JUDGMENT : Sujoy Paul, J. 1. The petitioner contested the election of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Kheritia Gram Panchayat Kheritaygaon, Tehsil Sausar, District Chhindwara. The petitioner contested the election of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Kheritia Gram Panchayat Kheritaygaon, Tehsil Sausar, District Chhindwara. 2. The petitioner was elected as Sarpanch. The petitioner's election was called in question by the respondent No.4 by filing a petition under Section 122 of the M.P. Panchayat Raj Evam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Adhiniyam' for short). 3. The petitioner entered appearance in the said proceedings of election petition and filed his reply. Admittedly, no issues were framed by the Election Tribunal. The election petitioner entered the witness box and deposed his statement. In due course, the petitioner also entered the witness box and deposed his statement. 4. The Tribunal passed the order dated 26.05.2015 (Annexure-P/6). In this impugned order, the Tribunal directed for recounting of the votes. Accordingly, certain Officers were delegated with the power to undertake the exercise of recounting. 5. The Tribunal passed another order impugned herein dated 27.05.2015 and found that after recounting, the election petitioner has obtained more votes than the present petitioner. This order dated 27.05.2015 was sent for approval before the Sub Divisional Officer (SDO), Chhindwara. 6. Criticizing the order dated 26.05.2015 (Annexure-P/6) and 27.05.2015, Shri Naman Nagrath, learned Senior Counsel contended that the said orders are contrary to the settled legal position. It is further urged that the approval is accorded by the Sub Divisional Officer only on 08.06.2015. Shri Nagrath by taking this Court to the averments of the election petition contended that there was no averments on the strength of which recounting could have been ordered. He submits that in absence of material facts and reliable evidence, recount could not have been ordered. He submits that in absence of framing issue in relation to need of recount, recount could not have been ordered. Learned Senior Counsel further urged that the secrecy of vote is sacrosanct in democratic process and it cannot be tinkered on mere asking. It is urged that petitioner's statement during cross-examination cannot be a ground for issuing a direction for recount. It is further urged that low margin of victory (4 votes in the present case) cannot also be a ground for recounting. It is urged that petitioner's statement during cross-examination cannot be a ground for issuing a direction for recount. It is further urged that low margin of victory (4 votes in the present case) cannot also be a ground for recounting. Lastly it is urged that for the purpose of recounting, the powers cannot be delegated to any other authority by the Tribunal. Shri Nagrath contends that the Election Tribunal is a statutory Tribunal as per the Adhiniyam. There was no occasion for the Tribunal to seek approval of its order from any other Authority (SDO in the present case). 7. Smt. D.K. Bohre, learned Govt. Advocate and Shri Mrigendra Singh, learned Senior Counsel supported the impugned orders. Shri Singh contends that at the time of counting, respondent No.4 filed an objection under Rule 80 of Nirvachan Niyam. He relied on Para 4 to 11 of the election petition in support of his contention that material pleadings are there in the election petition. He submits that consent of present petitioner during cross-examination is sufficient for ordering recount. Shri Singh further submits that after having given said consent, the petitioner is 'estopped' and cannot raise his eyebrows. It is further urged that for the purpose of recounting, the Tribunal has to appoint somebody and it cannot undertake the said task. It is further submitted that during recount, both the parties signed the proceedings and, therefore, petitioner now cannot challenge the said order. It is submitted that after recount on 27.05.2015, the certificate in favour of respondent No.4 was issued on 10.06.2015. In obedience thereof, the respondent No.4 took charge on 12.06.2015. In support of arguments relating to estoppel, he relied on (2003) 1 SCC 108 . It is submitted that the impugned orders are in accordance with law and hence no interference is required. In support of the aforesaid contention, he relied on AIR 1992 MP 340 (Ramdayal Prabhakar v. Mahendra Baudh and 12 others), AIR 1977 SC 681 (Sukhad Raj Singh v. Ram Harsh Mishra and others); 2003 (7) SCC 52 (Sayeda Akhtar v. Abdul Ahad), 2009 (5) SCC 136 (Bhuwan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and another) and 2003 (1) SCC 108 (Sohan Lal v. Babu Gandhi and others). 8. In rejoinder submission, Shri Nagrath contended that even if recounting has taken place and result is declared, the petitioner has a valuable right to assail the order of recount. Ltd. and another) and 2003 (1) SCC 108 (Sohan Lal v. Babu Gandhi and others). 8. In rejoinder submission, Shri Nagrath contended that even if recounting has taken place and result is declared, the petitioner has a valuable right to assail the order of recount. In support of arguments advanced by him, he relied on various judgments. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. Before dealing with rival contentions advanced at the Bar, it is profitable to summarise and cataloged the circumstance under which recount could be ordered. The Apex Court way back in Bhabhi v. Sheo Govind (1976) 1 SCC 687 opined that the election petition must contain the adequate statement of all the material facts on which the allegations of irregularity and illegality in counting are founded. On the basis of evidence adduced, such illegality must be established. The Court trying the petition must be satisfied that making of such an order of recount is imperatively necessary to decide the dispute and to do complete justice between the parties. The Apex Court in Ram Autar Singh Bhadauria v. Ram Gopal Singh, 1976 (1) SCC 43 followed the said principle. In Chanda Singh v. Choudhary Shiv Ram Verma, (1975) 4 SCC 393 , the Apex Court held that the democracy runs on the smooth wheels of periodic and pure elections. A certain amount of stability in the electoral process is essential. Recount of ballot cannot be interfered too frequently and on flippant accounts. The secrecy of the ballot is sacrosanct in democratic process. In Beliram Bhalaik v. Jai Beharilal Kachi, (1975) 4 SCC 417 , the Apex Court held that a whimsical and bald statement of the candidate that he is not satisfied with the counting will not tantamount to a statement of the "grounds" within the meaning of relevant rules. A Division Bench of this Court in Ganesh Ram Gayari v. Bagdiram and others (2013) 2 MPLJ followed the said principle. In Hanumant Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 3 MPLJ, this Court considered the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1993 SC 367 , (Shri Satyanarain Dudhani v. Uday Kumar Singh and others) and opined that secrecy of ballot cannot be lightly tinkered. In Hanumant Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 3 MPLJ, this Court considered the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1993 SC 367 , (Shri Satyanarain Dudhani v. Uday Kumar Singh and others) and opined that secrecy of ballot cannot be lightly tinkered. In a democratic set up, secrecy of ballot is of utmost importance and in absence of very specific pleadings of material facts and particulars supported by contemporaneous evidence, neither election can be quashed nor recount can be ordered. This Court considered the judgment of Mahender Pratap v. Kishan Pal and others, (2003) 1 SCC 390 in which it was held that the onus of proof on the basis of proper pleading is on the election petitioner. It is further held that the degree of proof is of very high standard for the purpose of annulling an election or for issuing direction for recounting. 11. In view of the aforesaid legal position, it is clear that the election cannot be mechanically nullified nor the order of recount can be passed on mere asking. The election petitioner needs to plead about the illegality or election process by way of specific pleadings. In other words, the illegality in the election process must be pleaded with accuracy and precision. Such pleadings must be proved by leading contemporaneous evidence. On the anvil of the said principles, it is now required to be seen whether such pleadings and evidence are available in the present case. 12. In Para 4 of the election petition, the election petitioner has contended that during counting of votes, Returning Officer has violated the rules and guidelines on the subject. In certain booths, the votes cast in favour of the election petitioner were rejected. The number of such votes are 198 which were illegally rejected by the Returning Officer. In para 5, it is urged that at the last of counting, election petitioner secured 824 votes whereas the returned candidate got 828 votes. Thus, the said candidate was declared as elected only on the margin of 4 votes. In this para, it is averred that 70 to 80 votes were cast in favour of election petitioner which were declared as illegal by the Returning Officer. Thus, the said candidate was declared as elected only on the margin of 4 votes. In this para, it is averred that 70 to 80 votes were cast in favour of election petitioner which were declared as illegal by the Returning Officer. In Para 6, it is submitted that during the course of original counting, the election petitioner submitted his objection but the Returning Officer did not take any action on the said objection. A written complaint was filed by the election petitioner before the Tahasildar on 06.02.2015. In this complaint it is prayed that recounting be ordered under Rule 80 of the M.P. Panchayat Nirvachan Niyam, 1995. The said objection was rejected on 06.02.2015 and on 09.02.2015, the present petitioner was declared as elected by margin of four votes. In para 8 & 9, the election petitioner stated that cause of action has arisen at Tehsil Sausar. The election petitioner has paid requisite Court fees. The election petitioner, in fact, has secured more votes than the present petitioner. His valid votes were treated as invalid votes and thereby he is subjected to severe injustice. 13. The election petitioner in support of the said pleadings entered the witness box before the Tribunal on 02.05.2015. It is deposed by her that she does not remember the name of her election agent who was deputed at the time of counting of the votes. She further admitted that her counting agent did not submit any objection during counting before the Returning Officer. She admitted that she was not aware about the averments of the election petition. She further admitted that the counsel who has drafted the petition did not read out the averments of the election petition before her. It is admitted by her that in relation to the allegations mentioned in the election petition, she did not prefer any complaint before the Election Commission. She further admitted that the Election Officers have considered the record and in accordance with the record, declared the present petitioner as elected. She further admitted that which guideline is being violated by the Election Officer is not known to her. There is a candid admission on the part of the election petitioner that she is not aware as to how many votes were cast in her favour nor she is aware abut the cancellation of votes cast in favour of the present petitioner. There is a candid admission on the part of the election petitioner that she is not aware as to how many votes were cast in her favour nor she is aware abut the cancellation of votes cast in favour of the present petitioner. She further admitted that she is not aware about the nature of irregularity/bungling by the Election Officers of "Brahmanpipla". Lastly it was admitted by her that she does not remember as to how many votes were cast in booth Nos.148 & 149. 14. A conjoint reading of pleadings of election petitioner and the statement of election petitioner does not inspire confidence. The election petitioner has miserably failed to plead about the nature of specific irregularities allegedly committed during counting. In the considered opinion of this Court, the pleadings in the election petition are not specific and are vague. Even those pleadings could not be supported by leading evidence by the election petitioner. At the cost of repetition, it needs to be remembered that there has to be a specific pleadings about the irregularity/illegality in the election process and the same must be supported by a very high degree of evidence. In the present case, necessary pleadings and evidence are absent. 15. The ancillary question needs consideration is whether on the basis of statements of present petitioner during cross-examination, recount can be ordered. The present petitioner was examined by the Tribunal on 19.05.2015. The opposite counsel asked a question whether present petitioner has any objection if recount takes place. It is important to note here that counsel for present petitioner took a serious objection that such question cannot be asked. However, it appears that the said objection was not upheld by the Tribunal and, therefore, the present petitioner answered that she has no objection if recount takes place. The pivotal question in this regard is whether on the basis of such statement recounting can be ordered. This point is no more res integra. This Court in Writ Petition No.1916/2001 (Chandra Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh) has dealt with the similar question. After considering various judgments on the point, including the judgment of this Court in Gendalal v. Narayan Acharya and others, 1981 JLJ 163, it was held that the decision rendered in the case of Gendalal (supra) is not a precedent for the proposition that on consent, the Election Tribunal can direct for recount of votes. After considering various judgments on the point, including the judgment of this Court in Gendalal v. Narayan Acharya and others, 1981 JLJ 163, it was held that the decision rendered in the case of Gendalal (supra) is not a precedent for the proposition that on consent, the Election Tribunal can direct for recount of votes. This Court in no uncertain terms made it clear that consent does not confer the jurisdiction on the Election Tribunal to direct for recount of votes. It is unnecessary to deal with the aspect whether there was consent or not. In view of this judgment, it is clear like noon day that on the basis of consent alone, Election Tribunal cannot order recounting. In addition, it is relevant to mention here that the election petition can succeed only if the grounds for setting aside the election mentioned in Rule 21 of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats (Election Petitions Corrupt Practices & Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1995 are satisfied. Consent is not one of those grounds. Hence, specified Officer/Tribunal has erred in directing the recount on this count. 16. Shri Mrigendra Singh, learned Senior Advocate on the aspect of consent relied on the judgment of the Supreme court in Sukhad Raj Singh (Supra). However, a plain reading of this judgment shows that the consent was arrived at between the parties before the Supreme Court. In the peculiar fact situation of that case, the Apex Court exercised its extraordinary powers and directed for recount of the votes. In the present case, neither both the parties were in agreement for the purpose of recount nor the Tribunal has any such extraordinary similar powers which the Apex Court possess. Thus, no benefit can be derived from this judgment. Similarly in Ramdayal Prabhakar (supra), this Court opined that in absence of any "agreement" between the parties, recount cannot be ordered. In the present case, there was no agreement arrived at between the parties. Merely because during cross-examination, petitioner said that she does not have any objection if recount takes place, it cannot be treated as an "agreement" arrived at between the parties. The Election Tribunal can set aside the election or direct for recount only when sufficient pleadings are there which are proved to the hilt by leading specific evidence. Thus, I am unable to agree with the contention of Shri Singh, learned senior counsel for respondent No.4. 17. The Election Tribunal can set aside the election or direct for recount only when sufficient pleadings are there which are proved to the hilt by leading specific evidence. Thus, I am unable to agree with the contention of Shri Singh, learned senior counsel for respondent No.4. 17. Another question needs consideration is whether low margin of victory can be a ground for recounting. The low margin became one of the reasons for recount. This aspect is also dealt with in R. Narayan v. Semmalai and others, 1980 (2) SCC 537 . The Apex Court held that low margin of vote alone cannot be a ground for setting aside the election or recount of votes. 18. The parties were at loggerheads on another aspect. This aspect is relating to delegation of power by the Election Tribunal for the purpose of recount. By the impugned order, the Tribunal directed certain Officers of the State Government to undertake the exercise of recounting. This point was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in (2007) 3 MPHT 462 (Sampat Devi v. OSD). This Court held that in absence of any enabling provision, such power of recounting cannot be delegated to any other authority. In view of the judgment, I am constrained to hold that the procedure adopted by the Tribunal is totally unknown to law. The same is impermissible and not supported by any enabling provision. Thus, the action of the Tribunal in delegating the power of recount to certain Officers is declared as void and illegal. 19. The last issue needs consideration is whether after declaration of result of recount, this petition is maintainable or not. The ancillary issue is whether petitioner who has signed certain papers during recount is estopped from challenging the said outcome. This point is also not res integra. The Division Bench in Rameshchandra v. Bashir, 2014 (4) MPLJ 564 upheld the order of learned Single Judge, whereby the result of recounting was quashed by the learned Single Judge. 20. In Ganeshram (supra), the Division Bench considered various judgments of the Supreme Court and held that even after recount, the lost candidate can assail it. 21. I do not see any reason as to why principle of estoppel can be applied against the present petitioner. This is trite law that there is no estoppel against law. 20. In Ganeshram (supra), the Division Bench considered various judgments of the Supreme Court and held that even after recount, the lost candidate can assail it. 21. I do not see any reason as to why principle of estoppel can be applied against the present petitioner. This is trite law that there is no estoppel against law. If election process is vitiated, there cannot be any reason to upheld it on hyper technical grounds. Merely because the present petitioner has signed certain proceedings of recounting, it cannot be said that she has either given her consent or is hit by principle of estoppel. Shri Singh, learned senior counsel although relied on the judgment of Bhuwan Singh (supra), it is seen that the said judgment is arising out of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The said judgment has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 22. Similarly in Saiyada Akthar, the judgment is based on M.P. Accommodation Control Act. This judgment cannot be pressed into service in the present case. This judgment deals with the aspect of non-framing of specific issue. Since it is held that the pleadings and evidence were not sufficient for ordering recount, this point needs no further consideration. Lastly, reliance is placed by Shri Singh, learned senior counsel on the judgment of Sohanlal (supra). This judgment deals with the power of Returning Officer to order recount. In the election petition, the order/action of Returning Officer is not under challenge. This Court is dealing with the legality, validity and propriety of the orders passed by the Election Tribunal. Hence, this judgment is also of no help to other side. 23. For the reasons mentioned in the aforementioned paragraphs, the orders dated 26.05.2015 (Annexure P/6) and 27.05.2015 are set aside. The petition is allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.