JUDGMENT : 1. The inviolable primary imperative of any democratic State is that it has a duty to do what is fair and just to its citizens. State action cannot be used to defeat the legitimate claim of a citizen by adoption of a formalistic or a legalistic attitude and is always to be guided by the sacrosanct principles of equity, fairness and reasonableness. Any action at the hands of the State that is uninformed by a reason is arbitrary and such arbitrariness is anathema to valid State action. In a vibrant democracy every act of the State is intended to be constitutionalised humanism. 2. No State action can survive if it is susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness, capriciousness and unfairness. The State cannot be purblind that we, as a nation, are guided by rule of law and that arbitrariness of any nature is negation of every principle of rule of law. The basic text of equity, reasonableness and fairness in State action and the absence of arbitrariness and unfairness is the sine qua non for the validity of any State action, be that authorised by statute or executive orders. The preambular mandate of our great constitution and the constitutional prescriptions under Articles 14 and 21 are the best assurances to a citizen against arbitrariness and capriciousness in state action and for the legitimate functioning of the State Agencies. 3. The law of liberty is often the battle for procedural protection and great principles sometimes cannot escape working injustice in particular things. 4. I began this judgment with the preface as above since what is presented in the fasciculus of pleadings and facts in this case is a scandalously unfair attitude of the State, when properties of citizens are brought to sale under the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short). Under the provisions of Section 50 of the said Act, a property of a private citizen, that is proclaimed for sale for recovery of amounts due to the Government or to its instrumentalities can be bid on behalf of the Government. Since the entire hypostasis of the defense of the Government has been built on Section 50 of the Act, I deem it idoneous to extract the same as under:- “50. Since the entire hypostasis of the defense of the Government has been built on Section 50 of the Act, I deem it idoneous to extract the same as under:- “50. Bidding on behalf of Government.- (1) When an immovable property is put up for sale at the time and place specified in the notice under clause (2) of Section 49 for the recovery of arrears of public revenue due on land, if there be no bid or if the highest bid be insufficient to cover the said arrears and those subsequently accruing due upto the date of sale, together with interest and cost of process, the officer conducting the sale shall postpone the sale to another date which shall not be later than sixty days from the date of the first sale and give notice of the subsequent sale as required under Clause (4) of Section 49. (2) When the property is put for sale on the date to which it was postponed under sub-section (1), at the time and place specified in the notice,- (i) if there be no bid, the officer conducting the sale may purchase the property on behalf of the Government for an amount of ten paise; (ii) if the highest bid be insufficient to cover the arrears referred to in sub-section (1) and those subsequently accruing due upto the date of the sale and interest and cost of process, such officer may bid on behalf of the Government for an amount higher than such bid by ten paise, and in either case the Government shall acquire the property subject to the provisions of this Act. (3) The provisions of Clause (3) of Section 49 and Section 84 shall not apply to cases where immovable property is purchased on behalf of the Government under the section. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, after the confirmation of the sale, all the right, title and interest of the defaulter, purchased on behalf of the Government, shall be deemed to have vested in the Government from the date of purchase and if the defaulter is in actual possession of the property or if he is entitled to possession, the Collector or the authorised officer shall, immediately after the confirmation of the sale, take possession of the property. If the Collector or the authorised officer is opposed or impeded in taking possession, he shall, if a Magistrate, enforce the surrender of the land to himself and, if not a Magistrate, he shall apply to a Magistrate, and such Magistrate shall enforce the surrender of the land to the Collector or the authorised officer, as the case may be.” 5. What is of immediate importance and relevance in this lis is that under the provisions of Section 50(2)(i), where the properties are put to sale and there are no bidders to buy the same, the Government would be authorised to buy it on its own behalf for a mere amount of one Rupee. It is also further provided in sub-clause (ii) of Section 50(2) that, if there are bidders to buy a property and if the highest bid is insufficient to cover the arrears, then an authorised officer of the Government may bid the property on behalf of the Government for an amount higher than such bid by one Rupee. It is the rationality and the reasonableness of the action of the State in buying a property under Section 50(2)(i) for a mere amount of one Rupee in the absence of bidders in an auction and for a mere one Rupee more than the highest bid in other cases that comes for pointed consideration in these writ petitions. 6. The three writ petitions that I am considering jointly and disposing of in this judgment are not related to each other in the facts involved. They are, certainly diverse from each other in the nature of the circumstances and the facts that are pleaded and projected therein. However, all the three cases are built on contentions and assertions against the reasonableness of the action of the Government in having purchased the property under the provisions of Section 50(2) (i) and Section 50(2)(ii) for an amount of mere one Rupee and for one Rupee over the highest bid. I, therefore, propose to dispose of all the three writ petitions, taking into account the commonality of the core legal issues raised, jointly in this judgment. 7. I, therefore, propose to dispose of all the three writ petitions, taking into account the commonality of the core legal issues raised, jointly in this judgment. 7. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri.Dr.K.P.Satheesan, assisted by Sri.Ibrahim and by Sri.Abdul Samad, appearing for the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.2751/2013, Sri.B.Krishna Mani, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.9938/2013 and Sri.N.M.Madhu, learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.18801/2011, Sri.Balagovindan, learned Counsel appearing for the additional respondent in W.P.(C)No.2751/2013 and the learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State of Kerala. 8. Before I record my views on the legal issues that I have indicated above it is appropriate that I give an apercus of the most essential facts in these cases. 9. The petitioner in W.P.(C)No.2751/2013 was a licensee of a toddy shop in the Chathanur Range and he also held a toddy transport permit for inter-division transport of the same under the Palakkad Division of the Excise Department. It appears that he had run up dues to an amount of about Rs.8,29,850/- towards the kist amount payable for the toddy shops and an amount of Rs.4,78,962/- as arrears against the toddy development permit. Since the petitioner was unable to make payment of these amounts, in spite of demands against him, his property measuring 19.90 Ares comprised in Sy.No.194/7/2 and 194/6-2-3 of the Ezhukone Village was brought to sale under the provisions of the R.R.Act. The sale proclamation however did not attract any bidders even though such sale was attempted more than once. The Government therefore, invoking the provisions of Section 50(2)(i) of the R.R.Act recorded that it has purchased the property for an amount of one Rupee. Even though the sale was confirmed, the petitioner alleges that the possession was not taken from him and that he continues to be in possession even today. Subsequent to the sale and its confirmation, it appears that the petitioner was permitted by the Excise Department to pay off the same arrears, for which the property was brought to sale, under an Amnesty Scheme and that he had paid off the said arrears taking advantage of the scheme, which fact is discernible from Exts.P2 and P3. Subsequent to the sale and its confirmation, it appears that the petitioner was permitted by the Excise Department to pay off the same arrears, for which the property was brought to sale, under an Amnesty Scheme and that he had paid off the said arrears taking advantage of the scheme, which fact is discernible from Exts.P2 and P3. When he had thus extinguished all the liabilities against him, he made an application to the Government that his property, purchased by the Government as above, be re-conveyed to him on the singular assertion that there was no justification for the Government to hold on to the property after the liability was extinguished. However, the competent authorities of the Government refused the request of the petitioner and rejected his claim for the reason that, as per the extant Government Orders, such an application could have been made by the petitioner only within a period of five years from the date of the sale. It is in such circumstances, that the petitioners have approached this Court in this writ petition. 10. As far as W.P.(C)No.9938/2013 is concerned, the petitioner therein was also a licensee of a licensed liquor shop under the Abkari Act. The petitioner appears to have been granted an FL-III license for shop No.27 of Kollam Range during the abkari year 1997-1998. The petitioner also fell into arrears of kist amount and since he was unable to make payment of the arrears, in spite of demand, his property having an extent of 30.56 Ares in Block No.4 in Re.Sy.No.194/6-2 of Ezhukone Village was brought to sale under the provisions of Section 50(2)(i) of the R.R.Act. The petitioner concedes that he has not been able to pay off the arrears unlike the case earlier mentioned even as on day. 11. Coming to the facts of W.P.(C)No.18801/2011, the petitioner therein was running a factory engaged in pre-rolling of steel rods. The petitioner says that the company was running well and that it was offering employment to several persons. He says that due to certain financial and other extenuating circumstances, the company ran into heavy losses and that consequently several payments, including statutory dues, fell in arrear and that the petitioner did not have the resources to pay off the same at that time. He says that due to certain financial and other extenuating circumstances, the company ran into heavy losses and that consequently several payments, including statutory dues, fell in arrear and that the petitioner did not have the resources to pay off the same at that time. This led to action being initiated against him under the provisions of the R.R.Act and the property belonging to the petitioner namely, 1 acre in Re.Sy.No.17/1 of the Cheruvannur Village, was proclaimed for sale on 04.07.2003. The petitioner says that 29 persons participated in the auction but that none of them made a bid that is equal to the total arrears due from him, namely, about Rs.38,00,000/-. The petitioner alleges that the officers of the Government then invoked Section 50(2)(ii) of the R.R.Act and bid the property on behalf of the Government for an amount of one Rupee on the ground that the bid amounts offered by the various bidders were not sufficient to cover the total arrears from the petitioner, which amount was fixed as the upset price in the sale. It transpires that even though his property was thus bought-in by the Government, the Department continued to demand from the petitioner the entire arrears as was found due from him prior to the sale. This led to a second round of recovery action against him in the year 2008 under which all his bank deposits were frozen and his other properties attached, with the intent to bring them to sale, constraining the petitioner to pay off the entire arrears with dues and interest as in the year 2008. Once such liability was extinguished by the petitioner in the manner above, he applied to the Government for re-conveyance of the property purchased by the Government in the year 2004, which was, however, rejected by the Authorities holding that the application of the petitioner was beyond the period of five years and, therefore, that he was not entitled to make such a claim going by the provisions of the extant Government Order covering the field. Sri.N.M.Madhu, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, referring to the interim order granted by this Court dated 12.7.2011 injuncting the respondent from dispossessing the petitioner, submits that his client is still in possession of the property even as on day. In such circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court in this writ petition. 12. Sri.N.M.Madhu, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, referring to the interim order granted by this Court dated 12.7.2011 injuncting the respondent from dispossessing the petitioner, submits that his client is still in possession of the property even as on day. In such circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court in this writ petition. 12. I have begun this judgment referring to the inviolable prescription of fairness in State action because the facts of these cases would perspicuously present a situation where, in spite of the sale of the property which is purchased by the State under the provisions of Section 50 of the R.R.Act, the liability of the defaulter doesn’t cease at all. The provisions of the statute, as is extracted above, may give an impression that the Government is authorised to buy the property for an insignificant amount of one Rupee and consequentially that the property would, thereafter, be construed to be a mere one Rupee in value. If this is the way Section 50 is construed then obviously the fallout of sale under these provisions would be nothing short of cataclysmic. 13. I say this because when a defaulter's property is brought to sale under the provisions of the Act, the attempt of the State is to recover as much money as is possible by sale of such property and the sole endeavour of the State has to be to liquidate the maximum arrears due to it. It is only if such endeavour and such attempts are futile that the provision mandates that the Government can buy the property under the provisions of Section 50 of the Act. The purpose of the statute being recovery and to make good the loss to the State or its agencies on account of the failure or refusal of the defaulter to make payment, it is ineffable how the State can maintain, when a property is purchased on its behalf under the provisions of Section 50 of the Act, that it can hold it as if it has obtained it for gratis. 14. The disquieting position in a sale under Section 50 is that the Government does not value the property and does not pass an order as to what is the value for which it has bought the land for itself. The statute provides that the Government can bid it for one Rupee. 14. The disquieting position in a sale under Section 50 is that the Government does not value the property and does not pass an order as to what is the value for which it has bought the land for itself. The statute provides that the Government can bid it for one Rupee. The question is whether by such a statutory prescription, the value of the land would become one Rupee fictionally. I am sure that the framers of the statute did not even intent so. 15. The attempt was to recover money and in the alternative to authorise purchase of the property on behalf of the Government for a value of one Rupee but this is not to be confused to say that the property would, thereafter, have a value of only one Rupee and that the liability of the defaulter would continue ad infinitum. To illustrate this, take the case of a person who has four properties and who is in default of certain some of money. When his first property is brought to sale and if there are no bidders, the State buys it for one Rupee under the provisions of Section 50 of the Act. However, the arrears continue unextinguished or even reduced. For the same arrears plus interest plus charges the State would bring the second property to sale and assume that there are no bidders for that sale also, then the State would buy that property also for one Rupee without any deduction in the arrear or the liability of the defaulter. The third property will thus be brought to sale and finally the fourth, sending the citizen, who unfortunately is a defaulter, into a state of abject impecunious but he would still continue to be in the eyes of the Government a defaulter for a much larger sum than what was due when the first property was brought to sale. This is scandalously inequitable and shockingly unfair especially at the hands of the Government. 16. As I have already indicated above, the foundational justification of a State action is always equity, fairness and reasonableness. Can the action of the Government in purchasing a property for a paltry one Rupee and then still proceeding to continue to recover money from the hapless defaulter, as if his property was worthless, be seen to be anything other than arbitrary or capricious? Can the action of the Government in purchasing a property for a paltry one Rupee and then still proceeding to continue to recover money from the hapless defaulter, as if his property was worthless, be seen to be anything other than arbitrary or capricious? I am certain that the answer to this question from any reasonable person would be an emphatic 'No'. 17. While interpreting statutes this Court is often faced with such dilemma as to whether the strict interpretation of the words of the Statute would cause injustice in particular cases. Statutes are intended for general application and cases that are very peculiar or specific in its ambit may require to be suitably modulated, so as to bring it within the sweep of the statutory prescriptions. While considering the impact of Section 50 of the R.R. Act the question precisely is this: the statute, it might appear, prescribes litera legis that the State can purchase a property for one Rupee. The question is how this is to be interpreted. Is it to mean that by the sale of the property on behalf of the Government, the property loses its entire value and that it attenuates to a mere one Rupee in its worth. This is not possible, even fictionally, since the property continues to be valuable, though the Government may possibly say that in its hand and because it is being put to a public purpose the property cannot be valued on market rate criterion thereafter. However this does not mean that the property has become valueless or that its worth has been truncated to one Rupee. In the absence of any provision in the Statute which prescribe that by such a sale the property itself will become devalued to an extent of a mere one Rupee, it will be impossible to condone or countenance the submission that by a sale in favour of the Government, the property would become a mere one Rupee in worth. This is not the way it was intended by the framers of the statute, I am sure. 18. The learned Special Government Pleader referring extensively to the provisions of the R.R.Act submits that there is no provision in the Act which deals with the valuation of the property when it is purchased on behalf of the Government. This is not the way it was intended by the framers of the statute, I am sure. 18. The learned Special Government Pleader referring extensively to the provisions of the R.R.Act submits that there is no provision in the Act which deals with the valuation of the property when it is purchased on behalf of the Government. The submission appears to be credible since the R.R.Act does not say that before the sale is confirmed in favour of the Government the property has to be valued. This leads to a very piquant situation where even the Government does not know the intrinsic value of the property that it purchases on his own behalf under the provisions of the Act. It does not cause a valuation of the property and it does not know what is the extent of the liability of the defaulter that would be effaced by sale and its confirmation over the property. This obviously leads to an inequitable situation where the defaulter would continue to be harassed and harangued by subsequent proceedings for recovery and until such time as he is able to pay off such demand, all his properties would be susceptible and subject to subsequent action for sale and distress. This is precisely why I am of the view that it is important to revisit the provisions regarding re-conveyance of the property or restitution of the same in favour of the defaulter once the dues are allowed to be settled subsequently. 19. The Counsel on either side are ad idem that the R.R.Act is silent as to re-conveyance or restitution of the property once a defaulter makes good the defaulted amounts. This consideration becomes paramount when the defaulter is permitted to pay off the arrears even subsequent to the sale, indicating that the Government also understands its provisions to mean that the sale does not extinguish the liability. The liability continues and the sale is confirmed in favour of the Government which means that the property becomes that of the Government but the liability is still remains undischarged. When the liabilities, thereafter, are recovered the question would be whether principles akin to unjust enrichment would apply even against the Government. These principles, that have its origin in the common law, are put into operation to ensure that a person does not get unjustly enriched at the expense of another. When the liabilities, thereafter, are recovered the question would be whether principles akin to unjust enrichment would apply even against the Government. These principles, that have its origin in the common law, are put into operation to ensure that a person does not get unjustly enriched at the expense of another. In the peculiar facts that are presented in these cases it is obvious that the Government, even after sale of the property, permitted and allowed the defaulters to pay the alleged arrears with upto date interest, charges and expenses (except in the case of W.P.(C)No.9938/2013). Once such an opportunity was granted, the question is whether the Government would thereafter be entitled to hold on to the bought-in-land on the specious defence that the application for such re-conveyance or restitution has been made by the petitioners beyond a particular time frame. I am afraid that the attitude of the Government is shockingly and scandalisingly unfair. 20. I have already said in my preface to this judgment that liberty is nothing but a battle for procedural protection. In the facts of these cases unfortunately I do not see that battle having been fought fairly by the Government. It appears to have taken the defaulters as enemies and an attempt is launched to decimate them notwithstanding the fact that they have surrendered their arms and offered armistice. The fact that the Government allowed them to settle the arrears subsequent to the sale would be sufficient justification, in my mind, entitling them to apply for re-conveyance or restitution of the property, even though such a specific provision is not available in the provisions of the R.R.Act. 21. This is singularly more so, because if the Government did not require the defaulters to make payment of the arrears subsequent to the sale, it could have denied them that opportunity and it could have stopped them from making any such remittance, holding that the property that was purchased on behalf of the Government would be sufficient to pay off or settle or satisfy the liability against the defaulter. This is not how the Government has operated in this case. This is not how the Government has operated in this case. Since it allowed the petitioners in W.P.(C)No.18801/2011 to pay off the entire amounts due from them and the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.2751/2013 to pay the amounts due under an Amnesty Scheme, thus ridding themselves of any liability, it would not be justified on the part of the State to hold on to the property citing officialese and technical reasons that as per the Government Orders the property cannot be re-conveyed except if it is applied for within a period of five years. 22. The learned Government Pleader at this time brings to my notice a Division Bench judgment of this Court in State of Kerala v. George Jacob ( 2010 (3) KLT 483 ) and contends that this Court has already declared that if an assignee or a defaulter settles the arrears under an Amnesty Scheme, the property sold or bid on behalf of the Government under Section 50 of the Act would not automatically stand cancelled. He points out that the Division Bench did not accept such contention of the defaulter and confirmed the sale holding that the Government is not bound to reconvey the property to the defaulter even though he has settled the liability subsequently under an Amnesty Scheme. 23. I have examined the judgment cited by the learned Government Pleader very much in detail. The facts of this case, vis-a-vis the facts recorded in the judgment, I must say immediately, present a completely different scenario. The Division Bench has recorded in paragraph 2 of the said judgment that the defaulter therein was an abkari contractor who fell in arrears of abkari dues to the State, consequent to which a Rubber Plantation belonging to him was attached and sold under the provisions of the Act. Since there was no bidders for such sale, it appears that the Government bid the property on its own for Re.1/-. However, what is pertinent in the facts in the case leading to this judgment is that the State, thereafter, valued the bought-in-land at a figure of Rs.8,44,800/- and the said amount was credited in the loan account with effect from date of confirmation of the sale. However, what is pertinent in the facts in the case leading to this judgment is that the State, thereafter, valued the bought-in-land at a figure of Rs.8,44,800/- and the said amount was credited in the loan account with effect from date of confirmation of the sale. Subsequently thereafter, it shows that the property of the co-licencee was also sold and a further amount of Rs.5,90,200/- was adjusted towards the very same liability and that this amount along the value of Rs.8,44,800/- mentioned above for the bought-in-land were credited and set off against interest liability. It was after such credit and set off that the defaulter in that case had cleared of the balance liability under an Amnesty Scheme. It does not require great expatiation to understand that the facts in the present case are completely on a different footing from that presented in the judgment in George Jacob (supra). 24. In the case at hand, the State had not given credit to any amount against the value of the bought-in-land and had permitted the defaulter to settle the liability of his own. It is, therefore, that my observations in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment would be of pertinent relevance in the facts of this case. 25. It is not in dispute, in the present case that the property was not valued nor was any amount credited to the petitioner as being the determined value of the property. If this had been done, then obviously the action of the State would have become irreproachable, even going by my observations herein. The fact that this has not been done strikes at the root of the action and renders it illegal and the judgment cited by the learned Government Pleader would be of no avail at all since the facts involved in this case are completely different. For such reason, I repel this contention. 26. The facts involved in W.P.(C)No.9938/2013 present a slightly different situation. In this case, as I have already indicated, the petitioner has not paid off the arrears even today. However he maintains that he had applied to have the sale set aside under Exts.P6 and P7 representations. He also says that he is willing to pay off the liability, but that he was not allowed to do so. In this case, as I have already indicated, the petitioner has not paid off the arrears even today. However he maintains that he had applied to have the sale set aside under Exts.P6 and P7 representations. He also says that he is willing to pay off the liability, but that he was not allowed to do so. Sri.Krishnamani, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner also points out that even after the sale, as per Ext.P4 communication, his client was asked to pay off the entire arrears and that in the eyes of the State his client still continues to be a defaulter, in spite of the purchase of his property by it under the provisions of Section 50 of the Act. 27. In W.P.(C)No.18801/2011, in addition to the contentions against Section 50 of the Act, certain other specific challenges have been mounted which also have some importance. Sri.N.M.Madhu, learned counsel for the petitioner in the said writ petition points out that the amounts found to be due from the petitioner was, in fact, in respect of the gratuity amount payable to the workmen under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He submits that the provisions of the Act was made applicable for recovery of the said amounts consequent to a declaration being issued under Section 71 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, a declaration under Section 71 of the Act would only enable the Government to recover the arrears in the same manner as arrears of 'public revenue due on land' are recovered. He submits with great amount of fervor that this would not make the arrears in this case, 'public revenue due on land' but only that the State would be authorised to recover it under the process applicable to such. This submission has great significance in the facts of this case because under the provisions of Section 50, as has been extracted above, the State could have bid the property by itself only if the arrears sought to be recovered were “public revenue due on land”. In Raveendran Nair M.G. v. State of Kerala and Others (2014 (4) KHC 518) a Full Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider these issues quite in detail. In Raveendran Nair M.G. v. State of Kerala and Others (2014 (4) KHC 518) a Full Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider these issues quite in detail. The Full Bench declared that even in spite of a declaration or a notification issued under Section 71 of the Act, the nature of the debt that is due to be recovered under the mechanism of the said Act does not alter itself to be a 'public revenue due on land'. The relevant portion of the conclusions of the Full Bench is contained in paragraph 8 of the said judgment, which makes pertinent reading and therefore, the same is extracted as under: “8. A combined reading of the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act and S.10 of the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act show that S.10 of the latter Act only provides the manner in which the amounts due under the Act are to be recovered. Likewise, S.71 of the Revenue Recovery Act only enables the Government to issue a notification making the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act applicable for the recovery of amounts due to institutions. These provisions show that even in spite of a declaration and a notification issued under S.71, the nature of the debt that is due to be recovered under the machinery of the Revenue Recovery Act does not get altered to a public revenue due on land. Instead, the fiction created is only for the purpose of making the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act applicable for the recovery of the amounts due to the institution notified under S.71 of the Revenue Recovery Act. Such a change in the character of debt is not contemplated in the scheme of either of these Statutes.” This position of law has now been virtually settled. There cannot be a dispute that those arrears which are declared, under Section 71 of the Act, to be recoverable under its provisions would not become 'public revenue due on land' but would be recoverable as if it is 'public revenue due on land'. The character of the arrears continue to be as was earlier but its recovery becomes facilitated, after declaration under Section 71 of the Act, through the stringent mechanism postulated under the said Act. The character of the arrears continue to be as was earlier but its recovery becomes facilitated, after declaration under Section 71 of the Act, through the stringent mechanism postulated under the said Act. This is why the learned counsel for the petitioner is justified in contending that for recovering the arrears of workman's gratuity under the Workmen's Compensation Act, even though the mechanism of recovery under the Act could have applied, its character could not be altered as a 'public revenue due on land'. His submission, therefore, is that bidding of the property by the Government by its own under the provisions of Section 50 of the Act would have to be seen as impermissible and illegal. There is great amount of force in the submission and I am of the view that the sale now confirmed in favour of the Government would become extremely enervated on this account. 28. I am strengthened by the view taken by another learned Judge of this Court in W.P.(C)No. 33784/2011 dated 08.04.2013, wherein the same opinion was entered on the question as to whether the assignee could be deprived of his land even after he has settled the liability after payment of the amount due. The learned Judge has answered this question in the negative on the ground that after such settlement, the assignee did not have any liability for recovery of which sale was conducted. In the sad judgment, the principles propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohan Wahi v. Commissioner, Income Tax, Varanasi and others ( (2001) 4 SCC 362 ) were also specifically adverted to while arriving at such conclusions. 29. I am not, however, proposing to affirmatively declare that the sale is bad for this reason, though I am guided to an opinion so, on account of my observations and findings as above, that the petitioner, on payment of its arrears, would be entitled to reconveyance or restitution of his property. Since the petitioner has already paid the entire arrears, it would be no consequence as of now, especially in view of my findings as above, that the sale be declared illegal or otherwise. 30. In the summation of my observations above, I am now drawn to consider the nature of relief that could be given to the petitioners in these cases or to any other person who faces similar situation. 30. In the summation of my observations above, I am now drawn to consider the nature of relief that could be given to the petitioners in these cases or to any other person who faces similar situation. Since the action of the Government in allowing the petitioners to pay off the money either under the Amnesty Scheme or otherwise would be sufficient demonstration of the intent of the Government to recover the entire amounts from them, even after the sale of their properties, I am certain that it will be completely inequitable to allow the Government to continue in possession or ownership of the bought-in-land in spite of the satisfaction of the entire dues and arrears by the petitioners. The petitioners in W.P.(C) Nos.18801/2011 and 2751/2013 would stand on the same position going by this view. The only difference being that the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.18801/2011 has, in fact, paid off the whole arrears with all dues and charges without having the benefit of any Amnesty Scheme contrary to the opportunity obtained by the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.2751/2013 to do so under a Scheme. 31. In such view of the matter I am impelled to allow W.P.(C)No.18801/2011 and W.P.(C)No.2751/2013 and direct the competent respondents in the said writ petitions to re-convey the properties purchased on behalf of the Government, as per Ext.P14 in W.P.(C)No.18801/2011 and Ext.P1 in W.P. (C)No.2751/2013, without any further delay and not later than one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. 32. Such directions having been issued, Sri.Balagovindan, learned Counsel appearing for the 8th respondent in W.P.(C)No.2751/2013 makes a submission that his client has a claim of title over the property involved in this case and that civil suits are pending between his client and the writ petitioner. I notice that the State had purchased the property as if it belonged to the writ petitioner and without noticing the claim, if any, of the 8th respondent. Dr.K.P.Satheesan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner submits that the property is still in the possession of his client and that it is never taken over by the Government. I notice that the State had purchased the property as if it belonged to the writ petitioner and without noticing the claim, if any, of the 8th respondent. Dr.K.P.Satheesan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner submits that the property is still in the possession of his client and that it is never taken over by the Government. If that be so, I am sure that if there are disputes in civil courts between the petitioner and the 8th respondent, nothing contained in this judgment, including the direction to re-convey the property in favour of the writ petitioner by the Government, would impede or trammle the rights of the 8th respondent in seeking title over the same against the writ petitioner and any action taken in terms of this judgment would obviously abide by the final decree and judgment of the competent civil courts with respect to the title, ownership and possession of the property in question. 33. Finally, the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.9938/2013 has not admittedly paid off the arrears even day. He says, however, that he is ready and willing to pay off the entire arrears, which the Government has not agreed. This is a matter which the petitioner can pursue with the Government and if the Government is disposed and amenable to accept the arrears with charges and interest, along with such reduction as may be legally permissible from the petitioner, he would also be entitled to claim re-conveyance and restitution of his property in terms of my observations herein. For this purpose I permit the petitioner to approach the competent among the respondents with his offer to pay off the entire amounts by filing a representation within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and if the competent Authority of the Government is of the view that such opportunity can be granted to him and the property re-conveyed, subject to of course to the consideration as to whether the property has already been used for other public purposes or allotted to landless people under a Scheme, to pass appropriate orders thereon without any delay but not later than two months from the date of receipt of such representation. I clarify that I have not considered the entitlement of the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.9938/2013 for seeking such a relief from the Government and the above directions are only to offer him an opportunity to approach the Government and no more and it will be open to the competent Authority of the Government to take any appropriate decision on his representation. These writ petitions are thus ordered.