ORDER : 1. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and order passed by the I Addl. Prl. Family Court at Mysuru (‘Family Court’ for short) in M.C. No. 365/2015. 2. Facts in brief are: That the appellant and respondent herein are the wife and husband, respectively, their marriage having been solemnized on 28.4.1008. They have begotten a son by name Ravikumar, presently aged about 18 years. Allegations and counter allegations were made by the petitioner and respondent before the Family Court. M.C. No. 195/2003 was filed by respondent-husband under Section 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of Hindu Marriage Act,1995 (‘Act’ for short). The appellant-wife resisted the same and ultimately, the said petition came to be dismissed, against which MFA No. 10504/2007 was filed by the respondent before this Court and the said appeal came to be dismissed by an order dated 07.02.2011. Subsequently respondent filed M.C. No. 365/2015 under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Act seeking divorce from the appellant on the ground of desertion and cruelty. Respondent was examined as PW-1 and Exs.P1 to P7 were got marked. Respondent was cross-examined and in the process, four documents were confronted to him and were marked as Exs.R1 to R4. A memo was filed on behalf of the appellant that she has no oral evidence to let in and she will be relying upon the admissions coming from the mouth of the respondent, as well as Exs.R1 to R4 to substantiate her defence. The trial Court, considering the material evidence on record and the arguments of both the sides, passed an order allowing the petition filed by the respondent. The said order is impugned in this appeal. 3. Learned counsel Sri. C.V. Srinivasa, appearing for the appellant would contend that the Family Court grossly erred in drawing an adverse inference against the appellant in faulting that she had not stepped into the witness box. It was argued that, when the materials placed on record from the side of the appellant was the undisputed testimony about the conduct of the respondent right from the year 1999, the Family Court should have given due weightage to this material and erred in rejecting the contention of the appellant. It was argued that, when the materials placed on record from the side of the appellant was the undisputed testimony about the conduct of the respondent right from the year 1999, the Family Court should have given due weightage to this material and erred in rejecting the contention of the appellant. Inviting the attention of this Court to the order passed by this Court in MFA No. 10504/2007 (DD 7.2.2011) submitted that several attempts made by the appellant-wife to live together with the respondent-husband did not materialize and this aspect was noticed and observed by this Court that similar attempt was made by this Court in persuading the parties to live together, initially the husband had agreed and later he went back. The observation made by this Court in the said MFA No. 10504/2007 speaks about the conduct of the respondent, which, in fact, establishes the false allegations made by the respondent against the appellant as regards the desertion and cruelty aspects are concerned. This Court has categorically held in MFA No. 10504/2007 that except the self serving testimony, no other evidence was placed before the Court to show that the wife treated the husband with cruelty. Even so far desertion is concerned, it was held that the appellant-wife is ready to join the husband right from the beginning. The intention of the respondent-husband is only to get rid of her and accordingly, rejected the appeal as no valid ground was made out by the respondent. Despite the dismissal of the appeal, on the very same grounds the respondent filed M.C. No. 365/2015. The Family Court ought to have considered the observations made by this Court in MFA No. 10504/2007 and would have rejected the M.C. petition filed by the husband, on the very same grounds. In support of the contentions advanced, the learned counsel placed reliance on the following Judgments: (i) Pandurang Jivaji vs. Ramchandra Gangadhar Ashtekar, AIR 1981 SC 2235 . (ii) Senguttuvan vs. Mahadevaswamy, ILR 2007 Karnataka 2709 4. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material on record. 5. It is not in dispute that the respondent had filed M.C. No. 195/2003 seeking decree of divorce to dissolve the marriage of the appellant with the respondent solemnized on 28.4.1997, which being dismissed, MFA No. 10504/2007 was filed by the respondent and the same came to be dismissed. 5. It is not in dispute that the respondent had filed M.C. No. 195/2003 seeking decree of divorce to dissolve the marriage of the appellant with the respondent solemnized on 28.4.1997, which being dismissed, MFA No. 10504/2007 was filed by the respondent and the same came to be dismissed. Again the respondent filed M.C. No. 365/2015 for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(ib) of the Act. Though the respondent examined himself as PW-1 and got marked Exs.P1 to P7, appellant has not chosen to enter the witness box, however confronted the documents during PW’s cross-examination and got them marked as Exs.R1 to R4 and thereafter filed a memo stating that she will make use of admission of PW-1 elicited during his cross-examination and the exhibits marked at R1 to R4. The Family Court framed the following points for consideration: (i) Whether the petitioner is entitled for dissolution of marriage as prayed? (ii) What order? Has given the findings on the above points as under: Point No. 1 – affirmative Point No. 2 – as per the final order, allowing the petition dissolving the marriage solemnized between the appellant and the respondent on 28.4.1997 at Vyasuraya Kalyana Mantapa, Mysore, by decree of divorce. 6. The order was passed in MFA No. 10504/2007 on 7.2.2011. M.C. No. 365/2015 was instituted on 20.7.2015. Now the point that arises for consideration before this Court is: (i) Whether a fresh cause of action has accrued for the respondent to institute M.C 365/2015? (ii) Whether the respondent is entitled to the decree of divorce? 7. PW-1 has stated on oath that after the dismissal of the appeal before this Court, efforts were made by him to convince the appellant to come back to the matrimonial home, but she had refused and insulted him. The witness has denied the respondent’s suggestion that he had made any such efforts. Further PW-1 has stated that after the dismissal of the appeal, a long rope was given to the wife to join him for nearly five years hoping for good but the sincere efforts made for about 17 years to get reunited with the appellant has not yielded any positive results. On the other hand, the insulting replies and the conduct of the appellant had caused mental agony to him. On the other hand, the insulting replies and the conduct of the appellant had caused mental agony to him. The intent of the appellant as could be gathered from the record is that she is ready to go back to the matrimonial house provided the petitioner lives separately from his mother and sets up a house for herself and their son. It is the pious obligation on the part of the son to take care of his mother. The demand of the appellant is for a separate house, which according to the respondent is not acceptable owing to the responsibility of a son. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narendra vs. K. Meena, (2016) 9 SCC 455 has held that in a Hindu society, it is a pious obligation of a son to maintain the parents. If a wife makes an attempt to deviate from normal practice and normal custom of the society, she must have some justifiable reason for that. In our opinion, normally no husband would tolerate this and no son would like to be separated from his old parents and other family members, who are dependent upon his income. The persistent attempt of the wife to constrain the appellant to be separated from the family would be tortuous for the husband and in our opinion, the trial Court was right when it came to the conclusion that such an act constitutes an act of cruelty. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Savitri Pandey vs. Prem Chandra Pandey, AIR 2002 SC 591 held thus: “7A. "Desertion" for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. In other words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations, i.e. not permitting or allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the parties. The proof of desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalises the sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of children. The proof of desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalises the sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case.” 8. It is well established principle that two important ingredients viz. (a) factum of desertion, (b) animus deserendi - intention to desert the spouse; to bring an end to cohabitation or marital life, if proved, it is a ground for dissolution of marriage. Admittedly, these two factors are proved by the respondent in the absence of any evidence led by the appellant to rebut the same. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Man Kaur (dead) by L.Rs vs. Hartar Singh Sangha, (2010) 10 SCC 512 has observed that if a party fails to enter the witness box to testify about his/her case, it calls for drawing adverse inference against such party. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant in the case of Pandurang Jivaji (supra) was rendered in a different context wherein the High Court had observed in its judgment that the decree holder had made no admission in his evidence which would justify refusal to draw adverse inference for the failure of the parties therein to step into the witness box. The Hon’ble Apex Court examining the records which was placed before it noticed that the examination of the record indicates that the observation made by the High Court that the decree holder had made no such admission is not quite correct. In such circumstances, it is held that the question of drawing an adverse inference against the parties on account of their absence from Court would arise only when there was no other evidence on record on the point in issue. Similarly, the Judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Senguttuvan (supra) was in the context of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. Hence, the same is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 9. Similarly, the Judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Senguttuvan (supra) was in the context of Section 139 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. Hence, the same is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 9. The factual matrix of the case as narrated above, would indicate that the appellant and the respondent are living separately for more than 17 years and their son is aged about 19 years old. There is absolutely no marital bondage between the parties. The marriage has become a fiction with the long period of continuous separation. Post appeal period forms altogether a different period paving way to a different cause of action. The indifferent attitude of the appellant abandoning the marital responsibilities, deserting the husband during the post appeal period is very well established by the respondent. Mere production of the order in MFA No. 10504/2007 would not prove the defence of the appellant unless fresh evidence is led in to discard the evidence of the respondent. The order of this Court in MFA No. 10504/2007 would not come to the assistance of the appellant while considering the current affairs, leading to a fresh cause of action. No purpose would be served in keeping the parties tied forever to a marriage, that in fact which has become a deadwood. These aspects are extensively considered by the Family Court in a right perspective while allowing the petition. No exception can be found with the impugned order. Points for consideration are answered accordingly in the affirmative. 10. As aforesaid, there is no merit in the appeal and resultantly the appeal has to be dismissed. In the circumstances, we are inclined to condone the delay of 10 days in filing the appeal as the same would not prejudice the rights of the respondent. Accordingly, we condone the delay of 10 days in filing the appeal. I.A. No. 1/2017 is allowed. 11. Appeal stands dismissed. 12. I.A. No. 2/2017 seeking for stay of the impugned order do not survive for consideration in view of the dismissal of the appeal.