ORDER : Veerendr Singh Siradhana, J. For the benefits of commutation and gratuity, were withheld by the State-respondents after retirement of the petitioner attaining the age of superannuation on 28th February, 2003; the petitioner has instituted the present writ application praying for the following relief: "(i) By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned charge-sheet deserves to be quashed and set aside so far as the petitioner is concerned and the respondent may further be directed to pay the amount of gratuity to the petitioner with interest at the appropriate rate. (ii) By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the petitioner may also be extended the benefit of commutation of pension which was otherwise admissible to the petitioner and thereby the petitioner should not be put to a loss on that count also. (iii) Any other appropriate order which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may be passed in favour of the petitioner. (iv) Cost may also be awarded to the petitioner." 2. Briefly, the essential material facts necessary for appreciation of the controversy are that the petitioner entered into the service with the State-respondents in the Audit and Accounts Department and retired after attaining the age of superannuation on 28th February, 2003, from the post of Inspector (Audit). It is pleaded case of the petitioner that with mala-fide and oblique motive, the petitioner was served with the charge-sheet on 27th February, 2003, just a day before his retirement on 28th February, 2003, for an incident that allegedly occurred in the year 1982-83. Furthermore, even after response filed to the charge-sheet on 11th March, 2003, the inquiry proceedings have not proceeded any further so much so that even Enquiry Officer has not been appointed till date. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sandeep Bhagwati, reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application, asserted that the charge-sheet dated 27th February, 2003, served on the petitioner a day before of his retirement attaining the age of superannuation on 28th February, 2003, was for oblique motives. Further, such a charge-sheet could not have been issued after an inordinate and unexplained delay with reference to an incident that dates back to 20-21 years. 4. Further, such a charge-sheet could not have been issued after an inordinate and unexplained delay with reference to an incident that dates back to 20-21 years. 4. Referring to Circular dated 3rd March, 2001, learned counsel has urged that enquiry against an employee, who is to retire shortly, is required to be initiated, with all due diligence and without any delay. Hence, the charge-sheet served on the petitioner after a delay of 20 years of the alleged incident, is bad in the eye of law. In support of his claim, counsel has relied upon the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636 , and opinion in the case of Dr. S.N. Inam v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2010 (1) WLC (Raj.) 245. 5. In response to the notice of the writ application, the State respondent has filed its counter affidavit, raising preliminary objection for the writ application being premature in view of pending departmental enquiry, as has been observed by the Apex Court of the land in the case of Union of India and Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayan, (2006) 12 SCC 28 . 6. Mr. B.L. Awasthi, learned Additional Government Counsel, while supporting the action of the respondent, asserted that the relevant matter surfaced to the notice of the Administrative Department i.e. Urban Development Department only in the year 1999. The action was initiated and proposals were sent for initiation of enquiry under Rules 16/18 of the Rajasthan Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, the 'Rules of 1958'). 7. It is further contended that the proposals, which were received in the Department of Personnel were not found in proper form and complete, and therefore, the information was sought from the concerned administrative department. After having received the complete informations and on a proper examination, the charge-sheet was issued by the Department of Personnel on 27th February, 2003. Thus, delay, if any, is not intentional and deserves to be condoned for bona-fide reasons. Moreover, charges were of grave misconduct, therefore, charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner along with others. 8. After having received the complete informations and on a proper examination, the charge-sheet was issued by the Department of Personnel on 27th February, 2003. Thus, delay, if any, is not intentional and deserves to be condoned for bona-fide reasons. Moreover, charges were of grave misconduct, therefore, charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner along with others. 8. Referring to the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, 1995(6) SCC 749 , it is urged that in case charges are of grave nature, then delay in supply of the charge-sheet, cannot be a ground for quashing the enquiry. For the audit report was prepared by the petitioner suffered with illegalities and irregularities, the action of the respondent cannot be faulted. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 10. The fact that the petitioner was served with the charge-sheet on 27th February, 2003, just a day before he retired attaining the age of superannuation on 28th February, 2003, is not a dispute. The petitioner filed his response to the charge-sheet on 11th March, 2003. It is also denied that the incident in reference to which charge-sheet was served dates back to the year 1982-83. Even after, the petitioner having been served a charge-sheet on 27th February, 2003, and response filed by him on 11th March, 2003, no Enquiry Officer was appointed till date. 11. Undeniably, the charge-sheet was issued with reference to the incident of the year 1982-83, to as many as 8 employees i.e. Shri Indrajeet Singh, the then Superintendent, Urban Improvement Trust, Ajmer, Shri Ram Kishan, the then Patwari, Shri Ved Prakash, the then Assistant Engineer, Shri Baldev Mathur, the then Assistant Engineer, Shri Vimal Jain, the then Junior Engineer, Shri Jagmohan Singh, the then Nayab Tehsildar, Shri Pankaj Prabhakar, the then Nayab Tehsildar, Shri Tapeshwar Swaroop, the then Land Record Inspector, Shri Gurudayal Singh, the then Land Record Inspector, Urban Improvement Trust, Ajmer and against the petitioner Shri Murari Lal Gupta, the then Auditor, Cooperative Society, Ajmer. 12. 12. The status of proceedings as on 23rd February, 2003, furnished by the counsel for the State-respondent, is that the enquiry proceedings against Shri Ram Kishan, Shri Tapeshwar Swaroop, Shri Pankaj Prabhakar and Shri Murari Lal Gupta (Petitioner), are pending. Shri Jagmohan Singh, was exonerated on 27th July, 2016, so also Shri Baldev Mathur and Shri Ved Prakash, have been exonerated on 8th October, 2014. It is further informed that Shri Gurudayal Singh died on 23rd April, 2007. 13. From the factual matrix as surfaced from the pleadings of the parties and arguments put forth, is that the incident in reference to which the charge-sheet was served on the petitioner and others as aforesaid, dates back to the year 1982-83. Thus, the charge-sheet was served almost after a decade on 27th February, 2003, while the petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 28th February, 2003 and retired. Further, since the incident and as of this day a period of about 34 years has elapsed with reference to the alleged incident. For the alleged incident dates back to year 1982-83, and thus, almost 14 years have elapsed since the charge-sheet was served on the petitioner on 27th February, 2003; still the proceedings have not been concluded so much so that even Enquiry Officer has not been appointed in the case of the petitioner. 14. In the case of P.V. Mahadevan (Supra), the Apex Court of the land, while dealing with the issue of delay in institution of enquiry proceedings and its effect, observed thus: "8. Our attention was also drawn to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-Board in this appeal. Though some explanation was given, the explanation offered is not at all convincing. It is stated in the counter affidavit for the first time that the irregularity during the year 1990, for which disciplinary action had been initiated against the appellant in the year 2000, came to light in the audit report for the second half of 1994-1995. 9. Sections 118 and 119 of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961 (Tamil Nadu Act No. 17 of 1961) read thus : "118. At the end of every year, the Board shall submit to the Government an abstract of the accounts of its receipts and expenditure for such year. 119. 9. Sections 118 and 119 of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961 (Tamil Nadu Act No. 17 of 1961) read thus : "118. At the end of every year, the Board shall submit to the Government an abstract of the accounts of its receipts and expenditure for such year. 119. The accounts of the Board shall be examined and audited once in every year by such auditor as the Government may appoint in this behalf." 10. Section 118 specifically provides for submission of the abstracts of the accounts at the end of every year and Section 119 relates to annual audit of accounts. These two statutory provisions have not been complied with at all. In the instant case the transaction took place in the year 1990. The expenditure ought to have been considered in the accounts of the succeeding year. In the instant case the audit report was ultimately released in the 1994-1995. The explanation offered for the delay in finalising the audit account cannot stand scrutiny in view of the above two provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 17. It is now stated that the appellant has retired from service. There is also no acceptable explanation on the side of the respondent explaining the inordinate delay in initiating departmental disciplinary proceedings. Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned Senior counsel is appearing for the respondent. His submission that the period from the date of commission of the irregularities by the appellant to the date on which it came to the knowledge of the Housing Board cannot be reckoned for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any delay on the part of the Board in initiating disciplinary proceedings against the appellant has no merit and force. The stand now taken by the respondent in this Court in the counter affidavit is not convincing and is only an afterthought to give some explanation for the delay. 11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. 11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer." 15. In the case of Dr. S.N. Inam (Supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court quashed the charge-sheet on the ground of inordinate delay for the charge-sheet was served on 21st June, 1974 and enquiry proceedings initiated could not be concluded up till 26th January, 1994, observing thus: "8. It is to be noted here that both the respondents have filed short replies and no document had been filed in support of their case. Later on an additional affidavit had been filed by the officer incharge, at the time when the hearing of the writ petition was to commence. Along with the affidavit some documents have also been filed. 9. The case of the petitioner is that the respondents have not concluded the enquiry despite of the fact that the charge-sheet was issued on 21.06.1974, in respect of an incident pertaining to the year 1972. Therefore, it is submitted that an inordinate delay has been caused in initiating the enquiry and this itself shows that a prolonged enquiry had been held to harass the petitioner. It is also stated that one of the cause of harassment is that the petitioner had earlier approached the High Court against the respondents. Therefore, it is submitted that an inordinate delay has been caused in initiating the enquiry and this itself shows that a prolonged enquiry had been held to harass the petitioner. It is also stated that one of the cause of harassment is that the petitioner had earlier approached the High Court against the respondents. Further the case of the petitioner is that the charge-sheet is illegal on the ground that no preliminary enquiry was held before the issuance of the same. It is also submitted that the petitioner was not made available the documents demanded by him. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned charge sheet has been served upon the petitioner only in the year 1974 allegedly against the charges of the year 1972. In other words, it is stated that initiation and the issuance of the charge-sheet upon the delinquent was after an inordinate delay is malafide. The petitioner has also relied upon the Government Circular dated 17.03.1960, in support of his case, that impugned charge sheet is not sustainable because the respondents have failed to abide by the time bound schedule programme given in it. Another submissions made on behalf of the petitioner is that the charge-sheet is liable to be quashed on the ground that it is totally vague. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh & Anr., 1990 (Supp) SCC 738; State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 and P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636 . 15. The sequence of events of the present case, as mentioned above, goes to show that in the earlier writ petition filed in the year 1975, an interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner on 09.05.1975 (Annexure-AR/2). But later on, the said writ petition was decided on 09.05.1984. Thereafter, an order was passed by the respondents on 13.12.1984 that as the writ petition filed by the petitioner has been dismissed by the High Court, the proceeding against him is to be restarted. Since then, the proceedings against the petitioner remained pending and when a notice for demand of justice was sent to the respondents on 26.01.1994, it remained unanswered and then the present writ petition came to be filed on 08.04.1994. Since then, the proceedings against the petitioner remained pending and when a notice for demand of justice was sent to the respondents on 26.01.1994, it remained unanswered and then the present writ petition came to be filed on 08.04.1994. In other words, the disciplinary proceedings could not be continued after the month of May, 1975 on account of the stay order of the High Court but then the writ petition itself came to be decided on 09.05.1984. The respondents had itself ordered for restarting the proceedings, by its order dated 13.12.1984, but even then no progress had been done for a span of ten years i.e. the year 1994. Therefore, it cannot be said that the disciplinary proceedings could not be completed on account of the orders of the Court and the delay caused is not attributable to the respondents. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the departmental proceedings could not make progress because of the non-cooperation of the petitioner. According to him, the petitioner was intimated to appear before the enquiry officer by order dated 01.05.1987. It is to be noted that a perusal of the said order goes to show that it had specifically mentioned that in case the petitioner does not appear then the ex-parte proceeding shall be undertaken. Therefore, if the petitioner had not appeared then there was nothing to prevent the respondents from proceeding ex parte in the departmental proceedings and they ought not to have kept the proceedings pending till the year 1994. It is to be noted that the enquiry officer had been changed on 01.06.1987. In my view, there was no just reason for the respondents not to have concluded the departmental proceedings soon after the decision of the earlier writ petition in the year 1984 and to have kept it pending for a period of ten years. This itself shows that the respondents themselves were neither serious towards the proceedings nor they had taken appropriate steps at any point of time to conclude the same within a reasonable period and in accordance to their own circulars, for that purpose." 16. For the reasons and discussions herein above, so also in view of the law declared by the Apex Court of the land, as well as the opinion of a Coordinate Bench of this Court, the claim of the petitioner merits acceptance. For the reasons and discussions herein above, so also in view of the law declared by the Apex Court of the land, as well as the opinion of a Coordinate Bench of this Court, the claim of the petitioner merits acceptance. Accordingly, the writ application succeeds and is hereby allowed. 17. In the result, charge-sheet served on the petitioner (Annexure-1) dated 27th February, 2003, is hereby quashed. 18. The respondent is directed to release the due amount of gratuity, commutation and other terminal benefits, along with interest @ 9% per annum from the date the amount became due till the date of payment. Compliance of this order be ensured, within a period of two months from the date, a certified copy of this order is presented. No costs.