JUDGMENT : M.R. Shah, J. 1. Draft amendment is allowed. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs; "(a) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or directions quashing and setting aside the action of the respondent State in divesting the land in question in favour of respondent No. 3 - Company by entering into public private partnership agreement with it and further be pleased to hold and declare that all steps taken by the State Government in permitting private respondent No. 3 Company to use the land in question are illegal, unjust and contrary to law; (b) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or directions directing that the land in question may be restored back to the petitioners on appropriate terms and conditions as State Government has no longer required land in question for the public purpose for which it was initially acquired or for any other purpose; (c) Your Lordships may be pleased to hold and declare that the action of the State Government in entering public private partnership agreement with the respondent No. 3 - Company for the land in question is bad in law and illegal." 2. The facts leading to the present Special Civil Application in nutshell are as under; 2.1. The land in question originally belonged to the petitioners and their forefathers, which came to be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for public purpose of workshop for Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation ("GSRTC" for short). The land in question came to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as far back as in the year 1969 to 1970. The award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act came to be declared in the year 1970. The possession of the land in question also came to be taken over by GSRTC (acquiring body) as far back in the year 1970. Thereafter, the land in question was used by GSRTC (acquiring body) for the purpose of workshop. However, thereafter in view of the change circumstances, GSRTC seems to have decided to use the land acquired for bus terminal at Palanpur. Thereafter, the land in question was used by GSRTC (acquiring body) for the purpose of workshop. However, thereafter in view of the change circumstances, GSRTC seems to have decided to use the land acquired for bus terminal at Palanpur. Therefore, GSRTC, as per the new policy, has proposed to enter into public private partnership agreement with respondent No. 3. It appears that under the new project alongwith the construction of bus terminal it is proposed to construct new shops and according to the petitioners the benefit of construction of such shops shall be given to respondent No. 3, and therefore, the petitioners have preferred the present Special Civil Application for the aforesaid reliefs. 2.2. Shri Majmudar, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has vehemently submitted that as the land in question was originally acquired for the purpose of workshop and now the same is sought to be used for altogether another purpose, that is construction of bus terminal and shops, there is change of purpose for which the land was acquired, which is not permissible. It is submitted that therefore when the purpose for which the land was originally acquired has changed and the land is not required by GSRTC for the purpose of workshop for which the land is acquired, the land is required to be re-granted to the petitioners. 2.3. In support of his above submissions, Shri Majmudar, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has heavily relied upon similar provision, more particularly, Section 99 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. It is submitted that applying the analogy as per Section 99 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, the land in question is required to be re-granted and/or returned to the petitioners. 2.4. Shri Majmudar, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners has further submitted that as such by such public private partnership agreement by GSRTC with respondent No. 3 (private party) and permitting to construct the shops on the land in question, ultimately the beneficiary shall be respondent No. 3 (private party). It is submitted that therefore the original purpose for which the land was acquired will be frustrated. Making the above submissions, it is requested to admit/allow the present petition. 3. It is submitted that therefore the original purpose for which the land was acquired will be frustrated. Making the above submissions, it is requested to admit/allow the present petition. 3. The present petition is opposed by Shri Dhawan Jayswal, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State. It is vehemently submitted by Shri Dhawan Jayswal, learned Assistant Government Pleader that the land in question came to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as far back as in the year 1970. The award came to be declared in the year 1970. The petitioners/original owners were paid the compensation under the award. It is further submitted that even the possession of the land in question was also taken over in the year 1970. It is submitted that therefore once the award was declared under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the original owners were paid the compensation as per the award and even possession of the land in question was also taken over in the year 1970, considering Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the land in question absolutely vests with the acquiring body, and therefore, the petitioners have no right, title or interest in the land in question. It is submitted that therefore the petitioners have no locus to file the present petition with respect to the land in question. It is further submitted by Shri Dhawan Jayswal, learned Assistant Government Pleader that in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, as per Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, the old Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall be applicable and/or the same shall hold the field. It is submitted that under the old Land Acquisition Act, 1894, there is no such provision of re-grant. 3.1. It is further submitted by Shri Dhawan Jayswal, learned Assistant Government Pleader that even otherwise when the land in question shall be used for the public purpose - bus terminal by GSRTC, it cannot be said that there is change of purpose. It is submitted that ultimately the land in question will be used for public purpose and that too by the very acquiring body - GSRTC. It is submitted that ultimately the land in question will be used for public purpose and that too by the very acquiring body - GSRTC. It is further submitted by Shri Dhawan Jayswal, learned Assistant Government Pleader that the submissions on behalf of the petitioners that by entering into public private partnership agreement between GSRTC and respondent No. 3 and by permitting respondent No. 3 to construct the shops on the land in question respondent No. 3 shall be benefited is concerned, it is submitted that the aforesaid has no substance. It is submitted that in the public private partnership agreement the entire cost would be borne by respondent No. 3 and against which respondent No. 3 will be permitted to construct the shops and on sale of such shops and realizing the amount, bus terminal can be constructed by respondent No. 3, which will be ultimately used for public purpose by GSRTC i.e. bus terminal. It is submitted that by the aforesaid it cannot be said that respondent No. 3 shall be benefited. 3.2. Making the above submissions and relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Chandrasekaran and Another v. Administrative Officer and Others reported in (2012) 12 SCC 133 and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Subodhchandra Gulabbhai Desai v. State of Gujarat reported in 2001 (3) GLR 2134 , it is requested to dismiss the present petition. 4. Heard the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. At the outset, it is required to be noted that as such the main prayer of the petitioners is to re-grant the land in question, which, as such, came to be acquired for public purpose by GSRTC (acquiring body) as far as back in the year 1970. It is required to be noted and it is not in dispute that as such the land in question came to be acquired in the year 1970 as per the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and award under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 came to be declared in the year 1970 and the petitioners - original owners were paid the compensation as per the award declared by the Land Acquisition Officer in the year 1970. It is also not in dispute that as such possession of the land in question was also taken over by GSRTC (acquiring body) in the year 1970. It is also not in dispute that since then GSRTC is using the land in question for public purpose/workshop. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and considering Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 once possession of the land in question is already taken by GSRTC (acquiring body); award is declared under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act and the original owners are paid the compensation, thereafter the land absolutely vests in the acquiring body. Once the land absolutely vests in the acquiring body thereafter the petitioners - original owners shall not have any right, title or interest on the land in question. There is no such provision under Section 99 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 to return the land to the original owner and/or to re-grant the land to the original owner, and therefore, as such, the petitioners would not have any locus to file the present petition, more particularly, considering Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the petitioners would not have any right, title or interest on the land in question, which absolutely vests in the acquiring body that too in the year 1970. At this stage, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of V. Chandrasekaran and Another (Supra) is required to be referred to. In the aforesaid decision in paragraph Nos. 25 to 31 Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and held as under; "25. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period. (Vide: Avadh Behari Yadav v. State of Bihar &. Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 31 ; U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (Supra); Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 424 , M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 322 ; and Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Syed Akbar & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 492 ). 26. Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 31 ; U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (Supra); Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 424 , M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 322 ; and Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Syed Akbar & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 492 ). 26. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure holders/persons-interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the possession of the land has been taken and the land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances. (Vide: State of Madhya Pradesh v. V.P. Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1593 ; Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. v. Shri Avinash Sharma, AIR 1970 SC 1576 ; Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2517 ; Rajasthan Housing Board & Ors. v. Shri Kishan & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 84 and Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India v. Subodh Singh & Ors., (2011) 11 SCC 100 ). 27. The meaning of the word 'vesting', has been considered by this Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344 , this Court held that the meaning of word 'vesting' varies as per the context of the Statute, under which the property vests. So far as the vesting under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is concerned, the Court held as under.- (AIR p.353, para 19) "19........ In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17, the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any condition or; limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration." 28. In Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 448 , in a similar situation, this Court held as under: (SCC p.802, para 5) "5..... The legislature has made it clear that vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration." 28. In Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 448 , in a similar situation, this Court held as under: (SCC p.802, para 5) "5..... Once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring Authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the ....declaration." 29. Similarly, in State of Kerala & Anr. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai & Anr., (1997) 5 SCC 432 , this Court held as under: (SCC p.433, para 4) "4...... It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. (See also: C. Padma & Ors. v. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 627 ; Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 436 ; Niladri Narayan Chandradhurja v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2002 SC 2532 ; Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 335 ; and Leelawanti & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 66 ). 30. In Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. Syed Akbar (Supra), this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section 48 of the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the persons- interested/tenure holders, and that therefore, the question of restitution of possession to the tenure holder, does not arise. v. Syed Akbar (Supra), this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land has vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section 48 of the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the persons- interested/tenure holders, and that therefore, the question of restitution of possession to the tenure holder, does not arise. (See also: Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1996 SC 1296 ; Chandragaudaj Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 6 SCC 405 ; State of Kerala & Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai & Anr., AIR 1997 SC 2703 ; Printers (Mysore). Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed & Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 460 ; Bangalore Development Authority v. R. Hanumaiah, (2005) 12 SCC 508; and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (2011) 9 SCC 354 ). 31. In view of the above, the law can be crystallized to mean, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the land owner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes persona non-grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to only receive compensation for the same, unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The State neither has the requisite power to re convey the land to the person-interested, nor can such person claim any right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this effect." 4.1. Identical question came to be considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Subodhchandra Gulabbhai Desai (Supra). In the aforesaid decision, the Division Bench has observed that as and when the land is acquired by the Government for public purpose it can be utilized for any public purpose and once the land is acquired, it becomes vested in the Government and there is no question of any enforceable right with the original land owner in case the same is not utilized. It is further observed that as such the land may remain in the process of utilization and may be utilized by the Government or the acquiring body for whose benefits such lands are acquired and no re-grant can be claimed by any party as an enforceable right before the Court of law. 4.2. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, petitioners are not entitled to any reliefs claimed in the present petition. Even otherwise, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly, the purpose for which now the land in question is sought to be used, it cannot be said that GSRTC is not going to use the land for public purpose. Originally the land was acquired for workshop and now looking to the need and development of Palanpur city the same is required by GSRTC (acquiring body) for the purpose of bus terminal, and therefore, as such, the land in question is going to be used for public purpose by GSRTC. Merely because now GSRTC is going to use the land for bus terminal and the original land was acquired for workshop, the petitioners are not entitled to get back the said land. Still as observed hereinabove, the land in question is going to be used for public purpose by the very acquiring body - GSRTC. 4.3. Now so far as the submissions on behalf of the petitioners that by entering into the public private partnership agreement by GSRTC with respondent No. 3 and by permitting respondent No. 3 to construct the shops respondent No. 3 is going to be benefited, and therefore also, the petitioners are entitled to get back the land in question is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance. It is required to be noted that as per the new policy concept of public private partnership agreement is developing. At this stage, it is required to be noted that as such the public private partnership agreement between GSRTC and respondent No. 3 is not on record. However, judicial notice can be taken that by such public private partnership agreement entire cost will be borne by the person with whom the agreement is entered into and he will incur the entire expenditure. To see that he may get something in return, such provisions of constructing the shops is permissible. However, judicial notice can be taken that by such public private partnership agreement entire cost will be borne by the person with whom the agreement is entered into and he will incur the entire expenditure. To see that he may get something in return, such provisions of constructing the shops is permissible. By the aforesaid, it cannot be said that as such the public private partnership agreement would be only with a view to benefit respondent No. 3. On the aforesaid ground the petitioners are not entitled to any reliefs as claimed. 4.4. Now so far as the reliance placed upon Section 99 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is concerned, it is required to be noted that in view of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, the new Act shall not be applicable at all. As observed hereinabove, as the land in question was acquired in the year 1970 and award was declared in the year 1970 under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 possession was already taken over from the petitioners/forefathers in the year 1970 and even the original land owners were also paid compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the year 1970, and, therefore, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall be applicable, which does not contain any such provision like Section 99 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Under the circumstances, reliance placed upon Section 99 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is also misplaced. 5. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, there is no substance in the present petition and the present petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.