JUDGMENT & ORDER : R.R. Prasad, J. This application has been filed for quashing the order dated 16.7.2016 passed by the District Magistrate, Imphal West, respondent No.1, whereby and where under the respondent No.1, in exercise of power conferred under sub section 3 of Section 3 of the National Security Act 1980, passed the order of detention in Cril/NSA/No.15 of 2016 against the detenu namely Yumnam Sunijl @ Babusana after recording that in order to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order it has become necessary to do so. 2. The grounds on which order of detention was passed are that the detenu joined an armed insurgent organization namely United National Liberation Front (UNLF) as a member in the year 2005. Thereupon, the detenu as well as others were imparted training at Myanmar. In April 2008 when the detenu came to Manipur from Myanmar, he along with others started indulging themselves in such activities which were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. On account of that cases were registered as FIR No.36(5)08 WGI PS u/s 20 of UA(P) Act and also FIR No.74(10)09 LIL PS u/s 20 UA(P) Act. The detenu on being arrested in connection with both the cases and were remanded to judicial custody. However, subsequently he was released on bail. After being released on bail, he started leading normal life but as the ideology of the insurgent organisations operating in the State of Manipur was so ingrained in him that he could not resist himself from joining a banned organization namely Kanglei Yawol Kanba Lup (KYKL) and started working for the said organization under the guidance of one Ksh. Doren Singh, an important member of the said organization. The detenu started demanding money from schools, individuals, firms, business establishment through a mobile. The detenu succeeded in extorting money from those organisations and individuals. The detenu, at the instance of self styled Capt. Even hurled bomb to terrorise the person who dared not to pay money to them. For such acts, cases were registered as FIR case No.56(3)16 NBL PS u/s 307/506/34 IPC and also u/s 20 of UA(P) Act as well as FIR Case No.35(5)16 WGI PS u/s 400 of the IPC as well as u/s 4 of the Expl. Sub-section Act. Even hurled bomb to terrorise the person who dared not to pay money to them. For such acts, cases were registered as FIR case No.56(3)16 NBL PS u/s 307/506/34 IPC and also u/s 20 of UA(P) Act as well as FIR Case No.35(5)16 WGI PS u/s 400 of the IPC as well as u/s 4 of the Expl. Sub-section Act. Subsequently, when the detenu was apprehended by the police incriminating articles were recovered and at his instance, an important member of the said organization, Doren Singh, was also arrested. Incriminating articles as well as the detenu and other persons arrested were handed over to Officer in-charge of Wangoi PS with a written report upon which FIR was registered as FIR Case No.37(5)16 WGI PS u/s 17/20 UA(P) Act; 25 (I-C) of Arms Act and also u/s 5 of the Expl.subst. Act. Thereupon, he was also arrested in connection with other cases and were remanded to judicial custody. On such grounds the respondent No.1, after recording that detenu would go on indulging himself in the activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, passed order of detention on 16.7.2016 which was approved on 27.7.2016 and was confirmed on 20.9.2016. The aforesaid order of detention, its approval and confirmation have been challenged on several grounds. 3. However, Mr. Khaidem Mani, learned Sr. counsel did confine his argument with respect to the point which is with regard to materials being absent for recording satisfaction by the detaining authority that there is every possibility of detenu being released on bail. In this regard, it was pointed out that it has been recorded that there has been likelihood of detenu being released on bail as one Md. Atao Rahaman @ Atabur @ Md. Ataur Rahaman, an accused in a case registered u/s 121/121-A of the IPC and also u/s 20/16 (a) (b) of the UA (P)Act and also u/s 25 (1-a) (1-B) of the A Act as well as u/s 4/5 of the Expl.Susb. Act has been released on bail by the court but such release of the accused on bail has nothing to do with the instant case as the petitioner has neither been made accused in a case in which Md. Atao Rahaman has been admitted to bail nor Md. Act has been released on bail by the court but such release of the accused on bail has nothing to do with the instant case as the petitioner has neither been made accused in a case in which Md. Atao Rahaman has been admitted to bail nor Md. Atau Rahaman has been made accused in a case in which the detenu has been booked in and thereby order of detention can be said to have been passed on ipse dixit ground and thereby order of detention is fit to be quashed in view of the decision rendered in a case of Huidrom Konungjao v. State of Manipur reported in (2012)7 SCC 181 wherein their lordships, after noticing similar facts, as has been stated above, had been pleased to hold that detention is based on mere ipse dixit statements made in the ground of detention which cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 4. Other submission which was advanced is that though in terms of the provisions as contained in Section 13 of the National Security Act, 1980 one can be detained for 12 months subject to confirmation of the detention order by the Advisory Board but in terms of the provisions contained in proviso to sub section 3 of Section 3 of the Act, State Govt. cannot pass order for detention exceeding 3(three) months in one go or at a stretch. But, here the detaining authority has passed the order of detention for a period of 12 months which is against the provision of the Act and thereby on this ground also the order of detention is bad. 5. As against this Mr. Vashum, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that from the order of detention it would appear that the detaining authority, after having taken notice of the fact recorded in the ground of detention, did satisfy himself that the detenu, after being released on bail, would indulge himself in same activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and only after recording such satisfaction the order of detention has been passed which never warrants to be interfered with by this Court. 6. It be stated that the Detaining Authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. 6. It be stated that the Detaining Authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of clause (1) & clause (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer and the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. To prevent misuse of this deterrent law, the law of preventive detention is to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, however technical, is mandatory and vital. These procedural safeguards are required to be zealously watched and enforced by the Court and their rigour cannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of the alleged activities of the detenu. In this regard, we may refer to a decision rendered in a case of Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (1981) 4 SCC 481 : 1981 SCC (Cri.) 853, wherein Their Lordships has observed: "4......... May be that the detenu is a smuggler whose tribe (and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy since its activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws of preventive detention afford only a modicum of safeguards to persons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are to have any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that at least those safeguards are not denied to the detenu." In this context, we may refer to another decision rendered in the case of Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh-Vrs – B.K. Jha, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 22 : 1987 SCC (Cri.) 244 wherein it has been held: "5.. . . The procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard." 7. The procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard." 7. Keeping in view the said principle, the Hon'ble Supreme Court subsequently in the case of Union of India –Vs Paul Manickam, (2003) 8 SCC 342 : 2004 SCC (Cri.) 239 recorded requirements to be made by the Detaining Authority passing order of detention when the detenue is in custody, which reads as follows: "14........Where detention orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of release of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly indicated. Subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention, and the decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, etc. Ordinarily, it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenu and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities, the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India: (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri.) 88. Where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India: (1991) 1 SCC 128 : 1991 SCC (Cri.) 88. The principles were set out as follows: even in the case of a person in custody, a detention order can be validly passed: (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has a reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail, and (b) that on being released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities; and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show an awareness of custody and/or a possibility of release on bail." 8. In that event at the cost of repetition, we may record that Detaining Authority while passing order of detention in a case of detenu being in custody, needs to observe following safeguards meticulously: (i) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (ii) If there is reason to believe on the basis of available materials placed before him – (a) that there is every possibility of being released; and (b) that on being so released he would be in all probability to indulge in prejudicial activities; (iii) If it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. 9. Thus, in the context of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we have to examine as to whether aforesaid safeguards have been observed meticulously by the Detaining Authority who has passed the order of detention when the detenu was in custody. 10. As we have said earlier that the detention order was passed after taking into account that accused was in custody. 10. As we have said earlier that the detention order was passed after taking into account that accused was in custody. There has been no denial of the proposition of law that the order of detention can be passed in respect of a person who is already in custody in respect of a criminal case. However, in view of the decision rendered in a case of Huidrom Konungjao v. State of Manipur & Ors (2012) 7 SCC 181 , it was held that if such detention order is challenged, detaining authority ought to satisfy the court following facts: (i) the authority was fully aware of the fact that detenu was actually in custody; (ii) there was reliable materials before the said authority on the basis of which it could have reasons to believe that there is reliable possibility of release on bail and further on being released, he would probably indulge in activities which are prejudicial to the public order. Further, it has been observed that in cases where this fact does not exist, the detention order would stand vitiated. 11. In the light of the decision, if we examine legality of the detention order, we would find that the detaining authority has recorded its satisfaction that there is likelihood of detenu being released on bail on account of the fact that one of the persons accused in connection with other case, not related in any manner with the instant case, has been enlarged on bail but granting bail had nothing to do with the instant case as neither this detenu was accused in that case in which the accused has been granted bail nor that person is an accused in the instant case in which detenu was taken into custody and moreover nature of offence alleged is also quite distinctive and therefore the ground upon which the satisfaction was recorded can be said to be ipse dixit and thereby order of detention is fit to be set aside in view of the decision rendered in the case of Huidrom Konungjao (supra). 12. Coming to the other submission relating to order of detention of 12 months made at one go being bad on account of the proviso to sub section 3 of section 3 of the Act, one needs to take notice of the provision as contained in Section 3 of the Act which reads as follows: "3. 12. Coming to the other submission relating to order of detention of 12 months made at one go being bad on account of the proviso to sub section 3 of section 3 of the Act, one needs to take notice of the provision as contained in Section 3 of the Act which reads as follows: "3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.-(1)The Central Government or the State Government may,- (a) If satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or (b) If satisfied with respect to any foreigner that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India,it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) The Central Government or the State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section, "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community" does not include "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community" as defined in the Explanation to subsection (1) of section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (7 of 1980), and accordingly, no order of detention shall be made under this Act on any ground on which an order of detention may be made under that Act. (3) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct, that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (2), exercise the powers conferred by the said subsection. Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. (4) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government: Provided that where under section 8 of the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detentions, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification, that, for the words "twelve days," the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted. (5) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the order." A reading of the above provision makes it clear that the State Government, District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police are the authorities conferred with the powers to pass order of detention. The only difference is that the order of detention passed by the Government would remain in force for a period of 3 months in the first instance whereas similar order passed by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police shall remain in force for an initial period of 12 days. Continuance of detention beyond 12 days would depend upon the approval to be accorded by the Government in this regard. Sub-section 3 of Section 3 of the Act makes this aspect very clear. Further, section 13 of the Act mandates that the maximum period of detention under the Act is 12 months. 13. Thus, the question for consideration is as to whether the State Government has the power to pass a detention order to detain a person at a stretch for a period of 12 months under the provision of the Act ? Same question fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case of Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors: (2014) Cril. LJ 2748; (2014) Supreme (SC) 407= AIR 2014 SC 2090 which, though was in connection with an Act namely, Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers Act,1986 (hereinafter referred to Andhra Act) but the relevant provision is in parameteria to the provisions enshrined under the National Security Act. Section 3 of the said Andhra Act empowers detention of certain categories of persons as defined under the said Act. Apart from conferring of power, section regulates the manner of passing the order of detention as well as their duration. Section 3 of the Andhra Act reads as follows: "Section 3: Power to make orders detaining certain persons : (1) The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger, dacoit, drug-offender, goondas, immoral traffic offender or land-grabber that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in Sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section : Provided that the period specified in the order made by the Government under this sub-section shall not in the first instance, exceed three months, but the Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. (3) When any order is made under the section by an officer mentioned in Sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government." 14. After having regard to the provisions of the Andhra Act, their Lordships did observe as follows: "12. A reading of the above provisions makes it clear that the State Government, District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police are the authorities, conferred with the power to pass orders of detention. The only difference is that the order of detention passed by the Government would remain in force for a period of three months in the first Instance, whereas similar orders passed by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police shall remain in force for an initial period of 12 days. The continuance of detention beyond 12 days would depend upon the approval to be accorded by the Government in this regard. Subsection (3) makes this aspect very clear. Section 13 of the Act mandates that the maximum period of detention under the Act is 12 months. 13. Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is very clear in its purport, as to the operation of the order of detention from time to time. Subsection (3) makes this aspect very clear. Section 13 of the Act mandates that the maximum period of detention under the Act is 12 months. 13. Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is very clear in its purport, as to the operation of the order of detention from time to time. An order of detention would in the first instance be in force for a period of three months. The Government alone is conferred with the power to extend the period, beyond three months. Such extension, however, cannot be for a period, not exceeding three months, at a time. It means that, if the Government intends to detain an individual under the Act for the maximum period of 12 months, there must be an initial order of detention for a period of three months, and at least, three orders of extension for a period not exceeding three months each. The expression "extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time" assumes significance in this regard. 14. The requirement to pass order of detention from time to time in the manner referred to above, has got its own significance. It must be remembered that restriction of initial period of detention to three months, is nothing but implementation of the mandate contained in Clause (4)(a) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. It reads as under : Clause 4 : No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless : (a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention : Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under Sub-clause (b) of Clause (7); or (b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Clause (7). 15. 15. Where the law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner following a particular procedure, it shall be done in the same manner following the provisions of law, without deviating from the prescribed procedure. When the provisions of Section 3 of the Act clearly mandated the authorities to pass an order of detention at one time for a period not exceeding three months only, the Government Order in the present case, directing detention of the husband of the appellant for a period of twelve months at a stretch is clear violation of the prescribed manner and contrary to the provisions of law. The Government cannot direct or extend the period of detention up to the maximum period of twelve months, in one stroke, ignoring the cautious legislative intention that even the order of extension of detention must not exceed three months at any one time. One should not ignore the underlying principles while passing orders of detention or extending the detention period from time to time. 16. Normally, a person who is detained under the provisions of the Act is without facing trial which in other words amounts to curtailment of his liberties and denial of civil rights. In such cases, whether continuous detention of such person is necessary or not, is to be assessed and reviewed from time to time. Taking into consideration these factors, the Legislature has specifically provided the mechanism "Advisory Board" to review the detention of a person. Passing a detention order for a period of twelve months at a stretch, without proper review, is deterrent to the rights of the detenu. Hence, the impugned Government Order directing detention for the maximum period of twelve months straightaway cannot be sustained in law." 15. Thus, it has been held that when the provision does mandate that the authority is to pass order of detention at one time for a period not exceeding to three months, any order of detention for a period of twelve months at a stretch would be against the law which would not be sustainable in law. 16. Thus, it has been held that when the provision does mandate that the authority is to pass order of detention at one time for a period not exceeding to three months, any order of detention for a period of twelve months at a stretch would be against the law which would not be sustainable in law. 16. Now coming to the present case if one compares the provisions of the National Security Act and the Andhra Act, referred to above, one would find that the relevant provision of the Andhra Act is in parameteria to the relevant provision of National Security Act and thereby ratio laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court is quite applicable in this case. Consequently, we do record that order of detention of 12 months passed in one go is certainly in contravention of the proviso to sub section 3 of Section 3 of the Act and thereby order of detention being unsustainable in law suffers from illegality on this count also. 17. Thus, we do find that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority of the likelihood of the accused being released on bail, is not based on any factual aspect and that the order of detention never happens to be in consonance with the provisions of sub-section 3 of Section 3 of the Act and thereby order of detention, its approval and confirmation being bad, are hereby quashed. Consequently, detenu namely Yumnam Sunil Singh @ Babusana s/o Y. Basanta Singh of Oinam Sawombung Awang Leikai PS Wangoi, is directed to be released forthwith, if not, wanted in any other case. The writ petition stands allowed. Let a copy of this order be furnished to Registrar General for communicating it to the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Manipur and also to Director General of police so that it be circulated to all the District Magistrates and the SPs.