JUDGMENT : S.N. PRASAD, J. The writ petition who is the workman has assailed the award dated 17.9.2000 passed in Industrial Dispute Case No.120 (97 (C) whereby and where under the reference has been answered in negative of the workman. 2. Case of the workman that he has joined service under the management on 15.4.1992 and continued 9.3.94, he has completed more than 240 days of service during the year 1992-93, and 283 days for the year 1993-94, he was regularly contributing to provident fund and receiving bonus but the management has terminated his service from 10.3.1994 without notice and without giving any benefits as provided under Section 25-F, so termination order is illegal in violation of principle of natural justice and prayer for reinstatement with full back wages has been made. 3. While on the other hand, case of the opposite party-Management is that North Orissa Workers Union has got no locus standi to represent the workman as and he was never a member of that union at the time of his termination and as such the reference is not maintainable as the workman did not prefer appeal before the Arbitrator as provided under the standing order. The petitioner was engaged in the granite department of the company from, 1992 to March, 1994 and nature of job was temporary, contractual and intermittent for the purpose of same preparation from granite blocks at cutting & polishing unit located at Joda. He was always being given appointments for a fixed period with terms and conditions mentioned in the appointment letter. Since he was given appointment for fixed period, his work ceased at the end of the period, as such this case falls under Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such Section 25 F is not applicable. 4. The workman being aggrieved with the action of the management has raised dispute which ultimately culminated into the reference and the same has been answered by the Industrial Tribunal by way of the award which is impugned in this writ petition. 5. The industrial Tribunal after examining the materials placed before it has formulated the following issues: (i) Whether the General Secretary, North Orissa workers' Union has locus standi to represent the second party-workman? (ii) Whether the reference is maintainable? 5. The industrial Tribunal after examining the materials placed before it has formulated the following issues: (i) Whether the General Secretary, North Orissa workers' Union has locus standi to represent the second party-workman? (ii) Whether the reference is maintainable? (iii) Whether the termination of the workman by the management without any written order w.e.f. 10.3.94 is justified and proper? (iv) If not to what relief the workman is entitled to ? 6. The Industrial Tribunal after taking into consideration the nature of appointment which is for a period of tenure which is extended time to time has come to conclusion that the workman cannot be said to be retrenched workman in view of the definition of retrenchment as contemplated under Section 2 () (bb) and the provision of Section 25-F has not been followed. 7. We have appreciated the contentions advanced by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record and before going through the finding given by the Industrial Tribunal it is relevant to have discussion of the relevant provision of Section 25 F, 25-B and 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which has got bearing with the issue involved in this case. Section 25F which speaks as follows: "25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until – (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing including the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such, wages for the period of the notice; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.)" From perusal of provision as contained in Section 25F i.e., the conditions precedent to retrenchment of Workman has been stipulated therein and in case of violation of the same, the compensation is to be paid to the workman. The conditions precedent is that the workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. 8. Continuous service has been defined under Section 258 which speaks as follows: "258. Definition of continuous service - (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman. (2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer. (a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than - (i) one hundred and ninety days in the cased a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case; (b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than - (i) ninety five days, in the case of workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) one hundred .and twenty days, in any other case. From perusal of provision as contained in Section 25B which stipulates that a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman. 9. Retrenchment has been defined under Section 2 (oo) (bb) which speaks as follows: 2 (oo) (bb) - "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of this service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include - (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein. From perusal of Section 2 (oo) (bb) which stipulates the definition of retrenchment which means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein. 10. Thus, under the exception clause i.e. under Section 2(oo) (bb), retrenchment cannot be said to be done in the termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman provided that such termination of service has been excluded from the definition of retrenchment. 11. The fact which is not in dispute in this case is that the workman was engaged on 26.3.1992 as would be evident from Annexure-3 which is the offer of appointment on certain terms and conditions, i.e. (1) Your temporary appointment is purely on the condition that you will be declared medically fit by Company's doctor. 11. The fact which is not in dispute in this case is that the workman was engaged on 26.3.1992 as would be evident from Annexure-3 which is the offer of appointment on certain terms and conditions, i.e. (1) Your temporary appointment is purely on the condition that you will be declared medically fit by Company's doctor. (2) As this appointment is for 85 days exclusively for above mentioned temporary work, it may be terminated 'earlier due to suspension/completion of work or any other reason on 72 hours advance written intimation by the Officer or Officer-in-charge. Similarly for any reason if you wish to relinquish your job, you shall have to give 72 hours written information to the Asst. Divisional Manager (Granite Project), Jamshedpur. (3) In normal course, your service shall automatically come to an end on 8.7.1992. Xxx xxx xxx (8) You will be governed by Company's certified Standing Orders applicable to Mines Division, provisions of other statutes and company's rules and regulations, as and when applicable to the establishment. (9) You will have to make your own arrangement of accommodation during your tenure of employment with the Company. In case, the above terms and conditions are accepted, you must submit your valid employment exchange registration card and certificates/testimonials in support of your educational qualification/experience before reporting for duty which in no case be late than 15.4.1992 to Mr. B.K.Patnaik, Asst. Divisional Manager (Granite Project) at Sample Preparation Unit, TISCO Limited, P.O. Joda, Dist. Keonjhar, Orissa. Xxx After lapse of force of the communication dated 26.3.1992 another order of appointment dated 10.7.1992 has been issued on the same terms and conditions as in the order dated 26.3.1992 (Annexure-3), thereafter on 10.10.1992, 13.1.1993, 14.4.1993,15.7.1993 and 28.12.1993 order of appointments has been issued. It is evident from the orders of appointment as annexed in the writ petition as contained in Annexure-3 series as has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. It is evident that the workman has been offered with appointments for 85 days with the conditions that it may be termination earlier due to suspension/completion of work or any other reason on 72 hours advance written intimation by the Officer or Officer-in-charge. Similarly, for any reason if the workman wishes to relinquished his job, he shall have to give 72, hours written intimation to the Asst. Divisional Manager. Geological Services, Jamshedpur or to the Asst. Similarly, for any reason if the workman wishes to relinquished his job, he shall have to give 72, hours written intimation to the Asst. Divisional Manager. Geological Services, Jamshedpur or to the Asst. Divisional Manager, Granite Department at Sample Preparation Unit, Tisco Limited, Joda. The offer of appointment contains that in case the terms and conditions are accepted, the workman has been directed to submit valid employment exchange registration card and certificates/ testimonials in support of your educational qualification/experience before reporting for duty, as such it is evident that the nature of appointment was in fixed tenure which the workman was knowing well and after accepting the terms and conditions he resumed his duty on each and every offer of appointments from 26.3.1992 till 28.9.1993 with breaks. 12. Petitioner has produced copy of Form-C which pertains to disbursement of bonus wherein days worked is 311.00 and 283.00 and the date of payment is 24.9.93 and 27.9.94 respectively and in support of this it has been argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner that since he has completed regular service of 240 days and as such before terminating him it was incumbent upon the management to follow the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Industrial Tribunal has taken into consideration the deposition laid by the workman wherein it has been deposed that admitting the fact that the appointment was for a specific period but during intervention period he was allowed to discharge his duty in other departments, however the same is seriously been disputed by the management as would be evident from the deposition of the management witness No.1. 13. In the light of this factual situation, now it is to be assessed as to whether provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was to be followed in this case or not? 13. In the light of this factual situation, now it is to be assessed as to whether provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was to be followed in this case or not? There is no dispute about the fact that the provision of Section 25F has been enacted upon the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is for the reason that the workman should have been provided with opportunity to know the reason of retrenchment if he has completed 240 days of service and definition of 240 days service has been provided under Section 25-B of the Act, the provision of Section 2 (oo) relates with same similar explanation and the relevant provision under Section 2 (oo) (bb) which contains a provision that if the engagement is by virtue of renewal of contract and due to non renewal of that contract, if the employee is not allowed to work the same will not come under the definition of retrenchment and in the light of this provision the case of the petitioner is to be scrutinized. There is not dispute about the fact in the case of the petitioner that he has been engaged for certain period under some terms and conditions if acceptable then the workman is supposed to join duty, the petitioner/workman here in each and every time after accepting the terms and conditions of the contract has resumed his duty. It is settled that if there is any terms and conditions mentioned in the offer of appointment and if it is accepted by the workman or the employer it is binding upon it. In this case since the workman is known about the terms of appointment which is accepted after completion of tenure period and after completion of tenure period the contract has not been extended for the reason that the project in question has been closed. Regarding closure it has specifically been deposed by the management witness which has been taken note by the Industrial Tribunal in the award and to that effect condition has been inserted in the offer of appointment to the effect that it may be terminated earlier due to suspension/completion of work or any other reason on 72 hours advance written intimation by the officer or officer-incharge. Terms and conditions has been laid down in each and every offer of appointment from which the petitioner was well aware and it is not the case of the petitioner that the terms and conditions of offer appointment has been violated by the management. Specific case of the petitioner that provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been violated. The objective of provision of Section 25-F to appraise the workman in case of retrenchment of such employee so that the principles of natural justice may be followed, but here in this case provision of Section 25F will not be applicable for the reason that there is specific terms and conditions in the offer of appointment for retrenchment after giving notice of 72 hours and-the said terms and conditions has been accepted by the workman without any objection and as such when the work has been closed the petitioner again insisting upon the management to provide appointment or even he cannot say that the provision of Section 25-F has been violated since there is specific condition mentioned in the offer of appointment. 14. We, after going through the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, have found that the Industrial Tribunal on each and every aspect of the matter has as discussed above has taken into consideration and thereafter the case has been decided on merit apart from maintainability answering locus standi of the Union. We are aware of the scope of the writ court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is settled as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 477 wherein it paragraph 7 their Lordships have been pleased to hold as follows: "7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art.226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art.226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals, these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording .the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact is recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact is recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised." The proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra) still holds good since the same has been considered by Hon'ble Apex Court recently in the case of M/s. Pepsico India Holding Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 wherein their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of showing interference with the finding of the Tribunal has been pleased to hold after placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 as follows: "17. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of his Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a Court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. As the Learned Chief Justice then was, observed at p.1301 of the report as follows. (SCC p.864, para 7). "The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article. 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. (SCC p.864, para 7). "The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article. 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the .... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose v. Commr. of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case. It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority." The proposition laid down in the above case is that the award can only be interfered with if there is perversity in the finding of the award or error apparent on the face of record but we, after going through the award, have found that the finding has been given after discussing the materials available on record and taking into consideration the statutory provision as discussed by us. In view thereof, we find no reason to interfere with the same. 15. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. Petition dismissed.