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2016 DIGILAW 989 (ORI)

Dhobani Beherani v. Laxmi Beherani

2016-10-28

A.K.RATH

body2016
JUDGMENT : A.K. RATH, J. 1. Plaintiffs are the appellants against a reversing judgment. 2. The plaintiffs instituted the suit for a declaration that the sale deed executed by defendant nos. 4 and 3 in favour of defendant No. 1 in the year 1976 as null and void, they are the absolute owners of the suit site by virtue of the deed of gift executed in the year 1987, for a direction to defendant No. 8 to pay an amount of Rs.200/- per month till delivery of vacant possession, permanent injunction and in the alternative for recovery of possession of the property. 3. The following genealogy would show the relationship of the parties. Kasi Behera Khalli Behera (D.2) 1st, wife (remarried to Hari Mallik) Puna Beherani (D.3) (2nd wife) Rabindra D.4. (Married to Plff No. 1) Bitu (Son-D.5) Kitu (Son-D.6) Ganga (Son-D.7) Muna (Plff. No. 2) Son Simanchala (Plff. No. 3) Son 4. The case of the plaintiffs is that defendant No. 1 is the sister of late Kasi Behera. Defendant No. 2 was the first wife of Kasi. In the year 1946, defendant No. 2 purchased the suit land by means of a registered sale deed out of her ‘stridhan’ property. Defendant No. 4 was born to defendant No. 2 through her first husband, Kasi Behera. After his birth, defendant No. 2 deserted her husband and remarried one Hari Mallik. Thereafter, Kasi Behera remarried defendant No. 3. Defendant nos. 5, 6 and 7 were born out of their wedlock. Defendant No. 2 gave up her possession over the suit land in favour of the later. There was misunderstanding between plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 4. To deprive the plaintiffs from their share in the suit property, defendants 3 to 7 created a nominal sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1 in respect of the suit land in the year 1976. The same was not binding on them. The further case of the plaintiffs is that the marriage between defendant No. 4 and plaintiff No. 1 was dissolved. In order to escape his liability from maintaining the plaintiff No. 1, defendant No. 4 created a benami sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1. Thereafter the defendant No. 1 asserted title over the suit land. The further case of the plaintiffs is that the marriage between defendant No. 4 and plaintiff No. 1 was dissolved. In order to escape his liability from maintaining the plaintiff No. 1, defendant No. 4 created a benami sale deed in favour of defendant No. 1. Thereafter the defendant No. 1 asserted title over the suit land. During pendency of the suit, defendant No. 2, Khalli Beherani executed a registered gift deed in respect of the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs on 7.2.1987. 5. Pursuant to issuance of summons, defendant No. 1 entered appearance and filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. According to her, the suit house was purchased benami in the name of defendant No. 2, but the same belongs to Kasi Behera. When the defendant No. 4 was about 10 years of age, his mother Khalli Beherani, defendant No. 2 deserted Kasi and her whereabouts were not known till date. The family regarded her as dead. Accordingly, defendant No. 4 along with defendant nos. 3, 5 to 7 succeeded the suit property. They sold the same to defendant No. 1. The defendant No. 2 had not gifted the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs. It is further pleaded that Kasi had executed a simple mortgage deed in favour of Y. Purushottam in respect of the suit property. He could not discharge the loan. Y. Purushottam filed a suit bearing No. T.M.S. 68/74 against defendant nos. 3 to 6 and obtained a decree. The said decree was executed in E.P. 27/76 against defendant nos. 3 to 6. Defendant nos. 3 to 6 in order to discharge the decreetal dues, sold the suit property to defendant No. 1. She paid the decreetal dues to the decree-holder through her brother Radha Kurshna Behera. The balance amount was paid at the time of execution of sale deed on 24.12.1976. Thereafter possession of the land was delivered to defendant No. 1. She used to pay the tax to the Municipality as well as rent to the Government. The plaintiffs have no semblance of right over the suit property. It is further stated that the defendant No. 2 is civil dead and her whereabouts is not known. She had not executed any gift deed in favour of the plaintiffs. She used to pay the tax to the Municipality as well as rent to the Government. The plaintiffs have no semblance of right over the suit property. It is further stated that the defendant No. 2 is civil dead and her whereabouts is not known. She had not executed any gift deed in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have created the gift deed for the purpose of the suit and, as such, the same is void. The plaintiffs have no right to claim for any rent from defendant No. 8 and, as such, not entitled to damages from defendant No. 8. Other defendants had been set ex-parte. 6. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, the learned court below framed nine issues. The same are as follows:- “1. Whether the plaintiffs have got right, title and interest over the suit house? 2. Whether the document No. 3389 of 1976 (the sale deed) is null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs? 3. Whether the defendant No. 1has no manner of right, title and interest over the suit house and is liable to be restrained from transferring the suit house to any one? 4. Whether defendant No. 2 as at any time executed any gift deed in favour of the plaintiffs? 5. Whether defendant No. 2 has right to make a gift of the house to the plaintiffs? 6. Whether defendant No. 8 is the trespasser and is liable to pay compensation by way of damages from the date of the registered notice dated 20.3.87? 7. Whether the suit is maintainable? 8. If there is any cause of action for filing the present suit? 9. To what other relief?” 7. To prove the case, the plaintiffs had examined three witnesses and on their behalf, three documents were exhibited. Defendant No. 1 was herself examined as D.W.1 and on her behalf, eight documents had been exhibited. 8. The suit was dismissed. Assailing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court, the plaintiffs filed appeal before the learned District Judge, Berhampur. The appellate court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court and remanded the suit back to the learned trial court with a direction to the learned trial court to examine Khalli, defendant No. 2 as a witness and dispose of the suit afresh. After remand, summons was issued to defendant No. 2. The appellate court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court and remanded the suit back to the learned trial court with a direction to the learned trial court to examine Khalli, defendant No. 2 as a witness and dispose of the suit afresh. After remand, summons was issued to defendant No. 2. She was examined as P.W.2. The learned trial court came to hold that defendant No. 2 is the owner of the suit land. She executed a registered gift deed on 7.2.1987 in favour of the plaintiffs. Thus, the plaintiffs have right, title and interest over the land. It further held that the sale deed, vide Ext.A is null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs. Held so, the learned trial court decreed the suit. 9. Assailing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court, defendant No. 1 filed Title Appeal No. 33 of 1991 (GDC) before the learned District Judge, Berhampur, which was subsequently transferred to the learned Additional District Judge, Berhampur and re-numbered as T.A. No. 15 of 1992. The learned appellate court held that the gift deed was executed on 7.2.1987. The suit was filed on 20.10.1986. Thus, on the date of filing of the suit, the gift deed was nonexistence. The plaintiffs had no cause of action to file the suit. The plaintiffs had no right, title and interest over the suit schedule property. Institution of the suit was misconceived. The defendant nos. 3 to 7 executed the sale deed, vide Ext.A, in favour of defendant No. 1 for a valid consideration. It was further held that defendant No. 2 was not heard of since her remarriage with Hari Mallick and ceased to exercise any right over the suit property since 1950. She did not object to mortgage the land by Kasi Behera, her first husband. She also did not raise any objection from the year 1976 till the date of filing of the suit to possession of the suit property by defendant No. 2. The defendant nos. 4 to 7 were perfectly within their rights to treat her as civil dead and sell the suit properties of defendant No. 2. Held so, the learned appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial court. 10. The defendant nos. 4 to 7 were perfectly within their rights to treat her as civil dead and sell the suit properties of defendant No. 2. Held so, the learned appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial court. 10. This Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law:- “Whether the lower appellate court erred in holding that defendant No. 2 had suffered civil death when the said defendant has been examined as a witness (P.W.2) in the suit?” 11. Mr. P.K. Das, learned Advocate for the appellants submitted that findings of the learned appellate court that defendant No. 2 had civil dead is perverse. Defendant No. 2 was examined herself as P.W.2 in the court below. The learned appellate court proceeded on the premises that defendant No. 2 is dead. Thus, the judgment of the appellate court is vitiated. 12. Per contra, Mr. Siddhartha Mishra, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that defendant No. 2 remarried to Hari Mallik. Her whereabouts was not known. She is civil dead. The defendant No. 4 along with defendant nos. 3 and 5 to 7 to press their legal necessity, sold the land to defendant No. 1 for a valid consideration. 13. Before adverting to the contentions raised by the counsel for both parties, it will be necessary to set out some of the provisions of the Evidence Act. 14. Sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act read as under:- “107. Burden of proving death of person known to have been alive within thirty years.—When the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is shown that he was alive within thirty years, the burden of proving that he is dead is on the person who affirms it.” “108. Burden of proving that person is alive who has not been heard of for seven years.—[Provided that when] the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is proved that he has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive, the burden of proving that he is alive is [shifted to] the person who affirms it.” 15. The decision of the Privy Council in the case of Lal Chand Marwari vs. Mahant Ramrup Gir and Another, AIR 1926 PC 9 , which stood the test of time over three quarters of a century by now is the locus classicus on the subject. It was held: “There is only one presumption, and that is that when these suits were instituted in 1916 Bhawan Gir was no longer alive. There is no presumption at all as to when he died. That, like any other fact, is a matter of proof. And their lordships would here observe that it strikes them as not a little remarkable that the theory on this point, on which the plaintiff's pleader hazards his whole case, is still so widely held, although it has so often been shown to be mistaken. The learned Judges of the High Court have in these suits pointed out the plaintiff's error. Yet, in another part of their judgment, if their lordships are not mistaken, they have themselves unconsciously fallen into it. They have made a decree in the plaintiff's favour because they had, as they thought, no reliable evidence as to the date of Bhawan Gir's death, and because in their judgment it was for the defendants to prove that date if they relied on it. Yet at the same time they have acceded to the plaintiff's claim for mesne profits which, at all events as claimed, are those profits accruing three years prior to the institution of the suits. This imports that Bhawan Gir was dead at that date. But if he was, then the same evidence showed that he had died many years before. The evidence, indeed, if regarded at all, required the Court not to allow mesne profits but to dismiss the suits altogether. Now upon this question there is, their Lordships are satisfied, no difference between the law of India as declared in the Evidence Act and the law of England, [Rango Balaji v. Mudiyeppa (1)] and searching for an explanation of this very persistent heresy their lordships find it in the words in which the rule both in India and in England is usually expressed. These words taken originally from In re Phene'a Trusts (2) run as follows:- “If a person has not been heard of for seven years, there is a presumption of law that he is dead; but at what time within that period be died is not a matter of presumption, but of evidence, and the onus of proving that the death took place at any particular time within the seven years lies upon the person who claims a right to the establishment of which that fact is essential.” Following these words, it is constantly assumed-not perhaps unnaturally-that where the period of disappearance exceeds seven years, death, which may not be presumed at any time during the period of seven years, may be presumed to have taken place at its close. This, of course, is not so. The presumption is the same if the period exceeds seven years. The period is one and continuous, though it may be divisible into three or even four periods of seven years. Probably the true rule would be less liable to be missed, and would itself be stated more accurately, if, instead of speaking of a person who had not been heard of for seven years, it described the period of disappearance as one "of not less than seven years.” 16. The apex Court in the case of N. Jayalakshmi Ammal vs. R. Gopala Pathar and Another, AIR 1995 SC 995 went in-depth into the jurisprudential concept underlying Sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act and reiterated the same view. 17. Thus, the issue as to the date and time of death has to be determined on evidence; direct or circumstantial and not by presumption. The burden of proof would lay on the person who asserts that death having taken place at a given date or time in order to succeed the claim. 18. The case may be examined on the anvil of the decision cited (supra). The burden of proof lies on the defendant No. 1 and defendant nos. 3 to 7 to prove that Khalli Beherani, defendant No. 2 is dead. This fact has not been proved by the defendants. They solely rely on the presumption under Section 108 of the Evidence Act. There is no presumption that defendant No. 2 died on any particular date or on the expiry of seven years. 3 to 7 to prove that Khalli Beherani, defendant No. 2 is dead. This fact has not been proved by the defendants. They solely rely on the presumption under Section 108 of the Evidence Act. There is no presumption that defendant No. 2 died on any particular date or on the expiry of seven years. After remand of the suit, defendant No. 2 was examined herself as P.W.2. The learned appellate court failed to consider the fact that defendant No. 2 was examined P.W.2. Thus the findings of the learned appellate court that defendant No. 2 has ceased to exercise any right over the suit property since 1950 and was no heard and, therefore, defendant nos. 4 to 7 were perfectly within their rights to treat her as civil dead and sell the suit properties to defendant No. 1 is perverse. 19. In the wake of the aforesaid, the judgment and decree of the learned lower appellate court are set aside. The judgment and decree of the learned trial court are affirmed. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.