JUDGMENT : R.D. Kothari, J. 1. ADMIT. Learned advocate Mr. Patel waives service of notice of admission on behalf of the respondent. With the consent of the learned advocates for the parties, the matter is taken up for final hearing. 2. This appeal from order arises from granting of interim relief by the learned trial Court. 3. In Exhibit-5 application in Special Civil Suit No. 252 of 2015 in substance, the plaintiffs prayer is; that the defendants themselves and/or their agents, servants or assignee etc., be restrained from giving effect - directly or indirectly - to the various resolutions (number of which is given in the relief clause) passed in a meeting held on 13.03.2015 and also to resolutions passed in meeting held on 06.04.2015. In view of resolutions passed in earlier meeting dated 13.03.2015, new and proposed Society i.e. defendants Nos. 2 to 19 came to be registered and in view of the resolutions passed in later meeting dated 26.04.2015, new and proposed Society i.e. defendants Nos. 20 to 43 came to be registered. 3.1. In the plaint, the plaintiff has pointed out how Co-operative Society is to be formed. Shortly stated, it says that for formation of Co-operative Society there should be ten promoters. Then Gram Sabha meeting is to be convened. In that meeting of Gram Sabha, these 10 persons would be nominated as promoters. Thereafter, share capital is to be collected from the members of the Society and then, Bank Account is to be opened in the name of proposed Society. Certificate of bank in this regard i.e. about account operated is to be obtained. The members of the Society thereafter has to collect necessary certificate from Talati-cum-Mantri including the certificate of they being agriculturist. Thereafter, proposal with application and relevant papers would be sent to Taluka Vistran Officer (TVO). The TVO on receipt of such material would verify the same, which includes making of local inspection. After such verification and after he being satisfied, he would forward the papers to - Assistant District Registrar (Panchayat), of Agricultural, Production, Co-operation and Irrigation Committee - along with his report. On receipt of such proposal, the Assistant District Registrar (Panchayat) would issue Public Notice inviting objections, if any, against the registration of proposed Society. Such Notice would be duly published. If the authority receives objections, it will be duly considered. On receipt of such proposal, the Assistant District Registrar (Panchayat) would issue Public Notice inviting objections, if any, against the registration of proposed Society. Such Notice would be duly published. If the authority receives objections, it will be duly considered. Thereafter, the proposal would be forwarded to the Supervisory Committee. Then as per the advise of Supervisory Committee, the proposal would be included in the Agenda. The proposal would be considered by the Agricultural, Production, Cooperation and Irrigation Committee and Co-operative Society would then come into existence on the recommendations made by the Committee. 3.2. Broadly stated, Co-operative Society is formed in above manner. As to the case of parties, briefly stated, it is the say of the defendants that formation of their Society is in accordance with law. Against that, it is the say of the plaintiff that unnecessary haste is shown in the formation of Society and in the process, the Society in the present case, came to be formed in the violation of direction given by this Court in Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited v. State of Gujarat & Ors., rendered in Special Civil Application No. 15560 of 2003 and others dated 07.10.2006. The plaintiff has raised other plea also including the plea that formation of Society is for political purpose only and it is to gain score over rivals in elections of APMC and other elections. Against that it is the say of the defendant that suit is instituted only with political motive and the plaintiffs have wrongly imputed motive on the part of defendants. The defendant has raised other pleas also including want of jurisdiction of Civil Court. 4. Heard the learned advocates for the parties. 5. Learned advocate Shri B.S. Patel for the appellant has submitted that jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred under Section 166 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act. It was also submitted that the plaintiff is not entitled for any interim relief inasmuch as granting of relief claimed as interim relief would amount to allowing the suit. It was also submitted that the plaintiffs are not aggrieved person, hence, the plaintiff cannot file a suit. The plaintiff has no locus standi. Learned advocate Shri Patel at the time of hearing has referred Sections 4, 6, 2, 9, 22, 153, 166 and 167 of the Act. Reference was also made to constitutional amendment of 2011. It was also submitted that the plaintiffs are not aggrieved person, hence, the plaintiff cannot file a suit. The plaintiff has no locus standi. Learned advocate Shri Patel at the time of hearing has referred Sections 4, 6, 2, 9, 22, 153, 166 and 167 of the Act. Reference was also made to constitutional amendment of 2011. Relying on the last referred submission on amendment, it was contended that formation of Society is now recognized as fundamental right. It was submitted that it would be erroneous to not to give full weightage to the fundamental right of the defendants. 5.1. Learned advocate Shri Patel has also submitted that none of the defendant Society about which the plaintiff makes grievance even remotely falls within the area of plaintiffs Society and that the plaintiffs area is different. It was also submitted that it is only in one case, there are two Societies in one village. It was submitted that unnecessary exaggeration is made by the plaintiff by focusing on such instances. Learned advocate Shri Patel has also submitted that claiming damages by the plaintiff itself shows that the loss alleged as likely to be caused to the plaintiff is not irreparable loss. The loss claimed by the plaintiff is possible to measure in terms of money. Bar of suit under Section 166 of the Act and for want of statutory notice under Section 167 of the Act was also seriously pressed into service. Lastly, learned advocate Shri Patel has submitted that none of the ingredients for granting of interim relief is established by the plaintiffs. 6. On the other hand, learned senior advocate Shri Percy Kavina appearing for the plaintiffs has drawn attention to the relevant part of the order under challenge. Non referring of the order under challenge by the appellant was also commented upon by the learned advocate. It was submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, objections of jurisdiction of Court and non-issuance of Notice has no substance. The principal submission of learned senior advocate Shri Kavina was that - that proposal of almost all the Society taken up for consideration in a Committee Meeting without said subject on the Agenda. Such proposal was taken up despite objections raised by the expert, and proposal was not only taken up, but it was cleared. The principal submission of learned senior advocate Shri Kavina was that - that proposal of almost all the Society taken up for consideration in a Committee Meeting without said subject on the Agenda. Such proposal was taken up despite objections raised by the expert, and proposal was not only taken up, but it was cleared. Attention was also drawn to communication received by the learned trial Court from the Secretary, Additional District Registrar, wherein the said authority has pointed out that registration of 42 Societies is in erroneous manner and against that suo motu, appeal is filed by the Registrar (Appeal) Gujarat State. The said appeal is coming up for hearing on 29.09.2015. Drawing attention to this, learned senior advocate has submitted that the author of the order has not come forward to challenge the order of the learned trial Court before this Court, but only the beneficiary of the order claims to be aggrieved and has challenged the order. Learned advocate has drawn attention to the relevant case laws on the point. In this regard, it may be stated that herein strong reliance was placed on Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra). Attention was drawn to para 18 to 25 of the said decision. 7. Learned advocate Shri Patel in reply has submitted that circumstance of the case should be considered by the Court. It was submitted that the judgment cannot be read as a statue. Attention was also drawn to the proviso of Section 4 of the Act. Besides that, it was also pointed out that in Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra) direction is given to the Society which are operating in the same area and contrast to that in the present case, the area of operation of defendant Society is different and it does not extend or operate in the area of plaintiff's Society, It was also submitted that formation of Society is an exercise of fundamental right. Attention was also drawn to relevant part of the written statement (WS) at page 166. Attention was also drawn to page 173 (D.E./list). It was also pointed out that 'No Objection Certificate' is issued against the formation of most of the proposed Society. In view of such fact, the case of the plaintiff should not to be accepted. Attention was also drawn to relevant part of the written statement (WS) at page 166. Attention was also drawn to page 173 (D.E./list). It was also pointed out that 'No Objection Certificate' is issued against the formation of most of the proposed Society. In view of such fact, the case of the plaintiff should not to be accepted. Distinguishing Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra), learned advocate has drawn attention to the decision of this Court in the case of Rameshbhai Maganbhai Lakhani & Ors., v. State of Gujarat & Ors., 2011 (4) GLR 2877. Learned advocate Shri Patel has also drawn attention to the decision of this Court in the case of Lark Laboratories (India) Ltd., New Delhi v. Medico Interpharma Ltd., Baroda, 2003(4) GLR 2820. 8. Briefly stated the findings of the learned trial Court revolves around the following points:-- "(a) Filing of an appeal under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act is not equally efficacious remedy in the facts of the present case (para 4 and 47). (b) That giving of Notice under Section 166 of the Act is mandatory cannot be accepted as action under challenge is claimed to be illegal, void ab-initio (para 42). (c) The claim of the defendants that right to form a Society is in exercise of fundamental right cannot be accepted, inasmuch as such right is not absolute right and it is subjected to reasonable restriction (para 45 etc.). (d) The case on hand is covered by the direction given by this Court in Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra), in para 18 to 25 and para 35. (e) Prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss all are in favour of the present plaintiff (para 51, 52 and 53)." 9. I may consider rival submissions of the learned advocates for the parties. 10. Subsidiary points urged by the learned advocates for the parties apart, in my opinion two points have potential to tilt the balance and final conclusion, - one well settled proposition about the limited power and scope for interference by appeal Court in discretionary order passed by the Court from which the appeal is preferred - second - Compliance to law laid down in Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra). Second points may be taken first. Subsidiary points if required may be dealt with thereafter. 10.1. Second points may be taken first. Subsidiary points if required may be dealt with thereafter. 10.1. In Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra) (Coram: Akil Kureshi, J.) has laid down thus:-- "18. While hearing these petitions, it is found that large number of cases arise out of existing societies opposing the registration of proposed societies in the same area. At the time when Registering authority is considering such applications, existing societies are not granted any hearing. Eventually, when registration is granted to a new society, existing societies carry the issue further in appeal and revision. The appeal and revision are entertained at their instance and this Court also has been entertaining the petitions at the instance of such societies. Thus by necessity as well as convention, locus standi of such existing societies to question grant of registration to a new society has been recognised. Such societies however, enjoy no right of being heard before the applications of rival societies are permitted. To my mind, this is somewhat of contradictory situation. If an existing society has right to appeal against the registration granted to a new society, such society must also have a right to be heard before the application of new society for registration is granted. This would be in consonance with the principles of natural justice. This would also be in larger interest since such society would be, at the outset, in a position to place material on record for consideration of Registering authority. As already noted section 4 of the said Act provides that if in the opinion of the Registrar, registration of a society may have an adverse effect upon any society, it shall not be registered. This aspect has been further highlighted in Government Resolution dated 18-7-2003. It is provided inter-alia that it should be ensured that in the same village in the same category not more than one society should be registered. This rule is not inviolable and for good reasons exceptions can be made particularly if it is found that registering another society would have no adverse effect on the existing society. Nevertheless, existing society would have a right to place material on record and be heard to establish before the authorities that such registration should not be granted. This rule is not inviolable and for good reasons exceptions can be made particularly if it is found that registering another society would have no adverse effect on the existing society. Nevertheless, existing society would have a right to place material on record and be heard to establish before the authorities that such registration should not be granted. 18.1 Considering these aspects of the matter, it would be appropriate to permit the existing societies operating in the same field to raise their objections and to be heard (not necessarily in person) before applications of new societies (covered under said Government Resolution dated 18-7-2003) in the same village/group villages are decided by the Registering authority. 19. Above situation would however, arise only in cases where primary village level societies are fighting for registration. In large number of cooperative societies at different levels however, such a situation may not arise. In such other cases also, question of adverse effect on existing society would arise. It would be desirable if the objections of other societies which are likely to be affected are taken into consideration by the Registering authority before taking a final decision regarding registering of a new society. For the above purpose since it would not be possible to identify the society which may face ultimate adverse effect, it would be appropriate that the Registering authority upon receipt of application for registration of a new society exhibits a copy of such application on a prominent place in the office for a period of 10 days which would enable other societies to raise their objections, if any. In response to such exhibiting of notice, if any objections are raised before the Registering authority, same should be taken into account before deciding the application for registration of a new society. It is however, made clear that only by virtue of raising objections, the objector would not ipso facto enjoy a right to be heard or appeal against the order which may be passed and such rights will be governed on the basis of facts arising in individual cases. 20. I have also noticed that though almost invariably the appellate orders as well as State orders are speaking orders, orders granting or refusing registration to the societies do not indicate any reasons. 21. 20. I have also noticed that though almost invariably the appellate orders as well as State orders are speaking orders, orders granting or refusing registration to the societies do not indicate any reasons. 21. In a decision dated 5-7-2006 in Special Civil Application No. 6381/1998 and connected matters, this Court with reference to requirement of giving reasons made following observations: S17. The upshot of the above discussion would be that the Government should be asked to formulate and publish its policy for consideration of special cases for conversion of non-grant-in-aid school into grant-in-aid school. The respondents should apply such policy in future in all cases uniformly subject of course to budgetary allocations. This is however not to suggest that such policy must remain constant or stagnant. For valid consideration to meet with different requirements to adopt to changed circumstances, it would always be open to the Government to modify the policy through subsequent GRs. Since it is found that in case of these petitioners, their applications have been turned down by the respondents time and again solely on the ground that they had at one stage agreed not to avail of grant while number of other institutions who had also given such undertakings were given grant, I find it appropriate that the Government should indicate its reasons for considering such applications in future. This would minimize the possibility of any discrimination as also enable the higher authorities or the courts to examine the reasons which weighed with the Government or its authorities in either granting or refusing such conversion. It would, therefore, be necessary that while dealing with, deciding and disposing of such applications, either accepting or refusing conversion, the authorities should record its reasons, however, brief the same may be. Observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner, reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 may be noted. S8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. In Gordhandas Bhanji ( AIR 1952 SC 16 ) (at p. 18): "Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself". Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.? 22. In the present case also, I find that the Registering authority should record, however briefly, the reasons either for grant or refusal of registration. This would ensure a degree of transparency in deciding the applications and will also enable higher authority/Court to properly appreciate the order passed by the Registering authority. 23. One more question that still calls for consideration is regarding simultaneous applications of two proposed societies in the same area. As noted earlier, authorities sometimes adopt the policy of giving preference to application which is earlier in point of time. Sometimes applications received later get earlier consideration and once registration is granted, applications of rival proposed society automatically fails. To my mind neither of these policies are fair or just. Simply attaching importance to the date of application would not be legally permissible. At the same time granting application to one society without considering the rival claim would also be equally unjust. In all such cases, not the date of application for registration, but merits of the claim for registration should receive precedence. The Registering authority therefore, in such cases shall have to weigh the rival claims and grant registration to such a society which is most likely to serve the cooperative principles and be in the interest of the population of the village or the area and otherwise fulfill the requirements under the act. 24. The Registering authority therefore, in such cases shall have to weigh the rival claims and grant registration to such a society which is most likely to serve the cooperative principles and be in the interest of the population of the village or the area and otherwise fulfill the requirements under the act. 24. It is also brought to the notice of the Court that in some cases societies are created and registered with the sole purpose of inflating voters lists for the elections of Agriculture Produce Market Committees or Federal Societies. Such societies mushroom at the election time but are not operation at all. Continued registration of such societies block creation of new societies and hamper spread of cooperative movement. To my mind, if there are societies which exist only on paper and are really not functional, their registration should be cancelled as early as possible. A defunct society cannot be allowed to prevent creation of a new society genuinely interested in serving the need of the people. It would therefore, be appropriate that Registrar Cooperative ensures that complaints of such kind are promptly examined and appropriate decision as may be found necessary in accordance with law is taken. For this purpose the Registrar may even consider setting up a special cell if number of such complaints are large. 25. With these general guidelines and directions, it would be necessary to take up individual cases for consideration." 11. From the above quote, following points emerges. "(1) Large number of cases arise out of existing Society opposing registration of proposed Society in the same area. (2) In view of the above, by necessity and convention locus standi of such Society stands recognized. (3) If existing societies have right to file an appeal then before the new Society is granted registration, such existing Society should have right to be heard. (4) This is also in consonance with the principles of natural justice. (5) Conceding right of hearing to existing societies would also be in larger interest in the sense that registering authority would have benefit of material before it for consideration. (4) This is also in consonance with the principles of natural justice. (5) Conceding right of hearing to existing societies would also be in larger interest in the sense that registering authority would have benefit of material before it for consideration. (6) Section 4 of the Act and Government Resolution dated 18.07.2003, are also in a sense, speaks of these (a) while Section 4 says new Society not to be registered, if it has adverse effect upon any Society (b) above Government Resolution says that for the same village, there should not be more than one Society of the same category registered. (7) This rule namely, not grating registration to more than Society in the same Village of the same category is not inviolable rule. For good reasons exception to this rule is acceptable. (8) There can be more than one Society in the same village and in the same category, but in those case for registering new Society, primary consideration would be whether registering another Society has likely to have any adverse effect or not ? (9) In those cases too, the existing Society would have right to be heard and place material before the registering authority for consideration by it. (10) For nature of hearing - stated above - it need not be in person in every case. It depends in facts and circumstances of each case. (11) Opportunity of hearing, principle need not be restricted to village level Society. (12) The question of adverse effect may arise beyond the village level Society also. Hence, before the authority takes final decision for registration of the new Society, it is desirable that objections if any, of such existing Society are also considered. (13) One of the mode of hearing for these later referred Societies may be thus - on receipt of such application for registering a new Society, registering authority should display such application on prominent place for ten days (14) Above mode of inviting objections would enable the existing Societies to raise objection, if they have any. (15) It is clarified that by mere conceding such right, it neither means personal hearing nor that against the decision of the registering authority, objector would have right of appeal. (16) The order of granting or refusing objection should not be non speaking order. (17) Reasons to be recorded. (15) It is clarified that by mere conceding such right, it neither means personal hearing nor that against the decision of the registering authority, objector would have right of appeal. (16) The order of granting or refusing objection should not be non speaking order. (17) Reasons to be recorded. Importance of recording reasons pointed out by relying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 , which in turn had place reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16 - Judgment of Bose, J). (18) Recording of reasons ensures transparency. (19) In case where two or more applications of proposed new Society simultaneously came up for consideration for the authority, decision of precedence should not be on the basis of date of application, but on the basis of the merits of the case/application. (20) Lastly, the Court therein says that it was brought to our notice that some Society exists only on paper. That they are created and registered only to inflate voters' list. This aspect is briefly referred by that Court in para 24. Since strictly speaking, the present case does turn on that, I leave this aspect at that." 12. Learned advocate Shri B.S. Patel has submitted that strong reliance placed on Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra) is mis-placed inasmuch as in later case, this case is distinguished by this court. It was submitted that the view taken in this, later decision should be preferred and not the view taken in Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra). Besides this, in this regard, it was also submitted that it is well settled that the judgment should not be read as statute. 13. As to the submission that Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra) referred in later case i.e. Rameshbhai Maganbhai Lakhani's case (supra), it is true that the Court in that case had distinguished Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra). In order to appreciate the submission of learned advocate Shri Patel, brief reference may be made to Rameshbhai Maganbhai Lakhani's case (supra). 14. In Rameshbhai Maganbhai Lakhani's case (supra) the members of the Society in their individual capacity have filed three petitions before this Court. In order to appreciate the submission of learned advocate Shri Patel, brief reference may be made to Rameshbhai Maganbhai Lakhani's case (supra). 14. In Rameshbhai Maganbhai Lakhani's case (supra) the members of the Society in their individual capacity have filed three petitions before this Court. This Court has decided the group of three petitions by common judgment. The petitioner's - Society were operating in the area known as Patanvaav, Chichod and Kalana in Dhoraji Taluka of Rajkot District. It was the case of the petitioners that the ruling party has with a view to inflate the voters' list of various local authorities, including the Agricultural Produce Market Committee of Dhoraji and Rajkot and other federal co-operative societies and District Co-operative Bank, initiated action in the Rajkot to register new Co-operative societies in various villages. It was also alleged by the petitioners that the official machinery is used by the ruling political party for achieving their object by capturing power position in various federal co-operative societies and other institutions. The petitioners have also alleged that respondent No. 4 - Society is accorded registration with a view to inflate the voters' list in various federal co-operative societies and the District Co-operative Bank. This Court in that case has identified various "indisputable aspects" emerging from the record. One such aspect identified by the Court is thus:-- "19 (vi) Not only petitioners have not claimed any authorization from their existing society for filing the petition challenging the registration of respondent No. 4 but they have also, through their Advocates, taken up a specific stand that the individual members of the existing society have locus standi and right to challenge the registration of new society in the area. Thus, it becomes evident and unequivocal that the petitioner have filed the petitions in their individual capacity and are not having any support from the existing society on whose behalf they claim to have been aggrieved so as to challenge the registration of respondent No. 4 - Society." 15. This aspect clearly distinguished Rameshbhai Maganbhai Lakhani's case (supra) from the present case. In the case on hand, the Society has filed a suit and not the individual member. This Court was pleased to distinguished Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra), mainly on this ground. This aspect clearly distinguished Rameshbhai Maganbhai Lakhani's case (supra) from the present case. In the case on hand, the Society has filed a suit and not the individual member. This Court was pleased to distinguished Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra), mainly on this ground. In Rameshbhai Maganbhai Lakhani's case (supra), strong reliance was placed by the petitioners on Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra). The Court has considered this submission and was pleased to distinguished Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra). On this point the Court concluded thus;- "In my view, this judgment does not recognize any right, to object or to be heard against proposal for registration of new societies, into the individual members of the existing societies at all. The learned Single Judge of this Court has merely read into the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 existing societies' right to file objections to be considered by the registering authorities as their appeals, revisions and writ petitions, against granting of registration are entertained by necessity or convention. But on the strength of this judgment, individual members of the exiting societies cannot claim any rights, which is said to be recognized by the learned Single Judge in the existing society only." (emphasis supplied). 16. The petitioners' who were individual member of the Society in each case had rushed up to this Court & their petitions came to be dismissed in Rameshbhai Maganbhai Lakhani's case (supra). That decision does not help much to the appellant. 17. The other submission of learned advocate namely the judgment should not be read as a statute is wrongly invoked in the present case. The question that flows from this submission of Shri Patel is does Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra) lays down what is binding guidelines to be followed in later cases - and to be precise, assuming it does lay down, what is binding nature of such guidelines which flows from the judgment in contrast to the procedure laid down in statute for that purpose. 18.1. Ideal or perfect statute, language of which fulfills the requirement of every kind of circumstance and any conceivable and inconceivable situation that may arose in future is impossible to draft. In every statutory provisions, little or more discretion left to judges or with the authorities. 18.1. Ideal or perfect statute, language of which fulfills the requirement of every kind of circumstance and any conceivable and inconceivable situation that may arose in future is impossible to draft. In every statutory provisions, little or more discretion left to judges or with the authorities. Besides that, the earlier belief that the Judges do not make law is a long before given up. Couple of quotes from binding decision in this regard may be useful. 18.2. Before referring quotes, it may be stated that the above submission raises question that does superior Court legislate through judgment? It is interesting point. It is true that modalities laid down in Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra), strictly speaking is not a statutory requirement. In the circumstances of the present case, whether this submission is acceptable? Reference to few quotes would be important. 19. In the case of Charan Lal Sahu v, Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1480 , the Court was considering the validity of various provisions of Bhopal Gas Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985. The said statute aimed at giving compensation to the victims. Legality of taking over claims of the victims by the Government via statute was challenged. One of the question arouse for consideration was payment of interim compensation. The statute does not provide for interim compensation. The question arose whether in absence of such provisions interim compensation can be granted or not? Sabysachi Mukherji, C.J., considering the provisions took the view that language of the Act does not militate against the constructions sought to be put up. Further the relevant provisions and the scheme of the Act suggest that the Act contains such obligation. The Court adopted "constructive intuition" approach to the interpretation of the Act. The relevant para may be quoted as under:-- "101. ...As submitted by learned Attorney General, it is true that there is no actual expression used in the Act itself which expressly postulates or indicates such a duty or obligation under the Act. Such an obligation is, however, inherent and must be the basis of properly construing the spirit of the Act. In our opinion, this is the true basis and will be in consonance with the spirit of the Act. It must be, to use the well-known phrase 'the major inarticulate premise' upon which though not expressly stated, the Act proceeds. Such an obligation is, however, inherent and must be the basis of properly construing the spirit of the Act. In our opinion, this is the true basis and will be in consonance with the spirit of the Act. It must be, to use the well-known phrase 'the major inarticulate premise' upon which though not expressly stated, the Act proceeds. It is on this promise or premise that the State would be justified in taking upon itself the right and obligation to proceed and prosecute the claim and deny access to the courts of law to the victims on their own. If it is only so read, it can only be held to be constitutionally valid. It has to be borne in mind that the language of the Act does not militate against this construction but on the contrary, Sections 9, 10 and the scheme of the Act suggest that the Act contains such an obligation. If it is so read, then only meat can be put into the skeleton of the Act making it meaningful and purposeful. The Act must, therefore, be so read. This approach to the interpretation of the Act can legitimately be called the 'constructive intuition' which, in our opinion, is a permissible mode of viewing the Acts of Parliament. The freedom to search for 'the spirit of the Act' or the quantity of the mischief at which it is aimed (both synonymous for the intention of the parliament) opens up the possibility of liberal interpretation "that delicate and important branch of judicial power, the concession of which is dangerous, the denial ruinous". Given this freedom it is a rare 688 opportunity though never to be misused and challenge for the Judges to adopt and give meaning to the Act, articulate and inarticulate, and thus translate the intention of the Parliament and fulfill the object of the Act. After all, the Act was passed to give relief to the victims who, it was thought, were unable to establish their own rights and fight for themselves...." 20. It may be stated that the case of Bhopal Gas Disaster came up for consideration before the five Judges Bench. Though some of the Judges gave separate concurring opinion, the Court was not divided in the conclusion. In other words, it is not that above quoted view is of "minority" view of the Court. 21. It may be stated that the case of Bhopal Gas Disaster came up for consideration before the five Judges Bench. Though some of the Judges gave separate concurring opinion, the Court was not divided in the conclusion. In other words, it is not that above quoted view is of "minority" view of the Court. 21. Following quote of para 17 and 18 from Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz Jung, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 67 would also give us clue about the proper mode of interpretation. Bearing in mind, the context for which reference to this decision is made, it is not necessary to refer facts of that case. It was held as under:-- "17. I am in respectful agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court. It cannot be disputed that a contract which has a tendency to injure public interests or public welfare is one against public policy. What constitutes an injury to public interests or welfare would depend upon the times and climes. The social milieu in which the contract is sought to be enforced would decide the factum, the nature and the degree of the injury. It is contrary to the concept of public policy to contend that it is immutable, since it must vary with the varying needs of the society. What those needs are would depend upon the consensus value-judgments of the enlightened section of the society. These values may sometimes get incorporated in the legislation, but sometimes they may not. The legislature often fails to keep pace with the changing needs and values nor is it realistic to expect that it will have provided for all contingencies and eventualities. It is, therefore, not only necessary but obligatory on the courts to step in to fill the lacuna. When courts perform this function undoubtedly they legislate judicially. But that is a kind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated to them to further the object of the legislation and to promote the goals of the society. Or to put it negatively, to prevent the frustration of the legislation or perversion of the goals and values of the society. When courts perform this function undoubtedly they legislate judicially. But that is a kind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated to them to further the object of the legislation and to promote the goals of the society. Or to put it negatively, to prevent the frustration of the legislation or perversion of the goals and values of the society. So long as the courts keep themselves tethered to the ethos of the society and do not travel off its course, so long as they attempt to furnish the felt necessities of the time and do not refurbish them, their role in this respect has to be welcomed." (emphasis supplied). 21.1. Then in later part of para 18, it was held as under:-- "All courts are at one time or the other felt the need to bridge the gap between what is and what is intended to be. The courts cannot in such circumstances shirk from their duty and refuse to fill the gap. In performing this duty they do not foist upon the society their value-judgments. They respect and accept the prevailing values, and do what is expected of them. The courts will, on the other hand, fail in their duty if they do not rise to the occasion but approve helplessly of an interpretation of a statute or a document or of an action of an individual which is certain to subvert the societal goals and endanger the public good." (emphasis supplied). 22. Reference may be made to view taken by Ray, C.J. in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain reported in 1975 Supp. SCC 1. In para 33, it was held as under:-- "33. ...Creation of law is application of law. The creation of a legal norm is normally an application of the higher norm, regulating its creation. The application of higher norm is the creation of a lower norm determined by the higher norm. A judicial decision is an act by which a general norm, a statute, is applied but at the same time an individual norm is created binding one or both parties to the conflict, Legislation is creation of law. Taking it into account is application of law. The higher norm may determine the organ and the procedure by which a lower norm and the contents of the lower norm are created. Taking it into account is application of law. The higher norm may determine the organ and the procedure by which a lower norm and the contents of the lower norm are created. For a norm the creation of which is not determined at all by another norm cannot belong to another legal order. The individual creating a norm cannot be considered the organ of the legal community, his norm creating function cannot be imputed to the community, unless in performing the function he applies norm of the legal order constituting the community. Every law creating act must be a law-applying act. It must apply a norm preceding the act in order to be an act of the legal order or the community constituted by it. When settling a dispute between two parties, a court applies a general norm or statutory or customary law. Simultaneously, the court creates an individual norm providing that a definite sanction shall be executed against a definite individual. The individual norm is related to the general norm as the statute is related to the Constitution. The judicial function is thus like legislation, both creation and application of law. The judicial function is ordinarily determined by the general norms both as to procedure and as to the contents of the norm to be created, whereas legislation is usually determined by the Constitution only in the former respect." (emphasis supplied). 23. Reference may also be made to Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, reported in (1989) 2 SCC 754 . Therein, the Court has observed:-- "...It is used to be disputed that Judges make law. Today, it is no longer a matter of doubt that a substantial volume of the law governing the lives of citizens and regulating the functions of the State flows from the decisions of the superior courts." 23.1. Then relying on famous say of Lord Reid as appear in the book, "Judges as a law maker". The Court has quoted thus:-- "There was a time, when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that Judges make law - they only declare it.... But we do not believe in fairly tales any more." 23.2. Judges of superior Court lays down law in process of deciding the case is accepted and recognized mode of law. It is known as interstitial law. But we do not believe in fairly tales any more." 23.2. Judges of superior Court lays down law in process of deciding the case is accepted and recognized mode of law. It is known as interstitial law. Above quotes from different Judges are in a sense instances of aspects of interstitial judicial law making. 24. Otherwise also, in the context of the question raised herein, the submission that judgment should not be read as a statue is mis-placed. Quick reference to few judgments of the Apex Court on - judgment not to be read as statute - would show that this submission is mis-placed. • "The judgment should be understood in the context of facts based on which observation sought to be relied on is made. (Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors. AIR 2007 SC 2786 ). • That for 'construing' the judgment, the same should be read in its entirety. (Nair Service Society v. State of Kerala (2007) 4 SCC 1 ). (para 26). • It is not permissible to read one line or a word occurring in isolation and to impute different meaning to the observation. (Prabha Shanker Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2004 SC 486 )." 25. Bare reading of para 8 and 10 of M/s. Escorts JCB Limited v. Commissioner Of Central Excise (2004) 8 SCC 335, wherein this submission namely the judgment of the Court are not to be construed as statute is specifically dealt with would show that in the context of the present discussion, this plea is mis-placed. Further, generally speaking this submission is pressed into service when judgment sought to be relied on by the other side is delivered on special or peculiar facts of that given case. In short, in the circumstances of the present case, this submission is mis-placed. 26. Now about the limited power and scope for interference in appeal against the discretionary order passed by the Court, principles are very well settled. Unless, the order under challenge is perverse or contrary to the binding decision or on such like ground the order is vitiated, the appellate Court could not interfere in the discretionary order passed by the learned trial Court. Interference, merely on the ground that alternate view is possible, is not permissible. The exercise of discretion by the learned trial Court may be either way. interference in appeal is fairly limited. Interference, merely on the ground that alternate view is possible, is not permissible. The exercise of discretion by the learned trial Court may be either way. interference in appeal is fairly limited. In this regard, reference may be made to Skyline Education Institute (Pvt.) Ltd. v. S.L. Vaswani and Anr., AIR 2010 SC 3221 . 27. After the conclusion of the arguments by the learned advocates for the parties, Shri Patel on behalf of the appellant has submitted additional affidavit of one of the appellant. A copy of it given to the other side. It is the say of the appellant that after the order of the learned trial Court, one document is tendered by the respondent, wherein extension of area of operation of plaintiffs' Society by amendment in bye-laws is sought to be brought on record. It is also pointed out that despite such alleged extension of area of operation of respondent Society, half of 42 newly registered Society remains outside the area of operation of the plaintiffs' Society. Hence, no likelihood of adverse effect on existing Society. 27.1. Except production of additional affidavit, learned advocates for the parties have not address the Court in respect of the additional affidavit. It may be recalled that one of the submission of learned advocate for the applicant at the time of hearing was no likelihood of adverse effect on plaintiffs' Society, hence, the grievance of the plaintiff is mis-placed and Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra), does not help the plaintiff. Submission is too spacious to accept. In Vachhol Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Mandali Limited's case (supra) it is clearly stated that issuance of notice and giving opportunity to the existing Society need not be restricted to the area of operation of existing Society in every case. Test is likelihood of adverse effect on existing Society. Whether there would be in fact adverse effect on existing Society or not it is difficult to decide for the Court and that too at interim stage. It is for the authority to decide. Considering the area of operation and other relevant consideration, the authority may conclude in favour of the present appellant. But the question that largely remained unanswered by the appellant is why almost all the applications taken up for consideration in the meeting wherein, in respect of most of the Societies, subject was not on agenda. Considering the area of operation and other relevant consideration, the authority may conclude in favour of the present appellant. But the question that largely remained unanswered by the appellant is why almost all the applications taken up for consideration in the meeting wherein, in respect of most of the Societies, subject was not on agenda. Taking up the application for consideration in such a manner and sanctioning the same in hush-hush - manner - so to say makes the case for consideration. There is no answer to this. It may also be noted that after granting sanction to 42 Societies, the authority has initiated suo motu action for cancellation of the registration. This proceeding is pending. In view of such facts and circumstances, area of operation of new existing Society in a sense takes back seat. 28. A brief reference now may be made to subsidiary points. Relying on 97th Constitutional amendment of 2011, it was pointed out that in Part-III in Article 19 Clause (1) and sub-clause (c) word 'co-operative' is inserted. In view of this amendment, the defendants have fundamental right to form a Society, This plea by itself cannot help much to the appellant. It is true that right to form Society is recognized as fundamental right. It is also true that in view of the presence of such heavy weight right in favour of the party, other rights and objections etc., of the other side would take back seat. But merely asserting that the defendant has a fundamental right leads to nowhere. In order to make the case for consideration, it is to be further pointed out that in the manner as pointed out by the party, there is violation or threat to his enjoyment of fundamental right. Filing of suit by plaintiff itself cannot be urged as threat to enjoyment of fundamental right. Beside that, the learned trial Court in a sense is right in holding that the fundamental right to form a Society is not absolute and it is subject to reasonable restrictions. Proviso to Section 4 lays down that new Society may not be registered if such "registration may have any adverse effect upon any other Society". The validity of this proviso is not under challenge. Learned senior advocate Shri Kavina has rightly pointed out that right of defendant to form a Society is not to be considered outside the statute. Proviso to Section 4 lays down that new Society may not be registered if such "registration may have any adverse effect upon any other Society". The validity of this proviso is not under challenge. Learned senior advocate Shri Kavina has rightly pointed out that right of defendant to form a Society is not to be considered outside the statute. In short, it would have been more appropriate if the plea of existence of fundamental right is raised not as a defence in the proceedings. 29. As to the other point, namely, bar of statutory notice and jurisdiction of Civil Court were also forcefully urged by learned advocate Shri Patel, however, in view of the above discussion, it is not possible to accept the submission of learned advocate on this point. Law relating to requirement of statutory notice and jurisdiction of Civil Court is now fairly well settled. The learned trial Court has not committed any error in rejecting this plea. As to the submission that the plaintiff has no locus standi and they are not 'aggrieved persons', it is too spacious plea to be accepted. Unlike writ petition, the plaintiff very easily acquires the locus standi. once, acceptable, the cause of action is asserted by the plaintiff. In view of the above discussion, the appeal fails. In view of the order passed in the main appeal, the present civil application stands disposed of accordingly.