Research › Search › Judgment

Delhi High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 1020 (DEL)

BEENA ARORA v. DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION

2017-03-22

VALMIKI J.MEHTA

body2017
JUDGMENT : VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. 1. By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner and who is a teacher with the respondent no.2/Sant Nirankari Public School, seeks the relief of being granted the Child Care Leave. Respondent no.2/school is an unaided private school. Petitioner however claims that since in government schools, employees are entitled to Child Care Leave, therefore, by application of Section 10 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) Child Care Leave is also to be granted to employees of private schools in Delhi, whether aided or unaided. 2. The issue in question is no longer res integra because of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of M.I. Hussain & Anr. Vs. Director of Education & Anr. in LPA No.592/2013 decided on 21.3.2014 and which judgment interprets the expression “prescribed benefits” under Section 10 of the Act so as to mean only monetary benefits. The relevant paras of the judgment in the case of M.I. Hussain & Anr. (supra) are paras 13 to 15 and which paras read as under :- “13. A perusal of Section 10 would evidence that it embraces scales of pay and allowances, medical facilities, pension, gratuity, provident fund and other prescribed benefits of the employees of a recognized school and prescribes that the same shall not be less than those of the employees of the corresponding status in school run by the appropriate authority. The appropriate authority would be as defined by Section 2(e), the authority which grants recognition. 14. The rule of “ejusdem generis” guides us that where two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, a noscitur a sociis, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted to a sense analogous to that of the less general. The true scope of the rule of ejusdem generis is that words of general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified. But the rule is one which has to be applied with caution and not pushed too far. The true scope of the rule of ejusdem generis is that words of general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified. But the rule is one which has to be applied with caution and not pushed too far. It is a rule which must be confined to narrow bounds so as not to unduly or necessarily limit general and comprehensive words. If a broad based genus could consistently be discovered, there is no warrant to cut down general words to dwarf size. If giant it cannot be, dwarf it need not be. To invoke the application of ejusdem generis rule there must be a distinct genus or category. The specific words must apply not to the different objects of a widely differing character but to something which can be called a class or kind of objects. Where this is lacking, the rule cannot apply. Unless there is a category, there is no room for application of the ejusdem generis doctrine and where the words are clearly wide in their meaning, they ought not to be qualified on the ground of their association. Noscitur a sociis - is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful or is otherwise not clear that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied. It can also be applied where the meaning of the words of wider import is doubtful; but where the object of legislature in using wider words is clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction cannot be pressed into service. 15. The learned Single Judge has overlooked the applicability of the Rule of ejusdem generis which embodies the Rule of noscitur a sociis. A broad genus clearly discernable in Section 10 is of benefits having character of money : (i) pay and allowance – money; (ii) medical facilities – money; (iii) pension – money; (iv) gratuity – money; and (v) provident fund – money. The five terms having common character of money are followed by the general expression other prescribed benefits. A broad genus clearly discernable in Section 10 is of benefits having character of money : (i) pay and allowance – money; (ii) medical facilities – money; (iii) pension – money; (iv) gratuity – money; and (v) provident fund – money. The five terms having common character of money are followed by the general expression other prescribed benefits. The said wide expression other prescribed benefits must take colour from the genus of the previous i.e. such benefits which are capable of being converted into money, to wit: bonus, leave encashment etc.” 3. In the present case, it is not the case of the petitioner that the Child Care Leave if not taken can be converted into monetary benefits such as leave encashment etc. Therefore since Child Care Leave cannot be converted into monetary benefits in view of the ratio of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of M.I. Hussain & Anr. (supra), petitioner hence cannot claim benefit of Child Care Leave by seeking application and benefit of Section 10 of the Act. 4. In view of the above discussion, and because of the ratio of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of M.I. Hussain & Anr. (supra) which interprets “prescribed benefits” under Section 10 of the Act only to mean monetary benefits, and that since Child Care Leave is not convertible into monetary benefits by encashment thereof, this writ petition therefore is liable to be and is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.