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2016 DIGILAW 979 (CAL)

Popat & Kotecha Properties v. Swapan Kumar Sil

2016-12-07

SUBRATA TALUKDAR

body2016
JUDGMENT : Subrata Talukdar, J. In this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioners challenge the order impugned No. 63 dated 28th July, 2015 passed by the Ld. 5th Small Causes Court at Calcutta in Ejectment Suit No. 276 of 2006. The petitioners are the plaintiffs in the ejectment suit and, in the suit, pray for eviction of the sole defendant/the opposite party (for short OP) herein from the suit property being one room on the 3rd Floor of Premises No. 6, Moulana Shawkat Ali Street (formally Coolotala Street), Kolkata-700073 (also known as the suit property). 2. The case, according to the plaintiffs/petitioners, is as follows:- a. That by an agreement dated 1st April, 1989 the defendant/OP was inducted as a tenant in the suit property at a monthly rental of Rs. 540/- payable according to the English calendar month. The tenancy is a commercial tenancy and the rent became payable in advance within the 10th of the current month. b. According to the plaintiffs/petitioners the defendant/OP was also liable to pay the municipal charges, municipal surcharges, maintenance charges and property taxes as revised from time to time. With the coming into force of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (for short the 1997 Act), the rent became enhanced to Rs. 702/- from the month of May, 2001. On an around 7th February, 2003 the plaintiffs/petitioners issued a notice under Section 20 of the 1997 Act for enhancement of both the rent as well as the other charges. The plaintiffs claimed rent at Rs. 1050/- per month with effect from 1st April, 2003. c. On failure of the defendant/OP to pay the enhanced rate of Rs. 1050/- from April, 2003, the tenancy was determined under Section 6(4) of the 1997 Act by notice dated 19th May, 2006. Such notice was followed by filing of the said Ejectment Suit No. 276 of 2006. d. In the suit the defendant/OP entered appearance and filed applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the 1997 Act. The plaintiffs/petitioners filed their objections to the application under Section 7(2). The defendant/OP also applied before the Rent Controller (for short RC) under Section 21 of the 1997 Act for deposit of rent. e. The application of the defendant/OP under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act was decided by the Ld. Small Causes Court by order dated 3rd April, 2007. The plaintiffs/petitioners filed their objections to the application under Section 7(2). The defendant/OP also applied before the Rent Controller (for short RC) under Section 21 of the 1997 Act for deposit of rent. e. The application of the defendant/OP under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act was decided by the Ld. Small Causes Court by order dated 3rd April, 2007. In the meantime the application under Section 7(1) also filed by the defendant/OP was allowed by the Ld. Small Causes Court on 13th November, 2006 permitting the tenant to deposit the current rent and thereafter to continue to deposit such rent month by month. f. Challenging both the orders under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) passed by the Ld. Small Causes Court, the plaintiffs/petitioners filed CO 3880 of 2007 before this Hon’ble Court. By order dated 11th April, 2008 an Hon’ble Single Bench directed the Ld. Small Causes Court to consider afresh the stand taken by the plaintiffs that the tenant is liable to pay municipal taxes and other charges. The Hon’ble Single Bench held that such consideration should take place after giving an opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence. g. By the order impugned dated 28th July, 2015, the Ld. Small Causes Court was pleased to reconsider the application filed by the defendant/OP under Section 7(2) in compliance with the direction of the Hon’ble Single Bench dated 11th April, 2008. Upon such reconsideration the Hon’ble Single Bench was pleased to allow the said application under Section 7(2) and directed, inter alia, the defendant to continue paying the monthly rent and maintenance charges as already paid till March, 2003 and, such rate would also apply to the period of default claimed by the plaintiffs in the suit being April, 2003 to November, 2006. The Ld. Small Causes Court also directed the defendant/tenant to continue the deposit of the current rent at the above rate within the 15th of each succeeding month. h. Ms. Noelle Banerjee, Ld. Advocate led by Sri Sakya Sen, Ld. Counsel argues before this Court that the order of the Ld. Small Causes Court dated 28th July, 2015 is legally unsustainable. Ld. Counsel point out that the Ld. Trial Court ought to have taken a strict statutorily compliant view of the application filed by the defendant/tenant/OP under Section 21 of the 1997 Act. According to Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Counsel argues before this Court that the order of the Ld. Small Causes Court dated 28th July, 2015 is legally unsustainable. Ld. Counsel point out that the Ld. Trial Court ought to have taken a strict statutorily compliant view of the application filed by the defendant/tenant/OP under Section 21 of the 1997 Act. According to Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the sine qua non of an application under Section 21 is the tender of rent as provided under the law. The Ld. Trial Court utterly failed to take notice of the fact that the rent tendered between April, 2003 to October, 2006 was not in terms of the statute or, even in terms of the contract entered between the parties on the 1st of April, 1989. i. Ld. Counsel for the petitioners also argue that the Ld. Trial Court out to have taken judicial notice of the fact that both Sections 7(1) and 7(2) cannot be invoked together. According to the petitioners, the Ld. Trial Court erred in not deciding the increase in the rent which was required to be a part of the determination of rent provided under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act. The Ld. Trial Court also failed to consider that the charges and taxes payable under the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) Act, 1980 in respect of the suit property are required to be collected first by the plaintiffs/landlords from the defendant/OP/tenant prior to its payment to the Municipal Corporation. The Ld. Small Causes Court ought to have held that the plaintiffs/petitioners have produced sufficient documents for disclosure of the taxes and dues of the KMC. Similarly, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the requirement under the contract of tenancy for the plaintiffs to collect the surcharge payable under the KMC Act, 1980. j. Ld. Counsel for the petitioners further argue that the claim to enhanced rent is embodied under Sections 5(7) and 5(8) of the 1997 Act. In view of the above noted provisions, the failure of the defendant/OP to pay the enhanced rent, shall have the effect of determining the tenancy. Such determination of the tenancy also has its basis in the fact that the monthly rent was never tendered by the tenant/OP within the contractually fixed time period. k. Ld. In view of the above noted provisions, the failure of the defendant/OP to pay the enhanced rent, shall have the effect of determining the tenancy. Such determination of the tenancy also has its basis in the fact that the monthly rent was never tendered by the tenant/OP within the contractually fixed time period. k. Ld. Counsel for the petitioners further point out that due to the non-availability of RC during the period in issue, the plaintiffs correctly approached the Civil Court, being the Ld. Small Causes Court, already in seisin of the matter to consider the effect of non-tender of the enhanced rent by the tenant/OP. It is the duty of the tenant/OP to comply with both his statutory and contractual obligations. Such statutory and contractual obligations include within their compass the payment of municipal, maintenance and connected taxes. l. Ld. Counsel for the plaintiffs also argues that the mere withdrawal of deposits tendered by the tenant/OP to the RC cannot be regarded as a waiver of the statutory and contractual rights of the plaintiffs. The burden to determine the proportionate liability under the Municipal Act lies with the OP/tenant himself and such liability can be determined under the provisions of the statutory municipal law. Such statutory municipal law does not contemplate any default on the part of the tenant/OP. 3. Arguing on behalf of the defendant/OP, Sri Sauradipta Banerjee, Ld. Counsel argues the following points:- i. That under Section 20 of 1997 Act it is, inter alia, provided for a notice of increase of rent. Sub-Sections 4A and 4B were added under Section 17 of the 1997 Act by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 2002 (for short the 2002 Amendment Act) to take retrospective effect from 10th July, 2001. The notice to increase the rent under Section 20 contemplates the situations and the rate of rent in respect of commercial tenancy as provided by Sections 17(4A) and 17 (4B) of the 1997 Act. ii. Relying on several judicial authorities in the matter of AVO Engineers (Pvt. Ltd.) vs. India Ice Aerated Water and Coal Storage Company Ltd. reported in 2006 (2) CHN 384 ; Punjab National Bank & Ors. vs. Gulab Chand Bhora & Anr. reported in 2008 (3) CHN 654 and Pallawi Resources Ltd. vs. Protos Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2010 SAR (Civil) 368, Ld. vs. Gulab Chand Bhora & Anr. reported in 2008 (3) CHN 654 and Pallawi Resources Ltd. vs. Protos Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2010 SAR (Civil) 368, Ld. Counsel for the tenant/OP argues that the notice to enhance the rent under Section 20 of the 1997 Act cannot automatically lead to an action for enforcement of such notice. Sri Banerjee points out that pursuant to the notice under Section 20, the tenant has the right to approach the RC for fixing the fair rent. No enforceable right to claim the enhanced rate and, on failure of the tenant to pay such enhanced rate, a suit for eviction can follow automatically. Sri Banerjee further argues that till the RC determines the fair rent upon service of a notice under Section 20, no mandate for increasing rent under Sections 4A and 4B of Section 17 can come into operation. iii. Referring to facts of the present case, Sri Banerjee submits that the plaintiffs/petitioners have proceeded on an erroneous premise of law. Such erroneous premise stems from the claim to eviction filed by the plaintiffs/petitioners on the basis of the enhanced rent in respect of which notice was given on behalf of the plaintiffs on the 7th of February, 2003. Such notice for enhanced rant was followed by a legal notice dated 9th May, 2006 for eviction on the ground that the tenant/OP is a defaulter. The Ejectment Suit No. 276 of 2006 E claims a decree for recovery of khas possession of the suit property on the platform of default in payment of enhanced rent by the tenant/OP beginning the month of April, 2003. iv. Sri Banerjee further submits that the plaintiffs/petitioners are not responsible for paying the municipal charges, taxes etc. since the plaintiffs are not the owners of the property. The plaintiffs/petitioners are merely the lessees for 99 years of the property inclusive of the suit property from the Official Trustees which is the Government of West Bengal. The municipal tax bills, charge etc. stand in the name of the Official Trustees and the amounts tendered to the municipality are so tendered by the lessees/petitioners/plaintiffs on behalf of the Official Trustees. The municipal tax bills, charge etc. stand in the name of the Official Trustees and the amounts tendered to the municipality are so tendered by the lessees/petitioners/plaintiffs on behalf of the Official Trustees. Sri Banerjee further points out that the Lease Deed between the petitioners/plaintiffs and the Government of West Bengal has not been produced in Court and, in the absence of such Lease Deed, it is not possible for the Court to come to a conclusion of the specific rights of the lessees to claim the proportionate municipal taxes. v. Sri Banerjee, further taking this Court to the contents of the claim dated 1st April, 1989, submits that the agreement specifically provides that the monthly rent of Rs. 540/- shall be inclusive of existing municipal rates and taxes. However, in the event of any enhancement in such rates or taxes in future the tenant shall pay his proportionate share which will be added to the rent for the time being paid by the tenant and, payable along with the rent within the stipulated contractual period. Also from the contractual agreement Sri Banerjee clarifies that the monthly rent does not include the municipal surcharge and such surcharge shall be payable to the landlords whenever demanded. Therefore, Sri Banerjee makes the point that since the landlords/plaintiffs were always in seisin of any increase in the municipal rates and taxes as well as under the contractual obligation to notify the surcharge to the tenant, any enhancement in such municipal rates and taxes as well as surcharge could only take place after putting the tenant to reasonable notice. Such reasonable notice does not contemplate a situation like in the present case when the plaintiffs proceed directly to an action for eviction on the basis of a default surmised through a notice under Section 20 of the 1997 Act. vi. Sri Banerjee makes the further point that the claim of the plaintiffs/petitioners that the defendant/OP has not deposited the rent in terms of the contract and also was required to make deposits in terms of Section 21 of the 1997 Act does not stand to much reason in view of the fact that the rent claimed to be in default beginning April, 2003 were all deposited before the RC and such rents have been withdrawn by the plaintiffs without demur from the RC. It is also on record and discussed by the Ld. It is also on record and discussed by the Ld. Small Causes Court in the order impugned dated 28th July, 2015 that receipts in respect of the deposits regularly tendered by the tenant/OP till March, 2003 were handed over by the plaintiffs/petitioners. Subsequently, on the failure of the plaintiffs/petitioners to accept the rent beginning April, 2003, such rent was re-tendered by way of a money order and thereafter deposited with the RC. 4. Having regard to the above noted facts, Sri Banerjee submits that there is no violation of the agreed mechanism between the parties for depositing the rent. Moreover, nowhere from the pleadings and evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs/petitioners it can be gathered that the point has been taken with regard to the delayed tendering of rent either in violation of the contract or, the statutory provision of Section 21. Sri Banerjee emphasizes that with regard to the payment of proportionate municipal taxes and charges it was necessary for the plaintiffs/petitioners to disclose the Lease Deed entered by and between them and the Official Trustees. 5. Having heard the parties and considering the materials placed, the findings of this Court can be sumned up as follows:- A. That Section 20 of the 1997 Act has been elaborately interpreted in the judgment referred to by Sri Banerjee. The interpretation is unequivocal that a notice under Section 20 is a notice of intention to increase rent. Such notice of intention to increase rent was admittedly communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendant/tenant on 7th of February, 2003. Both the Hon’ble Division Benches of this Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court have clarified, inter alia, that the determination of what would be the fair rent consequent to a notice under Section 20 lies in the realm of the RC. There is no mandate for automatic increase of rent without the landlords requiring to perfect the demand of such increase before any other authority -in this case under the statute before the RC. B. This Court further finds that having regard to the essence of the notice under Section 20, the plaintiffs/landlords were under the statutory requirement of perfecting their demand before the RC. Without perfecting such demand before the RC and giving an opportunity to object to any unilateral raise in the rent, no legal notice of eviction could be issued against the defendant/OP/tenant. Without perfecting such demand before the RC and giving an opportunity to object to any unilateral raise in the rent, no legal notice of eviction could be issued against the defendant/OP/tenant. Accordingly, this Court, prima facie, finds that the notice of eviction dated 19th May, 2006 without the fair rent being determined by the RC lacks legal mandate. C. In view of the legal untenability of the action for eviction pursuant to the notice under Section 20, this Court also finds that the suit for eviction with the relief of recovery of khas possession is founded on an erroneous premise, viz. that such suit can automatically follow a notice under Section 20. As demonstrated through a reading of the judgments on the point of the requirement to perfect the demand for increase in rent under Section 20, the scope of initiating an action for eviction is different under Section 20 compared to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the postulates of the action for eviction as embodied in Ejectment Suit No. 276 of 2006 are strictly not in accordance with the applicable statute, viz. the 1997 Act. D. This Court is of the further view that there is no contradiction between Sections 7(2) and Section 21 of the 1997 Act. The scope of the legal steps required to be taken under Section 7(2) follow the umbrella provision of Section 7(1) of the 1997 Act. Under Section 7(2) the tenant is required to deposit with the Civil Judge the admitted amount of rent together with an application for determination of the rent payable. The consequences of failure of the tenant to deposit the rent under Section 7(2) shall mean that the defence of the tenant against delivery possession be struck out. On the contrary, the requirement of Section 21 of the 1997 Act follows Section 20, i.e. the notice of increase of rent. Steps under Section 21 are required to be taken by the tenant before the RC whereas the application and its further adjudication under Section 7(2) lies within the domain of the Civil Court. Upon deposit of the rent as determined under Section 21 by the tenant, the landlords has the authority to apply for withdrawal of such rent. Steps under Section 21 are required to be taken by the tenant before the RC whereas the application and its further adjudication under Section 7(2) lies within the domain of the Civil Court. Upon deposit of the rent as determined under Section 21 by the tenant, the landlords has the authority to apply for withdrawal of such rent. To the mind of this Court therefore the inclusion of the two provisions namely, Section 7(2) and Section 21 in the 1997 Act are not conflicting and operate in their spheres as carved out by the statute. With reference to the above placed discussion this Court finds it useful to refer to the citation of the judgment of the Hon’ble Division Bench, also of this Court, reported in 90 CWN 638 in the matter of Chandradip Thakur & Ors. vs. Dulal Lal Seal & Ors.. Such observations are pari materia to the similar provisions under the 1997 Act. E. This Court of the further view that a reading of the contractual agreement dated 1st April, 1989 between the parties demonstrates the factoring in of the existing municipal rates and taxes with the monthly rent claimed by the landlords. This Court must notice the substance in the argument of Sri Banerjee that such factoring in of the monthly rent payable by the tenant/OP implies that in the event the municipal rates and taxes are raised in respect of the entire building inclusive of the suit premises, only the plaintiffs/landlords shall be privy to such special knowledge. Upon any raise in municipal rates and taxes qua the entire building, the plaintiffs/landlords are required to communicate the same to the respective tenants including the present OP. Upon such communication the parties are required to determine the proportionate share of increase of the municipal rates and taxes payable by the tenant as part of the monthly rent in favour of the plaintiffs/landlords. To the further mind of this Court such practice was adhered to by both the parties till March, 2003 and beginning April, 2003 the landlords/plaintiffs acted unilaterally by imposing the increased rent, inclusive of municipal taxes and surcharge. To the further mind of this Court such practice was adhered to by both the parties till March, 2003 and beginning April, 2003 the landlords/plaintiffs acted unilaterally by imposing the increased rent, inclusive of municipal taxes and surcharge. It is plain to this Court, in the light of the discussion above, that the monthly rent, inclusive of municipal rates and taxes, lay within the special knowledge of the plaintiffs/landlords/present petitioners and therefore there could be no occasion to institute a suit for eviction merely on the basis of a notice under Section 20 without permitting the tenant/OP to exhaust the remedy before the RC under Section 21. F. This Court is also of the view that the proportionate charge of municipal rates and charges ought to have been based upon a consideration of the eligibility of the landlords/plaintiffs to claim such rates and taxes. Such eligibility of the plaintiffs/landlords cannot be assessed do hors the provisions of the Lease Deed between the Official Trustee, i.e. the Government of West Bengal and the plaintiffs/landlords. However, such Lease Deed was never produced before the Ld. Trial Court. Therefore, this Court finds adequate merit in the submissions of Sri Banerjee, that the notice to increase rent under Section 20 ought to have followed due process by allowing the tenant scope for adjudication of his application under Section 21. G. Upon a perusal of the order impugned No. 63 dated 28th July, 2015 this Court finds that the Ld. Small Causes Court took a correct view of the factual and legal matrix. The Ld. Small Causes Court also correctly considered the fact that the plaintiffs/landlords continued to accept and withdraw the rent deposited by the tenant/OP from time to time. Therefore, the conduct of the plaintiffs/landlords can be said to attract the provisions of Sections 24 and 25 of the 1997 Act relating to conduct amounting to waiver. With reference to the above placed discussion this Court finds it relevant to quote the observations In Re: Sen & Company vs. Manimala Sadhu, 84 CWN 455. Paragraphs 16 reads as follows:- “16. If a party goes on dealing in the matter, just as though everything had been duly done or if he does not insist upon something being done, the natural and inevitable conclusion from his conduct would be that he has waived or dispensed with the doing of it. Paragraphs 16 reads as follows:- “16. If a party goes on dealing in the matter, just as though everything had been duly done or if he does not insist upon something being done, the natural and inevitable conclusion from his conduct would be that he has waived or dispensed with the doing of it. In such a case he cannot afterwards come up with the plea that it was not done. It would further appear from the foregoing discussion that a party would be at liberty to waive any right he may have under any statute unless the benefit is conferred by a statute which has public policy for its objection. An acceptance of rent to operate as a Waiver of forfeiture, must be in respect of rent which had accrued since the breach of the convenant of failure in compliance with a provision of the statute which resulted in the forfeiture.” 6. In the light of the above discussion, CO 3934 of 2015 fails and is accordingly dismissed. CO 3942 of 2015 7. On a parity of reasoning with the judgment delivered in CO 3934 of 2015 (supra), the present application being CO 3942 of 2015, also under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot survive. For the same reasons as adduced in CO 3934 of 2015 (supra) this Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the order impugned No. 72 dated 17th June, 2015 in Ejectment Suit No. 302 of 2006. 8. While adopting the reasons embodied in the judgment connected to CO 3934 of 2015 (supra), this Court briefly records the common features of facts and law applicable to both CO 3934 of 2015 and CO 3942 of 2015. It is relevant to mention that both the applications were filed by the common petitioners/landlords and only the identity of the tenant/defendant/OP is different. 9. In both the cases the landlords/plaintiffs entered into similar agreements with the tenants. Such agreements, inter alia, specified that the rent charged was of a consolidated amount inclusive of the existing municipal rates and taxes. The tenant/OP has always maintained that the rent agreed upon was regularly paid and, the municipal corporation tax remained unchanged. However, for the reasons discussed in CO 3942 of 2015 any enhancement in municipal rates and taxes was required to be apportioned in proportion to the respective area/areas in possession of the individual tenants. The tenant/OP has always maintained that the rent agreed upon was regularly paid and, the municipal corporation tax remained unchanged. However, for the reasons discussed in CO 3942 of 2015 any enhancement in municipal rates and taxes was required to be apportioned in proportion to the respective area/areas in possession of the individual tenants. Such apportionment primarily lay with the landlords/plaintiffs disclosing the quantum of enhancement of the tax since, as the lessor/landlords of the entire premises the duty to apportion municipal taxes lay primarily with the landlords/plaintiffs. 10. Second, this Court, for the reasons also discussed above in the judgment in CO 3942 of 2015, reiterates its view that the municipal surcharge can be claimed by the plaintiffs/landlords only in the event demand is raised on behalf of the KMC. Such demand is equally required to be communicated to the individual tenants. Therefore, this Court reiterates its view that in the absence of a demand for surcharge by the plaintiffs/landlords, no case for eviction on the ground that the tenant/OP has failed to deposit such surcharge can be made out. 11. Added to the point of the claim to municipal rates/taxes and municipal surcharge is the contention of the tenant/OP that the lessor is not the owner of the premises which belongs to the Government of West Bengal as the Official Trustee. Therefore, the authority of the lessors/plaintiffs/landlords to claim municipal rates, taxes and surcharges cannot be unqualified in the absence of the Deed of Lease. 12. This Court also finds adequate substance in the argument of Sri Rahul Karmakar, Ld. Counsel for the OP, relevant to the point that the plaintiffs/landlords are estopped from claiming that the rents were deposited by the OP/tenant much beyond the stipulated date in the contract or, alternatively, much beyond the period provided in the relevant sections of the 1997 Act. 13. Sri Karmakar has argued and, in the opinion of this Court not without merit, that the usual practice of the plaintiffs/landlords was to collect rent on subsequent dates and rent receipts were also given on dates unconnected to the terms of the contract. Such a practice prevailed for a decade and Sri Karmakar gives a specific instance of the rent bill for the month of April, 2003 which was raised later and consequently, was tendered by the OP/tenant subsequently. 14. Such a practice prevailed for a decade and Sri Karmakar gives a specific instance of the rent bill for the month of April, 2003 which was raised later and consequently, was tendered by the OP/tenant subsequently. 14. Sri Karmakar points out that the rent being refused, the OP/tenant redirected such rent by way of money order. When the money order returned, the rent had to be ultimately deposited by the OP/tenant before the RC in June, 2003. Therefore, a clear procedure was adopted and understood by both the parties to the contract regarding the modus of transmission and acceptance of the monthly rent. By submitting before the Court that the rent deposited by the OP/tenant is now invalid although, in the interregnum, the plaintiffs/landlords had withdrawn such rent from the RC is a self-defeating argument. 15. Finally, in respect of both CO 3934 of 2015 and CO 3942 of 2015 this Court comes to a single conclusion surrounding the eviction notice under 6(4) of the 1997 Act. The eviction notice is based on default in payment of the enhanced rate of rent by the OP/tenant. To the mind of this Court to found a cause of action for eviction on the purported failure of the OP/tenant to pay the enhanced rate randomly fixed through a notice of the landlords/plaintiffs under Section 20 of the 1997 Act is a violation of due process since the statutory provisions as well as the law laid down and discussed above, inter alia, provide for an opportunity to the noticee/tenant to invoke the provisions of Sections 21 and 22 of the 1997 Act. 16. This Court is also of the considered view that the plaintiffs/landlords have attempted to deal with the eviction proceedings in a deliberately hypertechnical manner thereby placing the legislative intent into a condition of avoidable stress. Such hypertechnicality can neither be read into the contract between the parties, nor the governing statutory provisions as defined through judicial pronouncements. 17. CO 3942 of 2015 also stands accordingly dismissed. 18. There will be, however, no order as to costs. 19. Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of all requisite formalities.