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2016 DIGILAW 982 (ORI)

Shobha Singh v. Ranjana Kumari Singh

2016-10-27

K.R.MOHAPATRA, VINOD PRASAD

body2016
JUDGMENT : K.R. Mohapatra, J. This Matrimonial Appeal arises out of order dated 24.12.2011 passed by learned Judge Family Court, Rourkela in C.P.No.114 of 2001 rejecting an Application for condonation of delay (Misc. Case No.23 of 2011) in filing the petition under Order 9 Rule 9, CPC to restore the Civil Proceeding, which was dismissed for default. 2. Civil Proceeding No.114 of 2001 was filed before the learned Judge Family Court, Rourkela by one Smt. Shobha Singh and Sri Santosh Kumar Singh (appellants herein) to get a declaration that the Appellant No.1 is the legally married wife of Appellant No.2. The pleadings in CP No.114 of 2001 reveal that the appellants got married on 24.02.1999 as per the Hindu customs and rites at village Kumei in Jahanabad district of Bihar. Out of their wedlock, they were blessed with two children, a son and a daughter. In the year 1999, while serving at Rourkela, appellant No.2 developed acquaintance with the respondent who was a co-worker. Taking advantage of the situation, the respondent tried to entice appellant No.2 to develop relationship to which appellant No.2 did not succumb. Having failed in all her attempts respondent, namely, Rajana Kumari Singh filed CP No.188 of 2000 to declare her as the legally married wife of appellant No.2. She contended therein that her marriage with the appellant No.2 was solemnized on 21.03.1999 in Dumerta Kali temple at Bandamunda observing Hindu rites and customs. Soon after both parties consummated their marriage and stayed at quarters of appellant No.2 at Bandamunda. On the next day of marriage, the respondent was sent to her parental home on the plea that she would be taken back subsequently after convincing the parents of appellant No.2, which never happened. When the respondent came to know that the appellant No.2 had married to appellant No.1, she came up with CP No.188 of 2000 for the aforesaid relief. 3. During pendency of CP No.188 of 2000, the appellants filed CP No.114 of 2001 for the relief stated above before the Judge Family Court, Rourkela. When the respondent came to know that the appellant No.2 had married to appellant No.1, she came up with CP No.188 of 2000 for the aforesaid relief. 3. During pendency of CP No.188 of 2000, the appellants filed CP No.114 of 2001 for the relief stated above before the Judge Family Court, Rourkela. It is contended that though the appellant No.1 had filed petition to implead herself as a party in CP No.188 of 2000 (filed by the respondent), the said application was rejected by the Judge Family Court, Rourkela on 19.09.2001 on the finding that impletion of appellant No.1 as a party to CP No.188 of 2000 would not be helpful in deciding the controversy between the parties therein. C.P. No.188 of 2000 was finally decided on 07.10.2002 holding the respondent to be the legally married wife of appellant No.2. Assailing the said judgment, appellant No.2 preferred MATA No.2 of 2003 before this Court. This Court, upon hearing the parties allowed MATA No.2 of 2003 on 16.10.2003, set aside the judgment passed in CP No.188 of 2000 and remanded the matter back to learned Judge Family Court, Rourkela to decide the same afresh giving opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence. Upon remand, learned Judge Family Court, Rourkela proceeded with the matter in compliance with the direction of this Court and vide judgment dated 21.04.2004 dismissed CP No.188 of 2000 holding that no marriage between the appellant No.2 and the respondent was solemnized as per Hindu rites and customs as claimed by the respondent therein. 4. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, respondent preferred MATA No.15 of 2004 before this Court, which was disposed of by judgment dated 05.11.2009 setting aside the judgment passed in CP No.188 of 2000. Being aggrieved by the said judgment in MATA No.15 of 2004, the appellant No.2 preferred RVWPET No.188 of 2010. In the said Review Petition, the appellant No.1 joined the appellant No.2. During final hearing of the Review Petition, i.e., on 18.02.2011, the respondent produced a copy of order dated 11.03.2003 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court in CP No.114 of 2001 dismissing the CP for default. From the copy of the said order, the appellants came to know about the fate of their Civil Proceeding No.114 of 2001. During final hearing of the Review Petition, i.e., on 18.02.2011, the respondent produced a copy of order dated 11.03.2003 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court in CP No.114 of 2001 dismissing the CP for default. From the copy of the said order, the appellants came to know about the fate of their Civil Proceeding No.114 of 2001. It is contended in this Memorandum of Appeal that this Court, while disposing of the Review Petition filed by the appellants on 08.03.2011 observed that in the event CP No.114 of 2001 is restored, learned Court below shall decide the same on the basis of evidence adduced therein without being influenced by the observations made in paragraph-10 of the judgment dated 05.11.2009 passed in MATA No.15 of 2004. 5. Accordingly, the appellants filed a petition under Order 9 Rule 9, CPC in CP No.114 of 2001 to set aside the order dated 11.03.2003 and to restore the CP No.114 of 2001 to file along with a petition for condonation of delay, which was registered as Misc. Case No.23 of 2011. In the said petition, the appellants contended that the marriage between the appellant Nos.1 and 2 solemnized as per Bhumihar customs and practice on 24.02.1999 at village Kumei in Jahanabad district of Bihar. They have been blessed with two children. On 11.03.2003, when the matter was taken up for hearing neither the appellants nor their counsel was present nor any step was taken on their behalf. As the appellants were absent, they could not know the fate of the case. Moreover, the order of dismissal of the CP for default was never communicated to the appellants by their Advocate. Hence, they were in dark about proceedings of the case. It was during hearing of the Review Petition No.188 of 2010 before this Court, the respondent produced a copy of order dated 11.03.2003 wherefrom, the appellants came to know about the dismissal of the CP filed by them. It was further pleaded therein that an application was filed for analogous hearing of CP No.188 of 2000 and CP No.114 of 2001 and they were under impression that CP No.114 of 2001 was being taken up along with CP No.188 of 2000. Thus, neither nonappearance of the appellants on the date of hearing, i.e., on 11.03.2003 nor delay in filing the petition for restoration was intentional. Thus, neither nonappearance of the appellants on the date of hearing, i.e., on 11.03.2003 nor delay in filing the petition for restoration was intentional. The same was bona fide and beyond the control of the appellants. It is due to the sheer misunderstanding and non-communication that they could not take proper step in CP No.114 of 2001 for which it was dismissed for default. Hence, they contended that unless CP No. 114 of 2001 is restored to file, the status of appellant No.1 cannot be ascertained, for which the appellants would be highly prejudiced. In view of the above, they prayed for setting aside of order dated 11.03.2003 and for restoration of CP No.114 of 2001 to file by condoning the delay. 6. The respondent filed objection to both the petitions refuting the contentions and allegations made therein. While challenging the maintainability of both the petitions, the respondent contended that the petitions suffer from delay, latches and lack of due diligence. The same were being filed only to protract the litigation and reopen the matter which has been set at rest since long. She further contended that in view of the judgment passed in MATA No.15 of 2004, the petition for restoration was not maintainable. In course of hearing of CP No.188 of 2000, the appellants on 19.09.2001, had filed a petition for analogous hearing of CP No.114 of 2001 with CP No.188 of 2000. Subsequently, they filed a memo and did not press the said petition. The appellants were very much aware of order dated 11.03.2003 as the respondent had brought this fact to the notice of this Court in course of hearing of MATA No.15 of 2004. On 29.04.2009, she had also filed certified copy of the order dated 11.03.2003 passed in CP No.114 of 2001 serving copy thereof on learned counsel for the appellants, but the appellants being aware of the fact did not file any petition for restoration of CP at that point of time. The Appellants were although out negligent in pursuing the Civil Proceeding. They had never bothered to appear before learned Judge, Family Court, Rourkela even if they were so required under the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and the lawyer had a little role in pursuing the matter in the Family Court. A Lawyer could at best assist the Court as well as the parties in difficulties. They had never bothered to appear before learned Judge, Family Court, Rourkela even if they were so required under the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and the lawyer had a little role in pursuing the matter in the Family Court. A Lawyer could at best assist the Court as well as the parties in difficulties. His role was that of a amicus curiae and no more than that. 7. It evinces from the record that after the pleadings of the parties were completed in the matter of restoration, none of the parties opted to lead evidence in the matter. However, the parties advanced their argument on the petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (Misc. Case No.23 of 2011) on 25.11.2011 and the matter was adjourned to 20.12.2011. On 20.12.2011, the order was not ready. On that date, both parties filed their written notes of arguments, which were taken into consideration. The impugned order was thus pronounced on 24.12.2011. 8. Heard Mr.Rajat Rath, learned Senior Advocate and Mr. Mukesh Panda, learned Counsel for the appellants and the respondent in person and perused the record. Mr.Panda, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the dismissal of C.P. No.114 of 2001 for default was not within the knowledge of the appellants as learned counsel appearing on their behalf neither took any step in the matter on the day the impugned order was passed nor the same was ever intimated the appellants. The appellants only came to know about the same on 18.02.2011, when the respondent produced a copy of order dated 11.03.2003 of learned Judge, Family Court, Rourkela in CP No.114 of 2001 dismissing the Civil Proceeding for default of the appellants. The Review Petition was heard on 18.02.2011 and the judgment was pronounced on 08.03.2011 dismissing the Review Petition with an observation that in the event the CP No.114 of 2001 is restored to file, the learned Judge, Family Court, Rourkela shall decide the same on the basis of the evidence adduced therein without being influenced by the observation made in paragraph-10 of the impugned judgment dated 05.11.2009 passed in MATA No.15 of 2004. Thus, the appellants filed a petition under Order 9 Rule 9, CPC before the learned Judge, Family Court, Rourkela for restoration of CP No.114 of 2001. 9. Thus, the appellants filed a petition under Order 9 Rule 9, CPC before the learned Judge, Family Court, Rourkela for restoration of CP No.114 of 2001. 9. Mr.Panda refuted the contentions of the respondent to the effect that in course of hearing of MATA No. 15 of 2004, a copy of the order of dismissal of C.P. No. 114 of 2001 was served on the counsel for the appellants. Further, relying upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramji Gupta & Anr. Vs. Gopi Krishan Agrawal (D) & Ors., reported in AIR 2013 SC 3099 , Mr. Panda submitted that the litigant should not suffer either for the mistake of his counsel or for the act of the Court. The appellants were under the bona fide impression that the learned counsel engaged by them would intimate the steps to be taken in C.P. No. 114 of 2001. But, due to the latches of their counsel, the matter was dismissed for default which was beyond the control of the appellants. In addition to the above, C.P. No. 114 of 2001 involves a substantial question of determination of marital status of appellant No.1 vis-à-vis the respondent with the appellant No.2, which is pivotal for determining the inter se status of the parties. Learned Judge, Family Court did not look into this material aspect in its proper perspective and passed the impugned order, which is not sustainable in the eye of law and is liable to be set aside. 10. Smt. Ranjana Kumari Singh, the respondent refuting the submission of Mr. Panda contended that in course of hearing of MATA No.15 of 2004 before this Court, she had supplied the copy of order dated 11.03.2003 of C.P. No. 114 of 2001, on which date it was dismissed for default. She also produced documents to that effect. It was her submission that the appellants deliberately allowed C.P. No. 114 of 2001 to be dismissed for default on 11.03.2003 and did not take any step thereafter to get it restored. All throughout, they had the knowledge about such dismissal. After disposal of RVWPET No.188 of 2001, when the appellants found all doors closed, to harass her, they adopted a novel procedure by filing a petition under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC for restoration of C.P. No. 114 of 2001. Even if, contention of Mr. All throughout, they had the knowledge about such dismissal. After disposal of RVWPET No.188 of 2001, when the appellants found all doors closed, to harass her, they adopted a novel procedure by filing a petition under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC for restoration of C.P. No. 114 of 2001. Even if, contention of Mr. Panda is accepted to the effect that dismissal of C.P. No. 114 of 2001 came to their knowledge on 18.02.2001, then also the petition under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC is hopelessly time barred as it was filed only on 06.08.2001 without giving proper explanation to the inordinate delay caused in filing such petition. Learned Judge, Family Court had taken into consideration all the aspects and passed the impugned order, which is legal, justified and the same needs no interference. Smt. Singh further contended that the appellant No.2 has been harassing her since the date of her marriage, i.e., 21.03.1999. The appellants have lost in all forums to establish their marriage, including before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence, the appeal should be dismissed with cost to save the respondent from further harassment. 11. Section 13 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (for short, ‘the Act’) provides for the right of the parties to legal representation, which reads as follows: “13. Right to legal representation–Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, no party to a suit or proceeding before a Family Court shall be entitled, as of right, to be represented by a legal practitioner: Provided that if the Family Court considers it necessary in the interest of justice, it may seek the assistance of a legal expert as amicus curiae.” 12. Vetting through the order sheet of learned Judge, Family Court in C.P. No. 114 of 2001, it appears that the appellants had, in fact, filed an application under Section 13 of the Act for legal representation, but no order has been passed on the same. The tenor of Section 13 makes it clear that no party before a Family Court, as of right, shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner. However, if the Family Court considers it necessary for the interest of justice, may take assistance of legal practitioner, but his role would be limited to that of amicus curiae. The law is no more res integra on this issue. However, if the Family Court considers it necessary for the interest of justice, may take assistance of legal practitioner, but his role would be limited to that of amicus curiae. The law is no more res integra on this issue. In the instant case, no specific order being passed by the Family Court for assistance of a lawyer, the appellants were obliged to take steps personally. Even otherwise, the procedure adopted in a suit of proceeding before the Family Court makes it imperative for the parties to appear before the Family Court in person in all stages of the suit or the proceeding and take steps accordingly. Thus, the plea of the appellants that they were not informed about C.P. No. 114 of 2001 by their lawyer will be of no help to them. That apart, the appellants did not also make any enquiry about the proceeding for a period of more than 9 years. No plausible explanation has been given for such lack of due diligence. A litigant should be much more vigilant in a suit or proceeding than his counsel. He has to be diligent throughout to protect his right in the suit or proceeding. No doubt, no litigant should suffer for the latches/negligence of his counsel. But, at the same breath, a litigant has to show how diligent he was in protecting his right in the suit or proceeding. Moreover, the litigant has to plead and prove the act of negligence or latches of his Advocate to wriggle out from disadvantageous position caused due to negligence of his Advocate. Before casting aspersion on the conduct of his counsel he has to prove his diligence in pursuing the suit or the proceeding. The Court while scrutinizing the veracity of the allegation of the litigant with regard to conduct of his counsel, has to be very careful to look into the conduct of the litigant himself in pursuing the matter. Mr.Panda, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramji Gupta & Anr. Vs. Gopi Krishan Agrawal (D) & Ors., reported in AIR 2013 SC 3099 in paragraph 22 of which the Hon’ble Court has held as under:- 22. In exceptional circumstances, the Court may exercise its inherent powers, apart from Order IX CPC to set aside an ex parte decree. Vs. Gopi Krishan Agrawal (D) & Ors., reported in AIR 2013 SC 3099 in paragraph 22 of which the Hon’ble Court has held as under:- 22. In exceptional circumstances, the Court may exercise its inherent powers, apart from Order IX CPC to set aside an ex parte decree. An ex-parte decree passed due to the non appearance of the counsel of a party, owing to the fact that the party was not at fault, can be set aside in an appeal preferred against it. So is the case, where the absence of a defendant is caused on account of a mistake of the Court. An application under Section 151 CPC will be maintainable, in the event that an ex parte order has been obtained by fraud upon the court or by collusion. The provisions of Order IX CPC may not be attracted, and in such a case the Court may either restore the case, or set aside the ex parte order in the exercise of its inherent powers. There may be an order of dismissal of a suit for default of appearance of the plaintiff, who was in fact dead at the time that the order was passed. Thus, where a Court employs a procedure to do something that it never intended to do, and there is miscarriage of justice, or an abuse of the process of Court, the injustice so done must be remedied, in accordance with the principle of actus curia neminem gravabit -an act of the Court shall prejudice no person.” No doubt, learned counsel for the appellants did not take any step on 11.03.2003 on which date the CP No.114 of 2001 was dismissed for default. The dismissal of the Civil Proceeding for default cannot be attributed to learned counsel for the appellants only. The appellants were equally at fault in not appearing before the Family Court to take steps in the matter, which he was required to. Demeanor of a litigant plays an important role in entitling him the relief sought for in addition to his statutory right, if any. Relief under Order IX as well as under Section 151 CPC is discretionary. The party has to come to the Court in clean hands and prove his bona fide for exercise of such discretion in his favour. Demeanor of a litigant plays an important role in entitling him the relief sought for in addition to his statutory right, if any. Relief under Order IX as well as under Section 151 CPC is discretionary. The party has to come to the Court in clean hands and prove his bona fide for exercise of such discretion in his favour. In the case at hand, apart from the so-called latches of their counsel, the appellant did not care to enquire about the stage or fate of their case for more than long nine years. Thus, the ratio decided in the aforesaid case is not applicable to the case at hand; primarily for the reason that the appellants were themselves at fault. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that non-communication of the fate of CP No.114 of 2001 by the counsel of the appellants is of no avail to them for restoration of the proceeding. 13. Mr. Panda, learned counsel contended that the appellants came to know about the fate of CP No.114 of 2001 on 18.02.2011, during the course of hearing of RVWPET No.188 of 2010 before this Hon’ble Court, when the respondent produced a copy of the order dated 11.03.2003 dismissing CP No.114 of 2001 for default. On the other hand, Smt. Singh, the respondent contended that she had served a copy of the aforesaid order on Mr. A.P. Bose, learned counsel for the appellants in course of hearing of MATA No.15 of 2004. In support of her submission, she also produced certain documents including the report of the handwriting expert in support of her contention that the signature appearing on the memo was that of Mr.Bose in token of receipt of documents mentioned in the said memo, which included the order dated 11.03.2003. We are unable to accept the authenticity of the handwritten expert, as it was not at the instance of this Court and the appellants were not given any opportunity to object the veracity of the same. There is no other document available on record to show that copy of the order dated 11.03.2003 passed in CP No.114 of 2001 was, in fact, served on learned counsel for the appellants in course of hearing of MATA No.15 of 2004. Mr. There is no other document available on record to show that copy of the order dated 11.03.2003 passed in CP No.114 of 2001 was, in fact, served on learned counsel for the appellants in course of hearing of MATA No.15 of 2004. Mr. Panda, learned counsel for the appellants also drew our attention to certain notings in the order sheet of MATA No.15 of 2004 to strengthen his argument to the effect that copy of the aforesaid order was never served on the appellants in course of hearing of MATA No.15 of 2004. It is apparent from record that a copy of the order dated 11.03.2003 was served on learned counsel on 18.02.2011 in course of hearing of RVWPET No.188 of 2010. Accepting the same to be the date of knowledge of the appellants regarding dismissal of CP No.114 of 2001, we proceeded to scrutinize the records. On perusal of the petition under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC as well as the petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (Misc. Case No.23 of 2011), it is apparent that no explanation has been offered for the delay in filing the petition under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC after the appellants came to know about the dismissal of the CP No.114 of 2001. It appears from the case record, that there is a delay of about 7 months in filing the petition under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. There is neither any oral nor documentary evidence in support of his contentions made either in petition for restoration or for condonation of delay explaining such delay. In that view of the matter, it is very difficult to accept the contention of the appellants that delay caused was bona fide and not intentional. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee -v- Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 in Paragraphs-21 and 22 of the said decision set out the principles to be adhered for condonation of delay as follows: “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1 (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1 (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4 (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” In case of Office Of The Chief Post Master General and Ors., vs. Living Media India Ltd.& Anr., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 , the similar view has been taken. Thus, it is true that the Court should always adopt non-pedantic approach for condonation of delay. However, when the delay is not properly explained, the hands of Court are tight and it cannot exercise its discretion in a routine manner to condone the delay. Thus, it is true that the Court should always adopt non-pedantic approach for condonation of delay. However, when the delay is not properly explained, the hands of Court are tight and it cannot exercise its discretion in a routine manner to condone the delay. Taking into consideration the discussion made above, and more particularly, the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court stated (supra), we find that the delay in approaching the Court for restoration of C.P. No.114 of 2001 was inordinate one. Much water has flown in the meantime and marital status of the respondent declared by this Court in MATA No.15 of 2004 has been confirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The right accrued to the respondent in the meantime shouldn’t be disturbed lightly unless a strong case is made out. As such, we find it very difficult to accept the contentions of Mr. Panda and to take a different view than that of learned Judge, Family Court. 14. On perusal of the impugned order, it appears that learned Judge Family Court has not committed any illegality in dismissing Misc. Case No.23 of 2011 for condonation of delay, which resultantly dismissed the petition under Order 9 Rule 9, CPC. 15. Discussions made above drive us to sum up that the impugned order is legal and justified and needs no interference. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed; however, under the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. Vinod Prasad, J. I agree.