ORDER : M.K. Hanjura, J. 1. By order dated 11th of October, 2017, of the learned Writ Court passed in MP No. 02/2017 filed in OWP No. 1075/2017 titled as "J&K Cooperative Union Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors," NCDFI has been impleaded as a party respondent No. 5 in the petition. Dissatisfied with this order the appellants have assailed the same in these two Letters Patent Appeals filed under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, on the grounds inter alia, that as per the policy of GOI, procurement of milk for supply to the army is made right from the year 2005 by having negotiated contract with NNDFL, State Cooperative Milk Federation/NDDB/JK Diary Producers, Processors, Marketing Unit Ltd. (JKDUCL), Milk Producers Cooperative Ltd. (JKMPLC) and the Jammu and Kashmir Cooperative Union (JKCUL). The order dated 10.08.2015, provides that the procurement of milk shall be made through NDCFI/State Cooperative Milk Federation/NDDB/JK Diary Producers, Processors, Marketing Unit Ltd. (JKDUCL), Milk Producers Cooperative Ltd. (JKMPLC) and Jammu and Kashmir Cooperative Union Ltd. (JKCUL) and the procurement policy shall be valid for a period of 3 years w.e.f 1.10.2015 to 1.10.2018. However, by order dated 12.07.2017, the names of the appellants have been left out. During the currency of the aforesaid writ petition (OWP No. 1075/2017), NCDFL, who has been participating in tendering process and has to continue to participate in the process even pursuant to the impugned order, filed an application bearing No. MP No. 02/2017 for impleadment as respondent No. 5. The appellants filed objections to the said application pleading therein that NCDFI is not a proper party as the petitioner has not sought any relief against him nor are the appellants challenging the participation of NCDFI in the tendering process. However, the Writ Court vide Order dated 11.10.2017 passed in the said petition impleaded the said applicant (NCDFI) as respondent No. 5 in the writ petition. The learned judge did not appreciate the matter in controversy in the right perspective. It is the Government of India, that has to justify the legality of the order challenged in the main petition. In the premises it has been stated that the appeals of the appellant deserve to be accepted and the order under appeal dated 11.10.2017 is liable to be set aside. 2. Heard and considered. 3. It is the Government of India, that has to justify the legality of the order challenged in the main petition. In the premises it has been stated that the appeals of the appellant deserve to be accepted and the order under appeal dated 11.10.2017 is liable to be set aside. 2. Heard and considered. 3. In order to have a better understanding of the matter in controversy clause 12 of Letter Patent Rules whereunder these appeals have been filed by the appellants requires enumeration and elucidation and it reads as under:- "12. And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, consistently with the provisions of civil Procedure Code, made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal, but the right of appeal from other judgments of the Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to us, our heirs or successors and be heard by our Board of Judicial Advisors for report to us." 4. Learned counsel representing the respondents have argued that the appeals are not maintainable when tested on the strength of clause 12 supra as the order under appeal does not fall within the ambit and scope of the word "Judgment". Learned counsel representing the respondents have argued that the appeals are not maintainable when tested on the strength of clause 12 supra as the order under appeal does not fall within the ambit and scope of the word "Judgment". To canvas their arguments, the learned counsel have placed reliance on a judgment of the Division Bench of this High Court rendered in the case of "Pawan Kumar v. Narender Kumar Jain" reported in AIR 2002 J&K 29 , the relevant excerpts of which are detailed below verbatim in order to understand its import and application to the appeals on hand:- 2. A plain reading of clause 12 makes it manifestly clear that an appeal is competent from the decision of a single Bench provided such decision falls within the ambit of judgment. therefore, a moot question arises as to whether an order of impleadment amounts to a judgment the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that it does he has placed reliance on Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben Kania, AIR 1981 SC 1786 . In its para 120, illustrations of orders are given which may be treated as judgments but these illustrations do not include an order of impleadment of the legal heirs. thus it needs to be determined whether an order of impleadment can be said to be a judgment. In this behalf it is appropriate to notice the observations of the Apex Court in paras 106 and 119 of the judgment supra, which are reproduced hereunder:- 106. Thus, the only point which emerges from this decision is that whenever a trial Judge decides a controversy which affects valuable rights on one of the parties. It must be treated to be a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. 119. Apart from the tests laid down by Sir White, C.J., the following consideration must prevail with the Court.: 1. That the trial Judge being a senior Court with vast experience of various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to pass discretional or interlocutory orders with due regard to the well settled principles of civil justice. Apart from the tests laid down by Sir White, C.J., the following consideration must prevail with the Court.: 1. That the trial Judge being a senior Court with vast experience of various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to pass discretional or interlocutory orders with due regard to the well settled principles of civil justice. Thus, any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the other cannot be treated as a judgment otherwise the appellate Court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial judge. The courts must give sufficient allowance to the trial Judge and raise a presumption that any discretionary order which he passes must be presumed to correct unless it is ex-facie legally erroneous or cause grave and substantial injustice. 2. That the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself of in a part of the proceedings." 3. Analysing the aforementioned suit lines, it emerges that: a. an order which contains the traits and trappings of finality and affects the rights of a party amounts to judgment within the meaning of clause 12 of Letters Patent; b. a discretionary order has to be presumed to be correct unless it is ex-facie erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice. 4. The learned Counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended that the legal heirs of Shadilal have no right whatsoever to claim the proprietary rights over the suit property because same was bequeathed to the appellants by the deceased defendant during his lifetime. 4. The learned Counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended that the legal heirs of Shadilal have no right whatsoever to claim the proprietary rights over the suit property because same was bequeathed to the appellants by the deceased defendant during his lifetime. To appreciate the contention it needs to be borne in mind that fall out of the order impugned in essence facilitates the final adjudication of the controversy involved in the suit whether property has been bequeathed to the appellants is an issue which is to be gone into if such stand is available to the appellants nothing prevents them to press it into service, for, the impleadment does not debar them to urge such contention in opposition to the claim the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to the suit property are yet to be determined, obviously, the impleadment does not affect the merits of the controversy involved in the suit. As a matter of act, amply opportunity is available to the appellants to contest the claim of the legal heirs. Thus we hold that an order of impleadment does not amount to judgment within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. However, we may hasten to add that cases are conceivable where serious injustice may cause to a party by allowing the application for impleadment take the instance of an application which is barred by limitation. By allowing such application, grave and substantial injustice is likely to cause to a party, therefore, unless delay is condonable under law and is condoned, the application has to be rejected. Suffice it to say that admittedly the application in the case in hand was not barred by limitation, therefore, the order impugned no way works injustice to the appellants viewed thus, the learned single Judge was quite justified to pass the order impugned. Same being sound in law, we are loath to display interference. 5. Before parting with, it needs to be observed that the consequences are quite different where the application seeking impleadment is rejected. The rejection deprives a party of the opportunity to advance and establish his claim. It brings the claim to an end. It has the effect of finality deciding the controversy forming the subject matter of the suit itself, therefore, it is bound to constitute "judgment" within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The rejection deprives a party of the opportunity to advance and establish his claim. It brings the claim to an end. It has the effect of finality deciding the controversy forming the subject matter of the suit itself, therefore, it is bound to constitute "judgment" within the meaning of clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Here it is advantageous to mention that the Apex Court in judgment supra, while examining the orders to ascertain whether there is determination of right or liability, has held that an order refusing to add necessary parties in a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a judgment within the mean of clause 12 of Letters Patent (seen Para 120, sub-para 7 of the judgment aforementioned). In our opinion the said illustration is analogous to an order rejecting the application for impleadment. Thus the view taken by us that rejection of application seeking impleadment amounts to judgment is substantially supported by the judgment supra. Accordingly, we hold that the Letters Patent is competent against rejection of the application of impleadment. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. However, in view of peculiar circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. 5. Per contra the learned counsel for the appellants have stated that the law laid down above does not hold good in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this High Court passed in LPA No. 8/1971 "titled "Bakshi hardatt v. State of J&K & Ors" reported in 1977 JKLR 153 , the relevant extracts of which are reproduced below word for word and letter for letter:- "The first point of our consideration is whether in such a case an appeal lies. In an ordinary suit in personam a refusal to join a party might very well be not appealable as the party might not be bound and probably would not be bound by the decree that might be passed. But a suit under S. 92 operates in remand an order tantamount to refusing to join persons as parties, in our opinion finally adjudicates or concludes the matter so far as those persons are concerned, it is consequently, in our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of CI. 13 of the Letters Patent.... ". But a suit under S. 92 operates in remand an order tantamount to refusing to join persons as parties, in our opinion finally adjudicates or concludes the matter so far as those persons are concerned, it is consequently, in our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of CI. 13 of the Letters Patent.... ". it would be therefore manifest that every refusal to implead a person as a party to a suit would not be judgment unless the ultimate decision to be passed in the suit also binds such a person as in such a case it would adversely affect his right which he would establish in that suit. The case of a person who was not bound by the ultimate decision to be passed in the case in which he wants to be arrayed as a party would not be judgment as he would be at liberty to agitate his right through an independent action against the parties to the earlier suit. The last authority in Karam Singh's case (supra) also does not advance the case of the appellant any further. It was a case where an order of the learned Single Judge allowing the application of a person to be impleaded as a party to a writ petition had been granted. The Division Bench held that no appeal under Letters Patent lay against the said order as it did not decide any right or liability in controversy between the parties. To emphasis that an order refusing the prayer of a person to be made a party to suit or other proceedings per se amounts to a judgment under CI. 12 of the Letters Patent, the learned counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to the following observations in the aforesaid judgment. "...... The position could not be same if the application of Mahesh Dass Sethi had been rejected. In that cases the appeal would be competent at his instance, because once his application was rejected, he could not re-agitate the matter and press his claim at any subsequent stage of the writ petition. "...... The position could not be same if the application of Mahesh Dass Sethi had been rejected. In that cases the appeal would be competent at his instance, because once his application was rejected, he could not re-agitate the matter and press his claim at any subsequent stage of the writ petition. the learned counsel could not perhaps appreciate this distinction in as much as it was argued by him that appeals have been admitted by this Court where the application for impleading a person as a party to a suit or case was rejected." Reading the judgment as a whole, we are clearly of the view that Mufti J. who delivered the judgment on behalf of the court only meant that a refusal which deprived a person of an occasion to agitate his claim in further definitely decided the rights and liabilities of the parties in controversy, and was therefore a judgment. The learned counsel has then argued that the appellant being only one of the many partners in the firm Messrs Kathua Motor Union his right to seek contribution from other partners has been adversely affected by the impugned order. According to the learned counsel unless the firm itself was a party to the present suit, no subsequent suit against the rest of the partners would lie at the instance of the appellant. This argument of the learned counsel is also devoid of any force. Partners in a firm occupy the same position as any other co-promisors in so far as the application of Sec. 43 of the Contract Act is concerned. This has been held by this Court as well as in a recently decided cases viz Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 13 and 14 Re: Finance Centre v. Shri Ram Parkash decided on Feb. 21, 77. There can be no manner of doubt that Sec. 43 of the Contract Act affords full guarantee to the appellant's right to claim contribution from other partners in the firm. The impugned order does not effect the merits of the case as it does not take away any such right of the appellant. 21, 77. There can be no manner of doubt that Sec. 43 of the Contract Act affords full guarantee to the appellant's right to claim contribution from other partners in the firm. The impugned order does not effect the merits of the case as it does not take away any such right of the appellant. If the allegations in the plaint are proved, a decree is bound to be passed against the appellant, and this would be so even if the firm Messrs Kathua Motor Union in which the appellant is a partner is added as a defendant to the suit, which clearly shows that the impugned order is innocuous which has no bearing on the rights and liabilities of the parties in controversy in the suit. For the foregoing reasons, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is not a judgment within the meaning of Cl.12 of the Letters Patent. The preliminary objection survives and the appeals fails which is hereby dismissed. Costs shall abide the result. 6. The judgments of the law cited above have a pellucid simplicity. These apply to the appeals under consideration in all the fours. The principle of law evolved in these is that a refusal to implead a person as a party in the petition which deprives him of an occasion to agitate his cause in future, decides his rights and liabilities in the controversy, and therefore, such an order falls within the definition of the word "Judgment" (as it occurs in clause 12 of the Letters Patent) against which an appeal will lie. The judgment of the Division Bench on which the Learned counsel for the appellants have put explicit reliance in carving out a case in their favour stretches this principle further by stating that in an ordinary suit in personam wherein impleadment is refused, such an order is not appealable as the party will not be bound by the decree that may be passed in the ultimate analysis. It provides further that every refusal to implead a person as a party to a suit would not be a "Judgment" unless the ultimate decision passed in the suit binds such a person in which eventuality his rights which he would establish in the suit, would get adversely affected. 7. It provides further that every refusal to implead a person as a party to a suit would not be a "Judgment" unless the ultimate decision passed in the suit binds such a person in which eventuality his rights which he would establish in the suit, would get adversely affected. 7. Looking at these appeals from the above perspective the judgments, supra lay down in clear and unequivocal terms that an order by which a person is impleaded as a party in a suit is not appealable unless the application for impleadment is barred by limitation. In the petition in which the application for impleadment has been allowed the rights and the liabilities of the parties are yet to be determined and the appellants have all the time to contest their claim. 8. Applying the ratio of the law laid down above (which is lucid and clear) to the facts of the appeals before us, the order of the learned Single Judge, whereby NCDFI has been impleaded as a party respondent No. 5 in the writ petition does not call for any interference for the reason that it does not fall within the purview of the word "Judgment" as provided under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised by the respondents survives as a consequence of which the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. 9. Registry to place a copy of this order on both the files.