ORDER : JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA, J. 1. The petitioner has sought to quash the order passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal ('Tribunal' for short) dated 6.12.2013, in application No. 4862/13 (Annexure-E) and also to quash the letter issued by the first respondent dated 27.7.2009(Annexure-A) and to call for the investigation or enquiry report dated 25.2.2009. 2. We have heard the petitioner-in-person and the learned counsel for the respondent. 3. The petitioner was working as Deputy Director, Food and Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs Department at Mysuru. A criminal case was registered against the petitioner by the Lokayukta Police under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the meanwhile, on the recommendation made by the Hon'ble Upa-Lokayukta, a departmental enquiry was ordered to be initiated against the petitioner by the first respondent and the said enquiry was entrusted to Hon'ble Upa-lokayukta as per order, dated 27.07.2009(Annexure-A). Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred W.P.No.10740/2013 before this Court. As the petitioner was required to exhaust the appropriate remedy available before the KAT, the Writ Petition was dismissed without prejudice to the rights and remedies available to the petitioner in accordance with law. Pursuant to this order the petitioner appears to have approached the KAT at Bengaluru, challenging Annexure-A. By the impugned order, dated 06.12.2013, (Annexure-E), the Tribunal has dismissed the application. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner is before this Court. 4. The petitioner has urged two fold contentions. First, it is contended that as per the procedure prescribed in Rule 14-A of the CCA Rules, the Lokayukta or Upa-lokayukta alone are competent to hold the Disciplinary Inquiry against the petitioner, whereas, in the instant case, the said power has been delegated to the Enquiry Officer contrary to the procedure prescribed in Rule 14-A of the CCA Rules. Second, the petitioner has been acquitted of the criminal charges foisted against him under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and therefore, the respondents are precluded from holding Departmental Enquiry against the petitioner on the same set of charges. Hence, on both these grounds the enquiry initiated against the petitioner is liable to be quashed. 5. As the first contention urged by the petitioner is based on Rule 14-A of the CCA Rules, the said Rule is extracted here below: 14. Hence, on both these grounds the enquiry initiated against the petitioner is liable to be quashed. 5. As the first contention urged by the petitioner is based on Rule 14-A of the CCA Rules, the said Rule is extracted here below: 14. A Procedure in cases entrusted to the Lokayukta: (1) The Provisions of sub-rule (2) shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 9 to 11A and 13, be applicable for purposes of proceeding against Government servants whose alleged misconduct has been investigated into by the Lokayukta or an Upa-lokayukta either under the provisions of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 or on a reference from Government. [' or where offences alleged against them punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, or the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has been investigated by the Karnataka Lokayukta Police before 21st day of December 1992']. 2. (a) Where on investigation into any allegation against. I. a member of the State Civil Services Group-A or Group-B, or II. a member of the State Civil Services Group- A or Group-B and a member of the State Civil Services Group-C or Group-D or III. a member of the State Civil Services Group- C or Group-D. 'the Lokayukta or the Upa-lokayukta or, (before the twenty first day of December, 1992), the Inspector General of Police of the Karnataka Lokayukta Police is of the opinion'] that disciplinary proceedings shall be taken, he shall forward the record of the investigation along with his recommendation to the Government and the Government, after examining such record; may either direct an inquiry into the case by the Lokayukta or the Upa-lokayukta or direct the appropriate Disciplinary Authority to take action in accordance with Rule 12. (b) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry into a case under clause (a) the enquiry may be conducted either by the Lokayukta or the Upalokayukta, as the case may be, or an officer on the staff of the Lokayukta authorised by the Lokayukta, or the Upa-lokayukta to conduct the inquiry; Provided that the inquiry shall not be conducted by the officer lower in rank than that of the Government servant against whom it is held. Provided further that an inquiry against a Government servant not lower in rank than that of a Deputy Commissioner shall not be conducted by any person other than the Lokayukta or the Upa-lokayukta or an Additional Registrar (Inquiries). Provided further that an inquiry against a Government servant not lower in rank than that of a Deputy Commissioner shall not be conducted by any person other than the Lokayukta or the Upa-lokayukta or an Additional Registrar (Inquiries). Provided also that an officer on the staff of the Lokayukta authorised to conduct an inquiry under clause (b) shall not have the power to appoint another officer to conduct it wholly or in part. (Underlining supplied) 6. As could be seen from the sub-rule (2)(b) above, when it is proposed to conduct an enquiry against a public servant under clause (a) of Rule 14-A, the enquiry may be conducted either by the Lokayukta or by the Upa-lokayukta personally or the said enquiry may be conducted by an Officer on the staff of the Lokayukta or the Upa-lokayukta. The proviso to the said Rule, however, requires that when the Officer on the staff of the Lokayukta or Upa-lokayukta is authorised to conduct the enquiry, such an Officer should not be lower in rank than that of the Government servant against whom the enquiry is held. 7. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the enquiry is entrusted to the third respondent viz., the Additional Registrar, Enquiries-IV, Karnataka Upa-lokayukta, who is of the rank of a District Judge. The petitioner is a Group-A employee, whereas the Enquiry Officer in the case on hand is above the rank of a Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the third respondent is incompetent to hold an enquiry into the charges levelled against the petitioner cannot be accepted. 8. Insofar as the 2nd contention urged by the petitioner is concerned, in our opinion, the said issue is now set at rest by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager(PJ). Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.,{(2005)} 7 SCC 764 : ( AIR 2005 SC 4217 ). The relevant observation made therein reads as under: '11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused ' beyond reasonable doubt', he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of ' preponderance of probability'. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.' 9. As stated by the three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above case, termination of criminal proceedings against an employee does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability arising under the disciplinary jurisdiction as per Service Rules. In view of this decision, even the second contention urged by the petitioner is liable to be rejected. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed.