JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. In this case, main accused, Sanjeev Kumar alias Sanju, has since expired. Appeal qua him already stands abated. 2. We are called upon to examine the correctness of the judgment dated 26th September, 2007 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur in Sessions Trial No. 18 of 2006, whereby accused Sanjeev Kumar (since deceased) and co-accused Jagmohan alias Mohini stand acquitted for having committed offence punishable under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC’). 3. Trial Court, charged the accused for having committed offence punishable Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 IPC, to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, in all, prosecution examined as many as fifteen witnesses. Statements of accused Sanjeev Kumar and co-accused Jagmohan under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were also recorded, in which accused Jagmohan took the following defence:- “This is a false case against me. In fact, on 10.2.2006, my sister got married with Abhishek and that up to 15.2.2006 I remained busy with my newly married sister and Jija while taking them around different temples situated nearby. On 15.2.2006, since my Jija had reservation in train, we hired a Scorpio vehicle in order to go to Chandigarh where we left our Jija whose, train left Chandigarh at 5.00 p.m. and thereafter, I alongwith my father, sister and driver made shopping at Chandigarh on the same day i.e. 15.2.2006. After having taken dinner at Chandigarh, we started for our place at about 8.30 p.m. and reached our house at about 12.30 a.m.(night). Thereafter, I remained with my sister in our house up to 21.2.2006, on which date, I alongwith my sister, mother, younger brother went to New Delhi in the same vehicle (Scorpio) since my Jija had to board flight for London. On the night of 22.2.2006, we returned to our house. On 23.2.2006 I was arrested by the police. In the month of March, 2005, I had an altercation with the then ASP, Sh. Patial at Kandraur who was in civil dress. At that time, he had threatened to frame me in some case and that in the instant case, I have been roped at the instance of ASP Patial. On 23.2.2006 I was arrested by the police. In the month of March, 2005, I had an altercation with the then ASP, Sh. Patial at Kandraur who was in civil dress. At that time, he had threatened to frame me in some case and that in the instant case, I have been roped at the instance of ASP Patial. A case under Sections 107, 150 Cr.P.C. was also got prepared by the ASP against me and others regarding the occurrence whereby I had an altercation with him. In the police Station, witness Jai Hind was telling that he did not know us but the police got, from him various papers, signed by giving beating.” Six witnesses were examined by the accused in their defence. 5. Trial Court, after appreciating the testimony of the prosecution witnesses acquitted both the accused. Hence the present appeal. 6. We have heard V.S. Chauhan, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Mr. Vikram Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General, on behalf of the State as also Mr. J.R. Poswal, Advocate, on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. In Prandas v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: “(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under S. 417, Criminal P.c., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 417, Criminal P.c. in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in – ‘Sheo Swarup v. Emperor’, AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) at pp.229, 230 (A), in these words: “Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognized in the administration of justice.”” 9. Undisputedly, there is no direct evidence and the prosecution case primarily rests upon circumstantial evidence. The prosecution wants to bring home the guilt of accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence, through the testimonies of 15 prosecution witnesses, so examined in Court. It is sought to be proved that some time in the night of 15th February, 2006 accused persons hatched conspiracy and after consuming alcohol, committed the murder of Raghunath alias Raju and thereafter destroyed the evidence by throwing away his body at a place, other than the one where such murder came to be committed. 10. It is a matter of record, as has emerged from the testimony of PW13-ASI Rattan Lal, that dead body of the deceased was found lying under the heap of a cow-dung in village Kandraur. When such information was communicated to the police and Rattan Lal reached the spot. On the basis of the Rukka so sent by him, FIR No. 70/06, dated 21.2.2006 (Ext. PW11/C) came to be recorded at Police Station, Sadar, Bilaspur. Dead body came to be identified by the relatives (PW1-Jai Hind) of the deceased and after preparation of the inquest report, post-mortem of the dead body was got conducted at District Hospital, Bilaspur. 11. The learned Trial Court has specifically not culled out the circumstances pressed by the prosecution to bring home the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, according to Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned Addl. Advocate General, following circumstances arise for consideration by this Court:- 1. The deceased was lastly seen in the company of the accused in the night of 15.2.2006 when all of them consumed alcohol; 2. The recovery of dead body from a place other than the one where the accused and the deceased together consumed alcohol; 3. The post-mortem report establishing the factum of death of the deceased by strangulation; and 4. The disclosure statement (Ext.PW9/F) so made by accused Jagmohan in the presence of Hira Lal (PW-9) which further led to recovery of the clothes worn by the said accused, vide memo (Ext.PW9/B). 12. The post-mortem report establishing the factum of death of the deceased by strangulation; and 4. The disclosure statement (Ext.PW9/F) so made by accused Jagmohan in the presence of Hira Lal (PW-9) which further led to recovery of the clothes worn by the said accused, vide memo (Ext.PW9/B). 12. It is a settled principle of law that in a case of circumstantial evidence, the onus heavily lies upon the prosecution to establish not only each of the circumstance but also the link between them, beyond reasonable doubt. It has to be an unbroken chain of events. Also, what is required to be established is that the guilt of the accused alone is proven, ruling out any doubt of his complicity or involvement of anyone else in the alleged crime. The chain of evidence has to be complete and not leave any reasonable ground of the conclusion inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and the hypothesis must be such that under all circumstances and in all probability, the act must have been committed by the accused alone and none else. 13. We now proceed to examine each of the circumstance. It is a matter of record, which fact also cannot be disputed by the accused, that the dead body stood recovered from a place known as Kandraur in the presence of, Jai Hind (PW-1). Identity of the dead body is also not disputed in any manner, which fact in any event stands established through the testimony of independent witnesses. Testimonies of the independent witnesses cannot be rendered to be doubtful. 14. It is also a matter of record that post-mortem of the dead body was got conducted by the police through Dr. N.K. Sankhyan (PW-12) who has proven on record the post-mortem report (Ext.PW12/F) and opined that deceased died due to mechanical asphyxia, as a result of strangulation by a ligature. 15. We do not find the accused to have probablised his defence but independent of that we have examined the prosecution evidence. 16. Now when we examine the testimony of Jai Hind (PW-1) on the question of last seen circumstance, we notice him to have deposed that “some time” “in the evening” of 15.2.2006 accused, deceased and he consumed liquor in his room. After some time, accused Sanju asked the deceased to bring more liquor from the liquor shop. 16. Now when we examine the testimony of Jai Hind (PW-1) on the question of last seen circumstance, we notice him to have deposed that “some time” “in the evening” of 15.2.2006 accused, deceased and he consumed liquor in his room. After some time, accused Sanju asked the deceased to bring more liquor from the liquor shop. Soon deceased returned empty handed, and stating that the liquor vend had closed. At that, accused Sanju started abusing other persons (Khan) who were also present in the room. This witness caught Sanju and snatched the danda which he was holding in his hand. Soon thereafter, on the asking of accused Sanju, deceased went outside. Accused Jagmohan also accompanied them. This was at about 10:30 p.m. While going, accused Sanju had also taken the danda along with himself. Thereafter, deceased never returned. Well this is all that he states. He does not state any scuffle, fight or verbal dual having taken place between the deceased or the accused. In fact, accused Sanjeev Kumar got annoyed at other persons presenting the room and not the deceased. But even when we examine the cross-examination part of his testimony, we do not find such version to be correct. This witness wants the Court to believe that Jagmohan came to be identified on the asking of the police, but then no such test identification parade was ever got conducted by the police. Unrebuttedly, the witness admits to have been beaten up by the police. In defence the accused has stated so. The possibility of his having deposed falsely against both the accused cannot be ruled out, more so in the light of testimony of Rakesh Kumar (PW3) and Het Ram (PW-10), who have not supported the prosecution and despite their extensive cross-examination nothing fruitful could be elicited from their testimony. He himself may have been a suspect. 17. The accused and the deceased allegedly consumed alcohol in the room of this witness. But then there is no link/corroborative evidence to establish such fact. Noticeably, from his testimony, motive of murdering the deceased cannot be inferred. Also, it cannot be stated that the accused had quarreled with the deceased. No such quarrel took place. All that the witness states is that when the deceased came empty handed, accused Sanju started abusing the Khan and not the deceased. 18. Noticeably, from his testimony, motive of murdering the deceased cannot be inferred. Also, it cannot be stated that the accused had quarreled with the deceased. No such quarrel took place. All that the witness states is that when the deceased came empty handed, accused Sanju started abusing the Khan and not the deceased. 18. Now coming to the next circumstance of disclosure statement of accused Jagmohan (Ext. PW9/F) dated 28.2.2016, we find four facts to have been disclosed by this accused:- 1. Both he and accused Sanju had murdered deceased Raju; 2. He could get recovered his shirt and Baniyan (vest) which he had concealed in the house of Sanju; 3. He could get recovered blue colour Baniyan (vest), with which they had strangulated the accused, concealed in the house of Sanju; and 4. The scissors with which the said Baniyan (vest) was cut. 19. Such statement was allegedly made in the presence of Jindu and Hira Lal. Witness Jindu has not been examined in the Court. From the testimony of Hira Lal (PW-9) we find such statement to have been made by accused Jagmohan. But however, there is one fact which renders the factum of recording of such statement to be doubtful and that being, admission made by this witness, that accused had also made a statement on 21.2.2006. Now, and what is that statement? Is not evidently clear from the record. Certainly it is not the one on which reliance is sought. Also, we find Balbir Singh (PW-14) to have admitted that accused stood arrested, prior to his taking over the investigation on 25.2.2006. Now the arrest memo is not on record. What transpired between 21.2.2006 and 25.2.2006 is evidently not clear on record. Hence, the veracity of such disclosure statement itself is in doubt. That apart, what was recovered are the clothes of accused Jagmohan and Baniyan (vest) allegedly with which the deceased was strangulated. The first part of disclosure statement cannot be used against the accused, in view of Sections 25 to 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. In so far as the recovery of the clothes of the accused are concerned, it does not further establish anything else, for the blood stains found on such clothes were not that of the deceased. The first part of disclosure statement cannot be used against the accused, in view of Sections 25 to 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. In so far as the recovery of the clothes of the accused are concerned, it does not further establish anything else, for the blood stains found on such clothes were not that of the deceased. The disclosure statement itself, as we have already observed is rendered to be doubtful and cannot be said to be a circumstance to have been established beyond reasonable doubt. 20. Post-mortem was conducted on 22.2.2006. As per version of Dr. N.K. Sankhyan (PW-12) death would have taken place sometime between 4 to 10 days. The death of deceased could not be established to be proximate to the time when he was last seen in the company of the accused. 21. There is yet another mitigating circumstance in favour of the accused. Allegedly the deceased was found missing w.e.f. 15.2.2006 but no report was ever lodged by anyone, much less by Jai Hind (PW-1). After all he wants the Court to believe that the deceased had lastly left in the company of the accused. Also there was no motive for the accused to kill the deceased. 22. Thus, the Court below, in our considered view, has correctly and completely appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. It cannot be said that judgment of trial Court is perverse, illegal, erroneous or based on incorrect and incomplete appreciation of material on record resulting into miscarriage of justice. 23. The accused persons have had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others versus Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (2010) 1 SCC 94 , since it cannot be said that trial Court has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice, no interference is warranted in the instant case. For all the aforesaid reasons, present appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any. Bail bonds furnished by the accused are discharged. Record of the trial Court be immediately sent back.