JUDGMENT : K.S. Jhaveri, J. 1. Both these appeals are filed against the judgment and order dated 2.2.2012 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 8, Ahmedabad City, in Sessions Case Nos. 33 and 151 of 2011, whereby accused No. 1 was convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, "IPC") and ordered to undergo imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 100/- and, in default of payment of fine, further simple imprisonment of fifteen days was awarded. However, accused No. 2 was acquitted from the charge of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 114 of IPC. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment, accused No. 1 has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 518 of 2012, while Criminal Appeal No. 588 of 2012 is preferred by the State against acquittal of accused No. 2. 2. The case of the prosecution is that accused No. 1 is the wife of the deceased and they were residing together since last seven years. It is alleged that accused No. 1 was having illicit relation with accused No. 2 and the deceased had become a hurdle in their relationship, therefore, both the accused have decided to remove him from their way. On 2.8.2010, as per the guidance of accused No. 2, accused No. 1 had given poisonous tablets, therefore, he became unconscious and thereafter he was given electric shock and thereafter he was strangulated by her. Accordingly, the accused killed the deceased. With these allegations, a complaint was lodged against the accused with police. 2.1 Upon filing of the complaint, investigation was carried out and the accused were arrested and charge-sheet was submitted in the Court of learned Magistrate. However, as the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the same was committed to Sessions Court. Thereafter, charge was framed against the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.2 During the trial, the prosecution has examined following witnesses:- S. No. Name Exhibit No. 1. Pravinbhai Khemchandbhai Panchal 13 2. Dr. Bhairavi Balvant Pandey 17 3. Bhagvansinh Prabhatsinh Gohil 21 4. Bharatbhai Budhabhai Bhoi 24 5. Mohsinkhan Aslamkhan Pathan 25 6. Vijaykumar Nirmalchandra Nandi 26 7. Lilachandbhai Mechharam Panchal 28 8. Sanjaylal Mani Mishra 30 9. Umang Dineshbhai Panchal 31 10. Ashaben Chetankumar Panchal 32 11. Dineshbhai Rameshbhai Panchal 12. Nanubhai Pathubha Jadeja 35 13. Pravinbhai Khemchandbhai Panchal 13 2. Dr. Bhairavi Balvant Pandey 17 3. Bhagvansinh Prabhatsinh Gohil 21 4. Bharatbhai Budhabhai Bhoi 24 5. Mohsinkhan Aslamkhan Pathan 25 6. Vijaykumar Nirmalchandra Nandi 26 7. Lilachandbhai Mechharam Panchal 28 8. Sanjaylal Mani Mishra 30 9. Umang Dineshbhai Panchal 31 10. Ashaben Chetankumar Panchal 32 11. Dineshbhai Rameshbhai Panchal 12. Nanubhai Pathubha Jadeja 35 13. Premsing Durjansinh Rajput 36 14. Amrutlal Vashrambhai Higrajiya 41 15. Narendrasinh Jagdishsing Zala 44 16. Jagdishbhai Mulchanddas Solanki 56 2.3 The prosecution has also produced and relied upon following documentary evidence:- S. No. Description Exhibit No. 1. Inquest panchnama 14 2. Panchnama of the clothes of deceased. 15 3. Postmortem report. 18 4 Death certificate. 19 5. Panchnama of clothes of the accused. 22 6 Panchnama of the work of dog squad. 24 7 Panchnama regarding demonstration. 27 8 Complaint of the complainant. 29 9 Photographs of the deceased. 38 10 CD of the place of offence. 39 11 Photographs. 40 12 Yadi written to FSL officer and his report. 42 13 Yadi written to FSL officer and his report. 43 14 Report under Section 157. 45 15 Panchnama of the place of offence. 46 16 FSL dispatch note. 47 17 Receipt of FSL. 48 18 Receipt of FSL. 49 19 Receipt of FSL. 50 20 Forwarding letter of FSL. 51 21 Opinion of FSL. 52 22 Forwarding letter of FSL. 53 23 Opinion of FSL. 54 24 Papers regarding treatment of accused of Civil Hospital. 55 2.4 At the end of trial, the Court below recorded further statements of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and thereafter, passed the impugned judgment and order awarding the sentence to accused No. 1 and acquitting accused No. 2, as aforesaid. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment of the trial Court, present appeals are preferred before this Court. 3. Mr. Hardik Dave, learned advocate appearing for the appellant of Criminal Appeal No. 518 of 2012, original accused No. 1, has taken us through the evidence on record and submitted that the impugned judgment and order is against the evidence on record. He submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused. He submitted that from the evidence of son and relatives of the deceased, prosecution has not been able to prove its case against accused No. 1. He submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused. He submitted that from the evidence of son and relatives of the deceased, prosecution has not been able to prove its case against accused No. 1. He further submitted that the case is based purely on presumptions and benefit of doubt is required to be granted to accused No. 1. He further submitted that even considering the medical evidence, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against accused No. 1. He further submitted that there is nothing on record to prove that accused No. 1 had purchased poison and it was given to the deceased by her. He further submitted that cause of death of the deceased is asphyxia due to ligature strangulation, therefore, the allegation of accused No. 1 giving the deceased poisonous tablets is not proved. He further submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove that accused No. 1 has strangulated the deceased. In view of these submissions, he prayed that Criminal Appeal No. 518 of 2012 maybe allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Pranav Trivedi, learned APP appearing for the State has submitted that the order of conviction recorded against accused No. 1 is just and proper and he has supported the conviction recorded by impugned judgment. He submitted that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and convicted accused No. 1. He has taken us through the evidence of minor son of the deceased and submitted that through his evidence, the prosecution has been able to prove its case against accused No. 1. He has also taken us through the evidence of Nanubha Pathubha Jadeja, PW-12, who has deposed that even the dog of the Dog squad pointed towards accused No. 1. This witness also identified accused No. 1 before the Court. He further submitted that, in the present case, accused is the wife of the deceased and since the offence took place in their house, and since the accused does not offer any explanation how her husband, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that accused No. 1 is responsible for commission of the crime. He further submitted that, in the present case, accused is the wife of the deceased and since the offence took place in their house, and since the accused does not offer any explanation how her husband, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that accused No. 1 is responsible for commission of the crime. He also submitted that the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of death of the deceased, which is not given by her. He also submitted that the complainant and other witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution, therefore, the trial Court has not committed any error in convicting accused No. 1. In view of these, he has submitted that accused No. 1 is rightly convicted and Criminal Appeal No. 518 of 2012 filed by accused No. 1 may be dismissed. 5. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 588 of 2012 is concerned, Mr. Pranav Trivedi, learned APP has taken us through the evidence and contended that the trial Court has committed an error in acquitting accused No. 2 inspite of voluminous evidence against him. He submitted that accused No. 2 was having illicit relation with accused No. 1 and since the deceased was husband of accused No. 1 and he was an obstruction in their relationship, both of them have killed him. He further contended that though the prosecution has examined 16 witnesses and also produced 24 documents in support of its case, the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated them and acquitted accused No. 2 of the charges levelled against him. He submitted that the prosecution has successfully proved its case against accused No. 2. He submitted that, in view of the statement of the complainant, it is clear that when he reached the place of incident, accused No. 1 did not given any reply but son of the deceased, viz., Umang told that accused No. 2 had come at night. This witness has also supported the case of the prosecution that accused No. 1 was having illicit relation with accused No. 2. He further submitted that Umang, minor son of the deceased, PW-9, has also given name of accused No. 2 and stated that accused Nos. 1, 2 and one Jayantibhai have committed the murder of his father. This witness has also supported the case of the prosecution that accused No. 1 was having illicit relation with accused No. 2. He further submitted that Umang, minor son of the deceased, PW-9, has also given name of accused No. 2 and stated that accused Nos. 1, 2 and one Jayantibhai have committed the murder of his father. He also submitted that the learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence on record in its proper perspective, therefore, the impugned judgment is required to be quashed and set aside by allowing present appeal. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Umang Oza, learned advocate for the respondent-accused No. 2 has contended that the trial Court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and acquitted the accused from the charges levelled against him. He submitted that so far as acquittal appeals are concerned, the law is well settled that where two views are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below. By taking us through the impugned judgment, he submitted that this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment and Criminal Appeal No. 588 of 2012 may be dismissed. 7. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 518 of 2012 is concerned, we have heard Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the appellant-accused No. 1 and Mr. Pranav Trivedi, learned APP appearing for the State. We have also gone through the impugned judgment and the evidence on record. From the medical evidence, it is clear that the deceased died due to asphyxia because of ligature strangulation. From column No. 17 of the postmortem report, it is clear that there was a ligature mark over upper part of neck. We have also gone through the deposition of PW-9 and PW-10, who are son and sister of the deceased. PW-9, Umang Dineshbhai Panchal, aged 7 years, has deposed that accused No. 1 has strangulated the deceased. PW-10, Ashaben Chetankumar Panchal, sister of the deceased has deposed that accused No. 1 told her that since there was pain in the stomach of the deceased, she had given soda to him. She further deposed that accused No. 1 and accused No. 2 had killed the deceased. Lilachandbhai Masarambhai Panchal, PW-7, Exh. 28 has deposed that when he reached the place of incident, accused No. 1 did not give him proper reply. She further deposed that accused No. 1 and accused No. 2 had killed the deceased. Lilachandbhai Masarambhai Panchal, PW-7, Exh. 28 has deposed that when he reached the place of incident, accused No. 1 did not give him proper reply. From the evidence of Nanubha Pathubha Jadeja, PW-12, it is clear that even the dog of the Dog squad pointed towards accused No. 1. Not only that accused No. 1 has not produced any evidence on record to counter the allegations levelled against her. Accused No. 1 has not tendered any explanation as to how and in which manner the incident has happened. Accused No. 1 has failed to tender any explanation to prove that she was innocent and she was not involved in the offence. In view of all these circumstances of the case, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681 , wherein it is observed as under:- "16. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye-witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. [State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 (para 27); Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 731 (para 15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. (1995) 3 SCC 574 (para 4)]. 17. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 (para 27); Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 731 (para 15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. (1995) 3 SCC 574 (para 4)]. 17. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes placed in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 2077 it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with 'khokhri' and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra (1992) 3 SCC 106 the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation were held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. In State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time. The letters written by the wife to her relatives showed that the husband ill-treated her and their relations were strained and further the evidence showed that both of them were in one room in the night. It was held that the chain of circumstances was complete and it was the husband who committed the murder of his wife by strangulation and accordingly this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused and convicted him under Section 302 IPC. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 the wife was found dead in a hut which had caught fire. The evidence showed that the accused and his wife were seen together in the hut at about 9.00 p.m. and the accused came out in the morning through the roof when the hut had caught fire. His explanation was that it was a case of accidental fire which resulted in the death of his wife and a daughter. The medical evidence showed that the wife died due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account of burn injuries. It was held that there cannot be any hesitation to come to the conclusion that it was the accused (husband) who was the perpetrator of the crime." 8. In the present case also, from the evidence of prosecution witnesses it is clear that accused No. 1 was having illicit relationship with accused No. 2 and the deceased was an obstruction in their relationship. When the death had occurred in the house, accused No. 1 is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of death. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation were held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of her husband. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation were held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of her husband. In view of these, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against accused No. 1 and it cannot give rise to any other conclusion except that accused No. 1 is guilty of the offence. Therefore, in our view, the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused and the trial Court has not committed any error in convicting accused No. 1 for the offences alleged against her. Therefore, Criminal Appeal No. 518 of 2012 is required to be dismissed. 9. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 588 of 2012 is concerned, we have heard Mr. Pranav Trivedi, learned APP for the appellant-State and Mr. Umang Oza, learned advocate for the respondent-accused No. 2. We have also gone through the evidence on record. Looking to the fact that the charge against the respondent-accused No. 2 is for the offences punishable under Section 302 of IPC, the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Though it is alleged that accused No. 2 was having illicit relation with accused No. 1, no proof could be produce in this regard. The prosecution also could not prove that accused No. 2 was present at the scene of offence along with accused No. 1 at the time of commission of offence. Not only that in the cross-examination of PW-9, Umang Dineshbhai Panchal, minor son of the deceased, it is clearly stated that when his statement was recorded by police, he was assisted by his grand father and grand mother. It is also deposed by him that when he came to depose before the Court, his grandfather had indicated towards accused No. 2 and thereafter accused No. 2 was identified by this witness. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove that accused No. 2 has abetted in commission of the offence. While passing the impugned judgment, learned Sessions Judge has given categorical finding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against accused No. 2. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove that accused No. 2 has abetted in commission of the offence. While passing the impugned judgment, learned Sessions Judge has given categorical finding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against accused No. 2. In our view, learned trial Judge has not committed any error while acquitting accused No. 2 of the charges levelled against him. It cannot be said that the learned Judge has committed any error while acquitting the accused as the prosecution could not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 10. Moreover, it is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under:- "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 10.1 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles:- "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 10.2 Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 10.3 Even in the case of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran & Another, (2007) 3 SCC 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under: "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 10.4 Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors, 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. State of MP reported in 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 10.5 In the case of Luna Ram v. Bhupat Singh and Ors, (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in paras-10 and 11 has held as under: "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 10.6 Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookkiah and Anr. v. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. v. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 10.7 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 10.7 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, AIR 1981 SC 1417 , wherein it is held as under: "This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93 : AIR 1967 SC 1124 that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 10.8 Thus, in case the appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. 11. We have gone through the oral as well as documentary evidence on record and we are in agreement with the view taken by the lower Court. Moreover, learned APP is not in a position to show any evidence on record so as to take a contrary view in the matter or to conclude that the approach of the Court below is vitiated by some manifest illegality or that the decision is perverse or that the Court below has ignored material evidence while acquitting accused No. 2. Hence, we are of the considered opinion that the Court below has not committed any error in acquitting the respondent-accused No. 2 of the charge levelled against him. We are in complete agreement with the reasonings given by and the findings arrived at by the Court below in the impugned judgment and, therefore, find no reasons to entertain Criminal Appeal No. 588 of 2012. 12. For the foregoing reasons, both these Criminal Appeals are dismissed. The impugned common judgment and order dated 2.2.2012 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 8, Ahmedabad City, in Sessions Case Nos. 12. For the foregoing reasons, both these Criminal Appeals are dismissed. The impugned common judgment and order dated 2.2.2012 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 8, Ahmedabad City, in Sessions Case Nos. 33 and 151 of 2011, convicting accused No. 1-Ramilaben w/o. Dineshbhai Babubhai Panchal for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and acquitting accused No. 2 from the charges levelled against him is hereby confirmed. At this stage, Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the appellant-accused No. 1, Ramilaben w/o. Dineshbhai Babubhai Panchal, requested that the accused may be given benefit of remission after completion of requisite period. Therefore, it is observed that upon completion of 14 years' imprisonment, the State Government may consider the case of accused No. 1-Ramilaben w/o. Dineshbhai Babubhai Panchal for remission. The period of sentence already undergone by accused No. 1 be given set off to her. Bail bond, if any, of the accused stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the Court below forthwith.