JUDGMENT AND ORDER (CAV) Heard Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. R.K. Bora, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners in WP(C) 1325/2017 and Mr. S.N. Sarma, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. B.D. Goswami, learned counsel representing the writ petitioners in WP(C) 1371/2017. Also heard Mr. D. Saikia, learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam, representing the State respondents as well as Mr. J.C. Gogoi, learned Standing Counsel, Deori Autonomous Council. Mr. D.J. Kapil, learned counsel appears for the writ petitioner nos. 7, 8 and 9, who had subsequently filed an application seeking leave of this Court to withdraw from WP (C) 1325/2017. 2. The facts, giving rise to the filing of these writ petitions, as apparent from the record, lie in a short campus and are briefly narrated herein-below :- (I) The Deori Autonomous Council Act, 2005, ( hereinafter referred to as the Act of 2005) was enacted by the Assam Legislative Assembly so as to provide for establishment of an autonomous authority within the constitutional framework for social, economic, educational, ethnic and cultural advancement of the members of Deori community. The General Council of the said autonomous body consists of elected members and in terms of the provisions of the Act of 2005, elections were held on 15/12/2016 for constitution of the General Council of the Deori Autonomous Council (hereinafter referred to as the DAC). The results were declared on 17/12/2016. In the elections held on 15/12/2016, as many as 18 (eighteen) members were elected to the General Council. (II) On 04/02/2017, the Government of Assam had issued a notification convening the first meeting of the elected General Council on 09/02/2017. The Deputy Commissioner of Lakhimpur district was authorised to administer the oath of office to the elected members of the General Council. Accordingly, the 18 elected members of the General Council took oath on 09/02/2017 and the said fact was also intimated to the Government by the communication dated 27/02/2017 issued by the Principal Secretary of the DAC. (III) On 16/02/2017, 10 (ten) elected members of the council i.e. the writ petitioners in WP(C) 1325/2017, submitted a requisition addressed to the Chairman of the DAC making a request for convening a General Meeting of the General Council within a period of 7 (seven) days. (III) On 16/02/2017, 10 (ten) elected members of the council i.e. the writ petitioners in WP(C) 1325/2017, submitted a requisition addressed to the Chairman of the DAC making a request for convening a General Meeting of the General Council within a period of 7 (seven) days. When the said requisition was not acted upon, the aforesaid ten members had circulated a notice dated 22/02/2017 informing all elected members of the DAC that a Special General Meeting had been convened on 23/02/2017 for discussing the agendas mentioned therein. The notice dated 22/02/2017 contained three agenda items, viz.- (i) No Confidence motion against the Chief Executive Councillor (CEC) Shri Madhab Deori and his Executive Council; (ii) Removal of the Chief Executive Councillor Shri Madhab Deori and his other Executive Councillors from their respective posts; and (iii) Discussion regarding constitution of a new Executive Council from the elected members. (IV) On the basis of the notice dated 22/02/2017, a meeting was held on 23/02/2017 wherein, a resolution expressing want of confidence in the Chief Executive Councillor and his Executive Councillors was adopted. In the said meeting, the writ petitioner no. 1 in W.P.(c) No. 1325/2017 was elected as the Chairman of the Council, the petitioner 11 was elected as the Deputy Chairman, the petitioner no. 3 was elected as Chief Executive Councillor, the petitioner no. 8 was elected as Deputy Chief Executive Councillor and the petitioner nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 were elected as Executive Councillors. A copy of the aforesaid resolution was thereafter, sent to the Government with a request to approve the same and take necessary steps for fixing the date of oath taking ceremony of the newly constituted body. Since the Government refused to act on the said resolution, the present writ petition was filed by the aforementioned petitioners seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondent authorities to approve the resolution dated 23/02/2017 and also to administer oath of office to the newly elected Executive Councillors. (V) During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, an additional affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioners in WP(C) 1325/2017 with a supplementary prayer for issuance of a direction upon the authorities to arrange for a floor test to prove the majority support of the Executive Council of the DAC. (V) During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, an additional affidavit was filed on behalf of the petitioners in WP(C) 1325/2017 with a supplementary prayer for issuance of a direction upon the authorities to arrange for a floor test to prove the majority support of the Executive Council of the DAC. (VI) WP(C) 1371/2017, on the other hand, was preferred by the 7 (seven) petitioners i.e. the respondent nos 6 to 12 in W.P.(c) 1325/2017, who constitute the Executive Council, assailing the resolution dated 23/02/2017 inter-alia on the ground that the same was de hors the statute and, hence, liable to be declared as illegal and non-est in the eye of law. 3. The respondent no. 2 i.e. the Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Assam, WPT & BC Department, has filed counter affidavit in WP(C) 1325/2017 contesting the claim of the petitioners therein, inter-alia contending that the meeting held on 23/02/2017 was in clear violation of the statutory provisions contained in Section 13(1) and 17(3) of the Act of 2005 and, therefore, the resolution adopted there-in was illegal and in-operable in the eye of law. In the said affidavit, it has further been stated that the writ petitioners have approached this Court by making contradictory prayers, inasmuch as, they could not have prayed for a mandamus seeking approval of the resolution dated 23/02/2017 and at the same time ask for a floor test. 4. Mr. K.N. Choudhury, learned senior counsel has argued that the respondent nos. 6 to 12, who are the office bearers of the Executive Council, in their failure to appropriately respond to the requisition dated 16/02/2017 has displayed complete apathy towards the cause of the General Council members. Under the circumstances, the only option left open for the writ petitioners was to seek their removal by invoking Section 9 of the Act of 2005. Mr. Choudhury further submits that the notice dated 22/02/2017 had been duly circulated amongst all the members of the Executive Council and the said fact would stand established from the records. Since the Executive Council members including the Chief Executive Councillor were aware of the agenda items to be discussed in the meeting, it must be presumed that they had sufficient notice about the convention of the meeting by the writ petitioners. Since the Executive Council members including the Chief Executive Councillor were aware of the agenda items to be discussed in the meeting, it must be presumed that they had sufficient notice about the convention of the meeting by the writ petitioners. According to the learned senior counsel, in the absence of any specific provision in the Act 2005 requiring the requisition for convening a special meeting for discussing the no confidence motion to be addressed to a particular authority, the recourse adopted by the petitioners for removal of the existing members of the Executive Council, in the circumstances of the case, cannot be held to be un-lawful. 5. Mr. Choudhury, has further contended that an elected body in a democratic institution such as the DAC would have a right to continue in office so long as it enjoys the confidence of the majority of the elected members. The fact that ten out of eighteen elected members had signed the resolution 23/02/2017 seeking removal of the existing body from office would establish beyond doubt that the existing executive body was in a minority and, therefore, did not have the right to continue in office. At the same time, submits Mr. Choudhury, the support of the majority members in favour of the newly elected body is apparent from the resolution dated 23/02/2017, which holds out a clear mandate to govern in their favour. Under such circumstances, submits Mr. Choudhury, even if there is any technical deficiency in the convention of the meeting on 23/02/2017, the same would not per se invalidate the mandate contained in the resolution adopted therein since the requisition dated 22/02/2017 was in substantive compliance with the democratic norms traceable to the constitutional philosophy. Mr. Choudhury submits that the procedure for discussing no confidence motion cannot be equated with the process required to be followed for removal from office pursuant to a disciplinary action. As such, observance of the principles of natural justice, according to the learned senior counsel, would be un-necessary in such a situation. In support of his aforesaid arguments, Mr. Choudhury has relied upon the following decisions :- (i) (1992) 4SCC 80 (Mohan Lal Tripathi Vs. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly and others); (ii) (2011) 9 SCC 573 (Pratap Chandra Mehta Vs. State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh and others); (iii) (1974) 2 SCC 706 (Babubhai Muljibhai Patel Vs. In support of his aforesaid arguments, Mr. Choudhury has relied upon the following decisions :- (i) (1992) 4SCC 80 (Mohan Lal Tripathi Vs. District Magistrate, Rai Bareilly and others); (ii) (2011) 9 SCC 573 (Pratap Chandra Mehta Vs. State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh and others); (iii) (1974) 2 SCC 706 (Babubhai Muljibhai Patel Vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and others); (iv) (2010) 12 SCC 1 (Bhanumati and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh through Principal Secretary and others); and (v) (2014) 7 SCC 663 (Usha Bharati Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others). 6. Mr. S.N. Sarma, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP(C) 1371/2017, on the other hand, contends that the procedure for removal of the Chief Executive Councillor and other Councillors has been provided under Section 9(1) of the Act of 2005. Section 13 of the Act prescribed the procedures for convening a meeting of the General Council, according to which, the meeting is required to be held at the headquarters of the DAC and at such time as may be notified by the DAC. Therefore, submits Mr. Sarma, the resolution adopted in a meeting not convened as per the mandate of Section 13 of the Act would be illegal and, therefore, would not have any force in the eye of law. Mr. Sarma has further argued that although the Act of 2005 does not indicate as to who should convene the meeting, yet, by reading the provision of the Act, the Court would be called upon to constructively interpret the different provisions of the Act so as to give due meaning to the legislative intent. Since the Legislature had never intended to permit any meeting to be privately convened by the elected members, that too for expressing “no confidence” on the Executive Body, the resolution dated 23/02/2017, according to Mr Sarma, is liable to be declared as illegal, null and void. In support of his aforesaid argument, Mr. Sarma has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary Vs. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and others reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1 . 7. Mr. D. Saikia, learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam, appearing for the State has supported the arguments advanced by Mr. Sarma has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary Vs. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and others reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1 . 7. Mr. D. Saikia, learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam, appearing for the State has supported the arguments advanced by Mr. S.N.Sarma, learned senior counsel for the petitioners in WP(C) 1371/2017 and has further contended that as per section 17(3) of the Act of 2005, the presence of the Principal Secretary of the Council in every meeting of the DAC is mandatory but in the meeting held on 23/02/2017, the Secretary of the DAC was admittedly not present. As a matter of fact, submits Mr. Saikia, there was no requisition submitted to the Principal Secretary requesting for convening a special meeting. Since, section 17(3) of the Act mentions about all meetings, hence, submits Mr. Saikia, the said provision would also be applicable to a special meeting convened so as to transact business under section 9(1) of the Act as well. 8. Referring to the contents of the notice dated 22/02/2017, Mr. Saikia submits that a bare reading of the same would go to show that it is not a requisition but in fact, was a notice informing about the meeting convened on 23/02.2017 by the writ petitioner in W.P. (C) No 1325/2017. Since section 9 permits a special meeting to be called on the basis of a requisition made in writing, the meeting convened on 23/02/2017 de hors a requisition cannot be held to be valid. Mr. Saikia, has summed up his arguments with the submission that a resolution adopted in a privately organised meeting, in an undisclosed venue and in violation of Section 13(1) and 17(3) of the Act cannot be taken cognizance of by the State and that is the reason no action had been taken in the matter by the Government. 9. I have considered the rival submissions made at the bar and have also perused the records produced by Mr. J.C. Gogoi, learned counsel representing the DAC. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length, it is apparent that the outcome of these writ petitions would depend on the answer to the key question as to whether the resolution dated 23/02/2017 can be clothed with any degree of legitimacy in the facts and circumstances of the case. J.C. Gogoi, learned counsel representing the DAC. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length, it is apparent that the outcome of these writ petitions would depend on the answer to the key question as to whether the resolution dated 23/02/2017 can be clothed with any degree of legitimacy in the facts and circumstances of the case. In order to answer the said question, a brief reference to the relevant provision of the Act of 2005 is deemed necessary. 10. Pursuant to the signing of the “Deori Accord”, the Assam State Legislative Assembly had enacted “The Deori Autonomous Council Act, 2005”, paving the way for establishment of Deori Autonomous Counsel (DAC). As mentioned above, the underlying objective of the Act is to provide maximum autonomy to the council within the constitutional framework, providing an opportunity for rapid, social, economical, cultural autonomy of the Deori community living within the State. 11. Section 5 of the Act of 2005 provides for a General Council, which shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with powers to acquire, hold and dispose of property. Section 6(1) of the Act provides that the General Council shall consist of 20 members, out of which 18 (eighteen) shall be elected members and the remaining 2 (two) shall be nominated by the Government of Assam to represent those groups/communities within the Council area which are otherwise not represented. In addition, the Members of Parliament and the Members of the Assam Legislative Assembly belonging to the Schedule Tribe reserved constituencies coming under the Council area would be the ex-officio members of the General Council. Section 6(4) further provides that at the first meeting after the election, the elected members of the General Council, for the purpose of constitution of the Executive Council, shall elect one member to be the Chairman, one member to be the Deputy Chairman, one Chief Executive Councillor, one Deputy Chief Executive Councillor and as many Executive Councillors, as may be decided by the General Council but not exceeding one third of the total number of members of the General Council. 12. As per Section 7 of the Act of 2005, the term of office of the General Council is for 5 (five) years with effect from the date of the first meeting as appointed by the Government after the election of the members unless dissolved earlier. 12. As per Section 7 of the Act of 2005, the term of office of the General Council is for 5 (five) years with effect from the date of the first meeting as appointed by the Government after the election of the members unless dissolved earlier. Section 8 stipulates that a member of the General Council can demit office by tendering resignation in writing to the Chief Executive Councillor but in the case of the Chief Executive Councillor, such notice of resignation is required to be addressed to any of the Executive Councillor. 13. Section 9 of the Act of 2005 makes provision for removal of the members of the General Council by a resolution carried by the total number of the elected members in a special meeting of the General Council called for the purpose. As per section 9(2), the Government may also, after giving an opportunity to show cause, remove a member of the General Council from office on the grounds mentioned there-in. Section 9 is quoted herein below for ready reference :- “9. Removal of Members of General Council. - (1) The Chief Executive Councilor or the Executive Councilors or any one of them or all of them may be removed from office by a resolution carried by a majority of the total number of the elected members at a special meeting of the General Council called for the purpose upon a requisition made in writing by not less than one third of the Members of the General Council. (2) The Government, after giving an opportunity to an elected Member of the General Council to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard, may by order, remove him from the office, if he- (a) after his election, is convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude punishable with imprisonment for any period exceeding six months, or (b) Incurs any of the disqualifications mentioned in section 54 after his election as Member of the General Council, or (c) is absent from three consecutive meetings of the General Council. (3) Any Member of the General Council who is removed from the office under sub-section (2) above, may within thirty days from the date of the order, appeal to such Judicial Authority as the Government may prescribe and the authority so prescribed after admitting an appeal may, after complying with the normal and fundamental principles of judicial proceedings, pass such order or orders either confirming or modifying or setting aside the order appealed against and pending the final disposal of the appeal may pass such other interlocutory order or orders including stay of. operation of the order appealed against. (4) The order passed by the Judicial Authority referred to in sub-section (3) above, on such appeal shall be final.” 14. Section 24 of the Act of 2005 makes provision for an “Executive Council” which shall consist of the Chief Executive Councillor (CEC) and as many Executive Councillors as may be permissible under section 6(4). Section 25 of the Act of 2005 deals with the term of Office of the members of the Executive Council, according to which, a member shall hold office until he ceases to be a member of the General Council or resigns from his office in writing. 15. A careful reading of the different provisions of the Act of 2005 goes to show that there is a provision in the form of section 9 of the Act permitting removal of the members of the General Council from office but the Act of 2005 is silent about removal of a member of the Executive Council including the Chief Executive Councillor from office. Rather, a combine reading of section 9 and 25 of the Act of 2005 goes to show that the only way the Chief Executive Councillor or an Executive Councillor can be removed from office is by way of removing him from the membership of the General Council by invoking section 9. 16. Section 13 of the Act lays down the procedure for holding meetings of the General Council. Section 13 is quoted herein below for ready reference :- “13. Meeting of the General Council. - (1) The General Council shall meet at least once in every three months for transaction of its business. 16. Section 13 of the Act lays down the procedure for holding meetings of the General Council. Section 13 is quoted herein below for ready reference :- “13. Meeting of the General Council. - (1) The General Council shall meet at least once in every three months for transaction of its business. (2) The meeting of the General Council shall be held at the headquarter of the Deori Autonomous Council at such time as may be notified by the Chief Executive Councilor : Provided that the first meeting of the General Council after the election shall be held on such date as may be appointed by the Government.” 17. Section 17(1) of the Act provides for a Secretariat for the Council to be headed by a Principal Secretary to be appointed by the Government in consultation with the Chief Executive Councillor. As per Section 17(2), the Principal Secretary shall be the Principal Executive Officer of the General Council and all other officers of the General Council shall be subordinate to him. Section 17(3) mandates that the Principal Secretary shall remain present and take part in all the discussions and meetings of the General Council. Section 17(3) is quoted herein below for ready reference :- “17 (3). The Principal Secretary shall be present and take part in the discussion of all the meetings of the General Council or the Executive Council or any Committee of the General Council and may, with the consent of the Chief Executive Councilor or any other person presiding over such meeting for the time being, as the case may be, at any time make a statement or give explanation of the facts and circumstances but shall not be entitled to vote in any such meeting.” 18. As noticed above, section 9 of the Act of 2005 only makes provision for removal of Members of the General Council in a special meeting convened on the basis of a requisition made in writing by not less than 1/3rd of the members. However, the Act of 2005 does not indicate as to the authority to whom the requisition should be addressed nor does it indicate as to who should convene the special meeting and with whose approval. However, the Act of 2005 does not indicate as to the authority to whom the requisition should be addressed nor does it indicate as to who should convene the special meeting and with whose approval. The Act of 2005 is also silent about the procedure to be followed in case no special meeting is convened for removal of Members of the General Council as per the requisition submitted by one third of the members. The absence of any specific provision in the Act of 2005 covering the above aspect of the matter assumes special significance in a case where a no confidence motion is being proposed against a member of the General Council who is also holding the office of the Chief Executive Councillor or Executive Councillors. In the Act of 2005 there is also no indication as to the procedure that needs to be followed on receipt of a requisition for convening a meeting for discussion of a No Confidence Motion. Under the above facts and circumstances, this Court is called upon to interpret the provisions of the Act of 2005 so as to adjudicate upon the question of legality and validity of the resolution dated 23/02/2017. 19. Law is settled that when the codifying statute is silent on a point than it is permissible to look at other similar laws [see (1999) 7 SCC 359 , 11 Port of Bombay v Sriyanesh Knitters]. As such, a cursory look at the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994, which contains legal provisions laying down the procedure for removal of the elected President and Vice-President of the Goan Panchayat from office, may be useful. The Assam Panchayat Act, 1994 had been enacted by the Assam State Legislative Assembly, which contains a provision in the form of section 15 laying down the procedure for removal of the President/ Vice -President of the Gaon Panchayat on the basis of “No confidence” motion proposed by the members. As per section 15(2) of the Act of 1994, a special meeting for discussing the no-confidence motion brought against the President/ Vice-President of the Gaon Panchayat can be convened when a requisition, signed by not less than one third of the total number of members of the Gaon Panchayat, is delivered to the President or the Vice President, as the case may be. As per section 15 (1), such a meeting is required to be specially convened by the Secretary of the Gaon Panchayat with the approval of the President. It is only when the president fails to give approval for holding the meeting within the prescribed period that the Secretary is required to move the higher authority i.e. the Anchalik Panchayat President for convening the meeting within the time frame provided in the Act. Section 15(5) of the Act of 1994 further provides that when the members express want of confidence both in the President and the Vice-President of the Gaon Panchayat at the same time, the Secretary of the Gaon Panchayat to report the matter to the President of the Anchalik Panchayat. In the above manner, section 15(1) to 15 (5) of the Act of 1994 lays down the code for convening the special meeting for removal of the President/ Vice-President of the Gaon Panchayat based on a no-confidence motion. 20. Similarly, section 28 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956, provides for removal of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Municipal Board by a resolution of the Board in favour of which not less than half of the total number of Commissioners has given their votes at a meeting specially convened for the purpose. Section 43 of the Act of 1956 lays down the procedure for holding Ordinary and Special meetings and according to section 43(2),the Chairman or in his absence, the Vice-Chairman may call a special meeting whenever he thinks fit and shall call one on a requisition by not less than three of the Commissioner. As per subsection 3 of section 43, the persons who signed the requisition may call the meeting if the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman fails to call the special meeting within twenty days after such a requisition has been made. Therefore, the Act of 1956 makes a statutory provision for permitting the members who had submitted the requisition to convene a special meeting if the condition precedent is met. 21. Likewise, section 169 of the Companies Act 1956 permits the members of the company to call for Extra-Ordinary General Meeting (EOGM) if the Board of Directors fails to call the meeting within twenty days from the date of deposit of a valid requisition. 22. 21. Likewise, section 169 of the Companies Act 1956 permits the members of the company to call for Extra-Ordinary General Meeting (EOGM) if the Board of Directors fails to call the meeting within twenty days from the date of deposit of a valid requisition. 22. Both in the case the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 and the Companies Act, 1956, the statute itself makes provision permitting the members submitting the requisition to convene the special meeting/ EOGM on their own in the event of failure of the designated authority to do so within the prescribed time limit. But in the Act of 2005, there is no such provision permitting the members of the General Council to convene a meeting on their own in case the designated authority fails to discharge their obligation under the statute. 23. In the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhury (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that if a statute is silent or imprecise on requirements under the Constitution, it is for the Court to read constitutional mandate into those provisions and make declaration accordingly. Observations made in paragraph 46 is deemed to be relevant for the purpose of this case and is therefore, extracted herein below :- “46. In the background of the constitutional mandate, the question is not what the statute does say but what the statute must say. If the Act or the Rules or the Bye-laws do not say what they should say in terms of the Constitution, it is the duty of the court to read the constitutional spirit and concept into the Acts. "In so far as in its Act Parliament does not convey its intention clearly, expressly and completely, it is taken to require the enforcement agencies who are charged with the duty of applying legislation to spell out the detail of its legal meaning. This may be done either- (a) by finding and declaring implications in the words used by the legislator, or (b) by regarding the breadth or other obscurity of the express language as conferring a delegated legislative power to elaborate its meaning in accordance with public policy (including legal policy) and the purpose of the legislation." 24. This may be done either- (a) by finding and declaring implications in the words used by the legislator, or (b) by regarding the breadth or other obscurity of the express language as conferring a delegated legislative power to elaborate its meaning in accordance with public policy (including legal policy) and the purpose of the legislation." 24. In a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Goa v Western Builders reported in (2006) 6 SCC 239 it has been observed that if the statute is silent and there is no specific prohibition then the statute should be interpreted in a manner which advances the cause of justice. 25. Again, in the case of State of Kerala v Unni (2007) 2 SCC 365 , it has been held that interpretation of statute rests on the principles of reasonableness, equity as well as good conscience. 26. In the case of Gurudevdutta VKSSS Maryadit v State of Maharastra reported in (2001) 4 SCC 534 , the Supreme Court has observed that the cardinal principle of interpretation of statute is that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. 27. Law is well settled that the general principle of interpretation of statute requires that the statute must e read as a whole. As noted above, the Act of 2005 does not contain any specific provision laying down the manner in which a special meeting for discussion of no confidence motion is required to be convened. Section 13 (1) of the Act, which deals with meetings of the General Council, merely speaks of the duration between two such meeting and the place and time of holding the meeting. Sub-section 2 of section 13, however, categorically mentioned that it is the Chief Executive Councillor who would notify the time of holding the meeting. There is no other provision in the Act which deals with holding of meeting of the General Council. 28. From the scheme of the Act of 2005, it is clear that a member of the General Council can be removed in a special meeting of the General Council. There is no other provision in the Act which deals with holding of meeting of the General Council. 28. From the scheme of the Act of 2005, it is clear that a member of the General Council can be removed in a special meeting of the General Council. Therefore, in the absence of any contrary provision contained in the Act, the meeting referred to in section 13(1) of the Act must be held to include all meetings of the General Council including a special meeting to discuss the no-confidence motion. Since, such meeting is required to be held at a time to be notified by the Chief Executive Councillor, it would logically follow that the meeting has to be convened with the approval of the Chief Executive Councillor. Therefore, this court is of the view that the requisition referred to in section 9 of the Act of 2005 must be presented before the Chief Executive Councillor seeking his approval for convening the meeting, unless ofcourse the motion of no confidence is proposed against the Chef Executive himself, in which event, it must be put up before any of the Executive Councillor. 29. A reading of Section 17(3) also indicates of a definite role of the Principal Secretary of the Council in every meeting of the General Council. For the reasons stated above, a special meeting for removal of the Executive Councillor would also have to be treated as a meeting of the General Council since such a meeting would require notice to be circulated to the members of the General Council. Convention of a meeting is undoubtedly a Secretarial function. Since, the presence of the Principal Secretary in all meeting of the General Council is mandated by section 17(3), it is thus obvious that under the Act of 2005, it is the Principal Secretary who is entrusted with the responsibility of convening the special meeting under section 9 of the Act so as to discuss a no confidence motion brought against the members. 30. 30. Coming to the facts of the case in hand, the Executive Council of the DAC had been constituted on 09/02/2017 and within a period of less than two weeks, the Notice dated 22/02/2017 was circulated by ten members of the General Council seeking removal of the Chief Executive Councillor and the other Executive Councillors but in the said notice it has no where been mentioned that their removal is being sought from the membership of the General Council. Since, the Act of 2005 does not contain any provision for removal of the Chief Executive Councillor or the other Executive Councillors from office without seeking their removal from the membership of the General Council, the question of removal of the members of the Executive Council in a meeting held on the basis of the Notice dated 22/02/2017 cannot arise in the eye of law. 31. That apart, the ten members issuing the notice dated 22/02/2017 were not competent to convene the meeting on 23/02/2017 on their own since there is no such provision in the Act of 2005 permitting them to do so. Moreover, I find from the record that the notice dated 22/02/2017 is not a requisition for convening a special meeting and there is no valid requisition submitted before any authority with a request to convene a special meeting to discuss a no confidence motion. It is not in dispute that the requisition dated 16/02/2017 was not for convening a special meeting to discuss proposal of no confidence against the Executive Council members. 32. Record further reveals that no copy of the Notice dated 22/02/2017 was formally served upon the Principal Secretary of the Council. For the above stated reasons, the notice circulated on 22/02/2017 cannot be held to be a requisition within the meaning of section 9 of the Act and hence, the proceedings held on 23/02/2017 was evidently dehors the law . 33. There is another significant aspect of the matter which needs to be mentioned herein. While section 9 of the Act of 2005 permits removal of the members of the General Council from office, the said provisions does not permit election of a new Executive Council members in the same meeting. 33. There is another significant aspect of the matter which needs to be mentioned herein. While section 9 of the Act of 2005 permits removal of the members of the General Council from office, the said provisions does not permit election of a new Executive Council members in the same meeting. Under the Act of 2005, the constitution of the Executive Council can only be done as per the procedure laid down in section 6(4) of the Act and that too at the first meeting of the General Council after the election. The Act of 2005, however, does not clearly spell out as to what would be the procedure to be followed for constitution of the Executive Council in the event the office of the Chief Executive Councillor or Executive Councillors falls vacant before completion of the term. What is, however, clear beyond any shade of doubt is that the ten members of the General Council, did not have any authority or jurisdiction to constitute a new Executive Council in a privately convened meeting without the involvement of the Government of Assam. I, therefore, find sufficient force in the submission of Mr Siakia on the above point. 34. As noticed above, the DAC is a statutory body having a fixed tenure of 5 years which can be cut short on being dissolved under section 68 of the Act. The members of the General Council are directly elected by a special electorate on the basis of a voters’ list prepared as per section 50 of the Act of 2005. The Executive Council is constituted from amongst the elected members of the General Council. It is, therefore, obvious that the members of the Executive Council would remain in office during the elected term as long as they enjoy the confidence of the majority of the elected members. There can be no quarrel with the proposition advanced by Mr. Choudhury, that in a democratic institution, no executive body can continue to remain in power without the confidence of the majority of the elected members. There can be no quarrel with the proposition advanced by Mr. Choudhury, that in a democratic institution, no executive body can continue to remain in power without the confidence of the majority of the elected members. But what must also be borne in mind is that the removal of the Chief Executive Councillor/ Executive Councillors or for that matter, any elected member from office has to be done strictly in accordance with the prescription of law as otherwise the same would lead to chaos and instability in the organisation posing a serious a threat to the very survival of the democratic institution. It would be pertinent to mention here-in that although the petitioners in W.P.(c) 1325/2017 had initially made a prayer for “floor test”, yet, during the course of argument, Mr. Choudhury did not press for the same although the opponent group was apparently ready to face a “floor test”. 35. Section 13 of the Act of 2005 speaks of a meeting of the General Council which is required to be notified by the Chief Executive Councillor. Although the term “notified” has not been defined in the Act, yet, in the absence of any contrary provision contained in the Act, it must be understood that the Chief Executive Councillor would have a statutory role in granting approval and ensuring convention of every meeting of the General Council. Moreover, since a proposal expressing want of confidence against the Chief Executive Councillor is likely to entail serious adverse consequences, it would be wholly un-just to deny reasonable time and opportunity to the said elected authority to suitably respond to the requisition. Therefore, the interpretation assigned to section 9 of the Act by Mr. Choudhury, if accepted, in the opinion of this court, would not only negate the intention of the legislature but would also frustrate the Act of 2005. 36. For the reasons stated here-in above, the proceeding held on 23/02/2017 on the basis of the notice dated 22/02/2017 is held to unsustainable in the eye of law and the same is hereby, declared as null and void. Consequently, WP(C) No.1325/2017 is held to be devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. In the result, WP(c) No.1371/2017 stands allowed. 37. Consequently, WP(C) No.1325/2017 is held to be devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed. In the result, WP(c) No.1371/2017 stands allowed. 37. Before parting with the record, this court would like to observe that as noticed above, the Act of 2005 appears to be imprecise on a few important aspects leaving room for more such controversies in the future. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General, Assam has also fairly submitted that the Act of 2005 calls for a re-visit. It is for the legislature to remedy the situation by making suitable amendments to the Act. Therefore, in the light of the observations made here-in above, the Government may take appropriate steps in the matter, if so advised. There would be no order as to costs. The records be returned back forthwith.