Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 1047 (ALL)

SUBHASH CHANDRA v. STATE OF U. P.

2017-04-19

KRISHNA MURARI, RAVINDRA NATH KAKKAR

body2017
JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Ram Surat Saroj, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel and Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for respondent No. 4. 2. These two writ petitions are based on identical set of facts challenging the same land acquisition notification hence have been clubbed and heard together and are being decided by a common judgment. 3. Challenge in these petitions have been made to the notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for acquisition of 73.3083 hectares of land situated in village Hazratpur Tehsil Dadri in district Gautam Budh Nagar for Planned Industrial Development through Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority. The plots belonging to the petitioners were also subject-matter of acquisition by the said notification. The notification under Section 4 was followed by a declaration dated 9.11.2009 made under Section 6 of the Act. Undisputedly, award has also been made on 12.12.2011. 4. Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 has raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of these writ petitions on the ground of inordinate delay and laches. It is submitted that petitions have been filed after seven years from the date of declaration issued under Section 6 and is highly barred by laches. It is further submitted that in absence of plausible explanation for inordinate delay and laches, the writ petition is not liable to be entertained. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that delay and laches have been explained in paragraph Nos. 13, 14 and 15 which are extracted hereinunder : “(13) That it is relevant to mentioned here that the Greater Noida Authority as well as State Government no any development work done over the plot in dispute and acquire lands by the impugned notification till today the petitioners are alongwith other tenure-holders possession over and doing agricultural work doing till today over the acquire lands. (14) That the statutory right of the petitioners filing the aforesaid writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to ignore the latches and delay by this Hon’ble Court because petitioners are poor agriculturist not aware of the facts challenging the notification before this Hon’ble Court, petitioners are aware the facts the notification quashed by the Hon’ble Court in respect of all the villagers, due to this reason, petitioners are not filed writ petition the concerned authority tried disposes the petitioners on 27.2.2017 after some arrangement of expenses petitioners without any delay filed the writ petition but the petitioners and petitioners could not received any compensation till today in respect of the aforesaid plot and also the respondents as well as land acquisition officer never tendered compensation in respect of the aforesaid plots and also not informed to the petitioners about the taking of the compensation by way of any notice till today. (15) That the some dispute arose between the tenure-holder/petitioners in respect of the Revenue Records after death of the ancestor whose heirs rightly recorded in the Revenue Record after compromise between the parties the name of the petitioner was recorded in the Revenue Record in Khasra No. 87 Area 0.1570 Hect. 89 0.1610 Hect. situated at Village Hajratpur, Pargana and Tehsil, Dadri, District Gautambudh Nagar. Due to this reason, petitioners have filed the representation without any delay before this Hon’ble Court if any laches filing the present petition may kindly be pleased to ignore and decide the case on merit in the interest of justice." 6. A perusal of the aforesaid averments, in our opinion, do not satisfactorily explain the delay and laches of more than seven years in approaching this Court. The mere fact that the petitioner had no knowledge that other tenure-holders had challenged the notification, or even if there was dispute between the co-tenure holders cannot constitute any ground much less good ground for condonation of delay and laches of seven years. 7. Thus, we find that petitioner has failed to submit any plausible explanation for delay and laches. The issue as to whether this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should decline to entertain the writ petitions on the ground of unexplained delay and laches have been subject-matter of various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 8. The issue as to whether this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should decline to entertain the writ petitions on the ground of unexplained delay and laches have been subject-matter of various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 8. Reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Shankara Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar and others, (2011) 5 SCC 607 , laying down principles for granting or refusing relief on the ground of delay and laches. In paragraph Nos. 54 and 68 of the reports, it was held as under : “54. The relevant considerations in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well-settled. They are : 1. There is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt on its own facts. 2. The principle on which the Court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by-the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because Court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. 3. The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. 4. No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. 5. That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay. 68. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. 4. No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. 5. That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay. 68. The other factor the High Court should have taken into consideration that during the period of delay, interest has accrued in favour of the third party and the condonation of unexplained delay would effect the rights of third parties. We are also of the view that reliance placed by Shri Ranjit Kumar on certain observations made by this Court would not assist him in the facts and circumstances of this case. While concluding on this issue, it would be useful to refer the observations made by the Court in the case of Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, wherein it is stated that : ‘Delay defeats equity and that the discretionary relief of condonation can be had, provided one has not given by his conduct, given a go by to his rights.’ 9. The Apex Court in Swaika Properties Ltd. and another v. State of Rajasthan and others, (2008) 4 SCC 695 , has held that writ petition challenging the land acquisition proceedings with delay and laches be not entertained. The Apex Court in Aflatoon and others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, (1975) 4 SCC 285 , has laid down following in paragraph 11 of the reports : “11. There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground t hat the particulars of the public purpose were not specified. A valid notification under Section 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners (See Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India)”. 10. In identical circumstance, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501 , upheld the judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by land holders on the ground of delay and laches. Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Ramaswami speaking for the bench, observed as under : “29. It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge, dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.” In the concurring judgment, Hon’ble S.B. Majumdar, J. held as under : “35. Such a belated writ petition, therefore, was rightly rejected by the learned Single Judge on the ground of gross delay and laches. The respondent-writ petitioners can be said to have waived their objections to be acquisitioned on the ground of its extinction of public purpose by their own inaction, lethargy and indolent conduct. The Division Bench of the High Court had taken the view that because of their inaction, no vested rights of third parties are created. That finding is obviously incorrect for the simple reason that because of the indolent conduct of the writ petitioners land got acquired, award was passed, compensation was handed over to the various claimants including the landlord. Reference applications came to be filed for larger compensation by claimants including writ petitioners themselves. That finding is obviously incorrect for the simple reason that because of the indolent conduct of the writ petitioners land got acquired, award was passed, compensation was handed over to the various claimants including the landlord. Reference applications came to be filed for larger compensation by claimants including writ petitioners themselves. The acquired land got vested in the State Government and the Municipal Corporation free from all encumbrances as enjoined by Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus, right to get more compensation got vested in diverse claimants by passing of the award, as well as vested right was created in favour of the Bombay Municipal Corporation by virtue of the vesting of the land in the State Government for being handed over to the Corporation. All these events could not be wished away by observing that no third party rights were created by them. The writ petition came to be filed after all these events had taken place. Such a writ petition was clearly stillborn due to gross delay and laches.” 11. To the similar effect is the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and another v. Shah Hyder Beig and others, (2000) 2 SCC 48 , it was held as under : “In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against the proceeding thereunder. There has been the consistent view taken by Hon’ble Apex Court.” 12. Recently a full bench of this Court in the case of Vivek Dubey v. State of U.P. and another, 2016(3) ADJ 139 , considering the principles to be followed while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution where there is unexplained delay and laches in approaching the Court has observed as under : “[16] Whether there is an unexplained delay or laches is a matter which has to be decided on the facts of each case. The principle that the Court will not entertain a petition which suffers from delay and laches is a rule of practice to guide the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The principle that the Court will not entertain a petition which suffers from delay and laches is a rule of practice to guide the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Among the factors which have to be borne in mind by the Court is whether as a result of a lapse of time, rights or equities have been created in favour of a third party which are liable to be displaced in the event that the petitions are entertained and relief granted. Whether the explanation of the petitioner is sufficient to draw an inference that there has been no indolence on his part, is a matter for the Court to decide in the facts of each case. It is for the Court to determine on the basis of all relevant circumstances whether the delay is of such a nature as to lead an inference that there has been a waiver and abandonment of the claim by a litigant.” 13. In view of the settled preposition of law by the aforesaid judicial pronouncements and the facts of this case where the acquisition proceedings have been challenged by the petitioner after a long lapse of time without any reasonable and satisfactory explanation for gross and inordinate delay in filing the petition, the challenge must fail. 14. In challenge to land acquisition proceedings, delay plays an important role. Petitioner cannot be allowed to sit on the fence and wait for completion of the land acquisition proceedings and thereafter approach the Court. 15. In view of the facts and discussions made above, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and the same, accordingly, stands dismissed. However, we do not make any order as to costs.