JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. Prachchhak, learned advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Oza, learned advocate for the respondent No. 1.1-1.2 and Mr. Mehta, learned AGP for the respondent Nos. 12 to 14. Though served no one has entered appearance for respondent Nos. 2 to 11. 2. In present petition the petitioner has challenged order dated 22.6.2007 passed by learned Tribunal in Revision Application No. TEN/BS/97/98. 3. So far as factual background is concerned the petitioner has averred and stated that:- "3. The petitioners say that the father of respondent No. 1-Shri Shukkarbhai Kikabhai Patel along with Jaisingbhai Shukkarbhai Patel and Amrutbhai Shukkarbhai Patel made an application before the Mamlatdar & Agricultural Land Tribunal on 4th December 1989 under Section 70(B) of the said Act. In the said Tenancy Case No. 70(B).7875/89 it was contended by the father of present respondent No. 1, respondent No. 1 and his brother that they are cultivating the land of Block No. 538 and 692 of Village Navera since the last 35 years and they are in possession of the said land. The said applicants claimed that they are growing Dangar, Podra, Tuval etc. and also taking winter crop. They claimed that they were sharing the crop with the original owners. They also claimed that they are paying the land revenue since the year 1974. They claimed that as they are threatened by the original owners as not to cultivate the land they are compelled to file the said application dated 4.12.1989 under Section 70(B) of the said Act. The said applicants had also filed an application dated 13.12.1989 under Section 70(NB) of the said Act praying that injunction against the original owners restraining them from entering upon and/or breaching their possession of the land in question. The Mamlatdar & ALT had recorded the evidence of Shri Shukkarbhai Kikabhai Patel, father of present respondent No. 1. He claimed that he is raising grass and cutting the same and is also taking care of baval trees which grows on the land. In his oral deposition he said that payment of revenue is from the year 1980. The Mamlatdar & ALT had recorded the evidence of Shri Shukkarbhai Kikabhai Patel, father of present respondent No. 1. He claimed that he is raising grass and cutting the same and is also taking care of baval trees which grows on the land. In his oral deposition he said that payment of revenue is from the year 1980. The evidence of Shri Mohanbhai Morarbhai was also recorded on behalf of the owners and he had clearly stated that there is no name of the applicants at any point of time in village from 7/12 and that their case claiming injunction against the original owners has no basis. He had further stated that the land in question is already sold to Shri Ramanlal Zinalal Desai by sale deed dated 13.12.1989 and possession is also handed over to the purchaser on behalf of the original owners. It was further stated that therein that the purchaser has levelled the land and cut the trees and that levelling is down by the purchaser. He pointed out that the original owners have nothing to do with the land in question as title and possession is already handed over to the purchasers. The petitioners say that it is pertinent to note that the land was sold and possession was handed over to the purchaser on 13.12.1989 and immediately thereafter, an application under Section 70(NB) of the said Act was preferred against the original owners. 4. The petitioners say that the Mamlatdar & ALT also recorded evidence of Shri Rameshbhai Ramanbhai in the case under Section 70(B) of the said Act. Said Shri Rameshbhai Ramabhai, who is one of the original owners clearly stated in his statement that the original owners, who are respondents No. 1 to 9 in the application under Section 70(B) of the said Act have already sold the land to Shri Ramanbhai Zinabhai, who is the owner as in the year 1991. He also stated that the original owners were cutting grass from the lands in question as it was a "ghasia" land and that sometimes they were employing labourers to get grass. He pointed out that for some years, paddy was grown in Block No. 692. However, since last three years, i.e. 1989 to 1991 only grass is grown on Block No. 692. He pointed out that for some years, paddy was grown in Block No. 692. However, since last three years, i.e. 1989 to 1991 only grass is grown on Block No. 692. He pointed out that the purchaser, Shri Ramanbhai Zinabhai is the owner and occupant of the land in question and that at no point of time there was any tenant on the land in question. He pointed out that the applicant Shukkarbhai or Jaisingbhai or Amrubhai never cultivated the land and that the purchaser has purchased the land for Rs. 85,000/- and he has put in possession by virtue of the said sale. He also pointed out that the land is levelled and wire fencing has been erected on the compound and trees of sapota (chikoo) and coconut are also grown by the purchaser. He also pointed out that one farm house has also been built by him. He further pointed out that from the beginning the land was fallow and was uneven. He further pointed out that applicant No. 1, i.e. Shukkarbhai K. Patel was doing labour work of Bhaktai (spiritual service provider) and Vaidya (therapist). Therefore, there were good relations with him and he used to have good relations with the father and mother, i.e. Shri Ramanbhai, one of the owners and he was called as he was doing work of Bhaktai (spiritual service provider). He further pointed out that his father trusted him. He was asked to pay the land revenue. He pointed out that at no point of time either the name of Shukkarbhai or his sons ever shown in the village record as cultivating the land. He pointed out that Shukkarbhai was interested in purchasing the land in question. However, the owners refused to sell the land to him.... (5) The petitioners say that the Mamlatdar & ALT on the basis of the evidence on record and the documentary evidence in the nature of village form 7/12 held that the applicants are not the tenants of the lands in question." 4. In aforesaid factual background learned advocate for the petitioner raised four contentions viz. (5) The petitioners say that the Mamlatdar & ALT on the basis of the evidence on record and the documentary evidence in the nature of village form 7/12 held that the applicants are not the tenants of the lands in question." 4. In aforesaid factual background learned advocate for the petitioner raised four contentions viz. (a) the land is not cultivable and therefore the respondents could not have been declared "tenants" i.e. tenancy in favour of the respondents could not have been declared (2) land in question is non-agriculture land and that therefore also tenancy could not have been declared (c) no agriculture activities are carried on the land in question therefore tenancy could not have been declared and (4) from the Form No. 8/A particularly column No. 13 of the said form it is evident that agriculture activity is carried on by owner himself and not by "cultivator" and that therefore any occasion for any one much less respondent No. 1 to claim tenancy would not arise. On the said four grounds the petitioner has assailed impugned order. 4.1 Mr. Prachchhak, learned advocate for the petitioner also submitted that natural growth of grass cannot be termed agriculture activity. So as to support the said contention learned advocate for the petitioner relied on the decision in case between Sanmukhrai Khandubhai Desai vs. Arvind Jekishandas 1979 (2) GLR 669 , Bhikhabhai Narsibhai vs. Fardunji Rustamji Adajania 1986 (1) GLR 395 , Babiben Rikhavchand Doshi vs. Deputy Collector, Tharad 1986 GLH 845 , Pune Panjarpole Trust vs. Baban Gabaji Saste, 2007 (6) BCR 505. 5. Per contra, Mr. Oza, learned advocate for the respondent No. 1 while disputing claim that on the land in question any agriculture activity was not undertaken and yield of any crop was not taken, submitted that the said respondent has been cultivating the land in question since many years and after appreciation of evidence the authorities have reached to the conclusion that the respondent has been cultivating land in question and therefore tenancy in favour of the respondent No. 1 is decided and the said order and finding by respondent Tribunal does not suffer from any error. 6. Mr. Mehta, learned AGP submitted that the tribunal's order does not suffer from any infirmity. He also submitted that actually the dispute is between the petitioner and private respondent i.e. respondent No. 1 and the respondent Nos. 6. Mr. Mehta, learned AGP submitted that the tribunal's order does not suffer from any infirmity. He also submitted that actually the dispute is between the petitioner and private respondent i.e. respondent No. 1 and the respondent Nos. 12 to 14 are formal parties. 7. I have considered rival submissions by the learned advocates for the contesting parties. I have also considered the material available on record including the order passed by Mamlatdar & ALT as well as order passed by the Deputy Collector and also the order passed by learned Tribunal. 8. At the outset it is relevant and necessary to mention that the submissions by learned advocate for the petitioners appear to be self contradictory inasmuch as on one hand the petitioners claim that the land in question is self cultivated and the petitioners have been cultivating the land themselves without any "cultivator". On the other hand the petitioners repeatedly and emphatically submitted that the land in question is not cultivable and the land is not agriculture land and any agriculture activity is not undertaken. If the said second contention is right then first contention should automatically fail. 9. So far as the facts are concerned, it has emerged from the record that present respondent No. 3 to 11 are original owners of parcel of land bearing blocks No. 538 and 692 at village: Navera, District: Valsad. 9.1 The petitioners claim that the said original owners were personally cultivating the land in question and their names were recorded in village Form No. 7/12 since 1950-51 and continued even during the year 1994-95. 9.2 It appears that subsequently the said land was sold to one Mr. R.Z. Desai. 9.3 According to the petitioners, said Mr. R.Z. Desai sold the land in question to petitioner No. 2 i.e. Mr. K.B. Tandel and said Mr. Tandel i.e. petitioner No. 2 is, as of now, in possession and occupation of the land in question. The respondent No. 1 disputes the petitioner's claim about possession. 9.4 The petitioners also claim that in December, 1989, the father of respondent No. 1 i.e. Mr. S.K. Patel and the petitioner No. 1 Mr. J.S. Patel and one Mr. Tandel i.e. petitioner No. 2 is, as of now, in possession and occupation of the land in question. The respondent No. 1 disputes the petitioner's claim about possession. 9.4 The petitioners also claim that in December, 1989, the father of respondent No. 1 i.e. Mr. S.K. Patel and the petitioner No. 1 Mr. J.S. Patel and one Mr. A.S. Patel had submitted an application to Mamlatdar & ALT under Section 70(B) of the Act and claimed tenancy on the ground that they were jointly cultivating the land i.e. Block No. 538 and 692 at village: Navera since 35 years and they are in possession of the land, they have been paying land revenue. 9.5 The said application was registered as Tenancy Case No. 17(B) 7875 of 1989. 9.6 It appears that the said 3 applicants also filed an application in December, 1989 under Section 70(N)(B) of the said Act and prayed for injunction against the original land owner, restraining them from disturbing their possession. 9.7 During the proceedings before Mamlatdar & ALT, statements of Mr. K.S. Patel and Mr. M.M. Patel has been recorded somewhere in January, 1990. In this context, petitioners have averred and stated that:- "5. The petitioners say that the Mamlatdar & ALT on the basis of the evidence on record and the documentary evidence in the nature of village Form 7/12 held that the applicants are not the tenants of the land in questions. 6. The petitioners say that the petitioners have applied for a copy of the said order. However, the Record & Proceedings are not being available and therefore, the petitioners could not get a copy of the order dated 29.02.1992, whereby the Mamlatdar & ALT rejected the application under Section 70B of the said Act filed by Shri Shukkarbhai Kikabhai Patel, Shri Jaisingbhai Patel and Shri Amrutbhai Patel." 9.8 Feeling aggrieved by the said order of Mamlatdar & ALT, the respondent No. 1 preferred Appeal before the Deputy Collector, and challenged the said order dated 29.2.1992. According to the petitioners, the Deputy Collector remanded the proceedings to Mamlatdar for rehearing. 9.9 Subsequently, the Mamlatdar & ALT registered the case as Tenancy Case No. 70(B)/R/8106/92. 9.10 According to the petitioners, the Mamlatdar & ALT passed order, in the remand proceedings and vide order dated 30.12.1997 he held that the respondent No. 1 Mr. According to the petitioners, the Deputy Collector remanded the proceedings to Mamlatdar for rehearing. 9.9 Subsequently, the Mamlatdar & ALT registered the case as Tenancy Case No. 70(B)/R/8106/92. 9.10 According to the petitioners, the Mamlatdar & ALT passed order, in the remand proceedings and vide order dated 30.12.1997 he held that the respondent No. 1 Mr. J.S. Patel with Smt. Sadhna A. Patel were the tenants of Block No. 538 of village Navera, however, he rejected similar claim of said respondent No. 1 Mr. J.S. Patel and Smt. Sadhana A. Patel in respect of Block No. 692 of village Navera. 9.11 Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners filed Tenancy Appeal through their Power of Attorney, before the Deputy Collector. The Appeal was rejected as Tenancy Appeal No. 61 of 1997. 9.12 In the said Appeal, the petitioners claimed that they are in possession of the land in question and impugned decision is contrary to record and the authority committed error in holding that the said applicants were tenants of the land in question. 9.13 In the said proceedings, Dy. Collector passed order dated 18.6.1998 in favour of present petitioner and set aside the order dated 30.6.1997 passed by Mamlatdar & ALT. 9.14 Against the order dated 18.6.1998 passed by Dy. Collector, the respondent preferred revision application before the revenue tribunal which was registered as revision application No. 97 of 1998. 9.15 The learned Tribunal considered the revision application and after hearing the parties, the learned Tribunal set aside the order dated 18.6.1998 passed by the Dy. Collector and restored the order dated 30.6.1997 passed by Mamlatdar & ALT. The learned Tribunal also declared that the revisionist i.e. present respondent is tenant since 1980. 9.16 With said decision, learned Tribunal returned the case to Mamlatdar & ALT to determine the purchase price of tenancy. 9.17 The petitioners are aggrieved by the said order dated 22.6.2007 passed by the learned Tribunal in revision application No. 97 of 1998. 10. In this background, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decisions in case of S.K. Desai (supra) and Shri Bhikhabhai Narsibhai (supra) and Ms. Babiben R. Doshi (supra). [a] In the decision in case of Bhikhabhai Narsibhai, POA Holder Vallabhbhai Parshottambhai & Anr. 10. In this background, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decisions in case of S.K. Desai (supra) and Shri Bhikhabhai Narsibhai (supra) and Ms. Babiben R. Doshi (supra). [a] In the decision in case of Bhikhabhai Narsibhai, POA Holder Vallabhbhai Parshottambhai & Anr. v. Fardunji Rustamji Adajania [1986 GLH 449], the Court considered the terms 'agriculture land' and 'tenant' and also considered the terms 'agriculturist' and 'to cultivate' and 'to cultivate personally'. In this context, the Court observed, inter alia, that:- "6. Since the land in question was given on lease for the sole purpose of tapping toddy trees, it was urged on behalf of the landlords that the purpose could not be said to be agricultural having regard to the definition of the term 'agriculture' contained in Section 2(1) of the Act much less could it be contended that the land was under cultivation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Therefore, argued Mrs. Mehta, the respondent could not be said to be a 'tenant' in respect of the land in question within the meaning of Section 2(18) of the Act to be entitled to purchase the land as a deemed purchaser. There can be no doubt that tapping toddy trees cannot be said to be an agricultural activity under the Act. If the purpose for which the land was let was tapping of toddy trees, there can be no doubt that the user of the land could not be said to be for agricultural purposes within the meaning of Section' 2(8) read with Section 2(1) of the Act. In that event it would be difficult to say that the respondent was the holder of land defined in Section 2(8) so as to be covered within the definition of 'tenant" under Section 2(18) of the Act. Having regard to the meaning of the expression 'to cultivate' in Section 2(5) of the Act read with the Explanation thereto, it is equally difficult to hold that the respondent was a deemed tenant under Section 4 of the Act. Under that provision it must be shown that the person claiming to be a deemed tenant was lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person. Under that provision it must be shown that the person claiming to be a deemed tenant was lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person. In order to show that the respondent was cultivating the land at the material point of time, the evidence on record must disclose that he was tilling or husbanding the land for the purpose of raising or improving agricultural produce or for carrying on any agricultural operation thereon. There is no evidence on record whatsoever that the respondent tilled or husbanded the land in question although he has stated that grass grows on the land and he was growing vegetables thereon, a statement which is not supported by any cogent evidence. 8. Under the 1939 Act also 'land' meant land used for agricultural purposes. The term 'agriculture' defined in Section 2(1) of that Act included horticulture, the raising of crops or garden produce, dairy farming, stock breeding and grazing, but not cutting of grass or wood only. The expression 'to cultivate personally' defined in Section 2(11) of that Act meant to cultivate by one's own account, by one's own labour or by the labour of any member of one's family or by servants or hired labour under one's personal supervision or the personal supervision of any member of one's family. Bearing in mind these definitions it is difficult to say that the purpose of letting was an agricultural purpose. As pointed out earlier, since the purpose of letting was tapping toddy trees situate on the land in question, it could not be said to be an agricultural purpose nor could it be said that the land was under the personal cultivation of the lessee. In the circumstances it is difficult to agree with Mr. Desai in his submission that the lessee was a protected tenant under the 1939 Act. 10. The approach of the Revenue Tribunal to the questions at issue can be culled out from the following observations found in paragraph 4 of its judgment- "The first question to be considered is whether the land is an agricultural land or not. Looking to the extract of V.F. 7-12 it is clear that the land has been agricultural land and grass grown on the land. It is also true that there are some Khajura trees also. Looking to the extract of V.F. 7-12 it is clear that the land has been agricultural land and grass grown on the land. It is also true that there are some Khajura trees also. However looking to the area of the land the number of Khajura trees are not proportionate to the area and therefore it cannot be argued that the entire land contains only Khajura trees. It is therefore clear presumption that the land is agricultural land. Even the words 'cultivate personally' does not debar the type of cultivation where there are some fruit trees or other trees giving some yield and there is cultivation in between. Even if the say of the opponent that he is cultivating vegetables is not believed even then the grass is grown and there are Khajura trees. The combined operation would therefore result in agricultural operation and therefore sub-sections (5) and (8) of Section 2 of the Act do not bar the right of the land to be agricultural land. As discussed earlier the entries in the V.F. 7-12 are clear and therefore it has to be held that land is agricultural land and the Act does apply. Regarding the question of the land not being cultivated there is no such evidence produced by the applicant. The land has been held on lease since the year 1917 and the possession has been with the opponent's family. There is no doubt that it can be said that they have been cultivating the land lawfully and even if the contractual tenancy is terminated there would - not be any bar to the tenant being considered a statutory tenant. ...Even Khajura trees required looking after which would result in agricultural operation and the grass which is grown would have to be cut. In that view of the matter there is no doubt that the opponent has a claim by heir-ship to be the tenant of the suit land." With respect, the entire approach of the Tribunal is in total ignorance of the fact that the land was leased for the sole purpose of chopping or tapping toddy trees. This purpose for which the land was leased under the rent-note of 1917 could never be said to be an agricultural purpose within the meaning of the Act. This purpose for which the land was leased under the rent-note of 1917 could never be said to be an agricultural purpose within the meaning of the Act. It is not the case even of the lessee that he was 'raising' grass in the land over which the Khajura trees were situate. It appears from the village form 7-12, xerox copies whereof have been placed before me by Mrs. Mehta, that grass grew on this land. But if grass grows naturally, it is not an agricultural operation because the definition of 'agriculture' under Section 2(1) speaks about 'raising of grass' and not 'grass growing naturally' on the land. In such circumstances the lessee cannot be said to be an 'agriculturist' within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act since there is no evidence to suggest that he was cultivating the land as understood by Section 2(5) of the Act; much less could it be said that he was personally cultivating the land as understood by Section 2(6) of the Act. The entry in the village form only shows that he and his predecessors-in-title were the occupants of the land. That means that even after the period of five years expired, the possession of the land continued to be with the predecessors-in-title of the lessee. However, after the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 came into effect, the purpose for which the land was let was frustrated as tapping of toddy trees was prohibited by Section 16 of that Act. Section 15 also prohibited the import, export, transport or possession of sweet toddy or nira. Under Section 11 only those holding a licence, permit, pass or authorization could import, export, transport, manufacture, bottle, sell, buy, possess, use or consume any intoxicant or hemp or cultivate or collect hemp or any toddy producing tree or permit such tree to be tapped or draw toddy from any such tree or permit toddy to be drawn there from. It, therefore, becomes clear from these provisions of the Prohibition law that tapping of toddy trees or permitting toddy trees to be tapped was an offence punishable under Section 66 of that Act. It was, therefore, unlawful for the lessee to tap toddy trees and for the lessor to permit tapping of toddy trees which was the sole purpose for which the land was leased under the agreement of 1917. It was, therefore, unlawful for the lessee to tap toddy trees and for the lessor to permit tapping of toddy trees which was the sole purpose for which the land was leased under the agreement of 1917. Even after the expiry of five years since the predecessors-in-title of the lessee continued to remain in occupation of the land, it could at best be. said that they were holding over the land on the same terms and conditions. They could not change the purpose of letting after the expiry of the contractual period and if the purpose remained the same, it became unlawful on the enactment of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949. In other words, since the purpose of letting became unlawful, the lease stood frustrated and by virtue of Section 56 of the Contract Act it became void. The relevant part of Section 56 of the Contract Act states that a contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes - impossible or unlawful. On the plain language of Section 56 of the Contract Act, therefore, the lease became void on the enactment of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, since tapping of toddy trees and permitting the tapping of toddy trees was prohibited and contravention thereof was made punishable under Section 66 with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees." In the decision, the Court observed, inter alia, that where the grass grows naturally, the operations cannot be considered agriculture operation because the definition of agriculture under Section 2(1) speaks about 'raising of grass' and not 'grass growing naturally' on the land. The Court also observed that in such circumstances, the lessee cannot be said to be an agriculturist within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. The Court also observed that in such circumstances, the lessee cannot be said to be an agriculturist within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. At this stage, it is necessary to note that while observing that "in such circumstances, the lessee cannot be said to be an agriculturists within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act", the Court also observed and recorded that, "since there is no evidence to suggest that he was cultivating the land as understood by Section 2(5) of the Act; it cannot be said that he was personally cultivating the land as understood by Section 2(6) of the Act". The said observation by the Court makes it clear that the decision with regard to the lessee that he could not be said to be agriculturists was based on evidence which was available, rather the said observation were made on account of lack of evidence on record in the cited case. The facts narrated in the decision also give out the fact that the case was examined by the Court essentially in light of the fact that entire land contained only Khajura trees and in light of rent note of 1917 which established that the land was leased for sole purpose of chopping or tapping toddy trees. [b] Mr. Prachchak, learned advocate for the petitioners, also relied on the decision in case of Sanmukhrai Khandubhai Desai v. Arvind Jekishandas Shroff [ 1979 (2) GLR 669 ]. Mr. Prachhak, learned advocate, in particular relied on the observation by the Court in paragraph No. 3 of the said decision, which reads thus:- "[3] Mr. Vakil appearing for the respondents urged that despite the making of the cutting of grass as an agricultural operation the legislature in its wisdom had not correspondingly amended the definition of the term ‘to cultivate and his submission therefore was that even if the cutting of the grass is an agricultural operation by virtue of the explanation appended to the definition of the term ‘to cultivate occurring in sec. 2(5) the petitioner cannot claim that he is cultivating the land. The explanation specifically states that whoever takes up a contract to cut grass or to gather fruits or other produce of trees on any land shall not on that count only be deemed to cultivate such land. 2(5) the petitioner cannot claim that he is cultivating the land. The explanation specifically states that whoever takes up a contract to cut grass or to gather fruits or other produce of trees on any land shall not on that count only be deemed to cultivate such land. It was in the fitness of things that with the insertion of a proviso enlarging the ambit of the term ‘agriculture the Government should have sought the modification of the explanation appended to the definition of the term ‘to cultivate but unfortunately the said definition of the term ‘to cultivate has remained unamended with the result that whenever the term ‘cultivate arises in the context of cutting of grass alone the man who has taken upon himself the job of cutting grass alone cannot be deemed to cultivate such land. The petitioners claim rested essentially on the ground that he was lawfully cultivating the land. The reasoning beneath the argument advanced by Mr. Vakil in my view deserves to be accepted as the inevitable corollary of the process of logic. Sec. 2 contains various interpretation clauses. They by themselves are not substantive law. The petitioner in his turn claims his alleged status on the ground of sec. 4 which is required to be interpreted in the light of the term ‘cultivate occurring therein and in order to know what to ‘cultivate is we have to perforce advert to its definition occurring in sec. 2(5) with its explanation. This is certainly anomalous but it is for the Legislature to rectify this sort of anomaly or for the Government to move suitable machinery for bringing about the desired change. As far as the abstract law is concerned the only conclusion that could be drawn is that a man who is given contract only to cut grass or to collect fruits from some land cannot claim to cultivate that land.;" [c] Learned advocate for the petitioners also relied on the decision in case of Surat Peoples Co-operative bank Ltd. v. Pravinkumar Maganlal Patel. In the said decision the Court considered the issue viz. who would be considered tenant/deemed tenant. Mr. Prachhak, learned advocate for the petitioners, placed emphasized on the observation in paragraph No. 7 of the said decision, which reads thus:- "7. In the said decision the Court considered the issue viz. who would be considered tenant/deemed tenant. Mr. Prachhak, learned advocate for the petitioners, placed emphasized on the observation in paragraph No. 7 of the said decision, which reads thus:- "7. A Plain reading of the above section makes it clear that a person claiming deemed tenancy under the said section shall not be the owner of the land in question and shall be in lawful possession of the land in question and shall be cultivating the same. The words 'to cultivate' have been defined in section 2(5) of the Act as under: 2(5) "to cultivate" with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions means to till or husband the land for the purpose of raising of improving agricultural produce, whether by manual labour or by means of cattle or machinery, or to carry on any agricultural operation thereon; and the expression "uncultivated" shall be construed correspondingly" However, it would not be out of place to also take into consideration the observation in paragraph No. 5 of the said decision, which reads thus:- "5. The plain reading of the agreement in question does not spell out the relationship of the land lord and the tenant between the Bank and the respondent. Under the said agreement, it was the Bank who had to bear expenses of cultivation i.e. the Bank had to pay for the wages of labourers; for the equipments that may be hired and for the expenses of seeds etc. The respondent had agreed to supervise agricultural operations and to sale agricultural produce in the market committee. The respondent had also agreed to submit receipts for the money spent to the bank. For the efforts made by the respondent, he had to be remunerated in cash equivalent to 1/3rd of the net profit of the sale of the agricultural produce of the said lands. Moreover, the said agreement specifically stipulates that all expenses should be incurred in the name of the Bank and the receipts should be issued in the name of the Bank. Moreover, the said agreement specifically stipulates that all expenses should be incurred in the name of the Bank and the receipts should be issued in the name of the Bank. Every year, the name of the Bank should be entered in the "Pani Patrak." The said agreement, therefore, cannot be said to be a rent note or an agreement creating tenancy in favour of the respondent." From the details mentioned in paragraph No. 3 of the decision, it transpires that there was specific agreement dated 13.6.1973 between the parties and in light of the said agreement, the petitioner sought to contend that the parties never intended to create tenancy. Having regard to the said aspects, the Court observed in paragraph No. 5 of the said decision that:- "5. The plain reading of the agreement in question does not spell out the relationship of the land lord and the tenant between the Bank and the respondent. ..... The respondent had agreed to supervise agricultural operations and to sale agricultural produce in the market committee. The respondent had also agreed to submit receipts for the money sent to the bank. ..... Moreover, the said agreement specifically stipulates that all ...... the receipts should be issued in the name of the Bank...." In that backdrop, the Court addressed the issue as to whether irrespective of the agreement, the respondent can be said to be "deemed tenant" within meaning of Section 4 of the Act or not. After considering the provision under Section 4 of the Act, the Court observed, inter alia, that:- "8. Hence, in my view, reading section 4 with section 2(5) of the Act, it is apparent that the person claiming deemed tenancy under section 4 of the Act shall be cultivating the lands personally by manual labour or by means of cattle or machinery and shall be carrying on agricultural operations thereof. The evidence on record reveals that the lands were being cultivated through hired labourers, wages of whom were borne by the Bank. The respondent has admitted in his evidence that he was getting the land cultivated through hired labourers i.e. the respondent did not cultivate the land personally either by manual labour or by means of cattle or machinery. Further, it is also admitted that the respondent did not pay rent to the Bank nor did he pay the land revenue for the said lands. Further, it is also admitted that the respondent did not pay rent to the Bank nor did he pay the land revenue for the said lands. All the expenses of cultivating the lands that is ploughing the lands, seeds and other agricultural operations were being borne by the Bank. This fact has been proved by the Bank by producing the accounts and the receipts for the payment made by it. It is also undisputed that after deducting the expenses incurred by the Bank from the sale proceeds of the agricultural produce of the said lands, the respondent was remunerated by paying 1/3rd of such net profit. Thus, the respondent cannot be said to have been remunerated in crop share." With the said observations, the Court held that the respondent failed to establish that he was tenant. The said observations in cited decision make it clear that the decision and conclusion by the Court are essentially based on the evidence which was examined and taken into account by the Court, more particularly the facts admitted by the concerned respondent in the cited decision. [d] Learned advocate for the petitioners relied on the decision in case of Pune Panjarpole Trust v. Baban Gabaji Saste & Ors. [2007 (6) BLR 505]. In the said decision, Court observed, inter alia, that:- "The word "Agriculture" was amended in 1957 and the bracketed portion was incorporated in the said definition. However, prior to the amendment, the words "to raise grass" have been interpreted by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nathubhai Gandabhai Desai (supra) wherein Division Bench has held that naturally grown grass does not amount to cultivation of land and, as such, the said land does not fall under the category of agricultural land. The Division Bench has observed as under: Now, the first question that we have to consider is : What did the legislature actually intend when it used the expression "any land has remained uncultivated, " and for that purpose we must turn to Section 2 which is the definition section. In that section "to cultivate has been defined as "to carry on any agricultural operation," and "agriculture" has been defined as including horticulture, the raising of crops, grass or garden produce, dairy farming, poultry farming, stock breeding and grazing, but does not include cutting of wood only. In that section "to cultivate has been defined as "to carry on any agricultural operation," and "agriculture" has been defined as including horticulture, the raising of crops, grass or garden produce, dairy farming, poultry farming, stock breeding and grazing, but does not include cutting of wood only. Briefly, the contention of the State of Bombay is that the lands which have been the subject matter of the declaration are grass lands in which grass grows, but grass grows spontaneously, grass is a natural crop and no human agency or human industry or effort is required for the purpose of growing grass. On the other hand, the contention of the petitioners is that the grass that they grow requires the sowing of seeds, it requires the process of weeding, and at least in one case it has been suggested that there is actually a well out of which water has to be supplied in order to enable the grass to grow. Now, these are divergent versions of what actually is being done on the lands of the petitioners. As we have pointed out, it is for the Government to be satisfied as to what is actually being done on these lands. It is for the Government to decide whether the land is uncultivated as provided by the statute. Realising this difficulty the petitioners have argued these petitions on the basis that the version given by the Government as to what is being done on these lands is the correct version, and even so it is urged by the petitioners that the result of the growing of this grass on the lands is agriculture and the petitioners are cultivating their lands within the meaning of that definition in Section 2. The question therefore which presents itself to us is whether it could he said of a person on whose land grass grows naturally and spontaneously without any effort on his part or without any activity on his part, that he-is raising grass and he is carrying on an agricultural operation. The question therefore which presents itself to us is whether it could he said of a person on whose land grass grows naturally and spontaneously without any effort on his part or without any activity on his part, that he-is raising grass and he is carrying on an agricultural operation. The only agricultural operation we are concerned with in this case is the raising of grass, and the case of the Government is, which we must accept for the purpose of these petitions, that all that the petitioners do is to cut the grass and use it as fodder for their cattle, and it is urged on behalf of the stale that merely cutting of grass can in no view of the case amount to the raising of grass as required by the Act. It will be noticed that the definition of "agriculture" is an inclusive definition; it is not an exhaustive definition; and by an inclusive definition it is always open to a Legislature to extend the natural meaning of a word or expression. It may give an artificial meaning to an expression and include in the connotation of that expression a connotation which it does not naturally bear, and it will be open to the petitioners to suggest that inasmuch as the definition of "agriculture" is not exhaustive, if they satisfy us that "agriculture" in its plain natural meaning would include the process which Government admit the petitioners carried out on their lands, then undoubtedly there would be a strong case made out by the petitioners for our holding that the mere cutting of grass is "agriculture" although the grass is grown naturally and spontaneously. Now, in our opinion, before we go to the natural and plain meaning of "agriculture," first turning to the meaning given to the word "agriculture" by the Legislature itself, the raising of grass cannot possibly mean the mere cutting of it when the petitioners have taken no part in the actual growing of the grass. Raising would mean promoting or causing the growth of, and therefore unless the petitioners in some way promote or cause the growth of grass, they would not be raising grass. In order to promote or cause the growth of grass, some operation must be done to the land itself. Raising would mean promoting or causing the growth of, and therefore unless the petitioners in some way promote or cause the growth of grass, they would not be raising grass. In order to promote or cause the growth of grass, some operation must be done to the land itself. Either it may be sowing seeds or it may be watering or it may be weeding or whatever other operation there may be. A rather ingenious argument was advanced by Mr. Jahagirdar that it is admitted by Government that the lands of the petitioners are fenced and watchmen are kept to see that grass when it is cut and stacked on the land is not damaged by cattle or other animals straying into the land, and Mr. Jahagirdar says that in doing that they are promoting or causing the growth of the grass. In our opinion, in fencing the land and in keeping watchmen to protect the grass, all that the petitioners are doing is to prevent the destruction or deterioration of the grass; but that is something very different from the raising of grass. As we pointed out, raising must refer to the growth of the grass itself, not to an operation that takes place after the grass is grown. Mr. Jahagirdar says that if there was no fence the grass may not grow at all or may not grow to its natural height and it may be damaged. But that again is an act to prevent something being done to the grass, whereas raising suggests some active operation on the part of a land owner in relation to the grass which he wants to be grown upon his land. It was then urged that the Act does not draw any distinction between an artificial and a natural crop and it was said that if grass grew on the land and whether the grass was natural or grown by human agency, it would make no difference to the question as to whether an agricultural operation was carried out on that land. It must be borne in mind that the emphasis that the Act places upon what operation is carried on the land, because what cultivating emphasises is carrying on of an agricultural operation. It must be borne in mind that the emphasis that the Act places upon what operation is carried on the land, because what cultivating emphasises is carrying on of an agricultural operation. Therefore, even though grass may grow on the land, unless an agricultural operation is carried out by the owner in relation to the growing of that grass, the definition of "to cultivate" would not be satisfied. ...Therefore, in our opinion, it is clear that as far as the expression "raising of grass" is concerned, it cannot possibly include the cutting of grass or any activity for the protection of grass either while it is growing or after it is cut, and to the extent that we are concerned with this inclusive definition the activity of the petitioners which the Government admits does not fall within the ambit of the definition." 11. From above quoted observations, it comes out clearly that in cases wherein the issue similar to the issue involved in present case are involved e.g. question as to whether the land in question is agriculture land and/or whether the concerned person is agriculturist and/or the activity in question is "cultivation" etc, the Court has invariably held that the evidence with regard to the activities or the work undertaken and carried out by the person who claims to be the lessee/tenant and/or agriculturist, would be of utmost importance. 11.1 Therefore, it is necessary to turn to the discussion in impugned orders where the authority has taken into account the evidence placed on record by both sides. 12. Before proceeding further, it will not be out of place to mention that in present proceedings, wherein this Court has to examine the orders passed by the statutory authorities, i.e. when the Court is exercising limited jurisdiction of judicial review, this Court would not enter into re-appreciation or re-evaluation of the evidence. The Court will restrict the examination of the impugned order to the extent of examining the conclusion drawn and recorded by the authority or learned Tribunal as to whether it is perverse if the concerned authority or the learned Tribunal has adopted one of the possible view, then, this Court would not interfere with such findings. The jurisdiction of this Court in exercise of judicial review is limited. 13. The jurisdiction of this Court in exercise of judicial review is limited. 13. Now, so far as impugned order and findings are concerned, from the record, more particularly from the application No. 1806 of 1996 filed by the petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and from the details mentioned at Page-101 of the petition, it has emerged that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had raised claim for tenancy in respect of Block No. 532 and 692. 14. However, when the order dated 30.06.1997 passed by Mamlatdar (which is confirmed by learned Tribunal) is examined, it emerges from the order that the Mamlatdar has not discussed the claim of respondent No. 2 in respect of block No. 692 and passed direction only with regard to block No. 538. 14.1 On further consideration of the order passed by learned Tribunal, it also comes out that in its order even the learned Tribunal also has not addressed the claim with reference to block No. 692. 14.2 In this context, it is necessary to mention that on this count, the respondent No. 1 relied on the evidence of Mr. Ramesh Rama, who has mentioned details with regard to crop of rice which, according to respondent No. 1, supports his case and establishes that the land yield crop of rice as well and demolishes case of the petitioners that there was natural growth of only grass on the land in question. 14.3 At this stage, it would not be out of place to take into account that learned advocate for the respondent referred to and emphasized the statement by Sukkarbhai Kikabhai Patel which was recorded by the Mamlatdar & ALT. During his statement, said Sukkarbhai Kikabhai Patel deposed and stated that he had been cultivating and tilling the land since many years. 15. On reading the order impugned in present petition, it also comes out that the authorities also failed to distinguish between yield of crop from block No. 538 and yield of crop in block No. 692. 15.1 From the said facts, it has also emerged that while reaching to final conclusion, learned Tribunal appears to have unfortunately lost sight of the said discrepancy and anomaly. This particular aspect acquires relevance and importance because in his statement Mr. Ramesh has mentioned yielding crop in block No. 692 but he has also made reference of block No. 302 which has not been referred to anywhere else. This particular aspect acquires relevance and importance because in his statement Mr. Ramesh has mentioned yielding crop in block No. 692 but he has also made reference of block No. 302 which has not been referred to anywhere else. The details about the yield of crop of block No. 538 does not come out from the material which is available on record of the case. 16. For the above mentioned reasons, it appears that it would be appropriate and in fitness of things and in interest of justice if the case is reconsidered and re-examined by learned Tribunal in light of foregoing discussion. For the said purpose, it would be necessary to remit the case to learned Tribunal for fresh consideration so that the learned Tribunal can specifically address the aspects and details mentioned above. 17. In light of the said position when the order passed by learned Tribunal is examined, another vital fact which emerges is that before the first authority aforesaid Mr. R.Z. Desai had submitted an application with request that he may be permitted to join the proceedings. The record does not show any decision on said application. Though learned counsel would submit that the application was not granted, he does not seem to be sure about factual aspect and the record is not helpful as it does not give out any decision and any submissions on behalf of Mr. Desai are not dealt with. The learned Tribunal also does not appear to have taken note of and dealt with this aspect. Therefore also, matter deserves reconsideration by learned Tribunal so that all aspects, including the issue related to Mr. Desai's application can be examined in proper perspective and in light of the record of the proceedings. 18. In this view of the matter, following order is passed:- [a] The Order dated 22.06.2007 passed by learned Tribunal is set aside and the proceedings are remanded to learned Tribunal. [b] The learned Tribunal will consider above mentioned issues and shall also re-examine entire evidence and after dealing with the evidence available on record and after addressing and dealing with contention raised by both the sides, learned Tribunal shall pass fresh reasoned and speaking orders with reasons for its findings and conclusions. [c] Learned Tribunal shall pass fresh order without being influenced by the order impugned in this petition. [c] Learned Tribunal shall pass fresh order without being influenced by the order impugned in this petition. [d] It is also clarified that contention of both sides are kept open and it will be open and permissible for contesting parties to raise all such contentions as may be available. [e] Learned Tribunal, shall also take into consideration the observation by the Deputy Collector in his order about application filed by Mr. R.Z. Desai for permission to join the proceedings. Learned Tribunal shall ascertain as to whether the said applicant was allowed to join the proceedings or not and whether opportunity of hearing was granted to said applicant or not. In the event, learned Tribunal finds that said applicant was not joined as party and not granted opportunity of hearing, learned Tribunal shall examine the said issue and pass appropriate order as it may consider appropriate in light of the facts of the case. With aforesaid observation and direction, present petition is disposed of. Rule is discharged. Disposed off