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2016 DIGILAW 973 (GAU)

DIPU DAS, Son of Shri. Dipak Das v. GUWAHATI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

2016-11-03

A.K.GOSWAMI

body2016
JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. S. Kataki, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. Bora, learned standing counsel, Gauhati Municipal Corporation, appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and 2. None has entered appearance on behalf of the respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5. 2. Notices on respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 were deemed to have been served by an order dated 31.08.2016. 3. The petitioner was settled with Parking Slot No.53, viz. H.B. Road (from Baptist Church to Dr. J.C. Das Road Junction) (Baptist Church side) (Angular Parking) of the Gauhati Municipal Corporation (for short, “Corporation”) and his term expired on 31.03.2016. On 08.04.2016, the Commissioner of the Corporation issued an order extending the lease of Parking Slot No.53, for a period of 3(three) months with effect from 01.04.2016 to 30.06.2016. Relevant portion of the said order reads as follows:- “In pursuance of decision taken by the Mayor-in-Council in its meeting held on 31.03.2016 the lease of Parking Slot No.53 viz. H.B. Road (From Baptist Church to Dr. J.C. Das Road junction) (Baptist Church side) (Angular Parking) has been extended for 3(three) months (w.e.f. 01.04.2016 to 30.06.2016). Subject deposit of sum of amounting to Rs.1,51,251/- (Rupees one lakh fifty one thousand two hundred fifty one) only.” 4. The petitioner had deposited an amount of Rs.1,51,251/- vide cheque No.373160 dated 31.03.2016. The cheque in question was dishonoured on account of insufficiency of fund in the account of the petitioner. On coming to know about the dishonour of the cheque, the petitioner deposited the aforesaid amount by cash vide money receipt No.4120 dated 18.05.2016. All the while the petitioner was allowed to continue with the lease of Parking Slot No.53 and the petitioner completed his extended term up to 30.06.2016. 5. A Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) dated 26.04.2016, in the meantime, was issued for leasing out/settling various Parking Slots including Slot Nos.51, 53, 54, 56 and 57 for a period of 9(nine) months with effect from 01.07.2016 to 31.03.2017. The petitioner submitted his separate tenders for the aforesaid 5(five) Slots. The petitioner had emerged highest tenderer in respect of all the aforesaid 5(five) Slots. However, settlement was offered to respondent No.3 for Parking Slot Nos.51 and 56, to respondent No.4 for Parking Slot No.53 and to respondent No.5 for Parking Slot No.54. 2(two) settlement orders were issued in favour of the respondent No.3, both dated 01.07.2016. The petitioner had emerged highest tenderer in respect of all the aforesaid 5(five) Slots. However, settlement was offered to respondent No.3 for Parking Slot Nos.51 and 56, to respondent No.4 for Parking Slot No.53 and to respondent No.5 for Parking Slot No.54. 2(two) settlement orders were issued in favour of the respondent No.3, both dated 01.07.2016. While settlement order in respect of the respondent No.4 was also issued on 01.07.2016, settlement order in favour of the respondent No.5 was issued on 04.07.2016. 6. It is stated by the petitioner that by making enquiries he reliably came to learn that his tenders in respect of Slot Nos.51, 53, 54 and 56 were rejected because of dishonour of the cheque. It is to be mentioned at this juncture that the petitioner was settled with Parking Slot No.57 by an order passed on 16.08.2016. 7. An affidavit is filed by the respondent Corporation stating that the petitioner was a defaulter to the tune of Rs.1,51,251/-. It is further stated that the petitioner deposited the aforesaid amount of Rs.1,51,251/- on 18.05.2016 after the Tender Committee had evaluated the tenders on 06.05.2016. With regard to Parking Slot No.57, it is averred that, inadvertently, settlement was offered to the petitioner, although he was a defaulter. 8. Mr. Bora has also produced the relevant records. In the Comparative Statements, there are endorsements to the effect that as the cheque for Rs.1,51,251/- was returned by the Bank with the reason “fund insufficient”, the highest tenderer, i.e. the petitioner, is a defaulter. 9. Mr. Kataki has submitted that the petitioner was allowed to continue with the operation of the Parking Slot for which extension was granted on 08.04.2016 despite the authorities coming to know that the cheque had bounced. The petitioner himself had paid the aforesaid amount on coming to learn that the cheque issued by him was dishonoured. It is also contended by him that merely because the cheque had bounced, the petitioner cannot be branded as a defaulter as it has got serious consequences. In the attending facts and circumstances, Mr. Kataki submits that the respondents acted illegally and arbitrarily in rejecting the highest tenders of the petitioner on an entirely untenable ground and, therefore, the settlements made in favour of the private respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 are liable to be set aside and quashed. 10. Mr. In the attending facts and circumstances, Mr. Kataki submits that the respondents acted illegally and arbitrarily in rejecting the highest tenders of the petitioner on an entirely untenable ground and, therefore, the settlements made in favour of the private respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 are liable to be set aside and quashed. 10. Mr. Bora, on the other hand, in tune with the stand taken in the affidavit, has submitted that the petitioner made good the amount of Rs.1,51,251/- after the Comparative Statements were prepared and, therefore, even if the petitioner had paid the said amount, his tenders merited rejection and, therefore, no illegality was committed by the Corporation in issuing the orders of settlements in favour of the respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5. 11. Now the question that has arisen for consideration of the Court is as to whether on the facts as alluded hereinbefore, the petitioner can be construed to be a defaulter. 12. Compact Oxford Reference Dictionary defines “default” as “(i) failure to fulfil an obligation, especially to repay a loan, (ii) a pre-selected option adopted by a computer programme or other mechanism when no alternative is specified.” The word “defaulter” is a derivative of the word “default”. 13. A defaulter is one who has defaulted and the term “defaulter” is generally used when there is omission or failure to perform a legal or contractual obligation. In the context of default in connection with payment, say, payment of rent or payment of instalment in connection with a loan taken, it is failure to pay some due. In the aforesaid context, when the payment became due assumes crucial significance. Only when a person does not make payment when such payment falls due or when such payment is not paid when required to be paid by a certain date, such a person may be treated as a defaulter. At times, concept of defaulter may be intrinsically connected with the concept of demand. Therefore, the term “defaulter” may also be interlinked with the terms and conditions of payment. 14. A perusal of the order dated 08.04.2016 goes to show that before issuance of the said order, there must have been some informal understanding that the petitioner would be allowed to continue with the lease of the Parking Slot No.53 because the extension is issued with retrospective effect from 01.04.2016. 14. A perusal of the order dated 08.04.2016 goes to show that before issuance of the said order, there must have been some informal understanding that the petitioner would be allowed to continue with the lease of the Parking Slot No.53 because the extension is issued with retrospective effect from 01.04.2016. If there was no understanding before hand, there would have been no occasion for the petitioner to have issued a cheque for an amount of Rs.1,51,251/- on 31.03.2016. What cannot be glossed over is that even without actual deposit of the amount, the petitioner was allowed to continue with effect from 01.04.2016. Not only that, he was allowed to continue till expiry of the extended period, which was 30.06.2016. Therefore, the expression as appearing in the said order to the effect “Subject deposit of sum of amounting to Rs.1,51,251/- (Rupees one lakh fifty one thousand two hundred fifty one) only” in this circumstance, cannot be construed to mean that the extension was contingent upon payment of Rs.1,51,251/-. Rather, it will be more appropriate to hold that the extension was subject to the petitioner making the payment with no stipulation with regard to any specific date of payment. It is also to be borne in mind that no notice was given to the petitioner to pay the amount of Rs.1,51,251/-. At the most, if the payment of Rs.1,51,251/- was not paid till 30.06.2016, i.e. the last day of extended period of settlement, the petitioner may have been treated as a defaulter. 15. In the instant case, though in respect of all the Parking Slots in question, the petitioner was the highest tenderer, solely on the ground that the cheque had been dishonoured, the petitioner was construed to be a defaulter. As noted earlier, order dated 08.04.2016 cannot be understood to mean that the petitioner was required to pay the amount on a particular fixed date and, therefore, the question of default, in any case, should not have arisen before expiry of 30.06.2016. Dishonour of a cheque on one occasion, without anything more, does not make an individual a defaulter. 16. Viewed in that context, the reasoning given for rejection of the tenders of the petitioner cannot be sustained in law. The impugned settlement orders are interfered with. Accordingly, the impugned orders of settlement are set aside and quashed. 17. Dishonour of a cheque on one occasion, without anything more, does not make an individual a defaulter. 16. Viewed in that context, the reasoning given for rejection of the tenders of the petitioner cannot be sustained in law. The impugned settlement orders are interfered with. Accordingly, the impugned orders of settlement are set aside and quashed. 17. Notwithstanding setting aside of the impugned orders of settlement, the respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5 will be permitted to continue to operate the Parking Slots in question till 10.11.2016. Beyond that date, they shall not be allowed to operate. This order is passed so as not to cause any loss to the Corporation during the intervening period till settlement orders are made. The Corporation may pass appropriate orders with regard to settlement of the aforesaid Parking Slots consistent with the observations made hereinabove. 18. With the above observations and directions, the writ petition stands allowed. No cost.