ORDER : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. These criminal misc. petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have been preferred for quashing FIR Nos.498/2011 and 427/2011 registered at Police Station, Anti Corruption Bureau, Jaipur Chowki at Sri Ganganagar for the offences under Sections 13(1)(D) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120B IPC as also FIR No.539/2012 registered at Police Station, Main Investigation Office, Anti Corruption Bureau, Jaipur, Chawki at Sri Ganganagar for the offences under Sections 13(1)(D) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Sections 420 and 120B IPC against the petitioner at the instance of the private complaint. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in L. Narayana Swamy v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2016) 9 SCC 598 (Para 12), wherein the judgment delivered in Anil Kumar & Ors. v. M.K. Aiyappa & Anr., 2013 (4) RLW 3604 (SC) has been followed. 3. Learned counsel for the respondents have placed reliance on the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. v. Narayana Reddy & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1672 (Para 14 to 20) and Gopal Das Sindhi & Ors. v. State of Assam & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 986 (V 48 C 158). 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the material available on record as well as the precedent laws cited at the Bar. 5. Paras 11 & 12 of the judgment in L. Narayana Swamy (supra) are as follows :- "11. Since requirement of obtaining sanction is contained in Section 19(1) of the PC Act, it would be proper to reproduce the same. For our purposes, reproduction of sub-Section (1) of Section 19 of the PC Act shall suffice which we reproduce herein below : "19. Since requirement of obtaining sanction is contained in Section 19(1) of the PC Act, it would be proper to reproduce the same. For our purposes, reproduction of sub-Section (1) of Section 19 of the PC Act shall suffice which we reproduce herein below : "19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.- (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 - (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from the offence save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office." 12. As is clear from the plain language of the said section, the court is precluded from taking "cognizance" of an offence under certain sections mentioned in this provision if the prosecution is against the public servant, unless previous sanction of the Government (Central or State, as the case may be) has been obtained. What is relevant for our purposes is that this section bars taking of cognizance of an offence. The question is whether it will cover within its sweep, order directing investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. ? The High Court has taken the view, in the impugned judgment, that bar is from taking cognizance which would not apply at the stage of investigation by the investigating officer. It is observed that sanction is required only after investigation and that too when, after investigation, it is found that there is substantial truth in the investigation report as to what amounts to cognizance of offence." 6. Paras 14 to 20 of the aforesaid judgment in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. are as follows:- "14. This raises the incidental question: What is meant by "taking cognizance of an offence" by the Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190 ? This expression has not been defined in the Code. Paras 14 to 20 of the aforesaid judgment in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. are as follows:- "14. This raises the incidental question: What is meant by "taking cognizance of an offence" by the Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190 ? This expression has not been defined in the Code. But from the scheme of the Code, the content and marginal heading of Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV under which Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a Court only when the Court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1). Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted, and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding sections in Chapter XV of the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a). If, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he, has in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. 15. This position of law has been explained in several cases by this Court, the latest being Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal (1973) 3 SCC 753 : ( AIR 1972 SC 2639 ). 16. The position under the Code of 1898 with regard to the powers of a Magistrate having jurisdiction to send a complaint disclosing a cognisable offence - whether or not triable exclusively by the Court of Session - to the police for investigation under Section 156(3), remains unchanged under the Code of 1973. 16. The position under the Code of 1898 with regard to the powers of a Magistrate having jurisdiction to send a complaint disclosing a cognisable offence - whether or not triable exclusively by the Court of Session - to the police for investigation under Section 156(3), remains unchanged under the Code of 1973. The distinction between a police investigation ordered under Section 156(3) and the one directed under Section 202, has also been maintained under the new Code; but a rider has been clamped by the 1st Proviso to Section 202(1) that if it appears to the Magistrate that an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session has been committed, he shall not make any direction for investigation. 17. Section 156(3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption: "Information to the Police and their powers to investigate" while Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading "Of complaints to Magistrate". The power to order police investigation under Section 156(3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by Section 202(1). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post-cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seisin of the case. That is to say in the case of a complaint regarding the commission of a cognisable offence, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure embodied in Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and avail of Section 156(3). It may be noted further that an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156, is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or charge-sheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section, an investigation "for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceedings." Thus the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings already instituted upon a complaint before him. 18. In the instant case the Magistrate did not apply his mind to the complaint for deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding; but only for ordering an investigation under Section 156(3). He did not bring into motion the machinery of Chapter XV. He did not examine the complainant or his witnesses under Section 200, Cr.P.C. which is the first step in the procedure prescribed under that Chapter. The question of taking the next step of that procedure envisaged in Section 202 did not arise. Instead of taking cognizance of the offence, he has, in the exercise of his discretion, sent the complaint for investigation by police under Section 156. 19. This being the position, Section 202(1). 1st Proviso was not attracted. Indeed, it is not necessary for the decision of this case to express any final opinion on the ambit and scope of the 1st Proviso to Section 202(1) of the Code of 1973. Suffice it to say, the stage at which Section 202 could become operative was never reached in this case, We have therefore in keeping with the well established practise of the Court, decided only that much which was essential for the disposal of this appeal, and no more. 20. For the foregoing reasons, we answer the question posed, in the negative, and dismiss this appeal." 7. Para 7 of the judgment in Gopal Das Sindhi & Ors. (supra) is as follows:- "(7) When the complaint was received by Mr. 20. For the foregoing reasons, we answer the question posed, in the negative, and dismiss this appeal." 7. Para 7 of the judgment in Gopal Das Sindhi & Ors. (supra) is as follows:- "(7) When the complaint was received by Mr. Thomas on August 3, 1957, his order, which we have already quoted, clearly indicates that he did not take cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint but had sent the complaint under Section 156(3) of the code to the Officer Incharge of Police Station, Gauhati for investigation. Section 156(3) states "Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such investigation as above-mentioned." Mr. Thomas was certainly a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance under Section 190 and he was empowered to take cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint. He, however, decided not to take cognizance but to send the complaint to the police for investigation as Sections 147, 342 and 448 were cognisable offences. It was, however, urged that once a complaint was filed the Magistrate was bound to take cognizance and proceed under Chapter XVI of the Code. It is clear, however, that Chapter XVI would come into play only if the Magistrate had taken cognizance of an offence on the complaint filed before him, because Section 200 states that a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses and also by the Magistrate. If the Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence on the complaint filed before him, he was not obliged to examine the complainant on oath and the witnesses present at the time of filing of the complaint. We cannot read the provisions of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We are unable to construe the word 'may' in section 190 to mean 'must'. The reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognisable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint, under Section 156(3) to the police for investigation. We are unable to construe the word 'may' in section 190 to mean 'must'. The reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognisable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint, under Section 156(3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognisable offences is with the police. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognisable offence. If he does so then he would have to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XVI of the Code. Numerous cases were cited before us in support of the submissions made on behalf of the appellants. Certain submissions were also made as to what is meant by "taking cognizance". It is unnecessary to refer to the cases cited. The following observations of Mr. Justice Das Gupta in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, AIR 1950 Cal. 437 . "What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that before it can be said that any magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a), Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter - proceeding under Section 200 and thereafter sending it for inquiry and report under Section 202. When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind, e.g., ordering investigation under section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence." 8. From a perusal of the Full Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. From a perusal of the Full Bench judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy & Ors. (supra), it is clear that the expression "taking cognizance of an offence" comes into play only when the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of the proceeding under Section 200 Cr.P.C. It has been noted in the said judgment that the power under sub-section (3) of Section 156 Cr.P.C. is in the nature of peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156(1) Cr.P.C. and is not an actual application of mind at that stage. Thus, the magisterial court cannot be precluded from referring the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for lodging an FIR, which is simply an action without actual application of mind. 9. From the purport of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as quoted above, it is clear that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under the Sections mentioned in this provision, unless a previous sanction of the Government has been obtained. Thus, the question as to when cognizance shall proceed is a disputed question, regarding which different opinion has been expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the precedent law. 10. In view of the above, this Court is of the opinion that the matters are squarely covered by the decision of the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 as well as the order passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court, as quoted above. It is also pertinent to note here that the impugned action taken by the authorities cannot be said to be contrary to the ratio of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. v. M.K. Aiyappa & Anr. (supra). 11. Moreover, a coordinate Bench of this Court in an identical matter being S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.3334 of 2015 (Ashvini Dan Charan. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. decided on 19.05.2016), passed the following order :- "Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Perused the material available on record. v. M.K. Aiyappa & Anr. (supra). 11. Moreover, a coordinate Bench of this Court in an identical matter being S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.3334 of 2015 (Ashvini Dan Charan. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. decided on 19.05.2016), passed the following order :- "Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Perused the material available on record. By way of this miscellaneous petition, the accused petitioner has approached this Court assailing the order dated 25.05.2013, whereby the learned Sessions Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act Cases, Bikaner, acting on a private complaint submitted by the respondent No.2 complainant, directed the Anti Corruption Bureau to conduct a preliminary inquiry and if cognisable offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act are disclosed then to register an FIR and conduct investigation therein. The direction thus given by the learned Sessions Judge is in consonance with the view expressed by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 . Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality, irregularity or perversity nor can it be said to run contrary to the ratio of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. v. M.K. Aiyappa & Anr., 2013 (4) RLW 3604 (SC). The order under challenge only directs a preliminary inquiry and thus no prejudice is caused to the present petitioner so as to entitle him to challenge the same. In case, the Anti Corruption Bureau registers an FIR in the matter then the petitioner would be at liberty to challenge the same by way of a fresh petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., if he so desires. Accordingly, the criminal miscellaneous petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed with the above observations. Stay application also stands rejected." 12. In light of the aforesaid discussion as well as the precedent laws laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as by a coordinate Bench of this Court, this Court does not find any merit in the present criminal misc. petitions, as the order under challenge only directs a preliminary inquiry and thus no prejudice is caused to the present petitioner so as to entitle him to challenge the same. petitions, as the order under challenge only directs a preliminary inquiry and thus no prejudice is caused to the present petitioner so as to entitle him to challenge the same. In case, the Anti Corruption Bureau registers an FIR in the matter and if cognizance is sought to be taken without sanction, then the petitioner would be at liberty to challenge the same by way of a fresh petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., if he so desires. 13. Accordingly, the criminal miscellaneous petitions being devoid of any merit are hereby dismissed with the above observations. Stay applications also stand rejected.