JUDGMENT : 1. Advertisement Notice No.10 of 2005 dated 29th December 2005, has been issued by J&K Services Selection Board issued, inviting applications from eligible candidates for participating in selection process for various posts. Amongst others, 240 posts of Teachers District Cadre Kathua were also advertised to be filled up in Education Department. 136 posts of Teachers were kept for Open Merit Category (OM); 20 for Scheduled Caste Category (SC); 24 for Scheduled Tribe Category (ST); 48 for Reserved Backward Area Category (RBA); 07 for ALC; 05 for SOC. The minimum qualification prescribed for the post of Teacher was 10+2. Petitioner responded thereto as physically handicapped candidate, having permanent deformity of right eye to the extent of 50%. Shortlist was issued, followed by interview. Thereafter, select List was issued. Petitioner did not find place in the Select List. Aggrieved thereof, he filed writ petition, being SWP no.1067/2008. This Court vide order dated 10th December 2012, disposed of the same in the following terms: 3. Respondents have specifically averred in their reply that in terms of the advertisement notice a person falling under the sub-category of blindness low vision cannot be appointed as a teacher and that is why the petitioner was not considered. Further, it is contended that in terms of Govt. Order No.62-SW of 2001 dated 10.03.2001, various classes of disabilities of physically handicapped persons are eligible for consideration against the post of teachers, but a person with blindness low vision is not eligible for consideration. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner while addressing the arguments stated at Bar that the Government has now issued the Government Order No.231-SW of 2011 dated 22.12.2011, whereby the candidates who are falling under the sub-categories of blind and blindness with low vision of Physically Handicapped Category are eligible for consideration against the post of Teachers. 5. Keeping in view the change of circumstances, respondents are directed to consider the case of petitioner for her appointment against the post of Teacher, District Cadre Kathua, with in a period of two months from the date a copy of the order is served upon them. Disposed of along with all connected CMAs. 2. Respondents, in pursuance of order dated 10th December 2012 passed in SWP no.1067/2008, considered and rejected petitioners case vide Order no.39-SSB of 2013 dated 12th February 2013. Disposed of along with all connected CMAs. 2. Respondents, in pursuance of order dated 10th December 2012 passed in SWP no.1067/2008, considered and rejected petitioners case vide Order no.39-SSB of 2013 dated 12th February 2013. It is this Order, which is challenged in the instant petition whereby seeking following relief: (i) Writ of certiorari, quashing order no.39-SSB of 2013 dated 12th February 2013, whereby respondent no.3 has rejected the case of petitioner without any reasonable justification; (ii) Mandamus, directing respondents to consider the petitioner afresh in terms of Government Order dated 22nd December 2011 and in light of the order/judgment passed by this Court in earlier writ petition, SWP no.1067/2008, and consequently appoint her against the post of Teacher District Cadre Kathua. 3. Respondents 1&2, in their reply, contend that respondents i.e. School Education Department is intending department. It referred General Line Teacher posts for selection and subsequent appointment, to respondent J&K Services Selection Board because respondent Board is duly constituted statutory body for the purpose of selection and that respondent Board makes criteria and according to that initiate selection process. They further contend that respondent Board called the candidates, who were eligible for interview as per criteria and since petitioner was not found eligible, she was not called for interview. Respondents maintain that they are only appointing authority and issue appointment orders only to the candidates duly selected by respondent Board and the present case relates to selection, which can appropriately be replied by respondent Board. 4. Respondent Board, in its reply, insists that petitioner does not fall within the ambit of Government Order no.62-SW of 2001 dated 11th March 2001 and since the disability possessed by petitioner does not fall within the ambit of said Government order, as he is visually disabled and said disability is not fixed as eligibility for the post of Teacher by the Government inasmuch as respondent Board is bound to make selections only under the Rules framed by the Government and cannot give retrospective effect to any act, rules or government order, which is under the exclusive domain of the Government and respondent Board is Instrumentality of the State and is not in a position under law to apply any Government order retrospectively. 5. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. 6. 5. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. 6. When Advertisement Notice No.10 of 2005 dated 29th December 2005 was issued by respondent Board, Government Order no.62-SW of 2001 dated 10th March 2001 had been in vogue and selection of Physically Handicapped Persons had to be made in terms thereof. Insofar as post of Teacher, advertised vide Advertisement Notice No.10 of 2005 dated 29th December 2005, is concerned, Government Order no.62-SW of 2001 dated 10th March 2001 was applicable thereto. Selection of Physically Handicapped Persons/Candidate was to be made in strict accordance with aforesaid Government Order no.62-SW of 2001 dated 10th March 2001 and eligibility prescribed therein. Having said so, deviation thereto, if any, caused by respondent Board would have amounted to vitiation of whole selection. In the present case, petitioner seeks retrospective effect of Government Order No.231-SW of 2011 dated 22.12.2011, whereby the candidates, who are falling under sub-categories of blind and blindness with low vision of Physically Handicapped Category, are eligible for consideration against the post of Teachers, which is not permissible in law inasmuch as if such a direction is passed, as prayed for by petitioner, it would open a Pandora box, which will be followed by other candidates, akin to petitioner, and the same will disturb whole process of selection initiated and culminated into appointments from 2001 till 2011. It is well settled that a new law ought to be prospective, not retrospective in its operation. 7. It may not be out of place to mention here that the retrospective operation of an enactment may mean one thing and its affecting the rights of parties another. Normally, an enactment is prospective in nature. It does not affect that which has gone, or completed and closed up already. Ordinarily, the presumption with respect to an enactment is that, unless there is something in it to show that it means otherwise, it deals with future contingencies, and does not annul or affect existing rights and liabilities or vested rights, or obligations already acquired under some provisions of law although its effect is that it does not affect an existing right as well. If an enactment expressly provides that it should be deemed to have come into effect from a past date, it is retrospective in nature. If an enactment expressly provides that it should be deemed to have come into effect from a past date, it is retrospective in nature. It then operates to affect existing rights and obligations, and is construed to take away, impair or curtail, a vested right which had been acquired under some existing law. 8. There is no dispute to the proposition that a Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is the edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is determinative of the legislative intent and according to the first and primary rule of construction, the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself and the function of the court is only to interpret the law and the court cannot legislate. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of the process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. Having said so, this Court cannot give retrospective effect to the aforesaid Government Order, which on its plain reading does not provide it having retrospective effect. 9. In Francis Bennion's Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn, the statement of law is stated as follows: “The essential idea of legal system is that current law should govern current activities. Elsewhere in this work a particular Act is likened to a floodlight switched on or off, and the general body of law to the circumambient air. Clumsy though these images are, they show the inappropriateness of retrospective laws. If we do something today, we feel that the law applying to it should be the law in force today, not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Such, we believe, is the nature of law. Dislike of ex-post facto law is enshrined in the United States Constitution and in the Constitution of many American States, which forbid it. The true principle is that lex prospicit non respicit (law looks forward not back). As Willes, J. said retrospective legislation is 'contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past transaction carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.” 10. As Willes, J. said retrospective legislation is 'contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past transaction carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.” 10. In Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry AIR 1957 SC 540 the Supreme Court said that “The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed.” 11. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1994 SC 2623 , it was stated that the ambit and scope of an amending Act and its retrospective operation as follows: “(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits. (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature. (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law. (iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished. (v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in Operation unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication.” 12. In K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 2012, the Supreme Court while considering the effect of amendment in the Land Acquisition Act in pending proceedings held thus as: “...In the instant case we are concerned with the application of the provisions of Sub-sec. In K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 2012, the Supreme Court while considering the effect of amendment in the Land Acquisition Act in pending proceedings held thus as: “...In the instant case we are concerned with the application of the provisions of Sub-sec. (1-A) of S.23 as introduced by the Amending Act to acquisition proceedings which were pending on the date of commencement of the Amending Act. In relation pending proceedings, the approach of the Courts in England is that the same are unaffected by the changes in the law so far as they relate to the determination of the substantive rights and in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary intention in an amending enactment, the substantive rights of the parties to an action fall to be determined by the law as it existed when the fiction was commenced and this is so whether the law is changed before the hearing of the case at the first instance or while an appeal is pending” 13. In State of M.P. and another Vs. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills, The Apex Court in Para 21 of the judgment the Apex Court has observed that “the notification of 3/71187 amending the 1981 notification with retrospective effect so as to exclude what may be described in brief as 'traditional industries' though, like Rule 14 of the deferment rules, the exclusion extends' even to certain other non-traditional units operating in certain situations. Though this notification purports to be retrospective, it cannot be given such effect for a simple reason. We have held that the 1981 notification clearly envisages no exclusion of any industry which fulfils the terms of the notification from availing of the exemption granted under it. In view of this interpretation, the 1987 amendment has the effect of rescinding the exemption granted by the 1981 notification in respect of the industries mentioned by it. S.12 is clear that, while a notification under it. 14. The Supreme Court as also the High Courts have on several occasions held that retrospective legislation can be held invalid on the ground that it is unreasonable or beyond the legislative competence. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. 14. The Supreme Court as also the High Courts have on several occasions held that retrospective legislation can be held invalid on the ground that it is unreasonable or beyond the legislative competence. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation. There is presumption of prospectively articulated in the legal maxim nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis, i.e. a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the post, and this presumption operates unless shown to the contrary by express provision in the statute or is otherwise discernible by necessary implication. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only. In the words of Lord Blanesburg, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. Every statute, it has been said, observed Lopes, L.J., which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions already past, must be presumed to be intended not to have a retrospective effect. [See: Keshvan v. State of Bombay AIR 1951 SC 128 ; Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd v. Union of India and ors (2012) 11 SCC 1 ; Doolubdass Pettamberdass v. Ramloll Thackoorseydass (1850) 5 MIA 109; Delhi Cloth Mills and General Co. Ltd v. CIT Delhi AIR 1927 PC 242 ; and Re, Pulborough Parish School Board Election, Bourke v. Nutt (1894) 1 QB 725, p.737]. Having said so, it is reiterated here that in the present case Advertisement Notice No.10 of 2005 was issued on 29th December 2005; then Government Order no.62-SW of 2001 dated 10th March 2001 had been in vogue and selection of Physically Handicapped Persons, therefore, had to be made strictly in accordance with the said Government order. The Government Order no.231-SW of 2011 dated 22.12.2011, under which petitioner seeks benefit, is, in essence, prospective and does not have retrospective operation. The Government Order no.231-SW of 2011 dated 22.12.2011, under which petitioner seeks benefit, is, in essence, prospective and does not have retrospective operation. 15. For the foregoing reasons and discussion, writ petition lacks in merit and is, accordingly, Dismissed. Interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated.