Order : The solitary question, which falls for determination in the instant revision application, is as to whether the cognizance for the offence taken under section 498A/34 IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act can be allowed to be compounded under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) and the petitioners can be discharged ? 2. The details of the facts is not required to be reproduced here rather a brief statement of fact would suffice the matter. At the instance of the informant Reshma Nahid, Sindri P.S. Case no. 37 of 2013 was instituted for the offence under Section 498A/34 IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act on the allegation that on 04.11.2012, she was married with petitioner no. 1, Shahab Ahmed Khan @ Shabad Khan according to Muslim rites and custom and Rs. 1,95,000/- cash along with other articles were given as dowry. At the time of rukhshati, her husband and in-laws demanded a Honda City Car and she went to her matrimonial house but due to non-fulfillment of their demand, she was subjected to physical and mental torture. On 08.11.2012, when she was going to Sindri i.e. her father’s house along with her husband, she was threatened by her in-laws and husband to bring the aforesaid vehicle from her father, otherwise she would not be allowed to enter into her matrimonial house. When on 26.11.2012, she returned to her matrimonial house, she was again subjected to physical and mental torture and on 06.01.2013, her Stridhan and ornaments worth Rs. 4,00,000/- were snatched by her in-laws and they took her signature on blank paper and dropped her again to Sindri and they fled away. Her father tried to intervene into the matter but it all went in vain. 3. It appears from the record that the court of Judicial Magistrate after examining the complainant and other witnesses, took cognizance of the offence. At the time of framing of charge, the accused petitioners filed a petition for their discharge but the same was rejected by the court below vide order dated 08.12.2014. Whereafter the petitioner preferred this revision. 4. During pendency of this revision application, an interlocutory application bearing no. At the time of framing of charge, the accused petitioners filed a petition for their discharge but the same was rejected by the court below vide order dated 08.12.2014. Whereafter the petitioner preferred this revision. 4. During pendency of this revision application, an interlocutory application bearing no. 3272 of 2016 was filed by way of joint compromise petition by the informant-opposite party with a prayer that now the parties have settled their dispute with the intervention of the well-wishers and relatives and the informant has now no grievance against the petitioners and cordial relationship has been restored between them. It is also stated that they have settled their disputes amicably without any coercion and threatening and the statement has been made by both the parties on two different affidavits. 5. Mr. Tiwari learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that since both the parties have settled their dispute outside the Court and have filed a joint compromise petition, in view of the ratio decided in B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another; (2003) 4 SCC 675 and Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another; (2012) 10 SCC 303 , the parties may be allowed to compound the offence. It was also submitted that in the changed circumstances, if the proceeding in the trial court is allowed to continue, in such eventuality, there would be almost no chance of conviction and it would be a sheer wastage of the court’s valuable time. 6. Learned counsel Mr. Ahmad representing the opposite party no. 2 also fairly submitted that the parties have settled their disputes and have filed a joint compromise petition, so in the interest of justice and to save the family, parties be allowed to compound the offence. 7. After the above submissions of the counsels, opposite party no.2 was directed to be physically present in Court and in pursuance to that, the complainant/opposite party no.2 appeared before the Court and on enquiry, she admitted the factum of compromise and also informed the Court that now she has no grievance against the petitioners, her husband or any other accused. 8. In B.S. Joshi & Ors.(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering a similar situation arising out of a case instituted under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code held in paragraph-14 as follows:- “14. 8. In B.S. Joshi & Ors.(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering a similar situation arising out of a case instituted under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code held in paragraph-14 as follows:- “14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counterproductive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian Penal Code.” Section 320 of the Code sets out the details of offences in different tables, which are compoundable by the parties and those, which are compoundable with the leave of the court. It is no doubt that Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is not included in the above list of Section 320 of the Code but in view of the ratio decided in the above B.S. Joshi (supra), it becomes the duty of the court to encourage the genuine settlement of matrimonial disputes. In another case Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 51 held as follows:- “51. Section 320 of the Code articulates public policy with regard to the compounding of offences. It catalogues the offences punishable under IPC which may be compounded by the parties without permission of the court and the composition of certain offences with the permission of the court. The offences punishable under the special statues are not covered by Section 320. When an offence is compoundable under Section 320, abatement of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence or where the accused is liable under Section 34 or 149 IPC can also be compounded in the same manner. The offences punishable under the special statues are not covered by Section 320. When an offence is compoundable under Section 320, abatement of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence or where the accused is liable under Section 34 or 149 IPC can also be compounded in the same manner. A person who is under 18 years of age or is an idiot or a lunatic is not competent to contract compounding of offence but the same can be done on his behalf with the permission of the court. If a person is otherwise competent to compound an offence is dead, his legal representatives may also compound the offence with the permission of the court. Where the accused has been committed for trial or he has been convicted and the appeal is pending, composition can only be done with the leave of the court to which he has been committed or with the leave of the appeal court, as the case may be. The Revisional Court is also competent to allow any person to compound any offence who is competent to compound. The consequence of the composition of an offence is acquittal of the accused. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 mandates that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section. Obviously, in view thereof the composition of an offence has to be in accord with Section 320 and in no other manner.” 9. In the above referred cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has allowed the parties to compound the offences deciding the ratio that when the parties have settled all the disputes between them amicably irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court within the frame work of its inherent power has every jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding and the F.I.R. The opposite party no. 2 has clearly averred in the joint compromise petition that two demand drafts of Rs. 1,30,000/- and Rs. 1,40,000/- have been handed over to her and she has now no grievance against these petitioners and she does not want to continue with the proceeding of this case. Thus, in the facts and circumstances, the parties are allowed to compound the offences. 10. 1,30,000/- and Rs. 1,40,000/- have been handed over to her and she has now no grievance against these petitioners and she does not want to continue with the proceeding of this case. Thus, in the facts and circumstances, the parties are allowed to compound the offences. 10. Hence, in the light of the ratio decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the entire criminal proceeding including the order impugned dated 08.12.2014 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad in Sindri P.S. Case No.-37 of 2013 corresponding to G. R. No. 1993 of 2013 are, hereby, set aside. 11. Accordingly, this Criminal Revision is, hereby, allowed. Revision allowed.