ORDER : S.A. DHARMADHIKARI, J. The genesis of the point in issue being common to both these petitions, they are being decided by this common order. 2. In W.P. No. 2735/2017, petitioner has assailed the supplementary show-cause notice dated 15-4-2017 (Annexure P-1C) and e-mail communications dated 19-4-2017 and 20-4-2017 (Annexures P-1 and P-1A), whereby petitioner has been informed by respondent No. 4 that his bid for the tender in question is rejected on technical evaluation by the Tender Evaluation Committee since he did not fulfill the tender criteria. In W.P. No. 3497/2017, petitioner has questioned the validity of the subsequent orders dated 24-4-2017 (Annexure P/1), 24-5-2017 (Annexure P/1-A) and 18-5-2017 (Annexure P/1-B), whereby the competent Authority has suspended business dealings with the petitioner and after granting opportunity of hearing debarred the petitioner from participating in any of the tender proceedings of NHDC Ltd. for a period of two years w.e.f. 4-12-2015. 3. Brief facts leading to filing of these cases are that petitioner is a registered partnership firm engaged in the business of supply of manpower (Security Guards) to Government departments. The petitioner had been a successful bidder in many of the tenders floated by the respondents for supply of manpower since 1997. For the year 2015–2016 also, a tender for supply of manpower was floated by the respondents vide tender notice dated 25-6-2015. In reply to the said NIT, petitioner submitted its bid along with copy of experience certificate issued by THDC India Ltd. After passage of some time, petitioner received a notice dated 1-10-2015 asking to show-cause as to why action be not taken against the petitioner-firm for submitting fake experience certificate. In response, to the aforesaid show-cause notice, petitioner submitted its reply on 13-10-2015 inter alia stating that experience certificate has been issued by THDC India Ltd. in lieu of work done by the petitioner for which payments had also been received by it from THDC. After considering the reply, respondents came to the conclusion that petitioner had violated “FRAUD” policy by submitting fake certificate and resultantly debarred the petitioner from participating in the tender process for a period of 2 years w.e.f. 4-12-2015. Respondents issued a subsequent letter dated 15-1-2016, whereby the period of debarment was reduced from 2 years to 6 months. After considering the reply, respondents came to the conclusion that petitioner had violated “FRAUD” policy by submitting fake certificate and resultantly debarred the petitioner from participating in the tender process for a period of 2 years w.e.f. 4-12-2015. Respondents issued a subsequent letter dated 15-1-2016, whereby the period of debarment was reduced from 2 years to 6 months. Again vide letter dated 28-6-2016, the petitioner was informed that it was debarred for a period of 2 years w.e.f. 4-12-2015 and the earnest money of Rs. 2,01,000/- had been forfeited for violating the FRAUD policy. Being aggrieved by the order dated 28-6-2016, petitioner preferred W.P. No. 4654/16 before this Court and the same was disposed of vide order dated 27-9-2016 in the following terms :— “This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief: “That the order Annexure-P/1, P/2 and P/3 quashed in entirety and the factum of debarment of the petitioner be expunged for the record of petitioner and the forfeited amount be refunded to the petitioner.” This Court as per order dated 11-7-2016 has issued a show cause notice to the respondents and after considering the submissions and the facts, by way of interim relief it is directed that operation and effect of the impugned order 28-6-2016 shall remain stayed. After service of the notice, the respondents No. 2 and 3 who passed the order tendered the appearance through Shri Deepak Awasthi, who has fairly stated across the bar that keeping the question of territorial jurisdiction open, as the appeal is provided under Clause 10 of the policy which is known as Banning Business Dealings and its procedure; it is urged that the Chief Executive Officer is the appellate authority as per Clause 3(b) of the said policy. However, the issue as raised by the petitioner before this Court may be adjudicated by the Appellate Authority within a time frame. Counsel appearing on behalf of the other respondents urged that at present they have nothing to say in the present case and therefore, appropriate orders to adjudicate the issue by the appellate authority may be passed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that in the present case the procedure of banning the business dealings has not been followed, however, the petition is maintainable which may be decided on merits. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that in the present case the procedure of banning the business dealings has not been followed, however, the petition is maintainable which may be decided on merits. After hearing both the parties and on consideration of the fact that the issue as raised by the petitioner may be adjudicated by the appellate authority in the facts and circumstances of the case, including the issue of no fault on his part. However, all the points may be dealt with and decided by the appellate authority including the issue of non observance of the procedure. However, in our considered opinion, it would be appropriate to direct that if petitioner files an appeal within two weeks from today before the Appellate Authority, then new appeal be decided within two months from the date of filing. It is further directed that till then the interim order passed by this Court shall remain in operation. It is made clear here the question of territorial jurisdiction would remain open to be raised at subsequent stage, if occasion so arises. With the aforesaid directions, this petition stands disposed of. In pursuance to the aforesaid order, petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, which was dismissed vide order dated 2-12-2016 on the ground that there was no provision for personal hearing and the order of debarment was upheld. Being aggrieved, a second writ petition was filed by the petitioner before this Court which came to be registered as W.P. No. 8897/16 and this Court vide order dated 3-4-2017, having found that respondents had issued the notice dated 1-10-2015 to the petitioner to take action in terms of the FRAUD policy but what action would be taken had not been clearly enumerated therein and though the policy contemplated personal hearing if required yet the same had been declined for the reason that it was not provided in the policy, set aside the order dated 2-12-2016 with liberty to the respondents to supplement the show-cause notice dated 1-10-2015, if any, within two weeks. The petitioner was set at liberty to file fresh reply, if any, within another two weeks and respondents were directed to take decision on merits within two months. The petitioner was set at liberty to file fresh reply, if any, within another two weeks and respondents were directed to take decision on merits within two months. In pursuance to the liberty so granted, respondents have issued a supplementary show-cause notice dated 15-4-2017 and orders dated 19-4-2017 and 20-4-2017 whereby bid of the petitioner was rejected on technical evaluation, which is subject-matter of challenge in W.P. No. 2735/17, wherein this Court, vide order dated 28-4-2017, as an interim measure, has directed that the tender process in question be concluded, but third party rights shall not be created in favour of anyone. However, during the pendency of this writ petition, respondents issued another order dated 18-5-2017, black-listing the petitioner which is subject-matter of challenge in W.P. No. 3497/17. 4. On notice, respondents have entered appearance and respondent Nos. 2 to 5 have filed counter affidavit. Drawing strength from the fact that in the first round of litigation in W.P. No. 4654/2016 the question of territorial jurisdiction was left open to be raised at subsequent stage if occasion so arises, in the counter-affidavit filed in W.P. No. 3497/2017, a preliminary objection has been raised in relation to territorial jurisdiction of this Bench at Gwalior on the underneath premise: (a) Respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are having their Corporate Office at Bhopal and Resettlement and Rehabilitation Office at Khandwa. The two projects namely Indira Sagar Power Station and Omkareshwar Power Station are also situated in district Khandwa, for which the petitioner had filed the bid. Thus the Corporate Office of respondent Nos. 2 to 5, as well as, the project in question lie within the jurisdiction of Principal Seat at Jabalpur. (b) The petitioner has not pleaded in his petition that cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench. (c) The NIT dated 25-6-2017 was issued online from the Office situated at Khandwa. Petitioner submitted the bid on-line and all the proceedings such as opening of technical bid, financial bid and issuance of work order are from the Office at Khandwa. With the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for respondent Nos. (c) The NIT dated 25-6-2017 was issued online from the Office situated at Khandwa. Petitioner submitted the bid on-line and all the proceedings such as opening of technical bid, financial bid and issuance of work order are from the Office at Khandwa. With the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 5 contended that since the entire process right from floating of NIT till issuance of orders impugned has been carried out at NHDC Office, Khandwa which falls within the jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court at Jabalpur, therefore, merely having a registered Office at Gwalior will not give any cause of action to the petitioner to file this petition before the Gwalior Bench. He submits that the High Court has framed rules regulating practice and procedure known as M.P. High Court Rules and Orders, Chapter 3 whereof, deals with territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat and Benches and Rule 4 therein provides that where a Bench, in the Principal Seat at Jabalpur or the Benches at Indore or Gwalior, on an objection taken by the Registry or otherwise, is of the opinion that a main case posted before it, had arisen from a revenue district falling within the territorial jurisdiction of some other Bench or the Principal Seat, it may record its opinion and return the main case for its presentation at proper place for orders, after retaining one complete set of the main case. He submits that in view of the above, this petition is not liable to be entertained at this Bench. 5. The petitioner has chosen not to file any rejoinder in W.P. No. 3497/17 and, therefore, the averments contained in the aforesaid counter-affidavit remain uncontroverted. Further, the rejoinder filed in W.P. No. 2735/17 is silent on the question of territorial jurisdiction. 6. Before adverting to the contentions on merits, it would be worthwhile to deal with the question of territorial jurisdiction in the backdrop of objections as raised by counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 5 in pursuance of the liberty granted by this Court in the first round of litigation (W.P. No. 4654/17). 7. Indisputably, the Notice Inviting E-tender has been floated on 25-6-2015 by the Manager (Contracts), NHDC Ltd., R and R, Khandwa, wherein the description of work reads thus:— “Providing Manpower services such as Stenographer, Computer operator, Asstt. 2 to 5 in pursuance of the liberty granted by this Court in the first round of litigation (W.P. No. 4654/17). 7. Indisputably, the Notice Inviting E-tender has been floated on 25-6-2015 by the Manager (Contracts), NHDC Ltd., R and R, Khandwa, wherein the description of work reads thus:— “Providing Manpower services such as Stenographer, Computer operator, Asstt. Secretarial/Technical Electrician, Diver, Cook, Plumber, Helper for Electrician, Helper, Gardenre and Sweeper etc. for R and R Project, of NHDC Ltd. Khandwa (M.P.)” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, it is apparent that the work order was issued for Khandwa project of NHDC. It is also not in dispute that respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are having their Corporate Office at Bhopal and Resettlement and Rehabilitation Office at Khandwa. Further the contract form (Annexure P/3) has been issued by Manager (Contracts), NHDC, R and R Office, Khandwa; the impugned communications (Annexures P/1 and P/2 in W.P. No. 2735/17) whereby bid of the petitioner has been rejected on technical evaluation have been issued by the Office of Chief Engineer, NHDC Ltd., Khandwa and the orders impugned in W.P. No. 3497/17 including the order of black-listing the petitioner-firm for a period of 2 years, have all been issued by Sr. Manager (Contracts), NHDC, R and R, Khandwa. In addition to it, there is no rebuttal to the contention of the respondents that all the proceedings such as opening of technical bid, financial bid and issuance of work order have been from the Office at Khandwa. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, it can safely be presumed that the genesis of cause of action is Khandwa, which, indisputably, lies within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Seat of this Court at Jabalpur. 8. In similar circumstances, while addressing the issue of territorial jurisdiction, the Apex Court in the case of Alchemist Limited v. State Bank of Sikkim, 2007 (3) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 284 : (2007) 11 SCC 335 : AIR 2007 SC 1812 after referring to catena of precedents on the point, has summarized thus:— “21. The legislative history of the constitutional provisions, therefore, make it clear that after 1963, cause of action is relevant and germane and a writ petition can be instituted in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which cause of action in whole or in part arises.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. The legislative history of the constitutional provisions, therefore, make it clear that after 1963, cause of action is relevant and germane and a writ petition can be instituted in a High Court within the territorial jurisdiction of which cause of action in whole or in part arises.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. Further, on the question of ascertaining the accrual of cause of action at a particular place, the Apex Court in the aforesaid case, held thus:— “40. In National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram., (2004) 9 SCC 786 : JT 2004 (4) SC 508, referring to earlier cases, the Apex Court held that: “the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be sustained.” From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the petitioner/appellant, would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a ‘part of cause of action’, nothing less than.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. However, before concluding, it would be worthwhile to analyze the point in issue in the light of doctrine of forum conveniens, as petitioner claims to have his registered Office in Gwalior. 11. In the case of Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567 , the Apex Court has held as under:— “17. However, before concluding, it would be worthwhile to analyze the point in issue in the light of doctrine of forum conveniens, as petitioner claims to have his registered Office in Gwalior. 11. In the case of Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567 , the Apex Court has held as under:— “17. It is seen from the above that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower to Court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear from the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in Paragraph 16 of the petition, in our opinion, fall into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer territorial jurisdiction on the Courts at Ahmedabad.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. In Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2007 (213) ELT 323 (S.C.): “41. Keeping in view the expression “cause of action” used in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, indisputably even if a small fraction thereof accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter though the doctrine of forum conveniens may also have to be considered.” 13. A special Bench (5 Judges) of Delhi High Court in Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2011 Del. 174 has considered this principle and in the said judgment Hon'ble Justice Dipak Misra (C.J. As His Lordship then was) opined as under:— “31. A special Bench (5 Judges) of Delhi High Court in Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2011 Del. 174 has considered this principle and in the said judgment Hon'ble Justice Dipak Misra (C.J. As His Lordship then was) opined as under:— “31. The concept of forum conveniens fundamentally means that it is obligatory on the part of the Court to see the convenience of all the parties before it. The convenience in its ambit and sweep would include the existence of more appropriate forum, expenses involved, the law relating to the lis, verification of certain facts which are necessitous for just adjudication of the controversy and such other ancillary aspects. The balance of convenience is also to be taken note of. Be it noted, the Apex Court has clearly stated in the cases of Kusum Ingots (supra), Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra) and Ambica Industries (supra) about the applicability of the doctrine of forum conveniens while opining that arising of a part of cause of action would entitle the High Court to entertain the writ petition as maintainable. 32. The principle of forum conveniens in its ambit and sweep encapsulates the concept that a cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court would not itself constitute to be the determining factor compelling the Court to entertain the matter. While exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court cannot be totally oblivious of the concept of forum conveniens. The Full Bench in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) has not kept in view the concept of forum conveniens and has expressed the view that if the appellate authority who has passed the order is situated in Delhi, then the Delhi High Court should be treated as the forum conveniens. We are unable to subscribe to the said view. 33. Ltd. (supra) has not kept in view the concept of forum conveniens and has expressed the view that if the appellate authority who has passed the order is situated in Delhi, then the Delhi High Court should be treated as the forum conveniens. We are unable to subscribe to the said view. 33. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are inclined to modify the findings and conclusions of the Full Bench in New India Assurance Company Limited (supra) and proceed to state our conclusions in seriatim as follows: (a) The finding recorded by the Full Bench that the sole cause of action emerges at the place or location where the tribunal/appellate authority/revisional authority is situate and the said High Court (i.e., Delhi High Court) cannot decline to entertain the writ petition as that would amount to failure of the duty of the Court cannot be accepted inasmuch as such a finding is totally based on the situs of the tribunal/appellate authority/revisional authority totally ignoring the concept of forum conveniens. (b) Even if a miniscule part of cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of this Court, a writ petition would he maintainable before this Court, however, the cause of action has to be understood as per the ratio laid down in the case of Alchemist Ltd. (supra). (c) An order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action to make the writ petition maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the appellate authority is situated. Yet, the same may not be the singular factor to compel the High Court to decide the matter on merits. The High Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. (d) The conclusion that where the appellate or revisional authority is located constitutes the place of forum conveniens as stated in absolute terms by the Full Bench is not correct as it will vary from case to case and depend upon the lis in question. (e) The finding that the Court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 if only the jurisdiction is invoked in a mala fide manner is too restricted/constricted as the exercise of power under Article 226 being discretionary cannot be limited or restricted to the ground of mala fide alone. (e) The finding that the Court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 if only the jurisdiction is invoked in a mala fide manner is too restricted/constricted as the exercise of power under Article 226 being discretionary cannot be limited or restricted to the ground of mala fide alone. (f) While entertaining a writ petition, the doctrine of forum conveniens and the nature of cause of action are required to be scrutinized by the High Court depending upon the factual matrix of each case in view of what has been stated in Ambica Industries (supra) and Adani Exports Ltd. (supra). (g) The conclusion of the earlier decision of the Full Bench in New India Assurance Company Limited (supra) “that since the original order merges into the appellate order, the place where the appellate authority is located is also forum conveniens” is not correct. (h) Any decision of this Court contrary to the conclusions enumerated hereinabove stands overruled.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. Regard being had to the discussion made hereinabove, there cannot be any doubt that the question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the territorial limit of the Court's jurisdiction. In the instant case, the petitioner has not at all been able to establish that cause of action in whole, or in part, has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Bench at Gwalior. Further, merely because the petitioner has its registered office at Gwalior, it cannot be said that it constitutes the place of forum conveniens, moreso in view of the fact that entire proceedings have culminated at Khandwa, wherefrom the impugned orders have been issued which also happens to be situs of the projects in question. The petitioner has maintained a blissful silence in this regard. The petitioner has maintained a blissful silence in this regard. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid settled position of law and in the backdrop of the factual matrix traced above, it is held that this Bench lacks the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present petitions and the cause of action is found to have arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat at Jabalpur. 15. In view of the aforesaid, Registry is directed to return the petitions to counsel for the petitioner in accordance with Rule 4 of Chapter 3 of M.P. High Court Rules, 2008, for their presentation before the Principal Seat at Jabalpur. 16. With the aforesaid, the petitions stand disposed of.