JUDGMENT : A.K. RATH, J. 1. This petition challenges the judgment dated 17.8.2016 passed by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Berhampur, Ganjam in F.A.O. No. 8 of 2016. By the said judgment, the learned lower appellate court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order dated 11.3.2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Berhampur, Ganjam in I.A. No. 16 of 2016, whereby and whereunder, application of the petitioner under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. for temporary injunction was rejected. 2. The petitioner as plaintiff instituted C.S. No. 31 of 2016 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Berhampur, Ganjam seeking the following reliefs:- “(a) Restraining the Defendants to demolish the structures and making any construction over the Suit Schedule-B property either by themselves or through their agents, representatives etc. (b) Directing the Defendants to fill up the holes and remove the temporary structures over the Suit Schedule-B property. (c) Restraining the Defendants to transfer, mortgage and alienate the Suit Schedule-B property in favour of any person or persons. (d) Directing the Defendants to make payment of Rs.4,00,000/- towards damage caused to the Suit Schedule-A property. (e) Further and other relief/reliefs as the Hon’ble Court thinks just and proper during circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.” 3. The case of the petitioner is that one Hari Krushna Padhi had vast landed property. He died leaving behind his widow Ketuka and three daughters, namely, Kanaka, Anusaya-petitioner and Sarojini. After death of Hari Krushna, there was a partition of the properties between his widow and three daughters and the deed was registered. In the said partition, the house and house site described in the schedule-A fell to the share of the petitioner. The same was mutated in her name. Similarly, the land fell to the share of Kanaka and Sarojini and Ketuka were also mutated. The house allotted to the share of Ketuka and her three daughters was a single storied building. The suit house described in the schedule-B fell to the share of Ketuka. Ketuka died in February, 1997. The schedule-B property devolved upon her daughters. In the second week of January, 2016, opposite parties 1 and 2 came to the schedule-A and B suit site with men and machinery to demolish the schedule-B property and cut the common concrete roof. 4. Ketuka died in February, 1997. The schedule-B property devolved upon her daughters. In the second week of January, 2016, opposite parties 1 and 2 came to the schedule-A and B suit site with men and machinery to demolish the schedule-B property and cut the common concrete roof. 4. During pendency of the suit, the petitioner filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 C.P.C. for temporary injunction restraining the opposite parties from demolishing the existing structure standing over the schedule-B land and damaging the schedule-A land till disposal of the suit. 5. Pursuant to issuance of notice, opposite party No. 2 entered appearance and filed a counter affidavit admitting therein that Hari Krushna constructed the suit house. He also admitted the partition of the house left by Hari Krushna between his widow and three daughters by means of a registered partition deed No. 3686 dated 17.12.1973. In the said partition, the petitioner got the northern portion of the house. To her south, Sarojini got her share and to the south of Sarojini, Kanaka got her share. Ketuka got her share in the southern end of house and house site left by Hari Krushna. It is further stated that he was looking after Hari Krushna and then Ketuka. Out of her love and affection towards him, Ketuka gifted some of her property to him through registered gift deed No. 3044 of 1974. Ketuka bequeathed some other property in his favour by executing a registered Will bearing No. 79 of 1974. After death of Ketuka, he is in possession of the schedule-B suit property as its owner. The petitioner has no right, title and interest over the same, nor she is in possession of the schedule-B property. He, his mother Kanaka, the children of Sarojini and one Brundaban Padhi decided to construct a multi-storied apartment over their land. Towards the south of the schedule-B suit property, the land of Brundaban situates. All of them requested opposite party No. 1 to construct an apartment over their land. Thereafter he executed a development agreement No. 622 of 2014 in respect of the schedule-B suit property in favour of opposite party No. 1. Similarly, his mother has also executed another development agreement No. 623 of 2014 in favour of opposite party No. 1. The children of Sarojini have executed a development agreement No. 185 of 2014 in favour of opposite party No. 1. Similarly, his mother has also executed another development agreement No. 623 of 2014 in favour of opposite party No. 1. The children of Sarojini have executed a development agreement No. 185 of 2014 in favour of opposite party No. 1. After obtaining necessary sanction from Berhampur Development Authority, opposite party No. 1 demolished the structure standing over schedule-B suit property. He has taken care to prevent any damage to schedule-A suit property. In the process, opposite party No. 1 has already invested crores of rupees in their project. Thus the petitioner has no prima facie case, the balance of convenience does not tilt in favour of the petitioner and she will not sustain irreparable loss and injury, in the event the application is dismissed. 6. The defence of opposite party No. 1 is almost identical to that of opposite party No. 2. It is stated that to execute his project, he has already spent rupees two crores by giving security deposit to opposite party No. 2 and others, who have executed development agreement with him and towards process fee to the Berhampur Development Authority and Berhampur Municipal Corporation. As per the terms of the development agreement, he is required to construct and deliver the completed flats to his claimants within 36 months. If injunction is granted, he will sustain irreparable loss. 7. The learned trial court came to hold that the petitioner has a prima facie case, but then the balance of convenience does not lie in favour of the petitioner and moreover, she will not suffer irreparable injury in the event injunction is refused. Relying on a decision of this Court in the case of M/s. Graftek Pvt. Ltd. vs. Sri Lord Lingaraj Mohaprabhu, 1998 (II) OLR 404, the learned trial court directed the opposite parties 1 and 2 to file an undertaking in shape of an affidavit that in the event they succeed in the suit, they will demolish that part of schedule-B property which may be allotted in the share of the petitioner and they will not claim any equity or compensation from the petitioner. Held so, the learned trial court dismissed the application on 11.3.2016. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the said order before the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Berhampur, Ganjam in F.A.O. No. 8 of 2016, which was eventually dismissed. 8. Heard Mr. B.K. Nayak, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Held so, the learned trial court dismissed the application on 11.3.2016. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the said order before the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Berhampur, Ganjam in F.A.O. No. 8 of 2016, which was eventually dismissed. 8. Heard Mr. B.K. Nayak, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. P.K. Rath, learned Advocate for opposite party No. 1. 9. The scope of interference with the order passed by the learned trial court under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited. 10. Dealing with the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution, the apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Sh. Jai Singh and Others, 2010 AIR SCW 5968 held thus:- “xxx xxx xxx Before we consider the factual and legal issues involved herein, we may notice certain well recognized principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly the High Court, under this Article, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with well established principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognized constraints. It cannot be exercised like a ‘bull in a china shop’, to correct all errors of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. The High Court cannot lightly or liberally act as an appellate court and re-appreciate the evidence. Generally, it cannot substitute its own conclusions for the conclusions reached by the courts below or the statutory/quasi-judicial tribunals. The High Court cannot lightly or liberally act as an appellate court and re-appreciate the evidence. Generally, it cannot substitute its own conclusions for the conclusions reached by the courts below or the statutory/quasi-judicial tribunals. The power to re-appreciate evidence would only be justified in rare and exceptional situations where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. The exercise of such discretionary power would depend on the peculiar facts of each case, with the sole objective of ensuring that there is no miscarriage of justice.” (Emphasis laid) 11. In Dalpat Kumar and another vs. Prahalad Singh and others, AIR 1993 SC 276 , the apex Court in paragraphs 4 and 5 held as follows:- “4. xxx xxx xxx Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court in exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court's interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. 5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that noninterference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.” 12. On the anvil of the decision cited supra, the case of the petitioner may be examined. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.” 12. On the anvil of the decision cited supra, the case of the petitioner may be examined. The admitted facts of the case are; (a) Hari Krushna Padhi was the owner of the house and the house site, (b) Hari Krushna died leaving behind his widow Ketuka and three daughters, (c) through a registered partition deed No. 3686 of 1973, Ketuka and her three daughters amicably divided the house site and house left by Hari Krushna and took their respective shares, (d) A-schedule house and house site lying to the north fell in the share of the petitioner, (e) to the south of the A-schedule, Sarojini got her share and to her south, Kanaka got her share of property and in the southern end, Ketuka got her share and Ketuka was the owner of the B-schedule suit property and she is already dead. 13. The petitioner asserts that after death of Ketuka, she, Kanaka and the children of Sarojini inherited the schedule-B suit property. She has 1/3rd interest over the same. The opposite parties assert that during the life time, Ketuka gifted some of her property to opposite party No. 2 by executing a registered gift deed No. 3044 of 1974. She bequeathed some of her other property in favour of opposite party No. 2 by means of a registered Will No. 79 of 1974. The petitioner disputes the genuineness of the registered gift deed and the registered Willnama of 1974 said to have been executed by Ketuka in favour of opposite party No. 2. Thus, the petitioner has a prima facie case. The courts held that the structure standing over schedule-B property has been demolished and the opposite parties constructed a multistoried apartment by investing an amount Rs.2,00,00,000/-. The same was done pursuant to development agreement entered into between the opposite party No. 1 and opposite party No. 2. In view of the same, the courts have rightly held that balance of convenience does not tilt in favour of the petitioner and she will not suffer irreparable loss and injury, in the event injunction is refused. 14. The same was done pursuant to development agreement entered into between the opposite party No. 1 and opposite party No. 2. In view of the same, the courts have rightly held that balance of convenience does not tilt in favour of the petitioner and she will not suffer irreparable loss and injury, in the event injunction is refused. 14. In Mandali Ranganna and others v. T. Ramachandra and others, AIR 2008 SC 2291 , the apex Court held that while considering an application for grant of injunction, the Court will not only take into consideration the basic elements in relation thereto, viz., existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, it must also take into consideration the conduct of the parties. It was further held that grant of injunction is an equitable relief. A person, who had kept quite for a long time and allowed another to deal with the properties exclusively, ordinarily would not be entitled to an order of injunction. The Court will not interfere only because the property is a very valuable one. It is not oblivious of the fact that grant or refusal of injunction has serious consequence depending upon the nature thereof. The Courts dealing with such matters must make all endeavours to protect the interest of the parties. For the said purpose, application of mind on the part of the Courts is imperative. Contentions raised by the parties must be determined objectively. Since construction had been made over the suit schedule property, the apex Court allowed the respondents to carry out the construction of the building and held that the same shall be subject to the ultimate decision of the suit. 15. On taking a holistic view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that no case is made out for interference. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. No costs.