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2017 DIGILAW 1001 (JHR)

Binu Prasad Munda @ Beni Prasad Munda v. State of Jharkhand

2017-06-29

D.N.PATEL, RATNAKER BHENGRA

body2017
JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 24th August, 2015 delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 6522 of 2013, whereby the petition preferred by these appellants was dismissed and hence, original petitioners have preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Factual Matrix The property in question pertaining to Khata No. 20, 21 and 48 is situated at village Timra, P.S. Karra, Thana No. 24 and village Jaria, District Ranchi (Now Khunti), State of Jharkhand. The genealogical table relating to the property in question reads as under : Lego munda Lepa munda Sadho Jadu (issueless) Madhua Sonica Guruwa Jaimasih @ mausa Nainsukh (issueless) Matius Masidas Simon Gabriel Paras Samuel (issueless) Silar Anandmasih Cyril Markus Agnes Bhadin Alias sahay Silas Prabhu Only daughter frida mundain w/o benjmin munda Abhram (applicant) Rejan The property in question was sold by Patras Munda, who is the recorded tenant, on 15th June, 1948 to Appellant No. 1-Beni Prasad Munda @ Benu Prasad Herenge and Benjamin Munda. The property was transferred through a registered sale-deed. Nothing happened for years together and decades together and on one fine morning on 22nd June, 1993, an application was filed by respondent Nos. 6 and 7 under Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, challenging the registered sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948, which was registered as S.A.R. Case No. 32 of 1993-94 before Schedule Area Regulation Officer-cum-D.C.L.R, Khunti. Without looking to the limitation etc. of 30 years and without giving opportunity of being heard to the purchasers of the property, order dated 15th March, 1997 (Annexure 1 to the memo of this L.P.A.) was passed in favour of the applicants of S.A.R. Case No. 32 of 1993-94 and immediately respondent Nos. 6 and 7 got possession because of this order. Appeal was preferred by these appellants, being S.A.R. Appeal No. 14R15/1997-98, before the Appellate Authority challenging the order passed in S.A.R. Case No. 32 of 1993-94 dated 15th March, 1997. Said S.A.R. Appeal preferred by these appellants was allowed and the order passed in S.A.R. Case No. 32 of 1993-94 was quashed and set aside. The possession which was taken away from these appellants by virtue of the order passed in S.A.R. Case 32 of 1993-94 now does not remain in existence. Said S.A.R. Appeal preferred by these appellants was allowed and the order passed in S.A.R. Case No. 32 of 1993-94 was quashed and set aside. The possession which was taken away from these appellants by virtue of the order passed in S.A.R. Case 32 of 1993-94 now does not remain in existence. Against the order passed in S.A.R. Appeal No. 14R15/1997-98, which is dated 19th August, 1998 (Annexure 3 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal), no appeal has further been preferred by respondent Nos. 6 and 7. The matter was remanded to decide S.A.R. Case No. 32/1993-94 afresh after quashing the earlier order dated 15th March, 1997 passed in S.A.R. Case No. 32/1993-94. S.A.R. Case No. 32/1993-94 has been decided afresh and now wisdom has prevailed upon the Court concerned and limitation etc. must have been carefully gone through that a registered sale-deed of the year 1948 is challenged in the year 1993. Earlier, no hearing was given to the purchasers of the property. Keeping in mind all these points, ultimately S.A.R. Case No. 32/1993-94 was dismissed by vide Order dated 24th May, 2002 (Annexure 4 to the memo of this L.P.A.). Thus, the fact remains that the very basis of the dispute relating to the property in question, which was an order passed in S.A.R. Case No. 32/1993-94 dated 15th March, 1997 (Annexure 1 to the memo of this L.P.A.) was not only quashed and set aside by the appellate authority vide order dated 19th August, 1998 (Annexure 3 to the memo of this L.P.A.), but, also after re-hearing the case, after remand, the S.A.R. case preferred by respondent Nos. 6 and 7 bearing number S.A.R. Case No. 32/1993-94 was dismissed vide order dated 24th May, 2002 (Annexure 4 to the memo of this L.P.A.). Thus, respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have continued with the possession unauthorisedly. For getting possession of their property these appellants had to file restitution application before the Officer concerned, who had passed order in S.A.R Case No. 32/1993-94. For no reason, whatsoever, the prayer for restoration of possession was rejected vide order dated 3rd July, 2007 in SAR Misc. Case No. 01/2006-07 (Annexure 5 to the memo of this L.P.A.), against which these appellants preferred appeal. For no reason, whatsoever, the prayer for restoration of possession was rejected vide order dated 3rd July, 2007 in SAR Misc. Case No. 01/2006-07 (Annexure 5 to the memo of this L.P.A.), against which these appellants preferred appeal. This appeal was also dismissed by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 24th January, 2013 in Appeal No. 50R-15/2008-09 (Annexure 6 to the memo of this L.P.A.). Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the orders passed by the Special Officer as well as by the Appellate Authority as they have not restored possession, despite the S.A.R. Case No. 32 of 1993-94 was dismissed which was preferred by respondent Nos. 6 and 7, a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 6522 of 2013 was preferred before this Court and it was dismissed vide order dated 24th August, 2015 and hence, present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioners. 3. Arguments canvassed by the counsel appearing for the Appellants : Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the property in question was sold by one Patras Munda to the predecessors in Title of these appellants through a registered sale-deed. For decades together nothing has happened and in the year 1993 an application was preferred by respondent Nos. 6 and 7 challenging the said sale-deed under Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and without giving any opportunity of being heard to these appellants and without any application of mind regarding long lapse of time of more than years, ex-parte order was passed in S.A.R. Case No. 32/1993-94 in favour of respondent Nos. 6 and 7. Vide order dated 15th March, 1997 this application was allowed in utter violation of the basic principles of Transfer of Property Act and Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and immediately the possession was given to respondent Nos. 6 and 7 of the property in question which was in possession of these appellants and their predecessors in Title from the year 1948. Appeal preferred by these appellants was allowed and the order passed in S.A.R. Case No. 32/1993-94 was quashed and set aside vide order dated 19th August, 1998 by Appellate Authority (Annexure 3 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) and the matter was remanded. After remand of the matter, fresh order was passed and S.A.R Case No. 32/1993-94 was dismissed vide order dated 24th May, 2002 (Annexure 4 to the memo of the L.P.A.). After remand of the matter, fresh order was passed and S.A.R Case No. 32/1993-94 was dismissed vide order dated 24th May, 2002 (Annexure 4 to the memo of the L.P.A.). Thus, very basis of giving possession of the property in question to respondent Nos. 6 and 7 does not remain in existence. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated while dismissing the restoration of possession application, initially by Special Officer and thereafter, by the Appellate Authority and thereafter, by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition and hence this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by these appellants. The respondent No. 6 and 7 have never challenged the ownership of the property of these appellants before any competent Civil Court. No civil suit has been instituted by the respondent Nos. 6 and 7. Despite these facts, unnecessarily while deciding the restoration of possession application by the Special Officer, thereafter the appeal by the appellate authority and the writ petition by the learned Single Judge, they have mentioned that if there is any dispute, Civil Court has the jurisdiction. In the facts of the present case, as submitted by the counsel appearing for the appellants, nobody has challenged the Title of these appellants with respect to the property in question by filing any civil suit. These facts have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and hence, also the judgment and order dated 24th August, 2015 delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6522 of 2013 deserves to be quashed and set aside. Simultaneously, the order dated 3rd July, 2007 passed in SAR Misc. Case No. 01/2006-07 (Annexure 5 to the memo of the L.P.A.) as well as the order passed by Dy. Commissioner, Khunti vide order dated 24th January, 2013 in Appeal No. 50R-15/2008-09 (Annexure 6 to the memo of this L.P.A.) also deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Arguments canvassed by counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 6 and 7. Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 6 and 7 submitted that Patras Munda expired without any male issue. Patras Munda was a tribal. As per the customary laws of the Mundas, no property can be inherited by the female members. Thus, there is no right of inheritance for the female members. Patras had a daughter namely Firda and Benjamin Munda is the husband of said Firda. 6 and 7 submitted that Patras Munda expired without any male issue. Patras Munda was a tribal. As per the customary laws of the Mundas, no property can be inherited by the female members. Thus, there is no right of inheritance for the female members. Patras had a daughter namely Firda and Benjamin Munda is the husband of said Firda. Thus, Benjamin is the son-in-law of Patras. No property can be transferred under Section 71 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 without permission of the Commissioner under Section 46 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and therefore, on 22nd June, 1993 vide SAR Case No. 32/1993-94 the sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948 was challenged before the Special Officer praying for restoration of the possession, which was allowed by the Special Officer vide order dated 15th March, 1997 (Annexure 1 to the memo of the L.P.A.) and hence, possession of the property in question was given to respondent Nos. 6 and 7. Thereafter, appeal was preferred by these appellants and the order dated 19th August, 1998 (Annexure 3 to the memo of the L.P.A.) of remand was passed by the Appellate Authority, hence, upon remand fresh order was passed in SAR Case No. 32/1993-94 and said application preferred by respondent Nos. 6 and 7 was not decided and parties were relegated to Civil Court. Counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 6 and 7 further submitted that restoration of possession was rightly dismissed by the Special Officer and appeal preferred by these appellants was also rightly dismissed by the Appellate Authority and no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge in appreciating these facts in order dated 24th August, 2015. Moreover, as per Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, execution of any order should be done within three years, whereas, here the order was passed by the appellate authority on 19th August, 1998 in S.A.R. Appeal No. 14R15/1997-98 (Annexure 3 to the memo of this L.P.A.) whereas, application for restoration of possession, being SAR Misc. Case No. 1/2006-07, was preferred much later and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. 5. Arguments canvassed by the counsel appearing for the respondent State of Jharkhand : Lepa munda Sadho Madhuwa Mausa Nainsukh (issueless) Matias Masidas Patras Anand Masih Silas Siril Markus (applicant no. 2) respondent no. 6 app/res/res Only daughter firda (w/obenjamin munda) o.p./pet/appellant Abhiran Ranjan (applicant no. 4) respondent no. 5. Arguments canvassed by the counsel appearing for the respondent State of Jharkhand : Lepa munda Sadho Madhuwa Mausa Nainsukh (issueless) Matias Masidas Patras Anand Masih Silas Siril Markus (applicant no. 2) respondent no. 6 app/res/res Only daughter firda (w/obenjamin munda) o.p./pet/appellant Abhiran Ranjan (applicant no. 4) respondent no. 7 app/res/res Counsel appearing for the State of Jharkhand submitted that genealogical table relating to the property in question is as under : In view of the aforesaid genealogical table, Patras Munda had sold away the property to Appellant No. 1 and Benjamine Munda by registered sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948 and thereafter, on 22nd June, 1993, an application was preferred by respondent Nos. 6 and 7 challenging the transfer of the said property and for getting the possession of the property. This application was registered as SAR Case No. 32 of 1993-94. This application was preferred under Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and without appreciating the 30 years period of limitation and without giving any opportunity of being heard to these appellants, order was passed by the Special Officer on 15th March, 1997 in favour of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 (Annexure 1 to the L.P.A.) and hurriedly the possession was given to respondent Nos. 6 and 7 without even waiting for reasonable period of appeal etc. Appeal was preferred by these appellants, being SAR Appeal No. 14R15/1997-98, which was allowed vide order dated 19th August, 1998 and order passed in SAR Case No. 32/1993-94 was quashed and set aside and the matter was remanded. Even after remand of the matter, when it was re-decided vide order dated 24th May, 2002, never the application preferred by respondent Nos. 6 and 7 was allowed, but, the respondent No. 6 and 7 were relegated to take recourse of a civil suit before any competent Civil Court. Thus, the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 19th August, 1998 (Annexure 3 to the memo of this L.P.A.) by which the earlier order passed in SAR Case No. 32/1993-94 dated 15th March, 1997 (Annexure 1 to the memo of the L.P.A.) which was quashed and set aside, remained intact and as it is. Further, it appears that respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have not instituted any civil suit till date. Thus, the very basis on which the possession was given to respondent Nos. Further, it appears that respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have not instituted any civil suit till date. Thus, the very basis on which the possession was given to respondent Nos. 6 and 7 has already been quashed and set aside by the order dated 19th August, 1998 (Annexure 3 to the memo of the L.P.A). These aspects of the matter have not been appreciated when these appellants preferred application for restoration of possession, being SAR Misc. Case No. 01/2006-07 (Annexure 5 to the memo of the L.P.A.), which was decided ex-parte without giving proper and adequate opportunity of being heard and it has been appreciated neither by the Appellate Authority in Misc. Appeal No. 50R-15/2008-09 nor by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the W.P. (C) No. 6522 of 2013. REASONS: 6. Having heard counsels appearing for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we, hereby, quash and set aside the judgment dated 24th August, 2015 passed in W.P. (C) No. 6522 mainly for the following facts and reasons : (I) The property in question was originally transferred by one Patras Munda to the Appellant No. 1 and one Benjamin Munda by registered sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948. Appellant No. 2 is the legal heir of said Benjamin and they were in possession since 1948. (II) After long lapse of time, of several years and decades together the nearby relatives of Patras preferred an application under Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, in the year 1993-94. This nearby relatives were respondent Nos. 6 and 7. genealogical table submitted by the counsel for the Government has already been reproduced here-in-above. (III) An application was preferred by respondent Nos. 6 and 7 questioning the sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948 and for getting possession of the properties in question. This application was registered as SAR Case No. 32/1993-94 before Special Officer at Khunti (now district Khunti). This S.A.R case was decided in favour of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 vide order dated 15th March, 1997 (Annexure 1 to the memo of the L.P.A.) without appreciating the period of limitation. Immediately the possession was given to respondent Nos. 6 and 7, without even waiting, for the appellate order and without waiting for a reasonable period. This S.A.R case was decided in favour of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 vide order dated 15th March, 1997 (Annexure 1 to the memo of the L.P.A.) without appreciating the period of limitation. Immediately the possession was given to respondent Nos. 6 and 7, without even waiting, for the appellate order and without waiting for a reasonable period. (IV) It has become a fashion in the State of Jharkhand to prefer such type of applications after four, five, six and seven decades. Sometimes such type of applications are being decided without giving adequate and effective opportunity of being heard and ignoring registered sale-deeds. We have come across several such type of orders passed by Special Officers under Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. In fact, the limitation for preferring such type of applications is 30 years as per Article 65 of the Limitation Act as amended by schedule Area Regulation, 1969. By this amendment waiting period has been extended from 12 years to 30 years so far as member of Scheduled Tribe is concerned. This law is more observed in breach, than in compliance in the State of Jharkhand. Much belatedly preferred applications beyond the aforesaid period of 30 years have been allowed, just upon asking. The possessions of decades together have been upset and given to such type of applicants and the original possessors have to move from pillar to post or from heaven to sky, before the appellate authorities and after succeeding before appellate authorities again they have to prefer "restoration of possession application" etc. This case is no exception to such type of methodology or modus operandi of belatedly preferred applications by the applicants. (V) As the Special Officer has passed an order dated 15th March, 1997 in S.A.R Case No. 32 of 1993-94 in favour of respondent Nos. 6 and 7, appellants preferred appeal, being SAR Appeal No. 14 R 15/1997-98 before the Appellate Authority, which was allowed vide order dated 19th August, 1998 (Annexure 3 to the memo of the L.P.A.). By this order of the Appellate Authority, order passed by the Special Officer in S.A.R Case No. 32/1993-94 was quashed and set aside and the matter was remanded to the said officer to re-decide the S.A.R Case No. 32/1993-94, especially the period of limitation (VI) Thus, the very basis of grant of possession of the property in question to respondent Nos. 6 and 7 has already been quashed and set aside by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 19th August, 1998 (Annexure 3 to the memo of this L.P.A.). After remand of the matter. S.A.R Case No. 32/1993-94 was re-decided and the Special Officer had relegated respondent Nos. 6 and 7 to a competent Civil Court. This order was passed on 24th May, 2002 (Annexure 4 to the memo of the L.P.A.) and thereafter, respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have neither challenged the title of these appellants nor they have questioned the legality and validity of the registered sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948. It appears that only intention of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 was to get possession of the property in question by hook or crook by any order, whatsoever, and vide the order dated 15th March, 1997, which was the first order passed in S.A.R. Case No. 32/1993-94, they succeeded and later on, despite said order being quashed by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 19th August, 1998 (Annexure 3 to the memo of the L.P.A.) the possession was never given back to these appellants. (VII) Thus, it appears that the order by which respondent Nos. 6 and 7 has got possession of the property in question, i.e. order dated 15th March, 1997 in S.A.R Case No. 32/1993-94, has already been quashed and set aside and respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have not yet filed any civil suit in any competent trial Court. They have never challenged the legality and validity of the registered sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948 by filing any civil suit and despite this they are continuing in possession of the property since the year 1997. (VIII) To get the possession of the property in question by these appellants, an application was preferred which was registered as S.A.R. Misc. Case No. 01/2006-07. This application was dismissed by Special Officer, Khunti vide order dated 3rd July, 2007 (Annexure 5 to the memo of the L.P.A.) without appreciating the fact that the order dated 15th March, 1997 passed in S.A.R Case No. 32 of 1993-94 has already been quashed and set aside by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 19th August, 1998 (Annexure 3 to the memo of the L.P.A.). Unnecessarily this authority has reiterated the remedies available in the Civil Courts. It ought to be kept in mind that respondent Nos. Unnecessarily this authority has reiterated the remedies available in the Civil Courts. It ought to be kept in mind that respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were never interested in going before any competent Civil Court. They have so far have not challenged the sale-deed. The respondent Nos. 6 and 7 wanted only possession of the property without any ownership in their favour. Once, they achieved this, vide order dated 15th March, 1997 (Annexure 1 to the memo of the L.P.A.), even though this order was set aside, they maintained stoic silence and continued with the illegal possession. (IX) These aspects of the matter were not appreciated by the Special Officer, while deciding S.A.R. Misc. Case No. 01/2006-07. In Land matters, it has become a novice method and a continuous practice that without going into the details of the facts the parties are relegated to trial Court for filing civil suit. Such type of order in S.A.R. Misc. Case No. 01/2006-07 has been passed. It appears that similar error has been committed by the Appellate Authority. Against the order dated 3rd July, 2007 in S.A.R. Misc. Case No. 01/2006-07 rejecting the "application for restoration of possession", an appeal, being Misc. Appeal No. 50R-15/2008-09 was preferred by these appellants. This Appeal has also been decided, by short cut method relegating the parties to the Civil Courts, but, nobody has appreciated that there is a registered sale-deed in favour of these appellants. These appellants cannot challenge their own registered sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948. If there is any doubt, in the mind of the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 about execution of the sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948, they have to go to the Civil Courts and not these appellants. It appears that the Special Officer, Appellate Authority as well as the learned Single Judge have lost sight of this plain and simple aspect of the matter while dismissing S.A.R. Misc. Case No. 01/2006-07, Misc. Appeal No. 50R-15/2008-09 and W.P. (C) No. 6522 of 2013 respectively. (X) Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were having a doubt regarding transfer of the property and the legality of transfer of the property, which has taken place much earlier in point of time, i.e. vide registered sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948 and they have preferred an application on 22nd June, 1993, i.e. after 45 long years. (X) Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were having a doubt regarding transfer of the property and the legality of transfer of the property, which has taken place much earlier in point of time, i.e. vide registered sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948 and they have preferred an application on 22nd June, 1993, i.e. after 45 long years. It would be pertinent to mention here that after approximately half a century, such type of application should not have been entertained by the Special Officer, i.e. S.A.R Case No. 32/1993-94 should not have been allowed. The Appellate Authority quashed order dated 15th March, 1997 passed in S.A.R Case No. 32/1993-94 and remanded the matter and even after remand of the matter when again S.A.R was decided respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were relegated to take recourse before competent civil Court. This second time decision in S.A.R Case No. 32/1993-94 is dated 24th May, 2002 (Annexure 4 to the memo of the L.P.A.). Thus, the order dated 15th March, 1997 passed in S.A.R. Case No. 32/1993-94, by virtue of which respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have got possession, does not remain in existence and the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have not filed any civil suit yet challenging the transfer of property vide registered sale-deed dated 15th June, 1948. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated while deciding S.A.R. Misc. Case No. 01/2006-07 vide order dated 3rd July, 2007 (Annexure 5 to the memo of the L.P.A.) as well as while deciding restoration appeal-Misc. Appeal No. 50R-15/2008-09, which was decided on 24th January, 2013 (Annexure 6 to the memo of the L.P.A.) and these facts have also not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P. (C) No. 6522 of 2013 vide order dated 24th August, 2015. 7. We, therefore, quash and set aside the Order dated 15th March, 1997 passed in S.A.R.Case No. 32 of 1993-94 (Annexure 1 to the memo of the L.P.A.), Order dated 3rd July, 2007 (Annexure 5 to the memo of this L.P.A.) as well as the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 24th January, 2013 in Misc. Appeal No. 50-R-15/2008-09 (Annexure 6 to the memo of the L.P.A.) as well as the order dated 24th August, 2015 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6522 of 2013. 8. Appeal No. 50-R-15/2008-09 (Annexure 6 to the memo of the L.P.A.) as well as the order dated 24th August, 2015 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (S) No. 6522 of 2013. 8. Possession will be given back to these appellants by the respondent Nos, 6 and 7 peacefully within one week and abiding by the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. The possession will be taken over by these appellants within one week. There is no super structure on the property concerned, as submitted by counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 6 and 7, hence, much time should not be taken in the taking over process of the property in question to these appellants. In fact, by virtue of this order the possession is considered to be already taken over by these appellants de jure. 9. This appeal is allowed and disposed of with a cost of Rs. 50,000/-, which will be paid by respondent Nos. 6 and 7 to these appellants within a period of six weeks from today. 10. Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 6 and 7 submits that this cost may be reduced because respondent Nos. 6 and 7 are poor. We are not inclined to reduce the cost of Rs. 50,000/- in view of the following facts : (a) The appellants are poorer, (b) Even after these appellants succeeded in the year 1998, respondent Nos. 6 and 7 continued with illegal possession, till date, (c) Unnecessarily, these appellants were dispossessed of land, which they were in possession from 1948. They were unnecessarily dragged in litigation after litigation's. Because of one wrong application by respondent No. 6 and 7, these appellants have to not only participate in this application, but, they have to prefer several litigation's, to get the possession back. The prayer for reduction of the cost rejected.