JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. S.S. Sarma, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S.K. Sahu, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. This petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, R/W Section 173(1) proviso of MV Act has been filed praying for condonation of 167 days delay in preferring the appeal. 3. The reasons for delay has been stated in paragraph-2 of the petition, which is reproduced below: “2. That the petitioner has states that papers had to be collected from advocate to Divisional Office and than to Regional Office, which took time and in view of huge amount involved, opinion of senior advocate was required to be obtained and all these took time and in doing so, the normal period of time to file an appeal expired and papers were ultimately sent to advocate on 08.01.2016 to file the appeal by engaging the senior advocate. But it was found that the certified copy of award was not available amongst the papers sent to him and just a photocopy of the same was available. The said fact was communicated to the regional office and thereafter the certified copy was applied before the Tribunal and was ultimately sent to the advocate on 06.05.2016 and he took some more time to finalise and settle the memo of appeal, stay petition etc. and thereafter appeal could be filed only on 12.05.2016 and by that time delay of 167 days had occurred. This delay is required to be condoned.” 4. The respondents by filing a counter affidavit vehemently objected the petition stating that the delay was indeed of 184 days and not of 167 days as stated in the petition. It has also been stated that the petitioner has not been able to show any cogent reason for the delay. 5. The cause shown as above, transpires that, judgment and award was passed on 17.08.2015 and the appellant allegedly sent necessary papers to its counsel on 08.01.2016 for filing appeal. It has been stated in a very casual and routine manner that in order to collect the documents from the advocate and obtaining opinion from the learned counsel the delay was caused. No cogent reason has been shown, why more than 4 months time was required just for handing over the brief to the learned counsel for filing the appeal. It has been stated in a very casual and routine manner that in order to collect the documents from the advocate and obtaining opinion from the learned counsel the delay was caused. No cogent reason has been shown, why more than 4 months time was required just for handing over the brief to the learned counsel for filing the appeal. Nothing has been stated specifically, how much time was required for collecting the papers from the advocate or how much time was taken by the learned Sr. Counsel for giving opinion. After more than 4 months, when the papers were sent to the learned counsel on 08.01.2016, learned counsel discovered, that certified copy of the award was not there and only a photocopy of the award was sent. Then again the appellant took 4 months for obtaining certified copy and handing it over to the learned counsel. Nothing has been stated as to when the certified copy was applied or when it was made available. Simply a casual statement that the certified copy was applied and ultimately the same was sent to the learned counsel on 06.05.2016. Explaining the delay in such a lackadaisical manner by the appellant, in my view, can only be attributed to sheer negligence, or inaction or lack of bonafide on the part of the appellant. A litigant guilty of lack of bonafide and negligence or inaction cannot expect the indulgence of the court for filing an appeal or application beyond the prescribed period without showing sufficient cause. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that sufficient cause should be construed liberally considering that the appellant is a corporate body, dealing with public money and that a huge amount is involved in the matter. No doubt, sufficient cause has to be construed liberally, but that does not mean, that one is totally absolved from showing any cause for the delay. Procedural law are meant for advancement of justice and usually expected to be followed and certainly not for flouting. Anyone seeking exemption from the prescribed procedure laid down by the statute is certainly under obligation to assign good cause preventing him to follow the prescribed procedure. When the statute has fixed certain time, within which an appeal or application is to be filed, it is expected that the appeal or application shall be filed within such time. Anyone seeking exemption from the prescribed procedure laid down by the statute is certainly under obligation to assign good cause preventing him to follow the prescribed procedure. When the statute has fixed certain time, within which an appeal or application is to be filed, it is expected that the appeal or application shall be filed within such time. Anyone seeking indulgence to file appeal or application beyond such prescribed time is bound to show sufficient cause for not filing the appeal or application in time. Proviso to Section 173 lays down that an appeal can be filed against any order of the Tribunal within 90 days. However, beyond such period of 90 days also, one can file an appeal provided ‘sufficient cause’ is shown preventing the appellant to file the appeal within the prescribed time. Merely because the appellant is a corporate body (Insurance Company) is not supposed to take it granted, that court shall condone the delay, irrespective of it shows or not any cogent reason. 7. The Apex Court in (2013) 4 SCC 52 (Amalendu Kumar Bera Vs. State of West Bengal) observed that merely because the Respondent is the State, delay in filing the appeal or revision cannot and shall not be mechanically considered and in absence of ‘sufficient cause’ delay shall not be condoned. In (2015) 9 SCC 102 (Union of India Vs. Tata Ydogawa Ltd.), the Apex Court refused to condone the delay of 51 days on the ground of inter-departmental correspondences and processing of matter, wherein the Apex Court observed as under: “We are aware of the fact that the Government being impersonal takes longer time than the private bodies or the individuals. Even giving that latitude, there must be some way or attempt to explain the cause for such delay.” 8. This Court also, in the case of ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Vs. Rup Nath Brahma Choudhury reported in 2017 (2) GLT 487, held that interdepartmental consultation cannot be considered as sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 9. In Postmaster General Vs. Living Media India Ltd. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 dealing with the delay in respect of appeal by Government, observed as under: “29. Vs. Rup Nath Brahma Choudhury reported in 2017 (2) GLT 487, held that interdepartmental consultation cannot be considered as sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 9. In Postmaster General Vs. Living Media India Ltd. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 dealing with the delay in respect of appeal by Government, observed as under: “29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 10. What therefore follows is that even a corporate body or a Government or instrumentality of the Government as a litigant does not stand on a higher pedestal as law shelter everyone under the same light. Even if such impersonal bodies are held to be entitled to some amount of latitude, such entitlement or indulgence, obviously does not fully absolve them from explaining the cause for the delay. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the reasons assigned for the delay as has been discussed hereinabove, can by no amount of liberal construction be considered as sufficient cause for condoning the inordinate delay of 167 days. 11. In view of the above, I find no merit in this petition and therefore, the prayer for condonation of delay is rejected and the I.A. stands dismissed.