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2017 DIGILAW 1007 (JK)

Union of India v. Banke Behari Gandotra

2017-11-14

TASHI RABSTAN

body2017
ORDER : 1. By the present application under Section 34 of the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (for short the Act), Union of India seeks to set aside the award dated 14th of December, 2012 passed by Shri Sunil Chopra, Sole Arbitrator. 2. The main facts as stated in the petition are that the arbitral award emanates from the claims of the respondents against the petitioner under the contract dated 23rd of March, 2009 for a price of Rs. 1,58,97,103.33 between the parties for construction pertaining to contract agreement No. CEPZ-35/2008-2009: Provision of Security Wall at Ratnuchak. As per contract, the date of commencement was fixed as 11th of April, 2009 and its completion on 10th of September, 2010 but the work could not be completed by the contractor within the stipulated period and after availing the extension, same was completed on 30th of April, 2011. On completion of work, certain differences and disputes arose between the parties out of the written contract agreement. Accordingly, Shri Sunil Chopra was appointed by the Competent Authority vide letter No. 13600/WC/872/06/E8 dated 22nd of November, 2011 to act as "Sole Arbitrator" to adjudicate upon the disputes persisting between the parties. Accordingly, parties referred the dispute to the "Sole Arbitrator" i.e. the respondent has referred six claims which read thus:- Claim No. 1 Reimbursement of upward variation in wages of labour as per Condition 63 of IAFW 2249, amount of claim Rs. 19,25,987/- Claim No. 2 Additional Expenses and Damages on account of delay in handing over of site, amount of Claim Rs. 7,82,000/- Claim No. 3 Provision of Grooves in Plastering, amount of Claim Rs. 1,10,000/- Claim No. 4 Additional Expenses on account of cartage of materials by head load on different parts of site, amount of Claim Rs. 36,45,987/- Claim No. 5 Past, Pendent elite and Future interest @ 18 per annum on the above claims and --- Claim No. 6 Cost of Reference, amount of Claim Rs. 1,20,000/- The petitioner-Union of India referred only one claim i.e. Claim No. 1-Cost of Reference, amount of Claim Rs. 1,00,000/-. 3. The Sole Arbitrator entered into reference on 5th of December, 2011 by calling upon both the parties to file their statement of case, pleadings-in-defence and reply to pleadings-in-defence (rejoinder), if any. 1,20,000/- The petitioner-Union of India referred only one claim i.e. Claim No. 1-Cost of Reference, amount of Claim Rs. 1,00,000/-. 3. The Sole Arbitrator entered into reference on 5th of December, 2011 by calling upon both the parties to file their statement of case, pleadings-in-defence and reply to pleadings-in-defence (rejoinder), if any. The parties accordingly, submitted their written statements and documents as under:- "(a) M/s. Banke Behari Statement of Claims submitted vide letter No. NIL dated 02 Jan 2011 & Pleadings in Defence to the Statement of Case of UOI submitted vide letter No. NIL dated 12 March 2012 & rejoinder submitted vide letter No. NIL dated 23 March 2012. (b) Union of India:- Statement of Claims submitted vide letter No. 86035/ARB/14/E8 dated 09 Feb 2012 & Pleadings in Defence on the claims of the contractor submitted vide their letter No. 86035/ARB/19/E8 dated 29 Feb 2012." 4. The sole Arbitrator vide impugned award rejected the claims No. 2, 3, 4 & 6 of the Contractor-respondent, however claims No. 1 and 5 of respondent-contractor have been accepted and the only claim of Union of India has also been rejected. 5. Union of India aggrieved of the award whereby accepted the claims No. 1 and 5 of the respondent-contractor on the grounds taken by the petitioner challenging the award is that the award dated 14.12.2012 passed by Arbitrator is in conflict with public policy, as the Arbitrator has awarded huge amount of Rs. 19,25,987/- in favour of respondent and on the basis of wrong interpretation of Special Condition No. 38 of the Contract Agreement by giving illegal benefits at the expense of public money. It is contended that Arbitrator is precluded from extending the period of award giving for more than one year under any condition. It is also contended that Arbitrator has relied upon Central Minimum Wages Act though same has no applicability in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is also the ground of challenge that Arbitrator has not properly appreciated the General Conditions No. 58 and 63 regarding the escalation in the wages of labour as there has been no escalation in the wages of the labour under Minimum Wages Act more than 10 per cent of the prevailing wages during the extended period, as such the Union of India is not liable to pay the awarded amount. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. The claim No. 1 of the respondent-claimant relates to the reimbursement of upward variation of wages of labour as per condition No. 63 of IAFW 2249 (General Conditions forming part of the Contract). It is also argued by learned senior counsel that as per Special Condition No. 38 of the Contract, the contractor is bound to pay the wages including the allowances to the labour as fixed under Minimum Wages Act, 1948, updated on the date of receipt of tender. It is also contended that in area of minimum rates of wages are also fixed by the State Government for the labour in construction, maintenance of buildings, roads and runways, the labour wages as fixed by the above said updated notification of the Ministry of Labour or the respective State Government whichever is higher in respect of this arrears shall be deemed minimum rates of wages payable under Contract and the Contractor shall not pay lower than the rates of wages whereas respondent contended that wages fixed by the Central Government under Minimum Wages Act, 1948 were much higher than prescribed under State Government and the labour as such was paid as per the rates fixed by the Central Government from time to time. It is averred that Condition No. 63 of IAFW-2249, provides that during the progress of work the wages of labour increased is a direct result of coming into force any fresh law or statutory rule or order as such increase exceeds 10 percent of the wages prevailing at the time of receipt of tender and thereupon the contractor pays such increased price of labour then the amount of contract shall be varied pro tanto and the contractor shall reimburse accordingly. 8. Before proceeding to deal with the grounds of challenge taken by the petitioner (Union of India), it would be appropriate to reproduce Section 34 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 hereunder:- "34. Application for setting aside arbitral award - (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). 2. An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if:- (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that:- (i) a party was under some incapacity. 2. An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if:- (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that:- (i) a party was under some incapacity. (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force. (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case. (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside. (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this part. (b) the Court finds that:- (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force. (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of State. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had bow disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is 16 appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award. 9. Perusal of Section 34 of the Act reveals that the award passed by the Arbitrator is very limited scope and the same cannot be interfered with except on the grounds prescribed under Section 34 of the Act. It is well settled that the Arbitrator is the sole Judge of the facts and law of a dispute referred to him for adjudication. The award cannot be interfered with unless illegality is apparent on the face of the record or that it is opposing the public policy. The Court in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Act, cannot sit as a Court of appeal over the findings of Arbitrator and the Court could be loath to interfere with the findings of facts, even if these are erroneous, unless there is illegality apparent on the face of the record. 10. The Supreme Court in ONGC Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) 5 SCC 705 , held that the ground in Section 34 of the Act for setting aside of the arbitral award, for the reason of the same being in conflict with the public policy of India, would not permit setting aside, in the aforesaid assets. As Section 34 proceeding, which in essence is the remedy of annulment, cannot be used by one party to convert the same into a remedy of appeal. It is further held that mere erroneous/wrong finding of the fact by the Arbitral Tribunal or even an erroneous interpretation of documents/evidence, is non-interferable under Section 34 and if such interference is done by the Court, the same will set at naught the whole purpose of amendment of the Arbitration Act. The arbitration is intended to be a faster and less expensive alternative to the courts. If this is one's motivation and expectation, then the finality of the arbitral award is very important. The remedy provided under Section 34 against arbitral award is in no sense an appeal. The arbitration is intended to be a faster and less expensive alternative to the courts. If this is one's motivation and expectation, then the finality of the arbitral award is very important. The remedy provided under Section 34 against arbitral award is in no sense an appeal. The legislative intent in Section 34 was to make the result of the annulment procedure prescribed therein potentially different from that in an appeal. In appeal, the decision under review not only may be confirmed, but may also be modified. In annulment, on the other hand, the decision under review may either be invalidated in whole or in part or to be left to stand if the plea for annulment is rejected. Annulment operates to negate a decision, in whole or in part, thereby depriving the portion negated of legal force and returning the parties, as to that portion, to their original litigating positions. Annulment can void, while appeal can modify. Section 34 is found to provide for annulment only on the grounds affecting legitimacy of the process of decision as distinct from substantive correctness of the contents of the decision. A remedy of appeal focuses upon both legitimacy of the process of decision and the substantive correctness of the decision. Annulment, in the case of arbitration focuses not on the correctness of decision but rather more narrowly considers whether, regardless of errors in application of law or determination of facts, the decision resulted from a legitimate process. 11. The ground taken by the petitioner-Union of India that the Arbitrator has no power/jurisdiction to pass award beyond one year of his entering into reference. This plea of the petitioner is not tenable, because, the parties have entered into a fresh agreement on the basis of written consent for enlargement of time by giving powers to the Sole Arbitrator to pass and publish the award within the extended period. 12. General Condition No. 63 of Contract IAFW-2249 provides that if during the progress of work, the wages of labour increases as a direct result of coming into force of any fresh law or statutory rule or order and such increase exceeds ten percent of the wages prevailing at the time of receipt of the tender and thereupon the contractor basing such increased price of labour than the amount of contract shall be varied pro tanto and the contractor shall be reimbursed accordingly. 13. 13. In the present case, there was an increase of labour wages by the Central Government by as many as six notifications during the currency of the contract work by more than 10 per cent i.e. after the receipt of the tender and the rates applicable on that dates the claimant/respondent accordingly, applied to department for reimbursement of the same in terms of General Conditions No. 63 of IAFW-2249 but the same was denied by the department. 14. Mr. R.K Gupta, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent has argued that the award passed by the Arbitrator whereby allowing claim No. 1 of the respondent-claimant along with interest against Claim No. 5 is strictly in accordance with terms and conditions of the Contract Agreement. He further averred that the averments made by the petitioner are only general in nature and no specific reasons have been assigned as to how the award is against the public policy. 15. In S.B.P. & Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 618 , the Supreme Court held that the phrase "Public Policy of India" is required to be given wider meaning and if the award on the face of it is patently in violation of statutory provisions, it cannot be said to be in public interest and such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. In para 37 of the judgment it was held that award could be set aside if it is contrary to fundamental policy of Indian Law or the interest of India or justice or morality or if it is patently illegal. A rider was however put that illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that the award is against the public policy. Yet another test laid down is of the award being so unfair and unreasonable that it shakes the conscience of the court. 16. There is a bald assertion made by the petitioner-Union of India to challenge the award by claiming that the award passed by learned Arbitrator is in conflict with public policy. However, the petitioner has not explained as to how the award passed by the Sole Arbitrator is against the public policy. Public Policy has been well explained in numerous pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by the different High Courts. However, the petitioner has not explained as to how the award passed by the Sole Arbitrator is against the public policy. Public Policy has been well explained in numerous pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as by the different High Courts. How the impugned award falls within the parameters laid down by the Court for declaring the award to be in conflict with Public Policy has not been elaborated. In absence of specific pleadings, aforesaid ground of challenge is not worth to consideration. 17. The Supreme Court in Rashtriay Ispat Nigam Ltd. vs. Dewan Chand Ram Saran, (2012) 5 SCC 306 refused to set aside an arbitral award, under the 1996 Act on the ground that the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal was against the terms of the contract and held that it could not be said that the Arbitral Tribunal had travelled outside its jurisdiction and the Court could not substitute its view in place of the interpretation accepted by the Arbitral Tribunal. It was reiterated that the Arbitral Tribunal is legitimately entitled to take the view which it holds to be correct on after considering the material before it and after interpreting the provisions of the Agreement and if the Arbitral Tribunal does so, its decision has to be accepted as final and binding. Reliance in this regard was placed on Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. ONGC Ltd. (2010) 11 SCC 296 and on Kwality MFG. Corporation vs. Central Warehousing Corporation, (2009) 5 SCC 142 . Similarly, in P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Broker (P) Ltd. vs. B.H.H Securities (P) Ltd. (2012) 1 SCC 594 it was held that a Court does not sit in appeal over the award of an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or re-appreciating evidence and an award can be challenged only under the grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) and in the absence of any such ground it is not possible to reexamine the facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at. The Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd. (2009) 10 SCC 63 even while dealing with a challenge to an arbitral award under the 1940 Act reiterated that an error by the Arbitrator relatable to interpretation of contract is an error within his jurisdiction and is not an error on the face of the award and is not amenable to correction by the Courts. It was further held that the legal position is no more res integra that the Arbitrator having been made the final Arbiter of resolution of dispute between the parties, the award is not open to challenge on the ground that Arbitrator has reached at a wrong conclusion. 18. In the instant case, the parties have agreed to and given written consent for enlargement of time i.e. upto 31st of December, 2012 for making and publishing the award, therefore, parties having been agreed to be bound by the Arbitral Award and by declaring it to be a final, one parties have so agreed, they cannot apply for setting aside the Arbitral Award on the grounds as put forth in the petition. Reliance in this regard is placed on Tarapore and Co. vs. Cochin Shipyard Ltd. Cochin (1984) 2 SCC 680 . 19. As per Special Condition No. 38 of the Contract Agreement, Contractor is under contractual obligation to pay higher of the wages as those fixed by the Central Government or the State Government. The respondents/claimants having paid the higher wages fixed by the Central Government, the Union of India cannot wriggle of its contractual obligation of the reimbursement of the same in terms of the Condition No. 63 of AIFW-2249. Respondent claimant has produced evidence regarding escalation of wages before the Sole Arbitrator, notifications issued by Central Government from time to time during the currency of the contract which amounted to hike in labour wages by 10 percent that was applicable at the time of receipt of tender i.e. 23.12.2008. In order to further substantiate the arguments, respondent claimant has also produced the muster roll of the labour before the Sole Arbitrator and the payment of wages to the said labour as per the notification issued by the Central Government from time to time. The Sole Arbitrator has accordingly, after considering evidence, documentary as well as submissions all aspect of the matter has passed the award. 20. The Sole Arbitrator has accordingly, after considering evidence, documentary as well as submissions all aspect of the matter has passed the award. 20. The scope of judicial review of an arbitral award is akin to review under Article 226 of Constitution of India of the decisions of the bodies, where it is a settled principle of law. State of U.P vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 505 and State of U.P vs. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 , that the judicial review is of the decision making process and not of the decision on merits and cannot be converted into an appeal. This is quite evident from the various Clauses of Section 34(2)(a) which prescribe the grounds of challenge on the lines of violation of the principles of natural justice in making of the award or invalidity of the arbitral agreement and non-arbitrability of the disputes arbitrated and of the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal or arbitral procedure being not in accordance with the agreement between the parties. Section 34(2)(b) adds the ground of the arbitral award being in conflict with the public policy of India. None of the said grounds is the ground of challenge on the merits of the award. The ground of challenge of the award being in conflict with the public policy of India is explained as the award being induced or affected by fraud or corruption or being in violation of Section 75 or Section 81. Thus the grounds of challenge are akin to the grounds of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not to grounds of appeal or revision. Thus the grounds of challenge are akin to the grounds of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not to grounds of appeal or revision. We are reminded of the merits legality distinction in judicial review as culled out by Lord Hailsham in The North Wales vs. Evans, (1982) 1 WLR 1155 by observing "the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorized by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the Court." Lord Brightman in the same judgment held that judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made and it would be an error to think that the Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the decision making process but also on the correctness of the decision itself. It was clarified that only when the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated the judicial review of the decision making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors. In our opinion the same is an apt test also for judicial review of the arbitral awards and just like a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review, the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the Court under the Arbitration Act is limited to see that the Arbitral Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that the arbitral award does not occasion miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court in Mc. Dermott International Inc. vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181 commenting on the radical changes brought about by the re-enactment of the arbitration law observed that the role of the Courts under the new law is only supervisory, permitting intervention in few circumstances only, like, in case of fraud or bias by the arbitrators, violation of natural justice etc. and the Court cannot correct the errors of arbitrators and can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin arbitration again. 21. and the Court cannot correct the errors of arbitrators and can only quash the award leaving the parties free to begin arbitration again. 21. The Supreme Court as far back as in Union of India vs. A. Rallia Ram, AIR 1963 SC 1685 held that "An award being a decision of an arbitrator whether a lawyer or a layman chosen by the parties, and entrusted with power to decide a dispute submitted to him is ordinarily not liable to be challenged on the ground that it is erroneous. In order to make arbitration effective and the awards enforceable, machinery is devised for lending the assistance of the ordinary Courts. The Courts are also entrusted with power to modify or correct the award on the ground of imperfect form or clerical errors, or decision on questions not referred, which are severable from those referred........The Court may also set aside an award on the ground of corruption or misconduct of the arbitrator, or that a party has been guilty of fraudulent concealment or willful deception. But the Court cannot interfere with the award if otherwise proper on the ground that the decision appears to it to be erroneous. The award of the arbitrator is ordinarily final and conclusive, unless a contrary intention is disclosed by the agreement. The award is the decision of a domestic tribunal chosen by the parties, and the civil courts which are entrusted with the power to facilitate arbitration and to effectuate the awards, cannot exercise appellate powers over the decision. Wrong or right the decision is binding, if it be reached fairly after giving adequate opportunity to the parties to place their grievances in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement." 22. It cannot also be lost sight of that non-conferring of finality on the arbitral awards not only affects the speed and expense of arbitration but also has a more subtle consequences of, extensive judicial review changing the nature of the arbitral process to an even greater extent. If arbitration becomes simply another level of decision making, subject to judicial review on merits, arbitrators may begin to decide cases and write opinions in such a way as to insulate their awards against judicial reversal producing opinions that parrot the appropriate statutory standards in conclusory terms, but suffer from a lack of reasoned analysis. If arbitration becomes simply another level of decision making, subject to judicial review on merits, arbitrators may begin to decide cases and write opinions in such a way as to insulate their awards against judicial reversal producing opinions that parrot the appropriate statutory standards in conclusory terms, but suffer from a lack of reasoned analysis. Such a shift from the arbitral model, in which decision makers are free to focus solely on the case before them rather than on the case as it might appear to an Appellate Court, to the administrative model, in which decision makers are often concerned primarily with building a record for review, in my opinion would substantially undercut the ability of arbitrators to successfully resolve disputes. The Courts therefore have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the Court will deem meritorious. The Courts if start undertaking to determine the merits of the grievance, would be usurping the function which under that Arbitration Act, 1996 is entrusted to the Arbitration Tribunal. This plenary review by the Courts of the merits would make meaningless the provisions that the arbitral award is final, for in reality it would almost never be final. 23. To strengthen the arguments further, Mr. Gupta, learned senior counsel has also relied upon the authorities viz. 2006 (11) SCC 181 , 2012 (5) SCC 306 , AIR 1989 (SC) 890 , 2012 (1) SCC 594 , 2010 (2) SCC 182 , 1994 (6) SCC 485 , 2011 (5) SCC 758 , 2011 (10) SCC 573 , 1999 (9) SCC 449 , 2010 (11) SCC 296 2011 (10) SCC 573 . Mr. Jamwal, learned Sr. CGSC, has relied upon the judgment rendered in Ramnath International Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India and a perusal of the same reveals that it is not applicable to the case in hand. 24. It is not the case of the petitioner-Union of India that the Sole Arbitrator has not adopted a judicial approach or acted in violation of principle of natural justice. 24. It is not the case of the petitioner-Union of India that the Sole Arbitrator has not adopted a judicial approach or acted in violation of principle of natural justice. It is also not the case that the Sole Arbitrator has not acted bona fide or not dealt with the subject in a fair, reasonable and objective manner or that the decision of the Arbitrator was actuated at extraneous consideration. No case of perversity or irrationality has also been made out. It is also not the case of petitioner that the Arbitrator in the present case, has not decided the matter with a sound head and a good heart. Therefore, the petitioner failed to make out his case to be entertained by this Court in terms of Section 34 of the Act. 25. Even if an error exists, this is an error of facts within jurisdiction, which cannot be re-appreciated by the Court under Section 34 of the Act. The Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd. (2009) 10 SCC 63 even while dealing with a challenge to an arbitral award under the 1940 Act reiterated that an error by the Arbitrator relatable to interpretation of contract is an error within his jurisdiction and is not an error on the face of the award and is not amenable to correction by the Courts. It was further held that the legal position is no more res integra that the Arbitrator having made the final Arbiter of resolution of dispute between the parties, the award is not open to challenge on the ground that Arbitrator has reached at a wrong conclusion. 26. Rest of the grounds of challenge pertain to appreciation of evidence, which this Court would not be in a position to do, for the reason, that this Court while exercising powers under Section 34 of the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 cannot sit in an appeal against the findings and fact of the law arrived at by the learned Arbitrator. The Sole Arbitrator, being Judge of the choice of the parties, has been given adjudicatory powers by the parties to decide the dispute on its own wisdom and wisdom of Arbitrator cannot be substituted by this Court unless the award is shown to be suffering from error of law and facts apparent on the face of the record. The Sole Arbitrator, being Judge of the choice of the parties, has been given adjudicatory powers by the parties to decide the dispute on its own wisdom and wisdom of Arbitrator cannot be substituted by this Court unless the award is shown to be suffering from error of law and facts apparent on the face of the record. No ground has been demonstrated by the petitioner in this petition. The plea of the petitioner is purely a question of fact, the same cannot be looked into. Once the Arbitrator has decided the dispute with a sound head and good heart, after hearing both the sides, the Court should not interfere with the award, even if the Court itself disagrees with the reasons assigned by the Arbitrator. 27. In this view of the matter, alternative plea raised by the petitioner-Union of India cannot be taken note of and therefore, cannot be made graft ground to challenge the award, which is otherwise found to be inconsonance with law. 28. Viewed thus, this petition fails and is accordingly dismissed along with connected MP's. 29. Registry to return the record to Mr. R.S. Jamwal, learned Sr. CGSC against proper receipt.