JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. (Oral)—The appellants are the owner and driver of the vehicle that was involved in vehicular accident resulting in injuries sustained by respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the ''claimant''), on account of such injuries, the claimant filed a Claim Petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, before the learned Tribunal below, for grant of compensation. 2. It was alleged that on 24.9.2011 at about 10.00 a.m. the claimant was travelling in tempo bearing registration No. HP-24B-2392 from Bilaspur to Bamta while carrying the shuttering material. It was alleged that on account of the rash and negligent driving of appellant No.2 accident took place and as a result whereof, the claimant suffered multiple injuries. He was initially taken to Zonal Hospital, Bilaspur, but thereafter was referred to IGMC, Shimla where he remained indoor patient w.e.f. 25.9.2011 to 01.11.2011 and claimed to have spent more than Rs. 2,00,000/- on his treatment till the filing of the claim petition. The claimant further averred that due to the accident, he was not able to work as a Mason or continue with his agriculture pursuits, which he had been doing prior to the accident and on such basis, prayed for compensation of Rs. 15,00,000/-. 3. The owner of the vehicle i.e. appellant No. 1 herein, in his reply denied that the accident in question had taken place on account of the rash and negligent driving of its driver i.e. appellant No.2 herein, and claimed that the accident took place because of the act, conduct and wrongs of the claimant himself. He claimed that the claimant boarded the vehicle for loading and unloading purpose and, therefore, it was the Insurance Company which was liable to pay the compensation, if any, in terms of the clause of indemnity as the vehicle was duly insured with it. 4. The appellant No.2 did not file his separate reply, but adopted the reply filed by appellant No.1. 5. As regards the Insurance Company, it was arrayed as respondent No.3 in the claim petition and while filing reply denied most of the contents of the claim petition for want of knowledge. However, it was submitted that the claimant was travelling in the vehicle as a gratuitous passenger and therefore, it was not liable to indemnify the insured. 6. On 1.1.2014, the following issues came to be framed by the learned Tribunal below: 1. However, it was submitted that the claimant was travelling in the vehicle as a gratuitous passenger and therefore, it was not liable to indemnify the insured. 6. On 1.1.2014, the following issues came to be framed by the learned Tribunal below: 1. Whether on 24.9.2011 at about 10.00 a.m. near H.R.T.C. Workshop, Bilaspur, petitioner sustained injuries on account of rash and negligent driving of respondent No.2 while driving tempo bearing No. HP-24B-2392? OPP 2. If issue No.1 above is proved in affirmative, whether the petitioner is entitled for compensation and if so, to what amount and from whom? OPP 3. Whether the petition is not maintainable? OPR 4. Whether the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present petition? OPR1. 5. Whether the respondent No.2 was not having valid and effective driving licence? OPR3. 6. Whether the offending vehicle was being plied without valid documents/OPR3. 7. Whether the petitioner was travelling as gratuitous passenger?OPR3. 8. Relief. 7. The parties led oral as well as documentary evidence and after evaluating the same, the learned Tribunal below allowed the claim petition by awarding a sum of Rs. 5,04,285/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till its deposit in favour of the claimant. 8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid award passed by the learned Tribunal below, the owner and driver of the aforesaid vehicle have filed FAO No. 229 of 2015 on the ground that the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal below are perverse and, therefore, deserve to be set aside and the claim petition ought to have been dismissed or in the alternative, the claim so awarded was required to be indemnified by the Insurance Company. 9. The Claimant/appellant has filed FAO No. 343 of 2015 for enhancement of the award. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material available on record. 10. What is ''perverse'' was considered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in a detailed judgment in Arulvelu and another v. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor and another (2009) 10 SCC 206 , wherein it was held as under:- "26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR 1977 Karnataka 58 , the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma & Another AIR 1977 Karnataka 58 , the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, (1878) 1 LR 1r 331 the Court observed that a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814 , the Court defined ''perverse'' as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct etc. 27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner: 1. Oxford Advanced Learner''s Dictionary of Current English Sixth Edition Perverse :- Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable. 2. Long man Dictionary of Contemporary English - International Edition Perverse : Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable. 3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998 Edition Perverse : Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law. 4. New Webster''s Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition) Perverse : Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behaviour or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant. 5. Stroud''s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, Fourth Edition Perverse : A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. 28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of U.P. (2003) 1 SCC 761 , the Court observed thus: (SCC p. 766, para 8 "8. We are of the opinion that the trial court was quite justified in acquitting the appellants of the charges as the view taken by it was reasonable one and the order of acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is well settled that appellate court would not be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal unless the same is found to be perverse. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In the present case, the High Court has committed an error in interfering with the order of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court as the same did not suffer from the vice of perversity." 29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police & Others (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Court while dealing with the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution observed as under: (SCC p.14, paras 9-10) "9. Normally the High Court and this Court would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be amenable to judicial scrutiny. 10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between the decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with." 30. The meaning of ''perverse'' has been examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312 , this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 316-17, para 7) "7. In the present case, the stage at and the points on which the challenge to the assessment in judicial review was raised and entertained was not appropriate. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in constituting itself into a court of appeal against the assessment. While it was open to the respondent to have raised and for the High Court to have considered whether the denial of relief under the proviso to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to the High Court re-appreciate the primary or perceptive facts which were otherwise within the domain of the fact-finding authority under the statute. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. The question whether the transactions were or were not sales exigible to sales tax constituted an exercise in recording secondary or inferential facts based on primary facts found by the statutory authorities. But what was assailed in review was, in substance, the correctness - as distinguished from the legal permissibility - of the primary or perceptive facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law." 11. What is ''perverse'' has further been considered by this Court in RSA No.436 of 2000, titled ''Rubi Sood and another v. Major (Retd.) Vijay Kumar Sud and others, decided on 28.05.2015 in the following manner:- "25..... A finding of fact recorded by the learned Courts below can only be said to be perverse, which has been arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in miscarriage of justice, is open to correction, because it is not treated as a finding according to law. 26. If a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or even the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then the finding is rendered infirm in the eye of the law. 27. If the findings of the Court are based on no evidence or evidence, which is thoroughly unreliable or evidence that suffers from vice of procedural irregularity or the findings are such that no reasonable persons would have arrived at those findings, then the findings may be said to be perverse. 28. Further if the findings are either ipse dixit of the Court or based on conjectures and surmises, the judgment suffers from the additional infirmity of non application of mind and thus, stands vitiated." 12. What is ''perversity'' recently came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi and others (2016) 3 SCC 78 wherein it was held as under:- "8. What is ''perversity'' recently came up for consideration before the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi and others (2016) 3 SCC 78 wherein it was held as under:- "8. "Perversity" has been the subject matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under section 96 of The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam (2007) 12 SCC 190 , it has been held at paragraph-11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect." 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram (2010) 15 SCC 530 , at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) "10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." 11. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondent-defendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally non-acceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. In the case before us, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the plaintiff/appellant that there has been structural alteration in the premises rented out to the respondents without his consent. Attempt by the respondent-defendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally non-acceptable to the trial court as well as the first appellate court. Material alteration of a property is not a fact confined to the exclusive/and personal knowledge of the owner. It is a matter of evidence, be it from the owner himself or any other witness speaking on behalf of the plaintiff who is conversant with the facts and the situation. PW-1 is the vendor of the plaintiff, who is also his power of attorney. He has stated in unmistakable terms that there was structural alteration in violation of the rent agreement. PW-2 has also supported the case of the plaintiff. Even the witnesses on behalf of the defendant, partially admitted that the defendants had effected some structural changes. 12. Be that as it may, the question whether there is a structural alteration in a tenanted premises is not a fact limited to the personal knowledge of the owner. It can be proved by any admissible and reliable evidence. That burden has been successfully discharged by the plaintiff by examining PWs-1 and 2. The defendants could not shake that evidence. In fact, that fact is proved partially from the evidence of the defendants themselves, as an admitted fact. Hence, only the trial court came to the definite finding on structural alteration. That finding has been endorsed by the first appellate court on re-appreciation of the evidence, and therefore, the High Court in second appeal was not justified in upsetting the finding which is a pure question of fact. We have no hesitation to note that both the questions of law framed by the High Court are not substantial questions of law. Even if the finding of fact is wrong, that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man''s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. The wrong finding should stem out on a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. Safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man''s inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the finding is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. 13. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann (2001) 4 SCC 262 , this Court has dealt with the limited leeway available to the High Court in second appeal. To quote para 34: (SCC pp.278-79) "34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-a-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication - what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ''103. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication - what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: ''103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact.- In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,- (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100." The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with." 14. In S.R. Tiwari v. Union of India (2013) 6 SCC 602 , after referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , it was held at para 30: (S.R.Tewari case6, SCC p. 615) "30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [ (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131 : AIR 1984 SC 1805 ] , Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [ (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429 : AIR 1999 SC 677 ] , Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [ (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372 : AIR 2010 SC 589 ] and Babu v. State of Kerala [ (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] ." This Court has also dealt with other aspects of perversity. 15. We do not propose to discuss other judgments, though there is plethora of settled case law on this issue. Suffice to say that the approach made by the High Court has been wholly wrong, if not, perverse. It should not have interfered with concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court on a pure question of fact. Their inference on facts is certainly reasonable. The strained effort made by the High Court in second appeal to arrive at a different finding is wholly unwarranted apart from being impermissible under law. Therefore, we have no hesitation to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial court as confirmed by the appellate court." 13. Adverting to the facts, it would be noticed that there is no dispute that the claimant sustained injuries in the vehicular accident, but the versions putforth by him before the Court varied from time to time. In the FIR Ext.P-1 which was registered by the claimant himself, it has been specifically mentioned that he was going in the vehicle to Bamta to bring shuttering material when the accident took place. 14. Whereas, in the claim petition, it has been mentioned that the claimant had hired the involved vehicle for the carriage of shuttering from Bilaspur to Bamta at the time when the accident took place. 15. 14. Whereas, in the claim petition, it has been mentioned that the claimant had hired the involved vehicle for the carriage of shuttering from Bilaspur to Bamta at the time when the accident took place. 15. However, while leading evidence, the claimant appeared as PW-1 and stated that on 24.9.2011 at about 10.00 a.m. he had engaged the Tempo in question for bringing the shuttering material. However, on being cross-examined by respondents No.1 and 2, he shifted his stand by stating that he was going in the vehicle as labourer for the purpose of loading and unloading the shuttering material. Yet again, while being cross-examined by the Insurance Company, he further shifted his stand by stating that on the said date he was going to Bamta to do the labour work. 16. At this stage, it would be relevant to make note of the statement of the owner i.e. appellant No.1, who appeared as RW-1 and stated that the claimant was in the vehicle in order to load and unload the material at that time and the same was loaded with shuttering material. 17. Evidently, the claimant has given conflicting stands with regard to his capacity in which he had been travelling in the Tempo. Even if for a moment it is assumed that he was travelling as labourer along with the shuttering material, even then there is no evidence to prove on record as to whose material was loaded in the vehicle and further, who had engaged the claimant as ''Coolie''. 18. Thus, in absence of any clear, cogent and convincing evidence available on record to establish that the claimant was travelling as the owner of the goods or even as a labourer, then obviously no fault can be found with the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal below holding him to be as unauthorized passenger in the vehicle and thereby fastening the liability upon the owner and driver of the vehicle by exonerating the Insurance Company. 19. It is contended by Mr. Pradeep Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants that the award passed by the learned Tribunal below is highly excessive and therefore, deserves to be suitably reduced. 20. It has come on record that the claimant at the time of the accident was aged 37 years and had suffered 30% permanent disability and the learned Tribunal below had awarded a sum of Rs. 20. It has come on record that the claimant at the time of the accident was aged 37 years and had suffered 30% permanent disability and the learned Tribunal below had awarded a sum of Rs. 5,04,285/- as compensation under various heads as detailed below:- i) Future income = Rs. 3,24,000/- ii) Medical expenses = Rs. 71,285/- iii) Attendant charges = Rs. 9,000/- iv) Pain and suffering etc. = Rs. 50,000/- v) Loss of expectation of life = Rs.50,000/- Total = Rs. 5,04,285/- 21. The income of the claimant was assessed by the learned Tribunal to be Rs. 4,000/- per month at that time which was increased by 50% after taking into consideration his age and fixed at Rs. 6,000/-.The permanent disability was taken as 30% and on such basis the loss of income was worked out to be Rs. 1800/-per month or say Rs. 21,600/- per annum to which a multiplier of 15 was applied and in this manner the total future income was worked out at Rs. 3,24,000/-. 22. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) Loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. 23. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include: (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e. on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) Inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life." 24. Therefore, quantification of damages divided under different heads must be very carefully observed by the courts while awarding compensation to the victims of motor-vehicle accidents. Therefore, quantification of damages divided under different heads must be very carefully observed by the courts while awarding compensation to the victims of motor-vehicle accidents. It is extremely essential for the courts to consider the two main components of damages i.e. both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages as per the guidelines laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court so that the just and reasonable compensation is awarded to the injured. 25. In Phillips v. Western Railway Co. 1874 (4) QBD 406 , Field, J., while emphasizing that damage must be full and adequate, held thus: "You cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original position, but you must bring your reasonable common sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is the only occasion on which compensation can be given. (The plaintiff) can never sue again for it. You have, therefore, now to give him compensation, once and for all. He has done no wrong; he has suffered a wrong at the hands of the defendants and you must take care to give him full fair compensation for that which he has suffered." Besides, the Tribunals should always remember that the measures of damages in all these cases "should be such as to enable even a tortfeasor to say that he had amply atoned for his misadventure". The observation of Lord Devlin that the proper approach to the problem or to adopt a test as to what the contemporary society would deem to be a fair sum, such as would allow the wrongdoer to "hold up his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing", should be kept in mind by the court in determining compensation in personal injury cases. 26. In the case of Mediana, 1900 AC 113 , Lord Halsbury held: "Of course the whole region of inquiry into damages is one of extreme difficulty. You very often cannot even lay down any principle upon which you can give damages; nevertheless it is remitted to the jury, or those who stand in place of the jury, to consider what compensation in money shall be given for what is a wrongful act. Take the most familiar and ordinary case; how is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Take the most familiar and ordinary case; how is anybody to measure pain and suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest that you can by any arithmetical calculation establish what is the exact amount of money which would represent such a thing as the pain and suffering which a person has undergone by reason of an accident....But, nevertheless, the law recognizes that as a topic upon which damages may be given." 27. In H.West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1958 (65) ACJ 504 (HL, England), Lord Morris in his speech observed as under: "Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of the like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that Judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards.". 28. In Ward v. James, 1965 1 All ER, 563 , Lord Denning while speaking for the Court, laid down the following three basic principles to be followed in such like cases: "Firstly, accessibility: In cases of grave injury, where the body is wrecked or brain destroyed, it is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in money, so difficult that the award must basically be a conventional figure, derived from experience or from awards in comparable cases. Secondly, uniformity: There should be some measure of uniformity in awards so that similar decisions may be given in similar cases; otherwise there will be great dissatisfaction in the community and much criticism of the administration of justice. Thirdly, predictability: Parties should be able to predict with some measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for by this means cases can be settled peaceably and not brought to court, a thing very much to the public good." 29. Thirdly, predictability: Parties should be able to predict with some measure of accuracy the sum which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for by this means cases can be settled peaceably and not brought to court, a thing very much to the public good." 29. In Perry v. Cleaver, 1969 ACJ 363 (HL, England), Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest held thus: "To compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult but no other process can be devised than that of making a monetary assessment." 30. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi, 1980 ACJ 55 (SC) , the Hon''ble Apex Court held: "The determination of the quantum must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in a free country in generous scales." 31. Mc Gregor on Damages, 14th Edn., para 1157, referring to heads of damages in personal injury actions states: "The person physically injured may recover both for his pecuniary losses and his non-pecuniary losses. Of these the pecuniary losses themselves comprise two separate items, viz., the loss of earnings and other gains which the plaintiff would have made had he not been injured and the medical and other expenses to which he is put as a result of the injury, and the courts have sub-divided the non-pecuniary losses into three categories, viz., pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and loss of expectation of life." 32. The principles for determining the compensation in case of permanent and partial disability have been exhaustively dealt with by referring to the relevant case law on the subject in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar, (2011) 1 SCC 343 in the following words: "Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent disability 6. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human-being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person''s inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person''s inability to perform any avocation or employment related activities as a result of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise from motor accidents injuries, are of a much wider range when compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (''Disabilities Act'' for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in section 2(i) of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming compensation. 9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the Doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body, cannot obviously exceed 100%. 10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings, would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation. 11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanently disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terns of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation (see for example, the decisions of this court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co.Ltd.,2010(10), SCC, 254 and Yadava Kumar v. D.M., National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2010 (10) SCC 341 ) ." 33. Even though, I may observe that the principle on the basis of which the future income of the claimant has been calculated, cannot be countenanced. However, I find that very meager amount has been granted towards pain and suffering and no amount has been awarded towards the loss of amenities of life. After all, the claimant was hardly 37 years of age at the time when the unfortunate accident took place and had remained admitted in the hospital for more than 40 days and during this period, had even undergone bone grafting. He would for the remaining life suffer the trauma of not being able to do his normal work and that apart would be deprived of the amenities of life as also enjoyment of life which otherwise cannot be compensated in any monetary terms. 34. At this stage, I may make a note of the application being CMP No. 2358 of 2017 filed by the appellants for leading additional evidence wherein only photographs have been annexed to show that the claimant is not suffering from any functional disability. However, having perused the application and accompanying photographs, I do not find any merit in the said application as not only the application is clearly an after thought, but even otherwise it is evidently clear from the photographs that the claimant is not in a position to bend one of his legs in view of the injuries sustained by him in the accident. Even otherwise, the mere fact that the claimant has mustered up courage and strength to start living and earning once again, does not in any manner lead to the conclusion that he has not suffered any functional disability as alleged by the appellants. 35. Even otherwise, the mere fact that the claimant has mustered up courage and strength to start living and earning once again, does not in any manner lead to the conclusion that he has not suffered any functional disability as alleged by the appellants. 35. Taking a holistic view and also taking into consideration all the relevant factors, I am of the considered view that the compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal below is just and fair and no interference is called for from this Court. 36. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in both the appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application(s) if any, also stands disposed of.