JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. D. Saikia, learned senior counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. R. Devi, learned Central Government counsel, appearing for the respondent No.1 and Mr. R.P. Kakoti, learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondent Nos.2 & 3. 2. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 17.12.2014 (Annexure-C of the writ petition), whereby the Director of Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati (for short, “IITG”) suspended the petitioner, who is a Professor of Department of Chemical Engineering, with immediate effect in view of lodging of All Women Police Station Case No.130/2014 under Sections 376(2)(b)/ 506 IPC against him and his subsequent arrest. By the said order, it was also indicated that terms and conditions of the suspension order would be governed as per the provisions of Clause 15(9) of the Statutes of IITG. 3. The petitioner had joined as Assistant Professor, Chemical Engineering Department in IITG in December, 2002 and was subsequently promoted to the post of Associate Professor and to the post of Professor in the year 2005 and 2007, respectively. Prior to the posting of the petitioner in IITG, the petitioner had served as Assistant Professor in Birla Institute of Technology & Sciences (for short, “BITS”), Pilani from 1998 to 2002. In the year 2014, the petitioner was posted as Dean Academic Affair and was made In-charge of Peer Review Section. One lady (name withheld, hereinafter referred to as “X”) was working as Senior Assistant, Academic Affairs and Peer Review Section. 4. “X” lodged an ejahar on 11.12.2014 before the Officer-in-Charge, All Women Police Station, Panbazar, Guwahati, stating, inter alia, that she had to report only to the petitioner in respect of her work and she is the only staff member in that section. She was initially disturbed by the petitioner during office hours by indecent insinuation, which she tolerated being a subordinate staff. However, on 01.12.2014 at about 5:30 PM, as she was about to leave office, the petitioner asked her to meet in the Peer Review Section and dictated some notes and in the process of dictating, he closed the door of the room from inside and switched off the light and grabbed her. Protest being made by her, the petitioner threatened her to spoil her career and pushed her towards a sofa by gagging her, as a result of which she got hurt in the head. Protest being made by her, the petitioner threatened her to spoil her career and pushed her towards a sofa by gagging her, as a result of which she got hurt in the head. She was overpowered and then raped. The petitioner threatened her to terminate her as well as her husband’s service, if the matter was disclosed to anyone. She had contemplated committing suicide. Being in mental trauma and because of fear of social stigma, immediately she did not inform anybody about the incident but had taken leave from 02.12.2014 to 04.12.2014. The petitioner had threatened her over telephone on 03.12.2014, 04.12.2014 and 05.12.2014. However, mustering enough courage, she informed her husband about the incident on 04.12.2014, who counselled her to lodge complaint against the petitioner and finally being persuaded, she had lodged the ejahar. This resulted in All Women Police Station Case No.130/2014 under Sections 376(2)(b)/506 IPC, which is already referred to earlier. 5. In connection with the aforesaid Police Station case, the petitioner was arrested on 16.12.2014 and thereafter, the suspension order, as noted above, was passed. The petitioner was released on bail on 16.03.2015 by an order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup in terms of Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC after expiry of 90(ninety) days as Final Form was not submitted by the Investigating Officer. 6. The petitioner submitted a representation on 19.03.2015 before the Director, IITG requesting revocation of the suspension order and release of subsistence allowance. 7. A show-cause notice under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short, “1965 Rules”) read with Article 311 of the Constitution of India was served upon the petitioner on 15.06.2015 by the Director, IITG, foundation of which lay in the police case lodged by “X”. Subsequently, vide his letter dated 05.08.2016, on the ground of technical reasons, the Director, IITG, had withdrawn the aforesaid show-cause notice. 8. An affidavit was filed by the respondent Nos.2 & 3 to which a reply affidavit was also filed by the writ petitioner. 9. Mr. Saikia submitted that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the alleged offence for harassing and humiliating him due to personal grudge and the petitioner had an otherwise unblemished record of service. It is submitted by him that in absence of a departmental proceeding, continued suspension of the petitioner due to pendency of the police case is unjustified. 9. Mr. Saikia submitted that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the alleged offence for harassing and humiliating him due to personal grudge and the petitioner had an otherwise unblemished record of service. It is submitted by him that in absence of a departmental proceeding, continued suspension of the petitioner due to pendency of the police case is unjustified. He has contended that the informant and her husband, who is also an employee of the IITG, had instigated the employees to oppose revocation of the suspension order of the petitioner and the authorities meekly succumbed to such unwarranted pressure tactics. The petitioner and his family is residing in the official quarter inside the campus even during the suspension period and in the above view of the matter, it is wholly unjustified not to utilise the service of the petitioner by revoking the order of suspension, if necessary, by adjusting the service of the informant in any other section. He has submitted that no review was conducted in terms of the provisions contained in Sub-rules (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules and as such continued suspension is rendered illegal. It is also submitted by him that as the charge-sheet was not submitted within a period of 90(ninety) days of his arrest, in view of the judgment rendered in Ajay Kumar Choudhary -Vs- Union of India, through its Secretary & Anr., reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 , the petitioner is entitled to be re-instated in service. He has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. -Vs- Dipak Mali, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 222 . 10. On the other hand, relying on the affidavit filed on 22.03.2017, Mr. Kakoti has submitted that Review Committee, set up to review the suspension of the petitioner, had met on 01.04.2015, 19.10.2015, 01.04.2016 and 30.09.2016 and the Review Committee had recommended extension of suspension period considering the pendency of the criminal case, which is of sensitive nature. He has also submitted that the Employees’ Association of IITG is also opposing reinstatement of the petitioner and revocation of the suspension order before conclusion of the trial may result in unrest, jeopardising academic environment as well as functioning of the Institute. He has also submitted that the Employees’ Association of IITG is also opposing reinstatement of the petitioner and revocation of the suspension order before conclusion of the trial may result in unrest, jeopardising academic environment as well as functioning of the Institute. The learned senior counsel has submitted that sufficient materials having been found against the petitioner, charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner by the Investigating Officer in G.R. Case No.12972/2014 under Section 376(2)(b) of IPC on 24.06.2015. He has also brought to the notice an Office Memorandum dated 07.01.2004 issued by the Director (E-II), Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, PG & Pensions (Department of Personnel & Training) on the subject of review of suspension order. He has relied on Paragraph 11 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank & Anr. -Vs- Deepak Kumar Bhola, reported in (1997) 4 SCC 1 to contend that the continued suspension of the petitioner is justified. 11. Ms. R. Devi has only submitted that it is essentially a matter between the petitioner and IITG. 12. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the materials available on record. 13. At the very outset, it will be useful to extract relevant portion of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules as under:- “10. Suspension. 12. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have perused the materials available on record. 13. At the very outset, it will be useful to extract relevant portion of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules as under:- “10. Suspension. – (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the President, by general or special order, may place a Government Servant under suspension – (a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or (aa) where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State; or (b) where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial: Provided that, except in case of an order of suspension made by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in regard to a member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and in regard to an Assistant Accountant-General or equivalent (other than a regular member of the Indian Audit and Accounts Service), where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority such authority shall, forthwith, report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made. (2) A Government Servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority, - (a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty-eight hours; (b) with effect from the date of his conviction, if, in the event of a conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty-eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consequent to such conviction. Explanation. – The period of forty-eight hours referred to in clause (b) of this sub-rule shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent period of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. Explanation. – The period of forty-eight hours referred to in clause (b) of this sub-rule shall be computed from the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent period of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account. (3) ****** (4) ****** (5) (a) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-rule (7), any order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. (b) Where a Government Servant is suspended or is deemed to have been suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceeding or otherwise), and any other disciplinary proceeding is commenced against him during the continuance of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded by him in writing, direct that the Government Servant shall continue to be under suspension until the termination of all or any of such proceedings. (c) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may, at any time, be modified or revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate. (6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension before expiry of ninety days from the effective date of suspension on the recommendation of the Review committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time. (7) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub-rule (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days. (7) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub-rule (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days. Provided that no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under sub-rule (2), if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of ninety days of suspension and the ninety days’ period in such case will count from the date of Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later.” 14. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules enjoins that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 10 shall be reviewed by the authority which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension before expiry of 90(ninety) days from the effective date of suspension on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall also have to be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension and that suspension period shall not be extended for a period exceeding 180(one hundred and eighty days) at a time. It is also made explicitly clear by Sub-rule (7) that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Sub-rule (1) or (2) of Rule 10 shall not be valid after a period of 90(ninety) days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of 90(ninety) days. 15. Sub-rules (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules were inserted by way of amendment and had taken effect from 02.06.2004. It will be also relevant to note that the words “before expiry of ninety days from the effective date of suspension”, as appearing in Sub-rule (6) was substituted by Notification dated 06.06.2007, which was published in the Gazette on 16.06.2007. 16. In view of the proposed amendment of Rule 10, as indicated above, an Office Memorandum dated 07.01.2004 was issued, which was referred to by Mr. Kakoti. The relevant portion of the said Office Memorandum reads as follows: “No.11012/4/2003 – Estt. 16. In view of the proposed amendment of Rule 10, as indicated above, an Office Memorandum dated 07.01.2004 was issued, which was referred to by Mr. Kakoti. The relevant portion of the said Office Memorandum reads as follows: “No.11012/4/2003 – Estt. (A) Government of India Ministry of Personnel, P.G. & Pensions (Department of Personnel & Training) “New Delhi, dated the 7th January, 2004 OFFICE MEMORANDUM Sub: Suspension of Government servants – Review of – Instructions reg. The undersigned is directed to say that Rule 10 (Suspension) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is being amended to provide that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this Rule shall be reviewed by the competent authority on recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose. It is also being provided in the Rules that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been under Sub-Rules (1) or (2) of Rule 10 shall not be valid after 90 days unless it is extended after review for a further period before the expiry of 90 days. It is further being provided that extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding 180 days at a time. (Copy of the Notification is enclosed). 2. It is, therefore, necessary to constitute Review Committee(s) to review the suspension cases. The composition of Review Committee(s) may be as follows:- (i) *** (ii) *** (iii) *** 3. The Review Committee(s) may take a view regarding revocation/ continuation of the suspension keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and also taking into account that unduly long suspension, while putting the employee concerned to undue hardship, involve payment of subsistence allowance without the employee performing any useful service to the Government. Without prejudice to the foregoing, if the officer has been under suspension for one year without any charges being filed in a court of law or no charge-memo has been issued in a departmental enquiry, he shall ordinarily be reinstated in service without prejudice to the case against him. However, in case the officer is in police/judicial custody or is accused of a serious crime or a matter involving national security, the Review Committee may recommend the continuation of the suspension of the official concerned.” 17. However, in case the officer is in police/judicial custody or is accused of a serious crime or a matter involving national security, the Review Committee may recommend the continuation of the suspension of the official concerned.” 17. A perusal of the aforesaid Office Memorandum goes to show that the Memorandum provides that if an Officer is under suspension for 1(one) year without any charge being filed in Court or if no charge-memo had been issued in a departmental enquiry, he shall ordinarily be reinstated in service without prejudice to the case against him. It is clarified that in case the Officer is accused of a serious crime or is an accused in a matter involving national security, the Review Committee may recommend the continuation of the suspension of the official concerned. 18. In Allahabad Bank (supra), the Bank employee was facing serious charges of corruption and misappropriation of money. In the aforesaid context, the Supreme Court had held that the mere fact that nearly 10(ten) years have elapsed since the charge-sheet was filed, cannot be a ground for allowing the employee to come back to duty on a sensitive post in the Bank, unless he is exonerated of the charge. 19. In Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), the Supreme Court laid down as follows:- “21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the person concerned to any department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognized principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognise that the previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceeding on the grounds of delay, and to set time-limits to their duration. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognized principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognise that the previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceeding on the grounds of delay, and to set time-limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation, departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us. 20. Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) was rendered in the context of a disciplinary proceeding initiated against an employee. In categorical terms, it was laid down that if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served within a period of 3(three) months from the date of suspension, suspension order shall not be extended. 21. The question of review of suspension order in connection with a disciplinary enquiry will arise only in the event the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served within a period of 3(three) months from the date of suspension. It is an admitted position that no departmental proceeding is pending against the petitioner and that suspension of the petitioner was not in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding. The petitioner’s suspension was a deemed suspension under Rule 10(2) of the 1965 Rules on account of he being in custody for a period exceeding 48(forty-eight) hours. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion that the ratio of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the case and the submission advanced by Mr. Saikia that charge-sheet in the criminal case having not been filed within a period of 3(three) months from his arrest, which is the deemed date of suspension also, the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service, is found to be without any merit. 22. Saikia that charge-sheet in the criminal case having not been filed within a period of 3(three) months from his arrest, which is the deemed date of suspension also, the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service, is found to be without any merit. 22. In Dipak Mali (supra), the Supreme Court had held that review for modification or revocation of the order of suspension is required to be done before the expiry of 90(ninety) days from the date of order of suspension and placing reliance on Sub-rule (7), it was held that as the review had not been conducted within 90(ninety) days from the date of suspension, the suspension order became invalid after 90(ninety) days. It was further held that subsequent review and extension would not revive the order which had already become invalid after the expiry of 90(ninety) days from the date of suspension. 23. The provisions of Sub-rules (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules are mandatory and, therefore, the authority as envisaged therein has to mandatorily undertake an exercise of review of the order of suspension within the time-frame, as indicated therein, irrespective of the fact whether the suspension is on account of pendency of a disciplinary proceeding or of a criminal case, failing which the order of suspension shall be rendered invalid. 24. In the instant case, as noticed earlier, the petitioner was arrested on 16.12.2014. The admitted position is that the first review had taken place on 01.04.2015 and the result of review was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 07.04.2015. Order of suspension of the petitioner dated 17.12.2014 recited that the petitioner was suspended with immediate effect. Going by the dates, in the first blush, it would appear that the first review had taken place beyond the period of 90(ninety) days. But a closer scrutiny of proviso to Sub-rule (7) of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules would demonstrate that the period of 90(ninety) days in case of a deemed suspension will count from the date the Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to the appointing authority, whichever is later. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had remained in custody till 16.03.2015 and the petitioner had brought to the notice of the authorities about his release on bail by letter dated 19.03.2015. Therefore, the first review was made well within the period of 90(ninety) days. 25. In view of the provisions of Rule 10 of 1965 Rules, extension of suspension cannot have exceed 180(one hundred and eighty) days at a time. In the first review conducted on 01.04.2015, which was communicated to the petitioner vide order dated 07.04.2015, decision was taken to recommend extension of the suspension period for another 90(ninety) days from the date of expiry. Even if the effective date of suspension is taken to be 19.03.2015, the period of 90(ninety) days expired on 19.06.2015. As the suspension period was extended for another 90(ninety) days by the review conducted on 01.04.2015, the extended period expired on 19.09.2015. Admittedly, next review of the order of suspension was made on 19.10.2015, which was beyond the extended period of suspension. 26. In view of the above discussion, when the review of the order of suspension was not carried out within the time prescribed under Sub-rules (6) and (7) of Rule 10 of the 1965 Rules, there is no escape from the conclusion that the order of suspension lapsed and had become invalid when review was undertaken on 19.10.2015. Subsequent extension could not have revived the order of suspension, which had already become invalid after expiry of 90(ninety) days of extension. 27. In view of the above determination, the petitioner will stand reinstated in service in his substantive post of Professor of Chemical Engineering. It is noted that a stand is taken in the affidavit of the respondents, which is not disputed, that Dean Academic Affairs and In-charge of Peer Review Section are purely administrative posts offered at the prerogative of the Institute. It is provided that on reinstatement, it will not be necessary for the authorities to engage the service of the petitioner as Dean Academic Affairs and In-charge of Peer Review Section, where the informant is working as a Senior Assistant. The order of reinstatement, will, however, be subject to the outcome of G.R. Case No.12972/2014. 28. With the above observations and directions, the writ petition stands allowed to the extent, as indicated above. No cost.