JUDGMENT : A.K. RATH, J. 1. Defendant No. 1 is the appellant against a confirming judgment. 2. Respondent No. 1 as plaintiff instituted the suit for declaration of right, title and interest, confirmation of possession and in alternative recovery of possession in the event she has been dispossessed during pendency of the suit and permanent injunction. The case of the plaintiff is that Manbodh Urmal had a daughter, namely, Ahalya. Ahalya married to Lochan Buda. Lochan stayed in the house of Manbodh as illatom son-in-law. Gura, the plaintiff, and Sumitra, daughters were born out of their wedlock. Ahalya left the village and her whereabouts was not known. Sumitra died issueless. The suit schedule land was recorded in the name of Ahalya. After Ahalya left the village, the plaintiff and her father remain in possession of the land. At present, she is in possession of the land. They used to pay rent. After death of Lochan, the plaintiff remained in possession of the same. The defendant No. 1 made a claim over the suit schedule land. Thereafter she came to know that the defendant No. 1 claiming to be the adopted son of Manbodh mutated the land in his favour. No notice was issued to her or her father. 3. Defendant No. 1, pursuant to issuance of summons, entered appearance and filed written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The case of the defendant No. 1 is that Ahalya was the illegitimate child of Manbodh. The whereabouts of Ahalya was not known and she was presumed to be dead. She had no children. The plaintiff was not the daughter of Ahalya. The specific case of the defendant No. 1 is that Manbodh was a widower. He married to her mother. After marriage, he remained in the house of Manbodh as his foster child. Manbodh adopted him as his son about 60 years back. The kisam of the land was choukidari jagiri. The land was never in possession of Ahalya. The same was mutated in his name in Mutation Case No. 216 of 2000. He is in possession of the land since the death of Manbodh. He has also perfected title by way of adverse possession. In the remarks column against plot nos. 331 and 333, the note of forcible possession of Sadhuram Oram and Chamari Oram has been reflected. Similarly, a quarter of forest guard situated over plot no. He is in possession of the land since the death of Manbodh. He has also perfected title by way of adverse possession. In the remarks column against plot nos. 331 and 333, the note of forcible possession of Sadhuram Oram and Chamari Oram has been reflected. Similarly, a quarter of forest guard situated over plot no. 279. Since the aforesaid persons are not parties to the suit, the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 4. After amendment, Rajaram Oram, Kailash Oram and defendant nos. 3 to 6 have been impleaded. In spite of service of summons, defendant nos. 2 to 6 have chosen not to contest the suit and as such set ex-parte. 5. On the interse pleadings of the parties, learned trial court framed eight issues, out of which, issue nos. 5 and 8 are pivotal issues. They are: "(V) Whether the plaintiff being the sole legal heir of Manbodh has got absolute right, title and interest over the suit property? (VIII) Whether the defendant No. 1 is the adopted son of Manbodh having interest over suit property?" 6. To substantiate the case, the plaintiff had examined four witnesses and on her behalf four documents had been exhibited. The defendant No. 1 had examined two witnesses and on his behalf five documents had been exhibited. 7. Learned trial court came to hold that the defendant No. 1 failed to prove that he is the adopted son of Manbodh and accordingly answered issue No. 8 in negative against the defendant No. 1. It further held that the plaintiff has successfully established that she is the sole legal heir of Manbodh. She has right, title and interest over the suit schedule land. She is in possession of the same and accordingly answered the issue No. 5 in favour of the plaintiff. Held so, learned trial court dismissed the suit. 8. Assailing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court, defendant No. 1 filed appeal before the learned District Judge, Sundargarh. The same was transferred to the court of the learned Additional District Judge, Sundargarh and renumbered as R.F.A. No. 09/17 of 2010-14. During pendency of the appeal, defendant No. 1 died and his legal heirs have been substituted as appellants. The appeal was dismissed. 9. Criticizing the judgment of the courts below, Mr. The same was transferred to the court of the learned Additional District Judge, Sundargarh and renumbered as R.F.A. No. 09/17 of 2010-14. During pendency of the appeal, defendant No. 1 died and his legal heirs have been substituted as appellants. The appeal was dismissed. 9. Criticizing the judgment of the courts below, Mr. P.K. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the findings of the courts below are perverse. There is no evidence on record that Ahalya is dead. Further both the courts failed to consider that the defendant No. 1 is the adopted son of Manbodh. Since the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit schedule property, simple suit for declaration of title is not maintainable without any consequential relief. He cited decisions of the apex Court in the cases of L.I.C. of India vs. Anuradha, AIR 2004 SC 2070 , Mehar Chand Das vs. Lal Babu Siddique and others, AIR 2007 SC 1499 , Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by LRs. and others, AIR 2008 SC 2033 . 10. Before proceeding further, it is apt to refer to the decisions cited by Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants. In L.I.C. of India (supra), Sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act was the subject matter of interpretation. Taking a cue from the Manual of Law of Evidence by Phipson and Elliot and on a survey of earlier decisions, the apex Court held that the law as to presumption of death remains the same whether in Common Law of England or in the statutory provisions contained in Sections 107 and 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the scheme of Evidence Act, though Sections 107 and 108 are drafted as two Sections, in effect, Section 108 is an exception to the rule enacted in Section 107. The human life shown to be in existence, at a given point of time which according to Section 107 ought to be a point within 30 years calculated backwards from the date when the question arises, is presumed to continue to be living. The rule is subject to a proviso or exception as contained in Section 108. If the persons, who would have naturally and in the ordinary course of human affairs heard of the person in question, have not so heard of him for seven years, the presumption raised under Section 107 ceases to operate. The rule is subject to a proviso or exception as contained in Section 108. If the persons, who would have naturally and in the ordinary course of human affairs heard of the person in question, have not so heard of him for seven years, the presumption raised under Section 107 ceases to operate. Section 107 has the effect of shifting the burden of proving that the person is dead on him who affirms the fact. Section 108, subject to its applicability being attracted, has the effect of shifting the burden of proof back on the one who asserts the fact of that person being alive. The presumption raised under Section 108 is a limited presumption confined only to presuming the factum of death of the person who's life or death is in issue. Though it will be presumed that the person is dead but there is no presumption as to the date or time of death. There is no presumption as to the facts and circumstances under which the person may have died. The presumption as to death by reference to Section 108 would arise only on lapse of seven years and would not by applying any logic or reasoning be permitted to be raised on expiry of 6 years and 364 days or at any time short of it. An occasion for raising the presumption would arise only when the question is raised in a Court, Tribunal or before an authority who is called upon to decide as to whether a person is alive or dead. So long as the dispute is not raised before any forum and in any legal proceedings the occasion for raising the presumption does not arise. If an issue may arise as to the date or time of death the same shall have to be determined on evidence-direct or circumstantial and not by assumption or presumption. The burden of proof would lay on the person who makes assertion of death having taken place at a given date or time in order to succeed in his claim. Rarely it may be permissible to proceed on premise that the death had occurred on any given date before which the period of seven years' absence was shown to have elapsed. 11. In Mehar Chand Das (supra), it was held that if the plaintiff is not in possession, a suit for mere declaration would not be maintainable. Rarely it may be permissible to proceed on premise that the death had occurred on any given date before which the period of seven years' absence was shown to have elapsed. 11. In Mehar Chand Das (supra), it was held that if the plaintiff is not in possession, a suit for mere declaration would not be maintainable. In Anathula Sudhakar (supra), the apex court to summarise the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, paragraph 17 of the report held thus: “17. To summarize, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under: (a) Where a cloud is raised over plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession. (c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title [either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar (supra)]. Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction. (d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straight-forward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.” 12. On the anvil of the decisions cited supra, the case of the appellants may be examined. 13. The specific case of the plaintiff is that Ahalya was not heard for the last 30 years and is civil dead. Ahalya was given in marriage and was divorced about 40 years back. Her whereabouts is not known and as such she is presumed to be dead. In view of the admission of the defendant No. 1 that whereabouts of Ahalya was not known and she is presumed to be dead, the submission of Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants has no legs to stand. 14. There is no specific pleading with regard to the adoption of defendant No. 1 to Manbodh. On a vivid analysis of the materials on record, learned trial court came to hold that the defendant No. 1 is not the adopted son of Manbodh. The submission of Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants has no legs to stand. 14. There is no specific pleading with regard to the adoption of defendant No. 1 to Manbodh. On a vivid analysis of the materials on record, learned trial court came to hold that the defendant No. 1 is not the adopted son of Manbodh. The submission of Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit land and as such, the suit for declaration of right, title and interest is not maintainable is difficult to fathom. The suit is for declaration of right, title and interest, confirmation of possession and in alternative recovery of possession, if the plaintiff dispossessed during pendecy of the suit and permanent injunction. Thus, the suit is maintainable. 15. In view of the analysis made in the preceding paragraphs, the second appeal does not involve any substantial question of law. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs.