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2016 DIGILAW 981 (JHR)

Franklin Baxla v. Union of India

2016-06-27

AMITAV K.GUPTA, D.N.PATEL

body2016
JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This writ petition has been preferred for enhancement of age of superannuation for the University teaching staff from 62 years to 65 years in the State of Jharkhand. 2. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that University Grants Commission Regulation, 2010 has been brought into effect with effect from 30th June, 2010 and the Central Government has already enhanced the age of superannuation for the teaching staff from 62 years to 65 years. This has been adopted by the State of Jharkhand and has published as notification (Annexure 7). This notification has been published on 26th December, 2012 and has not been given retrospective effect i.e. with effect from 30th June, 2010. This is the grievance of these two petitioners, as they have already retired from service of the University on 30th May, 2012 and 1st December, 2012 respectively and, therefore, this petition has been preferred by them so that the notification published by the State of Jharkhand enhancing the age of superannuation from 62 years to 65 years may be given retrospective effect so that their age of superannuation can be enhanced. 3. Counsel for the petitioners is relying upon a decision rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad Sharma Vs State of Bihar reported in (2013) 8 SCC 633 especially paragraphs 74, 77, 78 and 79 and has submitted that if the State of Jharkhand is accepting the recommendation of the University Grants Commission, they may be accepted in totality and as a composite structure of the recommendation and, therefore, enhancement of age of superannuation should have been given a retrospective effect i.e. with effect from 30th June, 2010. 4. Counsel for the respondents submitted that powers vested in the State of Jharkhand, which is a sovereign body, has been referred by Schedule VII, List III, Entry 25 of the Constitution of India. Neither any Act nor Rule nor Regulation enacted by the Parliament for enhancement of age of superannuation of the teaching staffs. They are merely recommendation by the University Grants Commission. Every State has a flexibility to adopt date of superannuation as per the finance of the particular State permits. Neither any Act nor Rule nor Regulation enacted by the Parliament for enhancement of age of superannuation of the teaching staffs. They are merely recommendation by the University Grants Commission. Every State has a flexibility to adopt date of superannuation as per the finance of the particular State permits. In the wisdom of the State of Jharkhand and as a policy decision of the State, the notification was published by the State of Jharkhand on 26th December, 2012 (Annexure 7), whereby the age of teaching staff has been enhanced from 62 years to 65 years and necessary amendment shall be carried out in Section 67(a) of the of the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000. Whether to give retrospective effect or not, is a policy decision of the State of Jharkhand and this Court will be slow in issuing a writ of mandamus to the State of Jharkhand for giving retrospective effect to such notification. Even otherwise also, there is no legitimate right vested in the employees for enhancement of the age of his superannuation and there is no public duty vested in the State that the State must enhance the age of superannuation of their teaching staff, hence, no writ of mandamus can be issued upon the State. 5. Counsel for the respondents-State is also relying upon the decision rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad Sharma Vs State of Bihar reported in (2013) 8 SCC 633 especially paragraph 74 onwards. The counsel for the respondents-State submitted that the recommendation of the University Grants Commission can be accepted by the State by publishing a notification from a particular date looking to the financial capacity of the State and the State in its wisdom has published a notification amending Section 67(a) of the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000 enhancing the age of superannuation upto 65 years with effect from 26th December, 2012. If such type of retrospective effect is to be given as per the desire of the petitioners, there will be no end of further retrospectivity of the cut-off dates. There are bound of few persons, where a cut-off date is prescribed, to fall on a wrong side of the cut-off date, but, that does not mean that the cut-of date fixed by the State is in violation of the Constitution of India. There are bound of few persons, where a cut-off date is prescribed, to fall on a wrong side of the cut-off date, but, that does not mean that the cut-of date fixed by the State is in violation of the Constitution of India. There cannot be, in fact, any cutoff date whereby no person falls on a wrong side of that cut-off date. The petitioners might have retired earlier than the cut-off date prescribed by the State. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision that as per Schedule VII List III Entry 25 and especially when the State Government intends to prescribe the age of superannuation and there is no contradictory provision in the Central Legislation, the State Legislature will prevail. There is no repugnancy between the State Law and the Central law as per Article 254 of the Constitution of India. Hence, no error has been committed by the State in publishing Annexure 7 and, hence, this writ petition may be dismissed with cost. 6. Counsel for the respondents-University adopts the argument canvassed by the State and has also submitted that no writ may be issued upon the State nor upon the University for giving retrospective effect to the notification published by the State which is at Annexure 7. REASONS : 7. Having heard learned counsels for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we see no reason to entertain this writ petition mainly for the following facts and reasons: - (i) Petitioner No.1 has already retired as University Teacher on 30th May, 2012 upon attaining the age of 62 years. Similarly, petitioner No.2 has already retired as University Teacher with effect from 1st December, 2012 upon attaining the age of 62 years. (ii) It further appears that the respondents-State has amended Section 67(a) of the Jharkhand State Universities Act, 2000 by the notification (Annexure 7) with effect from 26th December, 2002. Thus, the age of superannuation of the teaching staff has been enhanced from 62 years to 65 years with effect from 26th December, 2012, whereas, these petitioners are in search of retrospective operation of this notification so that their age of superannuation can be enhanced suitably. (iii) It appears that looking to Schedule VII List III Entry 25 which reads as under: - 25. (iii) It appears that looking to Schedule VII List III Entry 25 which reads as under: - 25. Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour. (iv) In view of this power vested in the Stated, the amendment has been carried out. There is no Central Legislation which is inconsistent with the amended proviso to Section 67(a) of the Act of 2000. Hence, there is no question of inconsistency or repugnancy between the Central Legislation or the State Legislation as envisaged under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. (v) What should be the age of retirement, that can be decided by the State. It is a power vested in the State to decide such age of superannuation. Where there is a power vested in the State, there is no corresponding right vested in the teaching staff and similarly there is no duty, much less a public duty, vested in the State that the State must enhance the age of superannuation. Once there is no public duty vested in the State, there is no question of violation of the so-called public duty whatsoever arises and, hence, no writ of mandamus can be issued upon the State for enhancing the age of superannuation. (vi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad Sharma and others Vs State of Bihar and others reported in (2013) 8 SCC 633 in paragraphs 74, 77, 78 and 79 as under: - “74. The said submission, in our view, is not acceptable on account of the fact that in the first paragraph of Section 67(a) it has been categorically stated that the age of superannuation would be 62 years. The second paragraph of the said section makes it even more clearer, since it reiterates that the date of retirement of non-teaching employees, other than the inferior servants, shall be the date on which he attains the age of 62 years. The first proviso also indicates that the university shall, in no case, extend the period of service of any of the teaching or non-teaching employee after he attains the age of 62 years. The first proviso also indicates that the university shall, in no case, extend the period of service of any of the teaching or non-teaching employee after he attains the age of 62 years. The second proviso, however, states that even after retirement, teachers may be reappointed in appropriate cases up to the age of 65 years in the manner laid down in the Statutes made in this behalf in accordance with the guidelines of the Commission. 77. We are inclined to agree with such submission mainly because of the fact that in the amended provisions of Section 67(a) it has been categorically stated that the age of superannuation of nonteaching employees would be 62 years and, in no case, should the period of service of such non-teaching employees be extended beyond 62 years. A difference had been made in regard to the teaching faculty whose services could be extended up to 65 years in the manner laid down in the University Statutes. There is no ambiguity that the final decision to enhance the age of superannuation of teachers within a particular State would be that of the State itself. The right of the Commission to frame regulations having the force of law is admitted. However, the State Governments are also entitled to legislate with matters relating to education under List III Entry 25. So long as the State legislation did not encroach upon the jurisdiction of Parliament, the State legislation would obviously have primacy over any other law. If there was any legislation enacted by the Central Government under List III Entry 25, both would have to be treated on a par with each other. In the absence of any such legislation by the Central Government under List III Entry 25, the regulations framed by way of delegated legislation have to yield to the plenary jurisdiction of the State Government under List III Entry 25. 78. In the absence of any such legislation by the Central Government under List III Entry 25, the regulations framed by way of delegated legislation have to yield to the plenary jurisdiction of the State Government under List III Entry 25. 78. We are then faced with the situation where a composite scheme has been framed by UGC, whereby the Commission agreed to bear 80% of the expenses incurred by the State if such scheme was to be accepted, subject to the condition that the remaining 20% of the expense would be met by the State and that on and from 1-4-2010, the State Government would take over the entire burden and would also have enhanced the age of superannuation of teachers and other staff from 62 to 65 years. There being no compulsion to accept and/or adopt the said Scheme, the States are free to decide as to whether the Scheme would be adopted by them or not. In our view, there can be no automatic application of the recommendations made by the Commission, without any conscious decision being taken by the State in this regard, on account of the financial implications and other consequences attached to such a decision. The case of those petitioners who have claimed that they should be given the benefit of the Scheme dehors the responsibility attached thereto, must, therefore, fail. 79. However, within this class of institutions there is a separate group where the State Governments themselves have taken a decision to adopt the Scheme. In such cases, the consequences envisaged in the Scheme itself would automatically follow.” (Emphasis supplied) (vii) In view of the aforesaid decision, there are all powers, jurisdiction and authority vested in the State to prescribe the date of retirement for the teaching staff of the University especially looking to Schedule VII List III Entry 25. (viii) Much has been argued about the University Grants Commission Regulation, 2010 by the counsel for the petitioners. It has been stated in the aforesaid decision that whatever University Grants Commission has stated is nothing, but, a recommendation for the ready reference of the State. There is no need for the State and much less, it is obligatory on the part of the State, to adopt in totality the recommendation of the University Grants Commission. It has been stated in the aforesaid decision that whatever University Grants Commission has stated is nothing, but, a recommendation for the ready reference of the State. There is no need for the State and much less, it is obligatory on the part of the State, to adopt in totality the recommendation of the University Grants Commission. Suitable changes can always be made by the State which is a Sovereign body, looking to the quasi federal nature of the Constitution of India. It is always a policy decision of the State to prescribe a date of retirement 7 W.P. (S) No.1387 of 2013 which has direct nexus with the, (a) financial capability of the State; (b) generation of employment in the State, where fresh employees can be employed so that new ideas may be brought into the University rather than following the old ideas permanently. (ix) It ought to be kept in the mind that the young persons ought to have been given opportunity by inducting them in public employment, instead of continuing for much longer time in service by the old employees, so that new techniques and new ideas can be brought into experiment. Always the University must be given a free hand in giving employment to the younger generations. The Court is not an expert of fixing a date of retirement, otherwise, there will be no end of wishes of the employees. If wishes were horses, beggars would ride. The will and wish of employees should be evaluated vis-a-vis larger public interest. Hence, no error has been committed by the State of Jharkhand in amending Section 67(a) of the Jharkhand State University Act, 2000 vide notification dated 26th December, 2012 (Annexure 7). (x) What cut-off date is to be given for the implementation of this notification is also a policy decision of the State. Whenever any cut-off date is prescribed, (In the facts of the present case, the cut-off date prescribed is 26th December, 2012), there are bound that a few employees who are falling on the wrong side of the cut-off date. There cannot be any cut-off date which can be prescribed by the State by which nobody is aggrieved. (xi) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1985 Supp SCC 45, in paragraph 30 as under:- “30. There cannot be any cut-off date which can be prescribed by the State by which nobody is aggrieved. (xi) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1985 Supp SCC 45, in paragraph 30 as under:- “30. The object of this legislation was to provide for absorption of temporary lecturers of long standing. So therefore experience and continuous employment were necessary ingredients. The Hindi version of the Ordinance used the expression “ke prarambh ke samaya is roop me karya kar rahe hein” is capable of meaning “and are continuing” to work as such at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance. Keeping the background of the purpose of the Act in view that would be the proper construction and if that is the proper construction which is in consonance with the English version of the Ordinance and the Act as well as with the object of the Act then in our opinion the Act and the Ordinance should be construed to mean that only those would be eligible for screening who were appointed prior to June 25, 1975 and were continuing at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. June 12, 1978 i.e. approximately about three years. If that is the correct reading, then we are unable to accept the criticism that those who were for a short period appointed prior to June 25, 1975 then again with interruption were working only at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. June 12, 1978 would also be eligible. In other words people with very short experience would be eligible for absorption. That cannot be the purpose of the Act. It cannot be so read reasonably. Therefore on a proper construction it means that all temporary lecturers who were appointed as such on or before June 25, 1975 and were continuing as such at the commencement of the Ordinance shall be considered by the University for screening for absorption. The expression “were continuing” is significant. This is in consonance with the object of the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service as one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers, certain continuous experience is necessary. The expression “were continuing” is significant. This is in consonance with the object of the Act to ensure continuity of experience and service as one of the factors for regularising the appointment of the temporary lecturers. For regularising the appointment of temporary lecturers, certain continuous experience is necessary. If a Legislature considers a particular period of experience to be necessary, the wisdom of such a decision is not subject to judicial review. Keeping the aforesaid reasonable meaning of clause 3 of the Ordinance and Section 3 of the Act in view, we are of the opinion that the criterion fixed for screening for absorption was not an irrational criterion not having any nexus with the purpose of the Act. Therefore, the criticism that a teacher who was working even for two or three months only before June 25, 1975 and then with long interruptions was in employment of the University at the time of the commencement of the Ordinance would be eligible but a teacher who had worked continuously from June 26, 1975 i.e. after the date fixed i.e. June 25, 1975 for three years would be ineligible and as such that will be discrimination against long experience, cannot be accepted. Such a construction would be an unreasonable construction unwarranted by the language used in the provisions concerned. It is well-settled that if a particular period of experience is fixed for screening or for absorption, it is within the wisdom of the Legislature, and what period should be sufficient for a particular job or a particular employment is not subject to judicial review. We need not refer to a large number of decisions on this point.” (emphasis supplied) (xii) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 368 , in paragraph no.8 as under:- “8. In the present case as pointed out earlier the past practice was to fix the last date for receipt of applications a month or one and a half months after the date of actual publication of the advertisement. Following the past practice the State Government fixed the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988. Those who had completed the required experience of three years by that date were, therefore, eligible to apply for the posts in question. Following the past practice the State Government fixed the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988. Those who had completed the required experience of three years by that date were, therefore, eligible to apply for the posts in question. The respondents and some of the intervenors who were not completing the required experience by that date, therefore, challenged the fixation of the last date as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is obvious that in fixing the last date as January 31, 1988 the State Government had only followed the past practice and if the High Court’s attention had been invited to this fact it would perhaps have refused to interfere since its interference is based on the erroneous belief that the past practice was to fix June 30 of the relevant year as the last date for receipt of applications. Except for leaning on a past practice the High Court has not assigned any reasons for its choice of the date. As pointed out by this Court the choice of date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the same unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The choice of the date for advertising the posts had to depend on several factors, e.g. the number of vacancies in different disciplines, the need to fill up the posts, the availability of candidates, etc. It is not the case of anyone that experienced candidates were not available in sufficient numbers on the cut-off date. Merely because the respondents and some others would qualify for appointment if the last date for receipt of applications is shifted from January 31, 1988 to June 30, 1988 is no reason for dubbing the earlier date as arbitrary or irrational. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in striking down the government’s action of fixing the last date for receipt of applications as January 31, 1988 as arbitrary.” (emphasis supplied) (xiii) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ami Lal Bhat (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614 , in paragraph nos. 5, 7, 11 and 17 as under: - “5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. 5, 7, 11 and 17 as under: - “5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rule-making authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cut-off date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. That cannot make the cut-off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed by this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works and has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate should not have completed the age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is made. Such a cut-off date was challenged. This Court considered the various steps required in the process of selection and said, “when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications”. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications”. This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cut-off date should be with reference to a fixed date. Therefore, fixing an independent cut-off date, far from being arbitrary, makes for certainty in determining the maximum age. 7. In the present case, the cut-off date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the 1st of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on which different departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cut-off date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The time-gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cutoff date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fall on the wrong side of such a cut-off date may well contend that the cut-off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued earlier; or in the alternative that the cut-off date could have been fixed later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cut-off date fixed and the manner in which it is fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameswaran Match Works and later cases that the cut-off date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cutoff date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any basis. In our view the cut-off date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the beginning of the calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain. 11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum age limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking that they are age-barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can be exercised in the manner contended. 17. In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged the cut-off date under the relevant rules are dismissed while the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the Rules concerned relating to the cut-off date being fixed with reference to 1st of January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no order as to costs. (emphasis supplied) (xiv) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn., reported in (2004) 2 SCC 76 , in paragraph nos.29, 31, 32 and 33 as under : “29. It is now well settled that for the purpose of effecting promotion, the employer is required to fix a date for the purpose of effecting promotion and, thus, unless a cut-off date so fixed is held to be arbitrary or unreasonable, the same cannot be set aside as offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, the cut-off date so fixed having regard to the directions contained by the National Industrial Tribunal which had been given a retrospective effect cannot be said to be arbitrary, irrational, whimsical or capricious. 31. It is not in dispute that a cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of the statute or executive order. In University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary it has been observed: (SCC p. 546, para 21) “21. 31. It is not in dispute that a cut-off date can be provided in terms of the provisions of the statute or executive order. In University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary it has been observed: (SCC p. 546, para 21) “21. … It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works, SCC at 310 : SCR at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan, SCC at 66 : SCR at p. 269.)” 32. If a cut-off date can be fixed, indisputably those who fall within the purview thereof would form a separate class. Such a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object which the decision of the Bank to promote its employees seeks to achieve. Such classifications would neither fall within the category of creating a class within a class or an artificial classification so as to offend Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 33. Whenever such a cut-off date is fixed, a question may arise as to why a person would suffer only because he comes within the wrong side of the cut-off date, but, the fact that some persons or a section of society would face hardship, by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the cut-off date so fixed is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. (emphasis supplied) (xv) It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Govt. of A.P. v. N. Subbarayudu, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 702 , in paragraph nos. 5, 7, 8 & 9 as under: “5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. 5, 7, 8 & 9 as under: “5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. (See State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal.) 7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical), vide State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (vide SCC para 5), Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn. (vide SCC para 31), University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary, etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter-affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cut-off date has been chosen, the court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. 9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass and in Govt. of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi the court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain. 9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass and in Govt. of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi the court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain. (emphasis supplied) (xvi) In view of the aforesaid decisions also, this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will be extremely slow in issuing writ of mandamus to give retrospectivity to the Annexure 7 which is a notification for amending Section 67(a) of the Act of 2000. It may happen that these two petitioners might have retired prior to 26th December, 2012, but that does not mean that the notification published by the State of Jharkhand should be given retrospective effect. State Government is not giving 'retrospective effect' keeping in mind several factors as per the policy decision, as stated herein above. This Court is not a Cost Accountant or Chartered Accountant or economist. There are financial ramifications also. Hence, we are not inclined to give any retrospective effect to the notification at Annexure 7, nor there is a public duty vested in the State to prescribe a particular retrospective date, much less 30th June, 2010 8. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, there is no substance in this writ petition. Hence, the same is hereby dismissed with a cost of Rs.10,000/- to each of the petitioners, and thereby totally an amount of Rs.20,000/- will be deposited by both these petitioners before the Member Secretary, Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority, Nyay Sadan, Doranda, Ranchi, which will be utilized for 'Middle Income Group Legal Aid Society' formulated by the Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority. This amount of Rs.20000/- i.e. Rs.10000/- by each petitioner, will be deposited before the Member Secretary, Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority, Nyay Sadan, Doranda, Ranchi within a period of sixteen weeks from today. 9. Registrar General of this Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the Member Secretary, Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority, Nyay Sadan, Doranda, Ranchi. 10. This writ petition is hereby dismissed with the aforesaid observations. Petition dismissed.