JUDGMENT Hon’ble Pramod Kumar Srivastava, J.—Original Suit No. 318/2006, Devendra Kumar Agnihotri v. Prakash Chandra Verma and others, was filed for the relief of specific performance of contract of sale of property of defendant in favour of plaintiff. This suit was decreed by the judgment dated 30.5.2011 of 2nd Additional Civil Judge (S.D.)(/ACJM-II), Shahjahanpur. Against this judgment of trial Court, Civil Appeal No. 92/2011, Prakash Chandra Verma and others v. Devendra Kumar Agnihotri, was preferred which was dismissed on merits by the judgment dated 16.9.2015 of the Additional District Judge, Court No. 4, Shahjahanpur, who had dismissed the appeal andconfirmed the findings of the trial Court for specific performance of contract. Aggrieved by the judgment of the two Courts below, present second appeal has been preferred by one defendant of the original suit. 2. The registered deed of agreement to sell in question executed was between plaintiff as first party, and Prakash Chandra Verma (defendant No.1) and Smt. Ram Kumari Verma (the mother of defendants) as second party to said contract. Before institution of original suit Smt. Ram Kumari Verma had died. All defendants are admittedly successor in interest and legal representatives of deceased Smt. Ram Kumari Verma for disputed property. It is pertinent to mention that execution of registered deed of agreement to sell in question admitted by the parties. The defendant-appellant had taken a few factual points in their w.s. which were not proved, and the trial Court as well as first appellate Court had given concurrent findings of facts that plaintiff and defendant side had executed registered agreement to sell dated 10.10.2005 by which the Prakash Chandra Verma (defendant No.1) and Smt. Ram Kumari Verma had taken advance consideration and agreed to execute registered sale-deed of disputed property after receiving remaining consideration. Thereafter plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform his part of contract but it was the defendants who had not executed sale-deed in spite of reminders and notice. With this findings both the Courts below have confirmed the decree of specific performance of aforesaid agreement to sell. 3. So far factual aspect is concern, it was challenged by the defendants-appellants. A perusal of the record reveals that there has been consistent and concurrent finding of fact on above mentioned point. With this findings both the Courts below have confirmed the decree of specific performance of aforesaid agreement to sell. 3. So far factual aspect is concern, it was challenged by the defendants-appellants. A perusal of the record reveals that there has been consistent and concurrent finding of fact on above mentioned point. Therefore, execution of registered agreement to sell has been proved and it is also proved that plaintiff-respondent has been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but it could not be executed due to fault of defendant-appellants. Concurrent and apparently correct findings had been given by the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court in this regard. Such findings cannot be interfered in second appeal by way of re-appreciation of evidences. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant in second appeal contended that the two Courts below had not properly considered the provision of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act in the light of facts and circumstances available before them. He contended that although powers under Section 20 of the Specific Performance Act is discretionary but Court should have applied it in this particular case, and should have ordered for the return of advance consideration to plaintiff-respondent instead of directing specific performance of contract through execution of sale-deed of property which would, in fact, ruin the appellant’s family. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that trial Court and first appellate Court had not considered the continuous readiness and willingness of plaintiff to perform his obligations under the contract in question. A perusal of the two judgments prove that after meticulous appreciation of evidence the trial Court as well as first appellate Court had reached to the conclusion that plaintiff-respondent had been ready and willing to perform his part of contract but it was the defendant-appellant acting with mala fide and was not ready to perform his part of contract, in spite of accepting the advance consideration, and had not even tried to return the same. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent had cited Dada Rao and another v. Ram Rao and others, (1999) 8 SCC 416 and Ganesh Shet v. Dr. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent had cited Dada Rao and another v. Ram Rao and others, (1999) 8 SCC 416 and Ganesh Shet v. Dr. C.S.G.K. Setty and others, (1998) 5 SCC 381 , in which the Hon’ble Apex Court had held that in suit for specific performance of contract when there is discrepancy on part of proposed purchasers, then Court should not exercise its discretion to grant decree for specific performance; but as a general rule plaintiff can be granted such relief of specific performance when his case is consistent with pleading as well as with proof. This rulings are acceptable. The Courts had held the acceptable proposition of law that the discretion lies with Court in the suits filed in specific performance of contract when plaint case is proved. The evidences adduced and concurrent findings reached makes it explicitly clear that in present matter plaintiff-respondent had continuously been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and there had been no slackness on his part. Therefore there appears no irregularity or illegality when the lowers Courts decreed the suit for the relief of specific performance of contract. 7. In the case of Rathnavathi and another v. Kavita Ganashamdas, 2015(1) CCC 164 (SC), the Apex Court had held as under: “In our considered opinion, the High Court being the last Court of appeal on facts/law while hearing first appeal under Section 96 of CPC as well within its powers to appreciate the evidence and came to its own conclusion independent to that of the trial Court’s decision. One cannot dispute the legal proposition that the grant/refusal of specific performance is a discretionary relief, and, therefore, once it is granted by the appellate Court on appreciation of evidence, keeping in view the legal principle applicable for the grant then further appellate Court should be slow to interfere in such finding, unless the finding is found to be either against the settled principle of law, or is arbitrary or perverse.” 8. In present matter promptness, readiness and willingness on the part of plaintiff-respondent for the specific performance of contract in question has been proved by the evidence, as held by the trial Court and affirmed by the first appellate Court. In present matter promptness, readiness and willingness on the part of plaintiff-respondent for the specific performance of contract in question has been proved by the evidence, as held by the trial Court and affirmed by the first appellate Court. Simultaneously, the mala fide on the part of appellant after accepting the advance consideration is also proved by evidence, and concurrent findings of the two Courts below, which are acceptable. Therefore findings of lower Courts are neither infirm nor arbitrary or perverse. In such case it appears fair and reasonable that plaintiff-respondent should not suffer due to overt and acts of the defendant-appellant who had been presenting incorrect defence and harassing the respondents. 9. The counsel for appellant had also pointed that it is the duty of the Court to consider suo moto for consideration of applicability of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act in favour of appellant-defendant. I am not in agreement with this contention. There has been guidelines laid down by the Apex Court which should be followed for reaching the decision as to whether in suit for specific performance benefit of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act should be granted to the defendant or not; but the defendant cannot claim this discretion as a matter of his right. It is also pertinent to mention that no such plea was taken by the defendants in their written-statements. Such plea cannot be raised directly in appeal to the prejudice to the legal rights of plaintiff. In the light of law discussed above there appears no propriety for this Court to exercise its power to interfere in the judgments of the two Courts below for granting any relief to the appellant in second appeal. 10. In the present matter the only dispute between the parties has been as to whether appellants and their predecessor in interest Smt. Ram Kumari Verma had willingly executed registered agreement to sell dated 10.10.2005 for sale of their disputed property in favour of plaintiff-respondent. It is not a question of law, but is a question of fact which can be decided only on basis of evidences, as has been done by the two Courts below. In absence of any question of law this appeal cannot be admitted under Section 100 CPC. 11. It is not a question of law, but is a question of fact which can be decided only on basis of evidences, as has been done by the two Courts below. In absence of any question of law this appeal cannot be admitted under Section 100 CPC. 11. On examination of the reasonings recorded by the trial Court, which are affirmed by the learned first appellate Court in first appeal, I am of the view that the judgments of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court are well reasoned and are based upon proper appreciation of the entire evidence on record. No perversity or infirmity is found in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial Court that has been affirmed by the first appellate Court to warrant interference in this appeal. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law, was involved in this case before the High Court. None of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiffs can be sustained. 12. In view of the above, this Court finds that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. Therefore the second appeal is dismissed. 13. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Court concerned.