 15. The entire impugned order dated 20.5.1998 shows that it has opened fresh adjudication under Section 7A of the Act but it only reconfirmed the order dated 17.6.1993 passed under Section 7A of the Act. Of course, the petitioner has participated in the hearing of the case as per order of this Court passed in O.J.C. No. 2226 of 1996. The relevant portion of the impugned order with regard to the contention of the petitioner is answered in the following manner: “I have also gone through very carefully the affidavit dated 12.5.98 submitted by Sri Pal through advocate before me during the hearing on 13.5.98 wherein he has contended that (1) he is not the owner of the establishment and (2) the assessment earlier made has not indicated the names of employees. It is a mere repetition that Sri Pal is wrong. He has declared himself as Managing Partner through return in Form 5A dated 30.1.79 and the assessment was made ex-parte after providing a total of 28 opportunities including newspaper notice. It is an established fact of Law, that notices returned with postal remark “Refused” by the Postal Authorities are treated as good notices as the person is supposed to be in knowledge of the proceeding. In the face of non-cooperation by the employer, the dues were assessed on the basis of available records with the Department.” 16. From the aforesaid order, it is clear that the concerned authority has proceeded basing on the declaration made by the present petitioner in Form 5-A dated 30.1.1979 where the petitioner himself has declared as Managing partner of the establishment. 17. Reply to the rejoinder has been filed by opposite party Nos.1 and 2 on 30.8.2016 to the documents relied upon vide Annexures-R-I, R-II and R-III. Annexure-R-I shows that the present petitioner executed Form 5-A showing him as employer on 30.1.1979. 17. Reply to the rejoinder has been filed by opposite party Nos.1 and 2 on 30.8.2016 to the documents relied upon vide Annexures-R-I, R-II and R-III. Annexure-R-I shows that the present petitioner executed Form 5-A showing him as employer on 30.1.1979. Annexure-R-II shows that the present petitioner has engaged employees in the establishment with effect from 8.11.1978 and Annexure-R-III shows that the petitioner has made an application to the concerned authority under the Employees’ Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 and Employees’ Family Pension Scheme for supplying all connected forms and challans so as to run his establishment. From Annexures-R-I, RII and R-III it appears they relate to one Sweet Stall, namely, “New Paradise” and petitioner claims the Managing Partner of said establishment. 18. The impugned orders are passed with regard to M/s. Paradise Hotel but later on the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 relied upon the documents of the petitioner showing him as employer of another establishment called “New Paradise”. In this regard also in the affidavit of opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 dated 30.8.2016 they have admitted that M/s. Hotel Paradise which was found functioning in the same place where “New Paradise” started functioning and Sri Pramod Pal was the Managing Partner of the said establishment. Thus, it is clear that the establishment for which entire demand is made is for M/s. Hotel Paradise but not for “New Paradise” although the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 based their claim relying upon Annexures-R-I, R-II and R-III which relate to “New Paradise.” 19. Section 2A of the Act speaks as follows:- “2A. Establishment to include all departments and branches.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that where an establishment consists of different departments or has branches, whether situate in the same place or in different places, all such departments or branches shall be treated as parts of the same establishment.” It is clear from aforesaid provision that if one establishment was functioning in a place and subsequently another establishment is started in the same place, the earlier establishment cannot cover the new establishment. On the other hand, the new establishment has to be assessed afresh and the assessment for the old establishment ought not to be applied to the new establishment. 20. On the other hand, the new establishment has to be assessed afresh and the assessment for the old establishment ought not to be applied to the new establishment. 20. In the instant case, it is clear from both the pleadings that M/s. Hotel Paradise was started by one Madhabananda Pal who was employer of said establishment and it continued up to 1979 and in the same place admittedly the establishment in the name and style “New Paradise” of which the present petitioner is the Managing Partner got started. Moreover, opposite parties have not proved that petitioner being successor of Madhabananda Pal has become employer of M/s. Hotel Paradise. Mere standing of “New Paradise” in the same place of M/s. Hotel Paradise having Code No. OR/722 cannot be taken as establishment under Section 2A of the Act. So, it cannot be said that the old establishment is to be assessed showing the petitioner as employer. 21. Apart from this, opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 have not filed any inspection report of the Inspector of Provident Fund who have visited M/s. Hotel Paradise during the period from 4/80 to 9/87 so as to find out the actual employees employed and other necessary particulars so as to impose the dues to be paid by the petitioner. Moreover, when admitted by opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 in their affidavit dated 30.8.2016 that “New Paradise” has been in the same place of M/s. Hotel Paradise, it will not be proper for opposite parties to claim dues for said period from the petitioner who is only the Managing Partner of “New Paradise.” Thus, the Court is of the view that petitioner is not the employer of M/s. Hotel Paradise bearing Code No. OR/722 under the provision of the Act. Point No. (ii) is answered accordingly. CONCLUSION: 22. From the foregoing discussion as made hereinabove, the Court is of the view that the writ application is maintainable and the petitioner is not the Managing Partner of M/s. Hotel Paradise but he is the Managing Partner of “New Paradise” which is placed in the same place where M/s. Hotel Paradise existed. Since the dues have been demanded by the opposite parties against the establishment M/s. Hotel Paradise for the period from 4/1980 to 9/1987, the petitioner thus appears to be not responsible to pay such amount. Since the dues have been demanded by the opposite parties against the establishment M/s. Hotel Paradise for the period from 4/1980 to 9/1987, the petitioner thus appears to be not responsible to pay such amount. Since the establishment of the petitioner “New Paradise” has been placed in the same place where the establishment M/s. Hotel Paradise existed, the impugned proceeding under Section 7-A of the Act and the impugned orders vide Annexures-1, 2 and 4 thereby against the petitioner for the establishment M/s. Hotel Paradise being de hors to the provisions of law are liable to be quashed and the Court do so. The writ application is accordingly allowed.