JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan J. This Criminal revision under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is directed against the order dated 9.5.2016 passed by learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Nurpur, District Kangra, whereby prohibitory orders under Section 144 Cr.PC (for short the ‘impugned order’) has been passed. 2. Baba Kyalu Dangal Mela from times immemorial is organized every year in the first week of June by the devotees of Baba Kyalu along with local inhabitants of Gram Panchayat Gangath and surrounding Gram panchayats. 3. Dispute in relation to organizing the Mela has arisen this year (2016) because in addition to old committee constituted for the management of the Mela, one new committee (petitioner) was formed, which started collecting membership and even published advertisement regarding the conduct of management of the Mela. 4. As per reply-affidavit filed by the SDM, Nurpur, it was respondent No.2 which had been organizing the Mela for the last many years, whereas petitioner had recently got itself registered under the Societies Registration Act. Both the parties, i.e. petitioner and respondent No.2 started polarizing the people and started quarreling with each other regarding taking over of the management of the Mela. They separately presented applications to the Gram Panchayat, Gangath as also to the SDM, Nurpur for obtaining various permission regarding conduct of Mela. Petitioner thereafter even applied for cancellation of registration of respondent No.2 society on the ground that it had been registered earlier. That apart, Presidents of both the parties along with their supporters had earlier met respondent No.1 and explained the situation and were directed to remain present alongwith the Pradhans of Gram Panchayat Gangath and Rappad on 9.5.2016 together with their claims and objections in this regard. Respondent No.1 heard both the parties along with the Pradhans and thereafter passed the impugned order. 5. The main contention put forth by the petitioner was that respondent No.2 (old committee) was not recording the earnings and expenditure and had misappropriated the funds. Whereas, on the other hand, respondent No.2 had produced photocopies of the earnings and expenditures and the other related records, which convinced respondent No.1 that the records were being properly maintained. 6. Respondent No.1, further came to the conclusion that since there were only few days remaining for the conduct of Mela, the petitioner was not in a position to conduct the management in such a short time. 6. Respondent No.1, further came to the conclusion that since there were only few days remaining for the conduct of Mela, the petitioner was not in a position to conduct the management in such a short time. In such circumstances, if the Mela was not held with in the prescribed time, then because of warring groups, this would hurt the religious sentiments of the devotees of Baba Kyalu as well as those of the local inhabitants. Therefore, in his wisdom, he ordered handing over of the management to the old committee, i.e. respondent No.2, who, according to him, had been handling the affairs since last 30 years. 7. In the reply-affidavit, respondent No.1 has categorically stated that aggressiveness of both the parties to take over the Mela management lead him towards the conclusion that in this struggle there is every likelihood of apprehension of breach of peace in the area and this fact weighed with him while passing the impugned order. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case, which were produced before me pursuant to the directions issued to this effect on 27.4.2016. 8. Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: “S.144. Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance of apprehended danger. (1) In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, a Sub- divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case and served in the manner provided by section 134, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquility, or a riot, of an affray. (2) An order under this section may, in cases of emergency or in cases where the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the order is directed, be passed ex parte. (3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to persons residing in a particular place or area, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place or area. (4) No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof: Provided that, if the State Government considers it necessary so to do for preventing danger to human life, health or safety or for preventing a riot or any affray, it may, by notification, direct that an order made by a Magistrate under this section shall remain in force for such further period not exceeding six months from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate would have, but for such order, expired, as it may specify in the said notification. (5) Any Magistrate may, either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made under this section, by himself or any Magistrate subordinate to him or by his predecessor- inoffice. (6) The State Government may, either on its own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any order made by it under the proviso to subsection (4). (7) Where an application under sub- section (5) or subsection (6) is received, the Magistrate, or the State Government, as the case may be, shall afford to the applicant an early opportunity of appearing before him or it, either in person or by pleader and showing cause against the order; and if the Magistrate or the State Government, as the case may be, rejects the application wholly or in part, he or it shall record in writing the reasons for so doing.” 9. The scope of aforesaid section has elaborately been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramlila Maidan Incident Vs. Home Secretary & ors, (2012) 5 SCC 1 and it has been held as under: “49 Section 144 Cr.P.C. is intended to serve public purpose and protect public order. The scope of aforesaid section has elaborately been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramlila Maidan Incident Vs. Home Secretary & ors, (2012) 5 SCC 1 and it has been held as under: “49 Section 144 Cr.P.C. is intended to serve public purpose and protect public order. This power vested in the executive is to be invoked after the satisfaction of the authority that there is need for immediate prevention or that speedy remedy is desirable and directions as contemplated are necessary to protect the interest of others or to prevent danger to human life, health or safety or disturbance of public tranquility or a riot or an affray. These features must co-exist at a given point of time in order to enable the authority concerned to pass appropriate orders. The expression `law and order' is a comprehensive expression which may include not merely `public order' but also matters such as `public peace', `public tranquility' and `orderliness' in a locality or a local area and perhaps some other matters of public concern too. `Public order' is something distinct from order or orderliness in a local area. Public order, if disturbed, must lead to public disorder whereas every breach of peace may not always lead to public disorder. 50.This concept came to be illustratively explained in the judgment of this Court in the case of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 : 1966 Cri LJ 608, wherein it was held that (AIR p.758, para 51) “51……When two drunkards quarrel and fight, there is `disorder' but not `public disorder'. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain `law and order' but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing `public order'. However, where the two persons fighting were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions, the problem is still one of `law and order' but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. The main distinction is that where it affects the community or public at large, it will be an issue relatable to `public order'. Section 144 Cr.P.C empowers passing of such order in the interest of public order equitable to public safety and tranquility. The provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C. empowering the authorities to pass orders to tend to or to prevent the disturbances of public tranquility is not ultra vires the Constitution. 51. Section 144 Cr.P.C empowers passing of such order in the interest of public order equitable to public safety and tranquility. The provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C. empowering the authorities to pass orders to tend to or to prevent the disturbances of public tranquility is not ultra vires the Constitution. 51. In the case of State of Karnataka v. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, [ (2004) 4 SCC 684 ],: (SCC p.691, para 6), this Court, while observing that each person, whatever be his religion, must get the assurance from the State that he has the protection of law freely to profess, practice and propagate his religion and the freedom of conscience, held more emphatically that the “courts should not normally interfere with matters relating to law and order which is primarily the domain of the concerned administrative authorities. They are by and large the best to assess and handle the situation depending upon the peculiar needs and necessities within their special knowledge.” 52. The scope of Section 144 Cr.P.C. enumerates the principles and declares the situations where exercise of rights recognized by law, by one or few, may conflict with other rights of the public or tend to endanger the public peace, tranquility and/or harmony. The orders passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C. are attempted to serve larger public interest and purpose. As already noticed, under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. complete procedural mechanism is provided for examining the need and merits of an order passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C. If one reads the provisions of Section 144 Cr.P.C. along with other constitutional provisions and the judicial pronouncements of this Court, it can undisputedly be stated that Section 144 Cr.P.C. is a power to be exercised by the specified authority to prevent disturbance of public order, tranquility and harmony by taking immediate steps and when desirable, to take such preventive measures. Further, when there exists freedom of rights which are subject to reasonable restrictions, there are contemporaneous duties cast upon the citizens too. The duty to maintain law and order lies on the concerned authority and, thus, there is nothing unreasonable in making it the initial judge of the emergency. All this is coupled with a fundamental duty upon the citizens to obey such lawful orders as well as to extend their full cooperation in maintaining public order and tranquility. 56. The duty to maintain law and order lies on the concerned authority and, thus, there is nothing unreasonable in making it the initial judge of the emergency. All this is coupled with a fundamental duty upon the citizens to obey such lawful orders as well as to extend their full cooperation in maintaining public order and tranquility. 56. Moreover, an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. being an order which has a direct consequence of placing a restriction on the right to freedom of speech and expression and right to assemble peaceably, should be an order in writing and based upon material facts of the case. This would be the requirement of law for more than one reason. Firstly, it is an order placing a restriction upon the fundamental rights of a citizen and, thus, may adversely affect the interests of the parties, and secondly, under the provisions of the Cr.P.C., such an order is revisable and is subject to judicial review. Therefore, it will be appropriate that it must be an order in writing, referring to the facts and stating the reasons for imposition of such restriction. In the case of Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia (supra), this Court took the view that the Court, while dealing with such orders, does not act like an appellate authority over the decision of the official concerned. It would interfere only where the order is patently illegal and without jurisdiction or with ulterior motive and on extraneous consideration of political victimization by those in power. Normally, interference should be the exception and not the rule. 10. A bare reading of Section 144 Cr.P.C. shows that : (1) It is an executive power vested in the officer so empowered; (2) There must exist sufficient ground for proceeding; (3) Immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable; and (4) An order, in writing, should be passed stating the material facts and be served the same upon the concerned person. 11. These are the basic requirements for passing an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. Such an order can be passed against an individual or persons residing in a particular place or area or even against the public in general. Such an order can remain in force, not in excess of two months. 11. These are the basic requirements for passing an order under Section 144 Cr.P.C. Such an order can be passed against an individual or persons residing in a particular place or area or even against the public in general. Such an order can remain in force, not in excess of two months. The Government has the power to revoke such an order and wherever any person moves the Government for revoking such an order, the State Government is empowered to pass an appropriate order, after hearing the person in accordance with Sub-section (7) of Section 144 Cr.P.C. 12. Out of the above requirements, the requirements of existence of sufficient ground and need for immediate prevention or speedy remedy are of prime significance. In this context, the perception of the officer recording the desired/contemplated satisfaction has to be reasonable, least invasive and bona fide. The restraint has to be reasonable and further must be minimal. Such restraint should not be allowed to exceed the constraints of the particular situation either in nature or in duration. The most onerous duty that is cast upon the empowered officer by the legislature is that the perception of threat to public peace and tranquility should be real and not quandary, imaginary or a mere likely possibility. 13. Mr. Suneel Awasthi, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law as it does not record any satisfaction regarding the breach of public peace or tranquility and further the respondent No.1 clearly appears to be oblivious to the fact that power under section 144 Cr.PC is required to be exercised only when immediate and speedy intervention is required. He would also contend that the learned Magistrate while passing impugned order has virtually exercised powers of Civil court by holding the respondent No.2 to be the society which had been conducting Mela and this essentially means that they would continue to do so for all times to come. 14. Before, I deal with this contention of the petitioner, it needs to be observed that the court should not normally interfere with the matters relating to the law and order which is primarily the domain of the administrative concern as they are by and large best to assess the only situation depending upon the peculiar needs and necessities within their special knowledge. This was so observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka & anr Vs. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia (2004) 4 SCC 684 . The relevant paras read thus: “7.Communal harmony should not be made to suffer and be made dependent upon will of an individual or a group of individuals, whatever be their religion be it of minority or that of the majority. Persons belonging to different religions must feel assured that they can live in peace with persons belonging to other religions. While permitting holding of a meeting organised by groups or an individual, which is likely to disturb public peace, tranquility and orderliness, irrespective of the name, cover and methodology it may assume and adopt, the administration has a duty to find out who are the speakers and participants and also take into account previous instances and the antecedents involving or concerning those persons. If they feel that the presence or participation of any person in the meeting or congregation would be objectionable, for some patent or latent reasons as well as past track record of such happenings in other places involving such participants necessary prohibitory orders can be passed. Quick decisions and swift as well as effective action necessitated in such cases may not justify or permit the authorities to give prior opportunity or consideration at length of the pros and cons. The imminent need to intervene instantly having regard to the sensitivity and perniciously perilous consequences it may result in, if not prevented forthwith cannot be lost sight of. The valuable and cherished right of freedom of expression and speech may at times have to be subjected to reasonable subordination of social interests, needs and necessities to preserve the very chore of democratic life - preservation of public order and rule of law. At some such grave situation at least the decision as to the need and necessity to take prohibitory actions must be left to the discretion of those entrusted with the duty of maintaining law and order, and interposition of Courts - unless a concrete case of abuse or exercise of such sweeping powers for extraneous considerations by the authority concerned or that such authority was shown to act at the behest of those in power, and interference as a matter of course and as though adjudicating an appeal, will defeat the very purpose of legislation and legislative intent. It is useful to notice at this stage the following observations of this Court in the decision reported in Madu Limaye v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and others ( 1970 (3) SCC 746 ): (SCC p.757, para 24). "The gist of action under Section 144 is the urgency of the situation, its efficacy in the likelihood of being able to prevent some harmful occurrences. As it is possible to act absolutely and even ex parte it is obvious that the emergency must be sudden and the consequences sufficiently grave. Without it the exercise of power would have no justification. It is not an ordinary power flowing from administration but a power used in a judicial manner and which can stand further judicial scrutiny in the need for the exercise of the power, in its efficacy and in the extent of its application. There is no general proposition that an order under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code cannot be passed without taking evidence: see Mst. Jagrupa Kumari v. Chobey Narain Singh (1936) 37 Cri .LJ.95, which in our opinion is correct in laying down this proposition. These fundamental facts emerge from the way the occasions for the exercise of the power are mentioned. Disturbances of public tranquility, riots and affray lead to subversion of public order unless they are prevented in time. Nuisances dangerous to human life, health or safety have no doubt to be abated and prevented. We are, however, not concerned with this part of the section and the validity of this part need not be decided here. In so far as the other parts of the section are concerned the key-note of the power is to free society from menace of serious disturbances of a grave character. The section is directed against those who attempt to prevent the exercise of legal rights by others or imperil the public safety and health. If that be so the matter must fall within the restriction which the Constitution itself visualizes as permissible in the interest of public order, or in the interest of the general public. The section is directed against those who attempt to prevent the exercise of legal rights by others or imperil the public safety and health. If that be so the matter must fall within the restriction which the Constitution itself visualizes as permissible in the interest of public order, or in the interest of the general public. We may say, however, that annoyance must assume sufficiently grave proportions to bring the matter within interests of public order." 8.The High Court in our view should not have glossed over these basic requirements, by saying that the people of the locality where the meeting was to be organized were sensible and not fickle minded to be swayed by the presence of any person in their amidst or by his speeches. Such presumptive and wishful approaches at times may do greater damage than any real benefit to individual rights as also the need to protect and preserve law and order. The Court was not acting as an appellate authority over the decision of the official concerned. Unless the order passed is patently illegal and without jurisdiction or with ulterior motives and on extraneous considerations of political victimisation of those in power, normally interference should be the exception and not the rule. The Court cannot in such matters substitute its view for that of the competent authority. 16. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the parties submitted that the prohibitory orders should not be allowed to be passed at the ipse dixit of the concerned executive officials. There must be transparent guidelines applicable. Since different fact situations warrant different approaches, no hard and fast guidelines which can have universal application can be laid down or envisaged. The situation peculiar to a particular place or locality vis-a-vis particular individual or group behaving or expecting to behave in a particular manner at a particular point of time may not the same in all such or other eventualities in another part of the country or locality or place even in the same State. The situation peculiar to a particular place or locality vis-a-vis particular individual or group behaving or expecting to behave in a particular manner at a particular point of time may not the same in all such or other eventualities in another part of the country or locality or place even in the same State. The scheme underlying the very provisions carry sufficient inbuilt safeguards and the avenue of remedies available under the Code itself as well as by way of judicial review are sufficient safeguards to control and check any unwarranted exercise or abuse in any given case and Courts should ordinarily give utmost importance and primacy to the view of the Competent Authority, expressed objectively also, in this case without approaching the issue, as though considering the same on an appeal, as of routine, keeping in view the fact that orders of the nature are more preventive in nature and not punitive in their effect and consequences.” 15. The order under Section 144 Cr.PC has been placed as annexure P-6 with the petition and the relevant portion thereof reads thus: “Whereas, it has made to appear to me in my court on 9th May, 2016 through records/facts presented and placed on file that traditionally this famous ‘Baba Kyalu Dangal Mela (Chhinj Mela) of Gangath Main Bazar” of Gangath has been organized by members belonging to the group namely “Sidhh Peeth Baba Kyhalu Ji Maharaj Dangal Gangath 21-22-23 Pravishth Jyeshth Mas”. I Rakesh Kumar Prajapati, IAS do hereby order that the group namely, “Sidhh Peeth Baba Kyalu Ji Maharaj Dangal Gangath 21-22-23 Pravishth Jyeshth Mas” will conduct the famous Baba Kyali Dangal Mela (Chhinjh Mela) of Gangath. They will be the only group involved with the management of the event in the months of May and June, 2016. They will have exclusive control over the preparation, organization, conduct, collection of donations, expenditure from the collections, maintenance of records and every other aspect of the famous “Baba Kyalu Dangal Mela (Chhinjh Mela) of Gangath Main Bazar” of Gangath. I do hereby prohibit all the members of the group namely, “Sri Baba Kyalu Ji Maharaj Chhinj Mela Evam Nirman Prabandhak Committee Gangath” from causing any obstruction of any kind whatsoever in the conduct of famous Baba Kyalu Dangal Mela (Chhinjh Mela) of Gangath and also cancel any permissions accorded to the group in past. I do hereby prohibit all the members of the group namely, “Sri Baba Kyalu Ji Maharaj Chhinj Mela Evam Nirman Prabandhak Committee Gangath” from causing any obstruction of any kind whatsoever in the conduct of famous Baba Kyalu Dangal Mela (Chhinjh Mela) of Gangath and also cancel any permissions accorded to the group in past. I hereby order Tehsildar, Nurpur and SHO, Nurpur to ensure the compliance of this order in letter and spirit. Following “Observer Committee” is hereby appointed to ensure smooth and transparent conduct of famour “Baba Kyalu Dangal Mela (Chhinjh Mela) of Gangath Main Bazar” Gangath: 1. Tehsildar, Nurpur (Chairman) 2. SHO, Nurpur (Member) 3. Pradhan GP Gangath(Member) 4. Pradhan GPRappad (Member).” 16. Coming to the first submission of the petitioners, it would be noticed that in the application filed by the petitioner for cancellation of registration certificate issued in favour of respondent No.2, they themselves had apprehended a problem of law and order in case certificate in favour of respondent No.2 was not cancelled. Thus, it cannot be said that respondent No.2 has exercised powers on imaginary grounds. 17. Adverting to the second contention regarding respondent No.2 having virtually exercised the powers of civil court, suffice it to say, that while passing order under Section 144 Cr.PC, the Executive magistrate does not adjudicate upon any of the rights of the parties and even otherwise the order passed by the Magistrate ordinarily remains operative only for a period of two months. This power is exercised looking into the urgency of the situation and the power therein is intended to be availed for preventing disorder, obstruction and annoyance with a view to secure the public weal by maintaining public peace and tranquility. 18. An order under Section 144 Cr.PC though primarily empowers the executive authorities to pass prohibitory orders visà- vis particular facet, but is intended to serve larger public interest. The legislative intention has clearly preserved the public peace and tranquility without lapse of time, acting urgently, if warranted, giving thereby paramount importance to the social needs by even overriding temporarily, private rights, keeping in view the public interest, which is patently inbuilt in the provisions under Section 144 Cr.P.C. 19. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Babulal Parate Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884 has observed that power under Section 144 Cr.PC are attracted only in an emergency. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Babulal Parate Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884 has observed that power under Section 144 Cr.PC are attracted only in an emergency. When it is necessary to counteract danger to public safety etc, the power conferred by the section is exercisable not only where present danger exists but is exercisable also when there is an apprehension of danger. 20. Learned counsel would lastly make a feeble attempt to canvass that instead of vesting respondent No.2 with excessive control over the preparation, organization, conduct etc of the Mela, the same should have been directed to be conducted by the Panchayats of Gangath and Rappad. 21. I am afraid that even this submission of the petitioner cannot be acceded to, more particularly, when it has come on record that it was the respondent No.2, which had been managing the affairs of the Mela for the past 30 years. That apart, it has also come on record that Pradhans of both the Panchayats have their own axe to grind and being interested parties they cannot, therefore, be entrusted with the affairs of Mela. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion as also the exposition of law laid down in the judgments cited above, I do not find any illegality, infirmity or perversity in the impugned order passed by the respondent No.1. Even otherwise, this court cannot act as an appellate authority over the decision of respondent No.1 unless order passed is patently illegal and without jurisdiction or with ulterior motives and on extraneous considerations so as to call for interference. This court cannot in such matters substitute its views for that of respondent No.1. The power and wisdom has, under Section 144 or Cr.PC, been given to respondent No.1 to take note of the situation and it was, therefore, open to him to take into account the situation prevailing there and pass an order including prohibitory orders in case the situation so warranted. The perception of the respondent No.2 in passing of the impugned order is reasonable, invasive and bonafide. Consequently there is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed. However, dismissal of this petition shall not come in the way of either of the parties in establishing their right before a competent court/authority of law, as the case may be.