ORDER : RAVIKUMAR, J. This revision petition is filed under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act challenging the judgment dated 28.1.2012 passed by the Waqf Tribunal, Kozhikode in O.S.No.10/2011. The revision petitioner was the 1st defendant, respondents 1 and 2 herein were the plaintiffs, the 3rd respondent was the 3rd defendant and the 4th respondent was the 2nd defendant, before the Tribunal. The suit was one for declaration and injunction. Declaration was sought to the effect that Ext.A2 which is a settlement deedbearing No.1394/1993 of Sub Registry, Chathamangalam, is null and void and not binding on the waqf. Injunction was sought against the 1st and 2nd defendants to restrain them permanently from trespassing upon the plaint schedule property and committing waste thereon and also from doing any acts against the title and possession of the Munnoor Juma Ath Palli. The suit was decreed as sought for. It is aggrieved by the said judgment passed by the Waqf Tribunal in O.S.No.10/2011 that the captioned revision petition has been filed seeking to set aside the judgment. 2. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 and also the learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent. Though notice was ordered to the 4th respondent, it was returned with the endorsement 'unclaimed' and subsequently, as per order dated 18.6.2012, it was declared that notice was served on him. 3. For a proper disposal of the revision petition, it is inevitable to narrate the facts in succinct. The plaint schedule property, viz; Parakkamthodika paramb comprised in Sy.No.12 (re-survey No.4/1-B) is having an extent of 18x9½ six feet koles (13.5 cents). Indisputably, it is the common case that the said property belonged to one Kunjambu. In the impugned judgment, it is stated that the said Kunjambu is the grandfather of the 1st defendant/revision petitioner. The learned counsel on both sides submit that in fact, the 1st defendant/revision petitioner is the son of the said Kunjambu and 2nd defendant, viz; the 4th respondent herein is the son of the 1st defendant/revision petitioner. In other words, he is the grandson of the said Kunjambu. Subsequently, as per Ext.A1, partition of the properties belonged to Kunjambu was effected in the year 1956. 4. According to the revision petitioner, he acquired title over the plaint schedule property as per Ext.A1. In other words, he is the grandson of the said Kunjambu. Subsequently, as per Ext.A1, partition of the properties belonged to Kunjambu was effected in the year 1956. 4. According to the revision petitioner, he acquired title over the plaint schedule property as per Ext.A1. The said contention and claim is founded on a recital made in Ext.A1, which reads thus: xxx xxx It is the precise case of the revision petitioner that the plaint schedule property is a property left out and was not partitioned and therefore, going by the said recital in Ext.A1, he acquired the said right over the said property. In fact, the original suit was instituted by the plaintiffs/respondents 1 and 2 herein claiming right over the said property based on the very same document, viz; Ext.A1. In Ext.A1, there is a recital, which is relied on by the plaintiffs to stake such a claim and it reads thus:- xxx xxx 5. The very case of the plaintiffs is that in Ext.A1 itself in unambiguous terms it was stated that the property described thereunder having the extent specifically mentioned therein was already dedicated as waqf and Ext.A1 would reveal that the properties excluding the said dedicated property and another item of property which was with the landlord alone were available for partition under Ext.A1. It is in the said circumstance that such a declaration and also consequential injunction was sought as mentioned hereunder. 6. As is evident from the impugned judgment, the Tribunal had taken note of Ext.C1 report of the Advocate Commissioner and Ext.C1(a) site plan. That would go to show that plaint schedule property was identified. In such circumstances, the Tribunal went on to consider the evidence on record consisting of the documentary and oral evidence and held that the plaint schedule property is the extent of property which was dedicated by Kunjambu as per his will as waqf property. Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected the claim of the revision petitioner/1st defendant that the property was left out of partition while effecting partition under Ext.A1. The suit was decreed based on such conclusion and findings. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that the Tribunal went wrong in holding that the plaint schedule property is not a property left out of partition while effecting partition under Ext.A1. The suit was decreed based on such conclusion and findings. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner submitted that the Tribunal went wrong in holding that the plaint schedule property is not a property left out of partition while effecting partition under Ext.A1. It is his case that since it is a property left out at the time of partition, in the light of the recital in Ext.A1, as per which a left out property should vest with the revision petitioner, the plaintiffs/respondents 1 and 2 herein would not have any title or right over the said item of property. It is the further contention that the Tribunal had not properly appreciated Exts.B1 to B6. Ext.B1 is the building permit dated 20.12.2011. Ext.B2 is an information given by the Waqf Board. Ext.B3 is a tax receipt, which would reveal payment of tax for the plaint schedule property by the defendant/revision petitioner. Ext.P4 is the photocopy of the electoral card and Exts.B5 and B6 are photocopies of tax receipts and Ext.B7 is the possession certificate issued to the revision petitioner/1st defendant. In the said circumstances, it is contended that a proper appreciation of the documentary evidence consisting of Exts.B1 to B7 would have definitely culminated in the dismissal of the original suit. In other words, it is the contention that it is the perverse appreciation of the said documents that resulted in the impugned judgment. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2, the plaintiffs therein contended that the Tribunal had rightly appreciated the entire evidence and in fact, the Tribunal has specifically taken note of the oral testimony of the revision petitioner as DW1. From the rival contentions, it is evident that both the revision petitioner/1st defendant and respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs were relying on the recitals in Ext.A1 to establish their right over the plaint schedule property. In such circumstances, the construction of Ext.A1 with reference to the aforesaid recitals relied on respectively by the revision petitioner and respondents 1 and 2 should decide the fate of this revision petition. 8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the Tribunal ought not to have entertained the original suit and it ought to have been found that the original suit is not maintainable. 8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the Tribunal ought not to have entertained the original suit and it ought to have been found that the original suit is not maintainable. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner further contended that in the written statement filed on behalf of defendants 1 and 2/revision petitioner and 4th respondent herein, it was specifically stated that the suit is barred by limitation. Such a contention was raised based on the fact that the declaration sought for was in respect of Ext.A2 document dated 18.5.1993, viz; Ext.A1 executed in the year 1993 and the suit was filed only in the year 2011. The learned counsel further contended that when a specific contention has been taken up in the written statement that the suit is barred by limitation, it was incumbent on the Tribunal to frame an issue in respect of the said question. Obviously, the Tribunal had not framed any issue in relation to the same and there is absolute absence of any discussion with respect to the said matter in the impugned judgment. We will deal with the said contention a little later. 9. As noticed hereinbefore, the revision petitioner and the 4th respondent took up a contention before the Tribunal that the suit was not maintainable. The Tribunal repelled the said contention holding that the pleadings of both sides would reveal that the suit is with respect to the property and the question is whether that property is waqf property or not. When the question is whether the property is waqf property or not, certainly, the only forum which is having jurisdiction to adjudicate upon that matter is the Waqf Tribunal. (See the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajasthan Wakf Board v. Devki Nandan Pathak and others (2017 (2) KLJ 717)]. In view of the said decision, it can only be held that the Tribunal has rightly held the suit as maintainable. 10. Before adverting to the rival contentions based on the submissions made in Ext.A1, we will proceed to consider the contention whether the suit ought to have been dismissed on the ground of being barred by limitation. Certainly, the revision petitioner and the 4th respondent in their joint written statement had taken up a contention that the suit in question was barred by limitation. Certainly, the revision petitioner and the 4th respondent in their joint written statement had taken up a contention that the suit in question was barred by limitation. But that was not considered by the Tribunal as can be seen from the impugned judgment. Evidently, the contention of the revision petitioner that the suit was barred by limitation is founded on Article 56 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which reads thus: 56 To declare the forgery of an instrument issued or registered Three years When the issue or registration becomes known to the plaintiff. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that when a suit is instituted, even if the question of limitation was not pointedly raised by the defendant/defendants, the court is bound to consider the said issue. In the decision in Craft Centre v. Koncherry Coir Factories (AIR 1991 Kerala 83), it was held that law of limitation is meant to be an aid against unconscionable conduct, if a claim is clearly barred, the court must unhesitatingly dismiss the suit. It is a law of repose, peace and justice which bars the remedy after lapse of a particular period by way of public policy and expediency without extinguishing the right in certain cases. In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty [ (2011) 3 SCC 436 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court held that it is obligatory on the part of the Court to dismiss the suit or an appeal if made after the prescribed period, even though limitation was not set up as a defence. The Apex Court re-stated the said position in a later decision reported in Foreshore Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. Praveen D. Desai (dead) through Legal Representatives and others ( (2015) 6 SCC 412 ). In the light of the provision in the Limitation Act and also the decisions referred (supra), there can be no doubt with respect to the position that in a case where defence was not set up based on limitation, the court is duty bound to consider the said aspect. In such circumstances, it is needless to say that when such a question was specifically raised in the written statement, the Tribunal should have framed issues and considered that question. In such circumstances, it is needless to say that when such a question was specifically raised in the written statement, the Tribunal should have framed issues and considered that question. But, at the same time, we are of the considered view that merely because the Tribunal had failed to raise such an issue and then to consider the same, there cannot be an inviolable position that the matter should be remanded for fresh consideration. True that the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and facts. In this case, in the plaint, going by Article 56 of the Limitation Act, it is evident that the period prescribed is three years when the issue of registration of an instrument became known to the plaintiff. In the case on hand, the suit was one for declaration and injunction and as noticed hereinbefore, declaration was sought to the effect that Ext.A2 settlement deed No.1394/1993 of Chathamangalam Sub Registry executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant is null and void and not binding on the waqf. It is also to be noted that according to the petitioners, the said document is a forged one. In such circumstances, when a declaration that an instrument is a forged one is sought for, the period of limitation has to be decided in terms of Article 56 of the Limitation Act. The period prescribed thereunder is 3 years. However, the starting point of the said period is the date on which the issue or registration of such document became known to the plaintiff. No doubt, normally, it is for the plaintiff to prove that the said suit is within the time. It is more so when time begins to run from the date of the plantiff's knowledge of a particular event. In a suit of such nature, the knowledge of that event can exclusively within the knowledge of the plaintiff. In such situation, it is essentially for the plaintiff to make a plea and to prove the date on which issue or registration of the document sought to be declared as forged, became known to him. Evidently, it is the date so mentioned in the suit that could be construed as the starting point of limitation period. In such situation, it is essentially for the plaintiff to make a plea and to prove the date on which issue or registration of the document sought to be declared as forged, became known to him. Evidently, it is the date so mentioned in the suit that could be construed as the starting point of limitation period. In such circumstances, in a case where the period of limitation has to be decided based on Article 56 of the Limitation Act, a mere recital of the date of knowledge in the plaint would not be sufficient and the pleading to that effect is also to be proved. In this case, admittedly, the revision petitioner in his written statement had specifically taken up a contention that the suit is barred by limitation. It is also true that in the plaint, the plaintiffs/respondents 1 and 2 herein had taken up a contention that the plaintiffs came to know about the execution of Ext.A2 on 2.1.2010. In fact, such a specific statement regarding the date of knowledge was given only in paragraph 9 dealing with the cause of action. The Tribunal had not actually framed a specific issue as to whether the suit is barred by limitation. As noticed hereinbefore, the question of limitation is essentially a mixed question of law and fact. This position has been made clear in Ramesh B. Desai and others v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and others [ (2006) 5 SCC 638 ]. In that case, the Hon'ble Apex Court quoted with approval a recital from its earlier decision in Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. v. Hanuman Seva Trust ( (2006) 5 SCC 658 ) and dealt with the said equation in paragraph 19 as follows:- “19. A plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. A plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. A plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. A plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. The question whether the words “barred by law” occurring in Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC would also include the ground that it is barred by law of limitation has been recently considered by a two-Judge Bench of this Court to which one of us was a member (Ashok Bhan, J.) in Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd. v. Hanuman Seva Trust ( (2006) 5 SCC 658 ) it was held: “8. After hearing counsel for the parties, going through the plaint, application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC and the judgments of the trial court and the High Court, we are of the opinion that the present suit could not be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of an issue of limitation and taking of evidence. Question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. Ex facie in the present case on the reading of the plaint it cannot be held that the suit is barred by time.” This principle would be equally applicable to a company petition. Therefore, unless it becomes apparent from the reading of the company petition that the same is barred by limitation the petition cannot be rejected under Order Rule 11(d) CPC.” The recital from Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd.'s case, extracted with approval in Ramesh B. Desai's case (supra) would reveal that it was held that a suit could not be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of an issue of limitation and taking of evidence. The reason is obvious as the Apex Court had in categoric terms held that the starting point of limitation is bound to be ascertained and it is entirely based on a question of fact. When that be so, evidence has to be let in to decide the starting point to apply the relevant provision to decide whether a suit is barred by limitation or not. 11. Whether a question of limitation could be decided as a preliminary issue was also considered in the said decision. The said question was answered with reference to the provisions under Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC. 11. Whether a question of limitation could be decided as a preliminary issue was also considered in the said decision. The said question was answered with reference to the provisions under Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC. Order 14 Rule 2 reads thus:- “2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues.-(1) Notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to- (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue.” 12. After analysing the provisions thereunder the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Code did not confer jurisdiction on Court to decide a mixed question of fact and law as a preliminary issue unless the facts are clear from the plaint itself and the mixed question of fact and law can be determined on the principle of demurrer. Further it was held therein that where a decision on an issue of law depends upon a decision of fact, it could not be tried as a preliminary issue. The said question again came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in Foreshore Cooperative Housing Society Limited's case (supra). Evidently, in that case, the Hon'ble Apex Court had to consider the scope of Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC in the light of a specific provision viz., Section 9-A (as amended by CPC (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1977). There is an express mandate under Section 9-A brought by amendment of the Maharashtra Amendment Act to decide the question of limitation as a preliminary issue of jurisdiction. Evidently, this is in total contrast with the scheme of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. There is an express mandate under Section 9-A brought by amendment of the Maharashtra Amendment Act to decide the question of limitation as a preliminary issue of jurisdiction. Evidently, this is in total contrast with the scheme of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. The Hon'ble Apex Court considered the scope of Order 14 Rule 2 in paragraph 36 of the said decision and held thus:- “Order 14 Rule2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, confers power upon the court to pronounce judgment on all the issues. But there is an exception to that general rule i.e. where issues both of law and fact arise in the same suit and the court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issue of law, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to the jurisdiction of the court or a bar to the suit created by any law.” The Apex Court went on to consider the question whether in the given facts of that case Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC or Section 9-A as amended by the (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, in the matter of deciding the objection with regard to jurisdiction of the court on the question of bar of limitation, could be decided as a preliminary issue. In paragraph 41 the Apex Court held:- “41. As noticed above, Section 9-A of the Maharashtra Amendment Act is a complete departure from the procedure provided under Order 14 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the inconsistency contained in the Act of Parliament viz. the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions contained in Section 9-A of the State Act, having regard to the fact that the assent of the President was received, the provisions of the said section has to be complied with and can be held to be a valid legislation.” Evidently, the Apex Court held that Section 9-A of the Maharashtra Amendment Act is a complete departure from the procedure provided under Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC and since Section 9-A of the Maharashtra Amendment Act got the assent of the President the said provision was held as a valid legislation to be followed mandatorily. Paragraph 61 of the said decision would reveal that the Apex Court distinguished the decision in Ramesh B. Desai's case (supra). It was held in paragraph 61 as follows:- “61. Paragraph 61 of the said decision would reveal that the Apex Court distinguished the decision in Ramesh B. Desai's case (supra). It was held in paragraph 61 as follows:- “61. Mr.Nariman, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant put heavy reliance on the decision in Ramesh B Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta ( (2006) 5 SCC 638 ), for the proposition that a plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. A plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. In our considered opinion, in the aforesaid decision this Court was considering the provision of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. While interpreting the provision of Order 14 Rule 2 this Court was of the view that the issue on limitation, being a mixed question of law and fact is to be decided along with other issues as contemplated under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. As discussed above, Section 9-A of the Maharashtra Amendment Act makes a complete departure from the procedure provided under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. Section 9-A mandates the court to decide the jurisdiction of the court before proceeding with the suit and granting interim relief by way of injunction.” 13. The discussion in paragraph 61 and the consequential observations would undoubtedly go to show that the Apex Court virtually did not disagree with the dictum laid down in Ramesh B. Desai's case (supra) and held that since the issue of limitation is a question of law and fact it has to be decided along with other issues as contemplated under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. But, at the same time, based on its finding to the effect that Section 9-A of the Maharashtra Amendment Act is a complete departure from the procedure provided under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC and that it mandates the court to decide the jurisdiction of the court before proceeding with the suit and granting interim relief by way of injunction, it was held that the provision introduced under Section 9-A is mandatory in nature and it is bound to be followed. It is thus obvious that even in the decision in Foreshore Cooperative Housing Society Limited's case (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court fully distinguished the decision in Ramesh B. Desai's case (supra) in the light of the specific provision under Section 9-A of the Maharashtra Amendment Act. At the same time, it is evident that in the decision in Ramesh B. Desai's case the Division Bench had virtually concurred with the dictum laid down by an earlier Division Bench decision in Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd.'s case (supra) as regards the scope of Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC. 14. In the case on hand, there is absolutely no case for anybody that a provision like Section 9-A of the Maharashtra Amendment Act was introduced in the State of Kerala so as to make it mandatory to consider the question of limitation as a preliminary issue. As long as there is no such amendment brought within the State of Kerala the said question can be decided only in terms of the provisions under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. It is in this context that the clear finding of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramesh B. Desai's case and Foreshore Cooperative Housing Society Limited's case (supra) to the effect that the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and further that its starting point is bound to be a question of fact, assumes relevance. When that be the position, with reference to the applicability of Order 14 Rule 2, C.P.C and while deciding a plea of limitation the question is whether the failure on the part of the Tribunal in exercising the powers of a Civil Court in declining to frame an issue specifically on the question whether the suit is barred by limitation and not allowing the parties to let in evidence on that issue assume relevance. As noticed hereinbefore, in Ramesh B. Desai's case the Apex Court relied on its earlier decision in Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd.'s case (supra) wherein the Apex Court held that a suit could not be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing an issue of limitation and taking evidence. In this case, the indisputable fact is that the revision petitioner/first defendant before the Tribunal along with the th respondent herein/2nd defendant therein had raised an objection to the effect that the suit is barred by limitation. In this case, the indisputable fact is that the revision petitioner/first defendant before the Tribunal along with the th respondent herein/2nd defendant therein had raised an objection to the effect that the suit is barred by limitation. We have no hesitation to hold that going by the provisions under Section 3 of the Limitation Act even in a case where the defendant had not specifically raised the question of limitation it is obligatory on the part of the Court/Tribunal which is a Civil Court for the purpose of the relevant Act to adopt the procedure under C.P.C. to decide the question whether the suit in question is barred by limitation. 15. In K.S.Nanji and Co. v. Jatashankar Dossa ( AIR 1961 SC 1474 ) the Hon'ble Apex Court held that where a person has a right to sue within three years from the date of his coming to know of a certain fact, it is for him to prove that he had the knowledge of the said fact on a particular date, for the said fact would be within his peculiar knowledge. The Apex Court went on to hold that, that apart, Section 3 of the Limitation Act makes it obligatory on a court to dismiss a suit barred by limitation, although limitation has not been set up as a defence, indicating thereby that it is the duty of a plaintiff to establish, at any rate prima facie, that the suit is within time. It is the obligation of the plaintiff to satisfy the court that his action is not barred by lapse of time. In paragraph 11 the Apex Court held thus:- “That apart, S. 3 of the Limitation Act makes it obligatory on a court to dismiss a suit barred by limitation, although limitation has not been set up as a defence, indicating thereby that it is the duty of a plaintiff to establish, at any rate prima facie, that the suit is within time. It is the obligation of the plaintiff to satisfy the court that his action is not barred by lapse of time: see Lalchand Marwari v. Rampur Gir, ILR 5 Pat 312 : ( AIR 1926 PC 9 ) and Perhlad Sein v. Rajender Kishore Singh, 12 Moo Ind App 292 (PC). Looking from a different perspective we arrive at the same result. Looking from a different perspective we arrive at the same result. Under the Evidence Act there is an essential distinction between the phrase "burden of proof" as a matter of law and pleading and as a matter of adducing evidence. Under S. 101 of the Evidence Act, the burden in the former sense is upon the party who comes to court to get a decision on the existence of certain facts which he asserts. That burden is constant throughout the trial; but the burden to prove in the sense of adducing evidence shifts from time to time having regard to the evidence adduced by one party or the other or the presumption of fact or law raised in favour of one or the other.” The Apex Court further held that the burden of proof, is on a plaintiff who asserts a right and it may be having regard to the circumstances of each case, that the onus of proof may shift to the defendant. But to say that no duty is cast upon the plaintiff even to allege the date when he had knowledge of certain relevant facts on a particular date is contrary to the soul of the said article in the Limitation Act and also to the rules of evidence. Thus, it is evident that the starting point of limitation has always been a question of fact and at the same time, the question of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. In such circumstances, in the light of the decision referred above, without framing a specific issue regarding the question whether a suit is barred by limitation and without letting the parties to adduce evidence in that regard the said question cannot be decided. The tenor of Section 3 of the Limitation Act and its interpretation given in various decisions would further reveal that even in a case where defendants had not taken up a defence based on the question of limitation, it is obligatory on the part of the court to decide whether the suit is barred by limitation. When once we conclude like that on that question, the further question to be decided is whether such a question would be a matter fall within the revisional jurisdiction. 16. When once we conclude like that on that question, the further question to be decided is whether such a question would be a matter fall within the revisional jurisdiction. 16. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh ( 2014 (4) KLT 182 (SC)) the Hon'ble Apex Court considered virtually the scope of revisional jurisdiction under different enactments by different States under Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Evidently, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court considered the revisional power under such enactments and also considered whether it is wider than the revisional power conferred under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Apex Court virtually considered the said question with reference to the enactments on that subject by the State of Kerala, State of Tamil Nadu and State of Haryana. The Apex Court on such analysis found that under the Rent Control Act, enacted by the State of Tamil Nadu, the power of High Court to act suo motu is absent whereas, such revisional power is specifically conferred under section 15(6) of the Haryana Rent Control Act. The Apex Court considered rather, distinguished the power between the “appellate jurisdiction” and “revisional jurisdiction”. It was held that ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Ordinarily, the revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may sometimes be exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction. The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is generally for the purpose of keeping the tribunals subordinate to the revising Tribunal within the bounds of their authority to make them act in accordance with law, according to the procedure established by law and according to well defined principles of justice. Further it was held that appellate jurisdiction always takes in the revisional jurisdiction and not vice versa. The Apex Court had also considered the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms “legality or propriety”, “regularity, correctness, legality or propriety” and “legality, regularity or propriety”. It was held that obviously, those terms will determine the extent of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the respective rent control statutes. It is to be noted that the very same words were employed in the proviso to Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act. It was held that obviously, those terms will determine the extent of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the respective rent control statutes. It is to be noted that the very same words were employed in the proviso to Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act. Section 83(9) and its proviso read thus:- “83.(9) No appeal shall lie against any decision or order whether interim or otherwise, given or made by the Tribunal: Provided that a High Court may, on its own motion or on the application of the Board or any person aggrieved, call for and examine the records relating to any dispute, question or other matter which has been determined by the Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or property of such determination and may confirm, reverse or modify such determination or pass such other order as it may think fit.” 17. The word ‘propriety' was not defined under Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act. Going by the definition of the said term in the Oxford English Dictionary (Vol.VIII), it means ‘fitness; appropriateness; aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions; conformity with requirements, rule or principle; rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy'. The Apex Court in the said decision after referring to its earlier decision in Hari Shankar and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury ( AIR 1963 SC 698 ) held that when in an act, while dealing with the revisional power, the terms ‘legality or propriety' determining the extent/ambit are employed, the revisional power must be much wider. It was further held that in such circumstances, the jurisdiction would enable the court of revision, in appropriate cases, to examine the correctness of the findings of facts also, though the revisional court is not “a second court of first appeal”. Though it was held therein that conceptually a revisional jurisdiction is part of appellate jurisdiction it is not vice versa and the power of the revisional jurisdiction is wider when the terms determining the extent/ambit employed in a statute contains the terms “illegality or propriety”. It was held that the ordinary meaning of the word ‘legality' is lawfulness. It refers to strict abherence to law, prescription or doctrine; the quality of being legal. The terms ‘correctness' and ‘propriety' ordinarily convey the same meaning, it is further held. It was held that the ordinary meaning of the word ‘legality' is lawfulness. It refers to strict abherence to law, prescription or doctrine; the quality of being legal. The terms ‘correctness' and ‘propriety' ordinarily convey the same meaning, it is further held. In other words, something which is legal and proper and in its ordinary meaning and substance, ‘correctness' is compounded of ‘legality' and ‘propriety' and that which is legal and proper is ‘correct'. To conclude on the question of the scope of revisional power it was held in paragraph 45 of the said decision as follows:- “45. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re-appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or re--assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.” In such circumstances, in the light of the decision in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.'s case (supra) and also considering the terms employed in Waqf Act while conferring the revisional jurisdiction the terms employed are ‘correctness', ‘legality or propriety'. When they being the terms employed while dealing with the revisional jurisdiction necessarily, in view of the dictum laid down in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.'s case it has to be held that the revisional jurisdiction under the Waqf Act is wider than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of CPC. We may hasten to add that it cannot be equated to the appellate jurisdiction as appellate jurisdiction is distinct and different from revisional jurisdiction. After referring to the decisions in Ramesh B. Desai's case and K.S.Nanji and Co.'s case (supra) and with reference to the provisions under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC we have already held that going by the tenor of ‘limitation', even when the defendant failed to set up defence based on the law of limitation, it is obligatory on the part of the court to decide whether the suit before it is barred by limitation or not. We have also found that in the absence of any specific enactment which is a valid legislation making it mandatory to decide the question of limitation as a preliminary issue that question could only be considered strictly in terms of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. In other words, in such circumstances, the court is bound to answer all the issues and the question of limitation could not be decided as a preliminary issue. But, at the same time, in the light of the decision in K.S.Nanji and Co.'s case (supra) and also going by the tenor of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, even in a case where the defendant failed to set up such a defence the court is bound to decide the said question. But, at the same time, in the light of the decision in K.S.Nanji and Co.'s case (supra) and also going by the tenor of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, even in a case where the defendant failed to set up such a defence the court is bound to decide the said question. When that be the position, in a case where the defendant specifically took up an objection that the suit is barred by limitation, it is all the more the bounden duty of the court/Tribunal to decide the question whether the suit is barred by limitation. In the light of the decision in Balasaria Construction (P) Ltd.'s case (supra) that question could not be decided without proper pleadings, framing of an issue on limitation and taking up evidence. In this case, admittedly, no issue was framed on the question of limitation and needless to say the parties had no occasion or opportunity to let in evidence on that issue. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.'s case the Hon'ble Apex Court held that where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision assailed is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity. Indeed, in this case, the provision under Section 83(9) requires this Court to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of determination of a particular question in the order which is challenged in revision. In such circumstances, in the light of the said decision and in view of the provision under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act this Court is bound to examine whether the order impugned suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity. When in the light of the provisions under Section 3 of the Limitation Act the Tribunal was under the obligation to consider the question whether the suit in question was barred by limitation and when on that question it was under an obligation to frame issues specifically and to let the parties to adduce evidence in that regard, the failure to do so would certainly a matter which is bound to be corrected by invoking the revisional power. 18. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents made a feeble attempt to canvass the position that in terms of Order 14 Rule 3, CPC this question is not bound to be framed as an issue. 18. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents made a feeble attempt to canvass the position that in terms of Order 14 Rule 3, CPC this question is not bound to be framed as an issue. We are afraid the said contention cannot be countenanced. Order 14 Rule 3 reads thus:- “3. Materials from which issues may be framed.-The Court may frame the issues from all or any of the following materials:- (a) allegations made on oath by the parties, or by any persons present on their behalf, or made by the pleaders of such parties; (b) allegations made in the pleadings or in answers to interrogatories delivered in the suit; (c) the contents of documents produced by either party.” Going by Order 14 Rule 3(b) an issue may be framed based on the allegations made in the pleadings. In this case, the pleadings of a defendant in a suit is the pleadings in the written statement. When the written statement filed by a defendant contains an objection that the suit in question is barred by limitation it cannot be said that the court is not under an obligation to frame an issue on that question. We have already found that even in the absence of the same it is bound to be framed in view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It cannot be said that Order 14 Rule 3 is in conflict with Section 3 of the Limitation Act. In fact, there is absolutely no conflict between the said provisions. 19. The long and short of the discussion is that the Tribunal went wrong in not framing an issue of limitation and in not affording an opportunity to the parties to let in evidence in that regard. This question is a matter to be examined under Section 83(9) of the Waqf Act. When once we came to the conclusion that the Tribunal had failed to frame such an issue and let the parties to let in evidence the order invites interference especially, in this case, none of the parties had adduced any evidence with respect to the starting point of limitation which essentially is a question of fact. When once we came to the conclusion that the Tribunal had failed to frame such an issue and let the parties to let in evidence the order invites interference especially, in this case, none of the parties had adduced any evidence with respect to the starting point of limitation which essentially is a question of fact. Since the fate of the suit would depend upon the decision on this question we do not think it appropriate to consider the merits of this case on the other aspects and we are of the view that in such circumstances, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration and the Tribunal shall frame an issue on the question of limitation and shall also afford opportunities to the parties to let in evidence in that regard. Needless to say that, in view of all the points, the Tribunal has to render findings strictly in accordance with Order 14 Rule 2 of CPC. The revision petition is disposed of as above.