Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 1004 (JHR)

Saro Devi, wife of Sheo Barat Yadav v. State of Jharkhand

2017-06-30

RAJESH SHANKAR

body2017
JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 09.04.2005 passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand in Board Case No. 19 of 2003 and also for quashing the order dated 03.02.2003 passed by the Dy. Commissioner, Palamau in L.C. Appeal No. XV 61 of 200102. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing of order dated 25.02.2002 passed by the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Daltonganj in Land Ceiling Case No. 17 of 200102, whereby the courts below have allowed the claim of the respondent no. 5 as a preemptor under the provisions of Section 16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. 2. During the pendency of the present writ petition, respondent no. 5 (Bipat Yadav) died. An interlocutory application being I.A. No. 3503 of 2007 was filed for substitution of original respondent no. 5 by his heirs and legal representatives. The said substitution petition was allowed vide order dated 17.01.2012 and accordingly, the original respondent no. 5 was substituted by his heirs and legal representatives, whose descriptions have been given in I.A. No. 3503 of 2007. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is the purchaser of the land of Khata No. 117, Plot No. 246, measuring an area of 0.691/3 acres situated at VillageJhari, P.S.Patan, DistrictPalamau vide sale-deed no. 7020 dated 06.07.2001 from one Smt. Bachhi. The original respondent no. 5 filed an application under Section 16(3) of Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (in short referred to as “the Act”) claiming himself as the adjacent raiyat as well as the co-sharer and his claim for pre-emption was allowed by the DCLR, Palamau. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau, however, the said appeal was dismissed. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand, which was also dismissed vide order dated 09.04.2005. The petitioner has, therefore, challenged all the orders passed by the courts below in the present writ petition. 4. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau, however, the said appeal was dismissed. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a revision petition before the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand, which was also dismissed vide order dated 09.04.2005. The petitioner has, therefore, challenged all the orders passed by the courts below in the present writ petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that though the revision petition preferred by the petitioner before the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand was dismissed, yet it was observed in the order dated 09.04.2005 by the Member, Board of Revenue that on perusal of the khatian and the genealogical table, it appears that the land of Khata No. 59 was recorded in the name of one Shiv Charan Ahir, who is the great grandfather of respondent no. 5 and also the great grandfather of the husband of the petitioner, but curiously enough, the said plea was not taken up by the petitioner either before the Deputy Collector Land Reforms, Palamau or before the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that she is a landless lady, who purchased the land for construction of the house and, therefore, all the courts below committed serious error in allowing the preemption in favour of original respondent no. 5. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of original respondent no. 5 being represented through his legal representatives submits that it is an admitted case of the parties to the proceeding that the petitioner has been claiming herself as a landless lady, but has also pleaded that she is an adjacent raiyat by virtue of having purchased the adjacent land through a different sale-deed. The said purchase was after the initiation of the preemption proceeding. Moreover, the husband of the petitioner being a legal heir of recorded tenant already possessed another piece of land including a dwelling house in which he lived with the petitioner and children. It is further submitted that the learned Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand has rightly rejected the contention of the petitioner noticing the fact that though she claimed herself to be a landless lady, yet simultaneously pleaded that she has purchased the adjacent land which cannot be said to be tenable in the eye of law as well as in the facts of the case. All the courts below have come to a clear finding that purchase of the adjacent land claimed by the petitioner comes under the trap of the provisions of Section 16(3) of the Act which leaves no scope for the petitioner to plead that she was a bonafide purchaser of land. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and going through the relevant documents placed on record, it appears that there have been concurrent findings of three courts below. On detailed adjudication of the factual as well as legal issues involved, the courts below reached the conclusion that the petitioner has not produced any evidence so as to substantiate her claim of adjacency, except a copy of the sale-deed that was executed 90 days after the preemption application was filed by the original respondent no. 5 and as such, the same could not be taken into consideration. On the other hand, the original respondent no. 5 submitted copies of three sale-deeds through which he claimed the adjacency. The original respondent no. 5 appears to have submitted sufficient documents before the learned courts below in proof of the fact that he is a co-sharer and the adjacent raiyat. On the other hand, the petitioner, in support of her claim, failed to produce any admissible evidence. The claim of the petitioner that she is a landless lady cannot be accepted in view of the fact that she had not pleaded before the courts below that she including her husband had no land except the land in question. The learned DCLR, Daltonganj has observed in his order that the husband of the petitioner is holding 3.62½acres of land and apart from that the petitioner has also purchased some plots except the land in question. 7. The Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of “Smt. Shanti Devi Vs. State of Bihar” reported in 2011 (2) BBCJ 642 has held as under: “12. However, the matter would have been different if the appellant would have pleaded as a matter of fact that she is the landless lady and she or other member of her family including her husband had no other land, except the lands in dispute purchased by her. However, the matter would have been different if the appellant would have pleaded as a matter of fact that she is the landless lady and she or other member of her family including her husband had no other land, except the lands in dispute purchased by her. Learned counsel for the respondents has rightly pointed out that no such pleading has been made either before the original authority or even before this Court and in absence of such pleading, the appellant cannot be permitted to take stand that she has no other land, except the lands in dispute. In the same vein it was urged that in fact the husband of the appellant is having other homestead and agricultural lands. Learned counsel for the respondents also contended that the appellant along with her husband and other family members are living together at some other lands. Lands held by the appellant herein or her spouse shall be taken to be the lands of the family as defined under section 2(ee) of the Land Ceiling Act.” 8. On perusal of the order dated 09.04.2005 passed by learned Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand, it appears that the aforesaid aspect has been dealt with in detail and after considering the rival submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and the original respondent no. 5, reached a conclusion that the petitioner has not been able to make out any legal claim of right of adjacency. 9. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned orders passed by the learned courts below. 10. The writ petition being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.