JUDGMENT : VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. 1. By this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner/Smt. Usha Talwar seeks the relief of being granted higher pay-scale on achieving the second stage of the Assured Career Promotion Scheme (ACP Scheme) on completion of 24 years of service. Petitioner seeks the relief of grant of the higher pay-scale of ACP-II along with compound interest. 2. Petitioner joined the respondent no. 4/school as an Assistant Teacher on 16.3.1985, the respondent no. 4/school being controlled by the respondent no. 1/society. Petitioner had earlier worked with an NDMC school as an Assistant Teacher from 15.9.1973. Petitioner pleads that her total service so as to compute the 24 years of service period for ACP-II benefits should be by adding the service of the petitioner in the NDMC school from 15.9.1973 to 16.3.1985 along with the service of the petitioner with the respondent no. 4/school from 16.3.1985. Petitioner accordingly pleads that petitioner is deemed to have completed 12 years of service on 15.9.1985 for grant of ACP-I and 24 years of service for grant of ACP-II on 15.9.1997. In fact I may note that the admitted position is that the subject ACP scheme came into force only subsequently on 9.8.1999, and thus the petitioner claims that petitioner had already completed 24 years of service before 9.8.1999 i.e. by 15.9.1997, and therefore both ACP-I and ACP-II benefits should have been granted to the petitioner immediately on commencement of the ACP scheme on 9.8.1999, but petitioner on 9.8.1999 was only granted the benefit of ACP-I. 3. Petitioner in addition to the aforesaid facts for pleading that petitioner is entitled to benefits additionally of ACP-II, petitioner also relies upon the order dated 27.4.2007 of the respondent no. 4/school. 4. Respondent nos. 1 and 4 have filed their counter affidavits. In this counter affidavit it is pleaded that petitioner was by the order dated 23.12.2005 wrongly granted ACP scheme but that order was erroneously issued and therefore the same was subsequently withdrawn on 4.4.2006. On behalf of the respondent nos. 1 and 4, it is also pleaded that petitioner’s services with the respondent no. 4/school is independent than the petitioner’s services earlier with NDMC school from 15.9.1973 to 16.3.1985, latter date being the date when the petitioner joined the respondent no. 4/school. Respondent nos. On behalf of the respondent nos. 1 and 4, it is also pleaded that petitioner’s services with the respondent no. 4/school is independent than the petitioner’s services earlier with NDMC school from 15.9.1973 to 16.3.1985, latter date being the date when the petitioner joined the respondent no. 4/school. Respondent nos. 1 and 4 therefore have pleaded that since the period of 12 years have to be counted from when the petitioner joined the respondent no. 4/school on 16.3.1985, and since the 12 years period stood completed only on 16.3.1997 hence the petitioner was granted the first ACP benefit w.e.f. 9.8.1999 but the second ACP benefit only became due to the petitioner on 16.3.2009 and since the petitioner had already superannuated on 30.10.2006, therefore the petitioner could not be granted the second ACP benefit. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 4 has also argued that the writ petition filed is liable to be dismissed by applying the doctrine of delay and laches as this writ petition is hopelessly beyond the period of limitation. 5. At the outset, I would like to note that under every ACP scheme, and which in some institutions is called as Modified Assured Career Promotion (MACP) Scheme and in other institutions as Time Bound Promotion (TBP) Scheme, the benefits of the higher pay-scales of the higher promotion posts are granted inasmuch as promotional posts are limited and since therefore everyone cannot be promoted to the higher posts, in order to avoid stagnation and frustration among the employees, benefits of the higher pay-scales of the promotion posts, without actual promotion, are granted to employees on completion of particular number of years of service with the employer. On completion of particular number of years of service, the grant of ACP-I and ACP-II benefits are not automatic, because for grant of benefit of higher pay-scales of the higher promotion posts, the candidate must also comply with the eligibility criteria for being appointed to the higher promotion posts. As regards the ACP scheme applicable in this case, this is specifically mentioned in para 6 of the Conditions wherein it is provided that the candidate in order to get benefits of the ACP scheme must fulfil the normal promotion norms of the higher promotion posts. 6. As regards the ACP scheme applicable in this case, this is specifically mentioned in para 6 of the Conditions wherein it is provided that the candidate in order to get benefits of the ACP scheme must fulfil the normal promotion norms of the higher promotion posts. 6. The prayer of the petitioner for grant of the ACP-II benefit from 9.8.1999 shows that petitioner is claiming through this writ petition which is filed on 9.2.2010 an entitlement which, assuming the case of the petitioner is to be accepted, arose on 9.8.1999 itself. If petitioner was entitled to benefit of second stage benefit of ACP scheme on 9.8.1999, and that as per the petitioner she was not given this benefit, then the petitioner would have had to approach this Court within the period of limitation i.e. within three years from 9.8.1999, but as already noted above this writ petition is filed i.e. around 11 years after 9.8.1999, and the same is therefore barred by limitation. Though the Limitation Act, 1963 strictly does not apply to writ petitions the underlying principles of the Limitation Act apply, whereby, the time barred writ petitions are dismissed by applying the doctrine of delay and laches. This is so held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa and Another vs. Mamta Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 and paras 52 to 54 of which judgment read as under:- “52. In the very first appeal, the respondent filed writ petition on 11.11.2005 claiming relief under the Notification dated 6.10.1989 w.e.f. 1.1.1986 without furnishing any explanation for such inordinate delay and on laches on her part. Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1963, makes it obligatory on the part of the court to dismiss the Suit or appeal if made after the prescribed period even though the limitation is not set up as a defence and there is no plea to raise the issue of limitation even at appellate stage because in some of the cases it may go to the root of the matter. 53. Needless to say that Limitation Act 1963 does not apply in writ jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions are dismissed at initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. 53. Needless to say that Limitation Act 1963 does not apply in writ jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions are dismissed at initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. In a case like at hand, getting a particular pay scale may give rise to a recurring cause of action. In such an eventuality, the petition may be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and the court may refuse to grant relief for the initial period in case of an unexplained and inordinate delay. In the instant case, the Respondent claimed the relief from 1.1.1986 by filing a petition on 11.11.2005 but the High Court for some unexplained reason granted the relief w.e.f. 1.6.1984, though even the Notification dated 6.10.1989 makes it applicable w.e.f. 1.1.1986. 54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court within a reasonable time.” 7. Therefore the claim of the petitioner for second ACP benefit, arising to the petitioner from 9.8.1999 when the scheme came into force for the first time, this claim is a claim which is hopelessly time barred and is therefore is hit by the doctrine of delay and laches, hence the claim of the petitioner for second ACP benefit is liable to be and is accordingly dismissed by applying the doctrine of delay and laches. 8. Let me now assume that the writ petition does not have to be dismissed by applying the doctrine of delay and laches. What would then be the position? I have already stated above that the requirement of the ACP scheme is that the pay-scale of the higher promotion post would only be granted on the candidate, petitioner in this case, fulfilling the eligibility criteria for promotion to the higher promotion post. What would then be the position? I have already stated above that the requirement of the ACP scheme is that the pay-scale of the higher promotion post would only be granted on the candidate, petitioner in this case, fulfilling the eligibility criteria for promotion to the higher promotion post. In the present case, hierarchy of promotion so far as the petitioner is concerned, the first stage is of Assistant Teacher (and which was the post to which petitioner was appointed with the respondent no. 4/school), with the first/next promotion post being the post of Trained Graduate Teacher (TGT), and the second promotion post being the post of Post Graduate Teacher (PGT). Petitioner has already been granted the first ACP benefit of TGT post with effect from 9.8.1999 and this is specifically admitted by the petitioner in para 6 of the writ petition. The issue therefore is that can the petitioner get the ACP-II benefit i.e. the pay-scale of a PGT. The answer to this has to be clearly in negative for the reason that the petitioner had to satisfy this Court, both by pleadings and filing documents, that what were the recruitment rules for promotion to the post of PGT, and how the petitioner satisfied such eligibility criteria for being promoted to the post of PGT, but neither there is any pleading nor are documents filed as to what are the recruitment rules for appointment to the post of PGT and how the petitioner satisfies the eligibility criteria for being promoted to the post of PGT, and therefore, in the complete absence of pleadings and relevant documents, it cannot be held that even on merits petitioner was entitled to and can claim the second ACP benefit. Petitioner’s claim for ACP-II is therefore rejected. 9. To complete the narration I would like to note that petitioner has placed reliance upon the Circular dated 2.8.1995 issued by the respondent no. 1/society, and which Circular in para 1 talks of joinder of service of employees who served earlier as teachers with NDMC school be added to the service as teachers with respondent no. 4/school for the purpose of pensionary benefit, and to which argument the counsel for respondent nos. 1/society, and which Circular in para 1 talks of joinder of service of employees who served earlier as teachers with NDMC school be added to the service as teachers with respondent no. 4/school for the purpose of pensionary benefit, and to which argument the counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 4 countered by referring to para 3 of the same Circular to that as regard the seniority issue of the candidates, that seniority would only be from their joining in the respondent no. 4/school, however, two views possible of this Circular dated 2.8.1995 and I need not pronounce on the same, inasmuch as, I am assuming for the sake of the present judgment that petitioner’s earlier service with NDMC school had to be added with the respondent no. 4/school, but even if that is done since petitioner has failed to plead and substantiate as to how petitioner can get ACP-II benefit of the post of PGT, hence the petitioner cannot get the ACP-II benefit being the pay-scale of a PGT. 10. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in the present writ petition, and the same is therefore dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.