JUDGMENT 1. This is defendants No. 1 and 2's second appeal directed against order dated 3.2.2012 passed by Ninth Additional District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Appeal No. 22-A/11, rejecting the application for condonation of delay in filing an appeal against judgment and decree dated 21.2.2011 passed by Fifth Civil Judge Class-I, District Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 19A/2009. 2. Suit at the instance of plaintiff-respondent No. 1 was for permanent injunction in respect of the suit property bearing Khasra No. 23, 24, 25 and 29 admeasuring 4.047 Hectares (10 acres) situated at Village Matamar Patwari Halka No. 15 Tahsil and District Jabalpur and the same was decreed by judgment and decree dated 21.2.2011 passed in Civil Suit No. 19A/2009, whereby, the claim of plaintiff was partly allowed to the extent that he was found to be the owner in possession of the property over Khasra No. 23 Area 2.428 hectares, Khasra No. 25 Area 0.21 hectares, Khasra No. 29 Area 0.31 hectares and the appellants-defendants No. 1 and 2 were permanently injuncted from causing any interference over the said property. 3. The appellants filed an appeal under section 96 CPC on 17.10.2011. As there was delay of 6 months and 4 days, an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was preferred by the appellants for condonation of delay. Condonation was sought on the ground that being a labourer, the appellant was engaged by a private contractor and was taken to a remote place at Kotma from where he could not come to Jabalpur to collect the copy of judgment and decree and file the appeal. 4. Contentions were denied by respondent No. 1-plaintiff. The first appellate Court after taking into consideration the entire facts on record, declined to condone the delay on a finding that the appellant has failed to produce any cogent evidence to establish that he was engaged as a labourer at Kotma. 4. Contentions were denied by respondent No. 1-plaintiff. The first appellate Court after taking into consideration the entire facts on record, declined to condone the delay on a finding that the appellant has failed to produce any cogent evidence to establish that he was engaged as a labourer at Kotma. A finding to that effect is in the following terms : ^^11- mDr fof/k ds izdk'k esa vfHkys[k dk voyksdu fd;k x;k vfHkys[k ds voyksdu ls Li"V gS fd fnukad 21-2-2011 dks tc vihykFkhZx.k ds fo#) fu.kZ; ikfjr fd;k x;k rc fopkj.k U;k;ky; ls le{k vihykFkhZ ds fo}ku vf/koDrk mifLFkr FksA tgk¡ rd vihykFkhZ dk ;g dguk gS fd og etnwjh djus gsrq dksrek pyk x;k gS] vihykFkhZ }kjk bl lacaèk esa dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; izLrqr ugha dh xbZ gS u gh dksrek ds fdlh lk{kh dks izLrqr fd;k x;k gS] ek= 'kiFk i= bl rF; dks izekf.kr djus ds fy;s i;kZIr ugha ekuk tk ldrk fd vihykFkhZ dksrek esa 6 ekg ls vfèkd le; rd jgkA^^ 5. Though it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the first appellate Court grossly erred in arriving at the said finding; however, no cogent material, documentary or oral, has been commended at to substantiate the claim and establish that the first appellate Court has returned a perverse finding. 6. The question is whether the appellant-defendant discharged the onus of establishing sufficient cause which prevented him to file appeal within the period of limitation and whether in given facts the first appellate Court committed grave error in misconstruing the facts and record as would give rise to a substantial question of law. In Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation [ (2010)5 SCC 459 ], it has been observed : 15. ... this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate. Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil. (Emphasis supplied) In Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh [ (2010)8 SCC 685 ], it has been observed : "25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. (Emphasis supplied) In Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh [ (2010)8 SCC 685 ], it has been observed : "25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” In Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai [ (2012)5 SCC 157 ], it has been observed with context of sufficient cause : "24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay." 7. In view whereof, the finding recorded by the first appellate Court that the appellant has failed to give sufficient cause for delay of 6 months and 4 days cannot, therefore, be faulted with. 8. In view whereof, the finding recorded by the first appellate Court that the appellant has failed to give sufficient cause for delay of 6 months and 4 days cannot, therefore, be faulted with. 8. In view whereof, since no substantial question of law arises, the appeal is dismissed at admission stage. No costs.