JUDGMENT : Ashis Kumar Chakraborty, J. 1. The subject matter of challenge in the present revisional application is the order dated July 04, 2016 passed by the learned Judge, 7th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta, in Misc. Case No. 4580 of 2014 rejecting the application of the petitioner Life Insurance Corporation of India for condonation of delay of 68 days, in preferring an application for recalling of the order dated September 15, 2014, whereby the appeal, being Misc. Appeal No. 44 of 2009 filed by the opposite party was decided in the absence of the petitioner. 2. The facts which are relevant for the decision in this revisional application lay in a narrow compass. The opposite party was a tenant in respect of a flat comprising 2000 square feet of the premises No. 3, Clive Road, Kolkata (hereinafter called "the suit property") under the petitioner, Life Insurance Corporation of India. By a notice dated July 08, 2003 the petitioner terminated the tenancy of the opposite party in respect of the suit property and requested the latter to hand over peaceful possession of the suit property to the petitioner on the expiry of the last date of August, 2003. However, the opposite party refused to vacate the suit property and the petitioner referred the case to the Estate Officer for initiation of an eviction proceeding against the opposite party from the suit property under the Public Premises (Eviction of Un-authorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (in short "the Act of 1971"). The Estate Officer issued a show cause notice under Section 4 of the Act of 1971 to the opposite party which was also replied by the latter. Thereafter, the Estate Officer proceeded with the eviction proceeding, numbered as E.O./367/0807 and the opposite party duly contested the said eviction proceeding. On September 01, 2009 the Estate Officer passed an order directing eviction the opposite party from the suit property. 3. The opposite party challenged the said order of eviction dated September 01, 2009 passed by the Estate Officer by preferring an appeal, being Misc. Appeal No. 44 of 2009 before the learned Chief Judge City Civil Court at Calcutta. The petitioner, as the respondent in the said appeal engaged an advocate to contest the appeal on its behalf. 3. The opposite party challenged the said order of eviction dated September 01, 2009 passed by the Estate Officer by preferring an appeal, being Misc. Appeal No. 44 of 2009 before the learned Chief Judge City Civil Court at Calcutta. The petitioner, as the respondent in the said appeal engaged an advocate to contest the appeal on its behalf. However, when the appeal was taken up for hearing by the learned appellate Court below, the learned advocate representing the petitioner did not appear and the appeal was heard ex-parte. By a judgment and order dated September 14, 2014, the learned appellate Court below allowed the appeal filed by the opposite party and set aside the order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer. In the last week of December, 2014 the petitioner filed an application, being Misc. Case No. 4580 of 2014 before the learned appellate Court below praying for, recalling of the said judgment and order dated September 14, 2014. Although, there was delay of 68 days in preferring the said application by the petitioner, but the petitioner filed the application under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 on September 15, 2015. As recorded above, by the impugned order the learned Court below rejected the said application filed by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963. The learned appellate Court below held that the application filed by the petitioner, under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 did not disclose any cogent or any sufficient ground for condonation of delay of as many as 68 days. 4. Mr. Suddhasatya Banerjee, learned advocate appearing in support of the present revisional application, strenuously contended that in the application under Section 5 of the Act of 1963, the petitioner disclosed the documents that it was on October 09, 2014 when the learned advocate engaged by the petitioner to represent it in the Misc. Appeal No. 44 of 2009 before the learned appellate Court below, for the first time informed the petitioner of the ex-parte order dated September 15, 2014 and thereafter on November 11, 2014 the petitioner engaged the new advocate, who is also its advocate-on-record in the present revisional application. Appeal No. 44 of 2009 before the learned appellate Court below, for the first time informed the petitioner of the ex-parte order dated September 15, 2014 and thereafter on November 11, 2014 the petitioner engaged the new advocate, who is also its advocate-on-record in the present revisional application. He submitted that on December 20, 2014 the petitioner obtained a certified copy of the said order dated September 15, 2014 and in the month of December, 2014 itself, the petitioner filed the said application before the learned appellate Court below praying for, recalling of the said order dated September 15, 2014. Mr. Banerjee urged the delay on the part of the petitioner to prefer the said application for recalling of the said order dated September 15, 2014 was only for 68 days. He, however, admitted that in the month of December, 2015, the petitioner filed the said application for recalling of the said order dated September 15, 2014, but the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was filed in the month of September 15, 2014. 5. On behalf of the opposite party Mr. Prashant Agarwal contended that neither the application filed by the petitioner for recalling of the said order dated September 15, 2014, nor its application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act disclosed any cause, far less any sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the said application for recalling of the said order dated September 15, 2014 and, therefore, the learned appellate Court below committed no error in law in rejecting the application for condonation of delay filed by the petitioner. In this regard, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Balwant Singh vs. Jagdish Singh reported in (2010) 8 SCC 685 , Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Ors. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 and H. Dohil Constructions Company Pvt. Ltd. vs. Nahar Exports Limited and Anr. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 680 . 6. In reply, Mr. Banerjee contended that it is well settled, as is have also been held by the Supreme Court in the said cases of Balwant Singh (supra), Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) and H. Dohil Constructions Pvt. Ltd. (supra) that the decisive factor for condonation of delay is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. 6. In reply, Mr. Banerjee contended that it is well settled, as is have also been held by the Supreme Court in the said cases of Balwant Singh (supra), Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) and H. Dohil Constructions Pvt. Ltd. (supra) that the decisive factor for condonation of delay is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. He submitted that the opposite party could not substantiate that the grounds urged by the petitioner for condonation of delay for a period of 68 days are either concocted or the same demonstrated any negligent act or lack of bona fide on the part of the petitioner and, as such, none of the said decisions cited by the opposite party has any application in the case in hand. He further submitted that in the present case, the delay on the part of the petitioner to file the said application for recalling of the said order dated September 15, 2014 was only for 68 days and as held by the Supreme Court in the said cases of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) and H. Dohil Constructions Pvt. Ltd. (supra) such short delay calls for liberal delineation. Mr. Banerjee strenuously urged that it is well settled that where a serious question of law is raised by a party the Court should take a liberal view on the application for condonation of delay. He submitted that in the present case, by the order dated September 15, 2014 the learned appellate Court below set aside the order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer by holding that since the tenancy of the opposite party in respect of the suit property commenced before the Act of 1971 came into force and, as such, the opposite party could not be evicted under the Act of 1971. It was contended that the said ground was not urged by the opposite party either before the Estate Officer or in its Memorandum of Appeal filed before the learned appellate Court below. According to Mr. Banerjee, in any event, whether the provisions of the Act of 1971 are not applicable against the opposite party is an important question of law and, as such, the learned appellate Court below ought to have condoned the delay for a short period of 68 days in preferring the said application for recalling of the said order dated September 15, 2014. 7. 7. I have considered the materials on record and the submissions advanced by both Mr. Banerjee and Mr. Agarwal, learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. As per Section 9(1) of the Act of 1971, against an order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer, the aggrieved party can file an appeal before the District Judge or the Designated Judicial Officer of the District in which the public premises is situate. Under Section 9(2)(a) of the Act of 1971 such appeal against an eviction order passed by the Estate Officer shall be preferred within 12 days from the date of publication thereof. However, the Proviso to Section 9(2) of the Act confers power on the concerned District Judge or the designated Judicial Officer to entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of 12 days, if he satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time. In this case, it was the learned Judge, 7th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta passed the said ex-parte order dated September 15, 2014 allowing the appeal filed by the opposite party and thereby, setting aside the order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer. 8. In the present case, there was a delay of 68 days on the part of the petitioner to prefer the said application for recalling of the said order dated September 15, 2014. The averments made by the petitioner in the said application as well as the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, already recorded above, for condonation of delay, for a short period of 68 days do not impute any inaction or negligence or lack of bona fide on the part of the petitioner, a statutory corporation nor the opposite party could point out any. Considering the averments made by the petitioner in the application for condonation of delay, I find that as held by the Supreme court in the case of Balwant Singh (supra), the explanation of the petitioner in the present case are all reasonable and plausible, so as to persuade the Court to believe the explanation to be true and the same are worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the petitioner. Further, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) and H. Dohil Constructions Pvt. Ltd. (supra) in the present case, when the delay in preferring the application for recalling of the said order dated September 15, 2014 is undisputedly for a short period of 68 days, the approach to deal with the petitioner's application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act calls for a liberal delineation. Undisputedly, in the case in hand, when the opposite party did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer to entertain the eviction proceeding against it under the said Act of 1971 and by the said order dated September 15, 2014 the learned appellate Court below set aside the order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer on the ground that the eviction proceeding initiated against the opposite party appellant under the said Act of 1971 was not at all maintainable in law. In all these facts, I find that the learned appellate Court below failed to exercise its jurisdiction to condone the delay on the part of the petitioner to prefer the application for recalling of the said order dated September 15, 2014 resulting in gross and manifest failure of justice. 9. For all the foregoing reasons, the revisional application, being C.O. 3169 of 2016 stands allowed and the impugned order dated July 04, 2016 passed by the learned Judge, 7th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Misc. Case No. 4580 of 2014 arising out of Misc. Appeal No. 44 of 2009 stands set aside. The delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the application for recalling of the said order dated September 15, 2014 passed by the learned Judge, 7th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta is condoned. 10. The learned Judge, 7th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta is directed to hear the Misc. Case No. 4580 of 2014 arising out of Misc. Appeal No. 44 of 2009 as expeditiously as possible preferably within January 15, 2017. 11. With the above directions, the revisional application, C.O. 3169 of 2016 stands disposed of. 12. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 13. Let, urgent certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.