ORDER 1. They are heard on I.A. No. 1679/2017, an application under Order XXXIX rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of CPC, whereby the appellant / defendant seeks interim injunction on the contention that he being in possession of the suit property, this possession may not be disturbed, failing which he would suffer from irreparable injury. 2. Prayer is opposed on behalf of respondent. 3. It is urged that specific finding has been recorded by the trial Court as well as by first appellate Court as regard to possession of respondent / plaintiff over the suit property and in case if the application is allowed, the respondent / plaintiff will suffer an irreparable injury which will be irretrievable. 4. Heard the parties at length. 5. The suit at the instance of respondent was for declaration and permanent injunction and for declaration that the will in respect of suit property bearing survey No. 320/2012 ad-measuring 2 hectares be declared as fabricated. 4. Heard the parties at length. 5. The suit at the instance of respondent was for declaration and permanent injunction and for declaration that the will in respect of suit property bearing survey No. 320/2012 ad-measuring 2 hectares be declared as fabricated. The trial Court besides framing the issue qua the declaration and permanent injunction also framed an issue on the defence taken by the present appellant that as regard to possession of the parties over the suit property as issues No.1 and 3 and while dwelling on the said issue, the trial Court written the following findings:- ^^28- tgk¡ rd izfroknh dk ;g dguk fd oknxzLr Hkwfe ij oknh dkfct ugha gS] cfYd og dkfct gS vkSj [kljk [krkSuh esa Hkh oknxzLr Hkwfe mlds uke banzkt gS] ml laca/k esa mYys[kuh; gS fd izfroknh gfjHkku dk jktLo vfHkys[kksa esa banzkt olh;r ds vk/kkj ij fd;k tkuk izn'kZ MhŒ 3 ds nLrkost ls nf'kZr gS vkSj rc tcfd olh;r gh izekf.kr ugha gqbZ gS rc mDr vk/kkj ij fdlh izdkj dk LoRo o vkfèkiR; Hkh izfroknh dks izkIr ugha gksxk vkSj oSls Hkh /kkjk 117 eŒizŒ Hkw&jktLo lafgrk ds vuqlkj Hkw&vfHkys[kksa esa dh xbZ izfof"V;ksa ds ckjs esa rc rd lgh gksus dh mi/kkj.kk dh tkrh gS] tc rd fd rRizfrdwy lkfcr u dj fn;k tk,A ;gk¡ ftl olh;r ds vk/kkj ij ukekarj.k gksuk izfroknh }kjk crk;k x;k gS] og olh;r gh izekf.kr ugha gqbZ gS] rc ,slh fLFkfr esa dksbZ LoRo vkf/kiR; izfroknh dks izkIr ugha gksaxs vkSj oknh }kjk izLrqr lk{kh okŒlkŒ 2 cq)flag okŒlkŒ 5 ukjk;.kflag us oknxzLr Hkwfe ij oknh dk dCtk gksuk crk;k gS vkSj okŒlkŒ 5 ukjk;.k dh lk{; izfrijh{k.k esa dCts ds fcUnq ij v[k.Muh; jgh gSA ftlls oknxzLr Hkwfe ij oknh dk vkf/kiR; gksuk izekf.kr gksrk gS] rc oknh dks dCts dh lgk;rk ekaxuk Hkh vko';d ugha Fkk] vr% okn iz'u Øekad 1 o 3 dks izekf.kr ds :i esa fujkd`r fd;k x;k gSA^^ 6. Even the appellate court in paragraph 28 has written the findings of respondent/plaintiff being in possession of the property, the appellate Court observed:- ^^28- tgk¡ rd fookfnr Hkwfe ds laca/k esa jktLo vfHkys[kksa esa izfroknh gfjHkku ds ukekarj.k dk iz'u gS] izfroknh ds vuqlkj olh;r ds vk/kkj ij mDr ukekarj.k fd;k x;k gS fdUrq blds iwoZ dh xbZ foospuk ls ;g Li"V gS fd izfroknh ds i{k esa dh xbZ dfFkr olh;r izekf.kr gksuk ugha ikbZ xbZ gS ,slh fLFkfr es LoRo dk vk/kkj izekf.kr ugha gksus ls ek= jktLo vfHkys[k dh izfof"V;kasa ds vk/kkj ij gh fookfnr Hkwfe ij izfroknh dk LoRo o vkfèkiR; izekf.kr gksuk ugha ekuk tk ldrk gSA blds vfrfjDr oknh lk{kh ØŒ 3 fnus'k JhokLro] tks rglhy bZlkx<+ esa ,lŒMhŒvksŒ ds jhMj ds :i esa inLFk gS] ds }kjk [kljk o ukekarj.k iath izn'kZ ihŒ 5 ds laca/k esa Li"V :i ls crk;k x;k gS fd mlesa fy[kkoV dh L;kgh esa varj gS] vksOgj jkbfVax gS] ftl ij dksbZ gLrk{kj ugha gS rFkk ukekarj.k vkns'k ds izdj.k Øekad ,oa vkns'k dk mYys[k ugha gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa Hkh ukekarj.k dh dk;Zokgh lafnX/k gks tkrh gS rFkk ek= ukekarj.k ds vk/kkj ij fookfnr Hkwfe ij izfroknhx.k dks dksbZ LoRo izkIr ugha gksrk gSA^^ 7. Trite it is that while exercising the discretion for grant of interim injunction during pending of a suit, following three tests are applied viz. (i) whether plaintiff has a prima facie case (ii) whether balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if temporary injunction is declined. These parameters are to achieve the object to protect the plaintiff from an injury which cannot be compensated adequately. 8. In Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden, [ (1990)2 SCC 117 ], it is observed - “16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are : (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trail. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. 17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the Court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive or complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion.” In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Sriman Narayan [ (2002)5 SCC 760 ], it is held : “8. The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when the exercise of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and remain uncertain till they are established on evidence at the trial the relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before which that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection has however to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The need for such protection has however to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The Court must weigh one need against another and determine where the “balance of convenience” lies. (See Gujarat Bottling Co.Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. [ (1995)5 SCC 545 )]. 9. In the case at hand, as the appellant/defendant fails to establish prima facie case of being in possession over the suit property in question, the application under Order XXXIX rules 1 and 2 read with section 151 of CPC stands dismissed. 10. Consequently, status quo as ordered on 6.4.2017 stands vacated.