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2017 DIGILAW 1047 (KER)

Soji Peter v. K. B. Vijayan

2017-07-20

P.N.RAVINDRAN, RAMACHANDRAN

body2017
JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. 1. The resolution of the limited question brought by the appellant in this appeal hinges on the character to be construed to the amount of Rs.10 lakhs concededly paid by the respondent to the appellant under an agreement for sale, by which the respondent agreed to buy and the appellant agreed to sell a certain extent of property belonging to the latter. The respondent maintains that the said amount of Rs.10 lakhs was paid as an advance for purchase of the property, which has been acknowledged as such in the agreement for sale. The appellant au contraire asserts that this amount represents the Earnest Money Deposit (EMD) and contends that he is entitled to forfeit the same in terms of the agreement. 2. The adjudicative character of this amount is vital in this case because it would answer the question as to whether the entire amount can be forfeited by the appellant as claimed by him. As stated above, it is the case of the respondent that the amount represents the advance payment and that of the appellant is that this is an EMD, liable for forfeiture under the terms of the agreement. 3. The court below, on an assessment of evidence and material on record, concluded, inter alia, that this amount is only an advance and not EMD as contended by the appellant and hence not liable for forfeiture. 4. An evaluation of this very singular issue in this appeal requires only the most essential and constitutive facts to be recorded, which are as below: 5. The plaint schedule property belongs to the appellant. The respondent and the appellant entered into an agreement for sale on 04.04.2007 fixing the sale consideration at Rs.75,250/- per cent. The extent of property sought to be conveyed was 260.25 cents. Admittedly and as recorded in the agreement, an amount of Rs.10 lakhs was paid by the respondent to the appellant as advance sale consideration. As per the terms of the agreement, the date for performance was fixed not later than 03.10.2011. 6. The respondent alleges that the appellant avoided execution of the sale deed citing one reason or the other, since the price of the property had considerably escalated, thus creating a nefarious intention in his mind to sell the property to third parties. As per the terms of the agreement, the date for performance was fixed not later than 03.10.2011. 6. The respondent alleges that the appellant avoided execution of the sale deed citing one reason or the other, since the price of the property had considerably escalated, thus creating a nefarious intention in his mind to sell the property to third parties. The respondent maintains that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that though he had requested the appellant for the documents of the property for scrutiny, he did not hand over the same. The reasons attributed by the respondent for the refusal of the appellant in handing over the documents is that the plaint schedule property, in fact, had no access, which would have been discovered by him, had the appellant given him the title documents and that it was, therefore, that the appellant refused to give the documents to him. He, therefore, says that he was constrained for these reasons to rescind the contract and ask for refund of the advance paid. According to the respondent, he was thus forced to rescind the contract solely for the reasons attributable to the appellant and that by such recession, not only has the appellant not sustained any loss but has, in fact, enjoyed a benefit on account of the escalation of the price of the property. The respondent, therefore, laid O.S.No.144/2011 on the files of the Sub Court, Perumbavoor seeking a decree for an amount of Rs.10 lakhs with interest at 12% per annum from the date of suit till realisation. 7. The appellant filed a written statement in the suit, wherein he contended that the respondent had obtained no cause of action against him. He admits that an agreement was entered into between them on 04.04.2011 and that an amount of Rs.10 lakhs was paid as sale consideration. His specific case in the written statement was that all the original prior title deeds relating to the plaint schedule property were shown to the respondent and verified by him. He says that the respondent and his men had come to the property several times for inspection and that it was only after such inspection that the agreement was entered into. He says that the respondent and his men had come to the property several times for inspection and that it was only after such inspection that the agreement was entered into. He says that he agreed to sell the property because he was in dire need of the money and he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The appellant contends that the allegations made by the respondent, that the plaint schedule property does not have a proper access or pathway to it, is completely incorrect and intended only as a ruse to rescind the contract. The appellant avouches in his pleadings that, on account of the breach committed by the respondent, he could not obtain money for investing in his business and that he was forced to draw large amount from a loan account. 8. The court below raised three issues for trial as under: “1. Who committed breach of agreement dated 4.4.2011 entered between the respondent and the appellant? 2. Whether the appellant is entitled to forfeit the advance amount of Rupees 10 lakhs towards the loss allegedly sustained by him? 3. Whether the respondent is entitled to get back the advance amount of Rupees 10 lakhs with interest from the appellant? 4. Reliefs and costs.” 9. The respondent examined himself as PW1 and another witness as PW2 and marked Exhibit A1, the agreement for sale, which is the subject matter of the suit. The appellant did not adduce any oral evidence but marked Exhibits B1 to B7 on his side. Exhibits C1 and C1(a) were also marked, which are the commission report and sketch as court exhibits. 10. On an evaluation of the evidence available on record and the depositions of the witnesses, the court below concluded that the reasons alleged by the respondent for recession of the contract were without truth and that the recession was not supported by sufficient rectitude. 10. On an evaluation of the evidence available on record and the depositions of the witnesses, the court below concluded that the reasons alleged by the respondent for recession of the contract were without truth and that the recession was not supported by sufficient rectitude. However, the court below, finding that an amount of Rs.10 lakhs was paid by the respondent as advance sale consideration and acknowledged as such by the appellant in Exhibit A1 sale agreement, decreed the suit with costs allowing the respondent to realise a sum of Rs.10,62,465/-, with interest at 12% per annum for the principal amount of Rs.10 lakhs from the date of suit till the date of decree and thereafter, at 6% per annum till the date of realisation from the appellant. The court also went on to hold that since the respondent was at fault in rescinding the contract, the benefit of Section 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act would not be available to him and this amount would not be a charge on the plaint schedule property. 11. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree the defendant in the suit has filed this appeal. 12. We have heard Sri.Shaji Chirayath, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. V. Rajendran Perumbavoor, learned counsel for respondents 2 and 3. 13. The consequences of breach of contract are contained in Chapter VI of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (the Act’ for short). The Chapter begins with Section 73 and ends with Section 75 and is thus a full code for every consequence in the case of breach of contract. Section 73 provides that when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party, who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him. Section 75 relates to the right of the party to rescind a contract. It says that a person who rightfully rescinds a contract is entitled to compensation for any damage which he has sustained through the non-fulfillment of the contract. Between these two specific provisions resides Section 74, which provides for award of compensation for breach of contract where a penalty is stipulated. It says that a person who rightfully rescinds a contract is entitled to compensation for any damage which he has sustained through the non-fulfillment of the contract. Between these two specific provisions resides Section 74, which provides for award of compensation for breach of contract where a penalty is stipulated. Since the issue in this case pivots on the question as to whether the appellant is entitled to claim for forfeiture of the entire advance consideration, it will be necessary to read the said Section in full. The same is, therefore, extracted as under: “74. Compensation for breach of contract where penalty stipulated for.- When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for.” 14. The issue as to how the compensation under Section 74 has to be adjudicated, quantified and awarded has already attained the attention of various courts, including the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in several cases earlier. This issue is no longer res nova and the overwhelming judicial material available in this field leads to an irresistible inference that where a sum is named in a contract as the liquidated amount payable by way of damages, only reasonable compensation can be awarded not exceeding the amount so fixed. Similarly, if an amount is fixed in the nature of penalty, then again only reasonable compensation can be awarded not exceeding the penalty so fixed. 15. One of the first affirmative decisions on this issue by our Court was in the year 1982 by a learned Division Bench in State of Kerala v. United Shippers and Dredgers ( 1982 KLT 738 ). The opinion of this Court is distilled in paragraph 18 of the judgment. 15. One of the first affirmative decisions on this issue by our Court was in the year 1982 by a learned Division Bench in State of Kerala v. United Shippers and Dredgers ( 1982 KLT 738 ). The opinion of this Court is distilled in paragraph 18 of the judgment. A reading of this judgment, especially paragraph 18 thereof, gives a complete understanding of the powers of the court acting under Section 74 of the Act, which is as under: “That the party complaining of breach of contract and claiming compensation is entitled to succeed only on proof of “legal injury” having been suffered by him the sense of some loss or damage having been sustained on account of such breach, is clear from S.73 and 75 of the Act. S.74 is only supplementary to S.73 of the Act and it does not make any departure from the principle being S.73 in regard to this matter. Every case of compensation for breach of contract has to be dealt with on the basis of S.73 of the Act. In a particular case where the contract itself stipulates for payment of a sum of money on the breach of contract or contains any other stipulation for penalty, the principle additionally propounded by S.74 also will have to be applied and that is why irrespective of the amount stipulated in the contract, the party suffering from the breach is entitled only to reasonable compensation which, however, shall not exceed the amount so stipulated in the contract. Whether it be a contract which stipulates a sum of money as being payable on breach of contract or whether it contains any other penal clause, or whether it is a contract which does not contain any such clause, the party complaining of breach of contract cannot successfully claim compensation unless he makes out loss or damages referable to such breach. The best measure of reasonable compensation would of course be the extent of actual loss or damage sustained. If the extent of actual loss or damage sustained is capable of being proved that provides a safe guide for the court to determine the quantum of reasonable compensation. If quantification of loss or damage is not possible, the party who has suffered on account of the breach is not without remedy. If the extent of actual loss or damage sustained is capable of being proved that provides a safe guide for the court to determine the quantum of reasonable compensation. If quantification of loss or damage is not possible, the party who has suffered on account of the breach is not without remedy. He can still request the court to assess reasonable compensation on the materials available and award the same to him. The words in S.74 ‘whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby’ have been employed to underscore the departure deliberately made by Indian legislature from the complicated principles of English Common Law and also to emphasis that reasonable compensation can be granted even in a case where extent of actual loss or damage is incapable of proof or not proved. That is why S.74 of the Act deliberately states that what is to be awarded is reasonable compensation. In a case where the party complaining of breach of the contract has not suffered legal inquiry in the sense of sustaining loss or damage, there is nothing to compensate him for; there is nothing to recompense, satisfy or make amends. Therefore, he will not be entitled to compensation.” 16. As far as the Hon’ble Supreme Court is concerned, the issue of compensation on account of breach of contract in its various hues and countenances was considered in several cases. One of which is the judgment delivered in the case of Fateh v. Balkishan Dass ( AIR 1963 SC 1405 ), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court succinctly declared the law in this area in paragraphs 10 and 15, which read as under: 10. Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act deals with the measure of damages in two classes of cases (i) where the contract names a sum to be paid in case of breach and (ii) where the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty. We are in the present case not concerned to decide whether a contract containing a covenant of forfeiture of deposit for due performance of a contract falls within the first class. The measure of damages in the case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is by S. 74 reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated for. We are in the present case not concerned to decide whether a contract containing a covenant of forfeiture of deposit for due performance of a contract falls within the first class. The measure of damages in the case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is by S. 74 reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated for. In assessing damages the Court has, subject to the limit fo the penalty stipulated, jurisdiction to award such Compensation as it deems reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Jurisdiction of the Court to award Compensation in case of breach of contract is unqualified except as to the maximum stipulated, by compensation has to be reasonable, and that imposes upon the Court duty to award compensation according to settled principles. The section undoubtedly says that the aggrieved party is entitled to receive compensation from the party who has broken the contract whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused by the breach. Thereby it merely dispenses with proof of “actual loss or damage”, it does not justify the award of compensation when in consequence of the breach no legal injury at all has resulted because compensation for breach of contract can be awarded to make good loss or damage which naturally arose in the usual course of things, or which the parties knew when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach. 15. Section 74 declares the law as to liability upon breach of contract where Compensation is by agreement of the parties predetermined, or where there is a stipulation by way of penalty. But the application of enactment is not restricted to cases where the aggrieved party claims relief as a respondent. The section does not confer a special benefit upon any party, it merely declares the law that notwithstanding any term in the contract predetermining damages or providing for forfeiture of any property by way of penalty, the Court will award to the party aggrieved only reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount named or penalty stipulated. The jurisdiction of the Court is not determined by the accidental circumstance of the party in default being a respondent or a appellant in a suit. The jurisdiction of the Court is not determined by the accidental circumstance of the party in default being a respondent or a appellant in a suit. Use of the expression “to receive from the party who has broken the contract” does not predicate that the jurisdiction of the Court to adjust amounts which have been paid by the party in default cannot be exercised in dealing with the claim of the party complaining of breach of contract. The Court has to adjudge in every case reasonable compensation to which the respondent is entitled from the appellant on breach of the contract. Such compensation has to be ascertained having regard to the conditions existing on the date of the breach.” 17. Thereafter, in the year 1969, in the judgment in Maula Bux v. Union of India ( (1969) 2 SCC 554 ), which was a matter that arose from Allahabad, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further expatiated on this issue and declared emphatically that even if the amounts are construed as earnest money, if the forfeiture is in the nature of penalty under Section 74 of the Act, it would apply and therefore, that only reasonable compensation can be paid after such adjudication. Paragraph 5 of the said judgment makes this view indisputable and it reads as under: “Forfeiture of earnest money under a contract for sale of property - Movable or immovable - If the amount is reasonable, does not fall within Section 74. That has been decided in several cases : Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup, AIR 1926 PC 1 ; Roshan Lal v. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Ltd. Delhi, ILR 33 All 166; Muhammad Habibullah v. Muhammad Shafi, ILR 41 All 324; Bishan Chand v. Radhakishan Das, ILR 19 All 490. These cases are easily explained, for forfeiture of reasonable amount paid as earnest money does not amount to imposing a penalty. But if forfeiture is of the nature of breach of penalty, Section 74 applies. Where under the terms of the contract the party in breach has undertaken to pay a sum of money or to forfeit a sum of money which he has already paid to the party complaining of a breach of contract, the undertaking is of the nature of a penalty.“ 18. Where under the terms of the contract the party in breach has undertaken to pay a sum of money or to forfeit a sum of money which he has already paid to the party complaining of a breach of contract, the undertaking is of the nature of a penalty.“ 18. In the same year, in another appeal that arose from the High Court of Calcutta, the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered all the earlier judgments on the question of earnest money deposit and codified the principles relating to it. In the said judgment, namely, Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills and Others v. Tata Air Craft Limited ( (1969) 3 SCC 522 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 21, recorded the principles relating to earnest money as under: From a review of the decisions cited above, the following principles emerge regarding “earnest”: “(1) It must be given at the moment at which the contract is concluded. (2) It represents a guarantee that the contract will be fulfilled or, in other words, ‘earnest’ is given to bind the contract. (3) It is part of the purchase price when that transaction is carried out. (4) It is forfeited when the transaction falls through by reason of the default or failure of the purchaser. (5) Unless there is anything to the contrary in the terms of the contract, on default committed by the buyer, the seller is entitled to forfeit the earnest.” 19. The views of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on these lines stood the test of time, it never having been disturbed. In the year 2003, their Lordships were considering this issue again in a matter that arose from Bombay in the judgment reported in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. SAW Pipes Ltd. ( AIR 2003 SC 2629 ). The Court paraphrased these principles once again emphasising that what is eligible to be awarded, to the person complaining of breach of a contract, is only a reasonable compensation and nothing more. The Court paraphrased these principles once again emphasising that what is eligible to be awarded, to the person complaining of breach of a contract, is only a reasonable compensation and nothing more. The relevant portion of the said judgment, wherein this re statement is made reads as under: “It is apparent from the aforesaid reasoning recorded by the arbitral tribunal that it failed to consider Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act and the ratio laid down in Fateh Chand’s case (supra) wherein it is specifically held that jurisdiction of the Court to award compensation in case of breach of contract is unqualified except as to the maximum stipulated; and Compensation has to be reasonable. Under Section 73, when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive compensation for any loss caused to him which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. This Section is to be read with Section 74, which deals with penalty stipulated in the contract, inter alia provides that when a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach the party complaining of breach is entitled, whether or not actual loss is proved to have been caused, thereby to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named. Section 74 emphasizes that in case of breach of contract, the party complaining of the breach is entitled to receive reasonable Compensation whether or not actual loss is proved to have been caused by such breach. Therefore, the emphasis is on reasonable compensation. If the compensation named in the contract is by way of penalty, consideration would be different and the party is only entitled to reasonable compensation for the loss suffered. But if the compensation named in the contract for such breach is genuine pre-estimate of loss which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it, there is no question of proving such loss or such party is not required to lead evidence to prove actual loss suffered by him. But if the compensation named in the contract for such breach is genuine pre-estimate of loss which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it, there is no question of proving such loss or such party is not required to lead evidence to prove actual loss suffered by him. Burden is on the other party to lead evidence for proving that no loss is likely to occur by such breach.” After stating the law as such, their Lordships thereafter went on to examine the question of earnest money and to define it within the contours of the Act. The view of the Hon’ble Court on this issue is available very clearly in paragraphs 67 and 68, which read as under: “67. In Maula Bux’s case (supra), the Court has specifically held that it is true that in every case of breach of contract the person aggrieved by the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage suffered by him before he can claim a decree and the Court is competent to award reasonable compensation in a case of breach even if no actual damage is proved to have been suffered in consequence of the breach of contract. The Court has also specifically held that in case of breach of some contracts it may be impossible for the Court to assess compensation arising from breach. 68. Take for illustration construction of a road or a bridge. If there is delay in completing the construction of road and bridge within stipulated time, then it would be difficult to prove how much loss is suffered by the Society/State. Similarly, in the present case, delay took place in deployment of rigs and on that basis actual production of gas from platform B-121 had to be changed. It is undoubtedly true that the witness has stated that redeployment plan was made keeping in mind several constraints including shortage of casing pipes. Arbitral Tribunal, therefore, took into consideration the aforesaid statement volunteered by the witness that shortage of casing pipes was only one of the several reasons and not the only reason which led to change in deployment of plan or redeployment of rigs Trident-II platform B-121. In our view, in such a contract, it would be difficult to prove exact loss or damage which the parties suffer because of the breach thereof. In our view, in such a contract, it would be difficult to prove exact loss or damage which the parties suffer because of the breach thereof. In such a situation, if the parties have pre-estimated such loss after clear understanding, it would be totally unjustified to arrive at the conclusion that party who has committed breach of the contract is not liable to pay compensation. It would be against the specific provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act. There was nothing on record that compensation contemplated by the parties was in any way unreasonable. It has been specifically mentioned hat it was an agreed genuine pre-estimate of damages duly agreed by the parties. It was also mentioned that the liquidated damages are not by way of penalty. It was also provided in the contract that such damages are to be recovered by the purchaser from the bills for payment of the cost of material submitted by the contractor. No evidence is led by the claimant to establish that stipulated condition was by way of penalty or the compensation contemplated was, in any way, unreasonable. There was no reason for the tribunal not to reply upon the clear and unambiguous terms of agreement stipulating pre-estimate damages because of delay in supply of goods. Further, while extending the time for delivery of the goods, respondent was informed that it would be required to pay stipulated damages.” 20. In the next year, namely in 2004, an appeal was laid by M/s. Videocon Properties relating to similar issues and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the judgment reported as Videocon Properties Ltd. v. Dr. Bhalchandra Laboratories ( (2004) 3 SCC 711 ), declared that it is not the description of the words that would be determinative of the character of the sum but the real intention of the parties that can be gathered from the surrounding circumstances as well. The Hon’ble Court said that what may be called as an advance may really be a deposit or earnest money and what is termed as a deposit or earnest money may finally turn out to be an advance or part of the purchase price. The Hon’ble Court said that what may be called as an advance may really be a deposit or earnest money and what is termed as a deposit or earnest money may finally turn out to be an advance or part of the purchase price. These declarations have been made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 14 of the judgment, which reads as under: “The further aspect that requires to be noticed is as to the nature and character of earnest money deposit and in that context the distinguishing features, which help to delineate the differences, if any. The matter is not, at any rate, res integra. In (Kunwar) Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup, AIR 1926 PC 1 , it was held that the earnest money is part of the purchase price when the transaction foes forward and it is forfeited when the transaction falls through, by reason of the fault or failure of the purchaser. This statement of law had the approval fo this Court in Maula Bux v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 554 . Further, it is not the description by words used in the agreement only that would be determinative of the character of the sum but really the intention of parties and surrounding circumstances as well, that have to be looked into and what may be called an advance may really be a deposit or earnest money and what is termed as “a deposit or earnest money” may ultimately turn our to be really an advance or part of purchase price. Earnest money or deposit also, thus, serves two purposes of being part-payment of the purchase money and security for the performances of the contract by the party concerned, who paid it.” 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court followed the above principles without any variance in several judgments after this, one of them being M/s. Construction and Design Services v. Delhi Development Authority ( AIR 2015 SC 1282 ). 22. The underlying principle that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has declared in all the above judgments is, whatever be the stipulation contained in the contract, the party complaining of breach would be entitled to compensation only if he/she sustains loss and only after an adjudication as to the reasonable compensation to be awarded to him/her. 23. 22. The underlying principle that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has declared in all the above judgments is, whatever be the stipulation contained in the contract, the party complaining of breach would be entitled to compensation only if he/she sustains loss and only after an adjudication as to the reasonable compensation to be awarded to him/her. 23. It is true that in Maula Bux case (supra), there was an observation that forfeiture of earnest money under a contract, if reasonable, does not fall within Section 74 and that it would fall within its sweep only if the earnest money is considered as a penalty. This apparent dissonance led to a further consideration of these issues by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the year 2015 in the judgment reported in Kailash Nath Associates v. Delhi Development Authority and Another ( (2015) 4 SCC 136 ). The Hon’ble Supreme Court reconciled all the apparent inconsistencies in the judgments referred to above in paragraphs 40, 42 and 43.1 of the said judgment. Since the statements and declarations of law have been laid on record by the Hon’ble Supreme Court without any cause for ambiguity, it is only appropriate that those paragraphs are read and for such purpose, they are extracted as under: “From the above, it is clear that this Court held that Maula Bux case (Maula Bux v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 554 ) was not, on facts, a case that related to earnest money. Consequently, the observation in Maula Bux that forfeiture of earnest money under a contract if reasonable does not fall within Section 74, and would fall within Section 74 only if earnest money si considered a penalty is not on a matter that directly arose for decision in that case. The law laid down by a Bench of five Judges in Fateh Chand case (Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass, AIR 1963 SC 1405 ) is that all stipulations naming amounts to be paid in case of breach would be covered by Section 74. This is because Section 74 cuts across the rules of the English common law by enacting a uniform principle that would apply to all amounts to be paid in case of breach, whether they are in the nature of penalty or otherwise. This is because Section 74 cuts across the rules of the English common law by enacting a uniform principle that would apply to all amounts to be paid in case of breach, whether they are in the nature of penalty or otherwise. It must not be forgotten that as has been stated above, forfeiture of earnest money on the facts in Fateh Chand case was conceded. In the circumstances, it would therefore be correct to say that as earnest money is an amount to be paid in case of breach of contract and named in the contract as such, it would necessarily be covered by Section 74. In the present case, forfeiture of earnest money took place long after an agreement had been reached. It is obvious that the amount sought to be forfeited on the facts of the present case is sought to be forfeited on the facts of the present case is sought to be forfeited without any loss being shown. In fact it has been shown that fat from suffering any loss, DDA has received a much higher amount on re-auction of the same plot of land. Where a sum is named in a contract as a liquidated amount payable by way of damages, the party complaining of a breach can receive as reasonable compensation such liquidated amount only if it is a genuine pre-estimate of damages fixed by both parties and found to be such by the court. In other words, where a sum is named in a contract as a liquidated amount payable by way of damages, only reasonable compensation can be awarded not exceeding the amount so stated. Similarly, in cases where the amount fixed is in the nature of penalty, only reasonable compensation can be awarded not exceeding the penalty so stated. In both cases, the liquidated amount or penalty is the upper limit beyond which the court cannot grant reasonable compensation.” 24. It is in the umbra of the statements of law contained in the judgments above that the case of the appellant will have to be considered. Even though the appellant has pleaded that he had suffered on account of recession of contract by the respondent, nothing has been brought on record, either in documentary evidence or in oral deposition, to show the nature of loss or the extent thereof. Even though the appellant has pleaded that he had suffered on account of recession of contract by the respondent, nothing has been brought on record, either in documentary evidence or in oral deposition, to show the nature of loss or the extent thereof. All that the appellant has done is to plead a bald statement and to re-state the same in his deposition as DW1 that he had suffered loss, since he was unable to invest the money, that he might have obtained under Exhibit A1 sale, in his business. Even though the appellant asserts that he had suffered loss and therefore, entitled to forfeit the entire advance paid, he did not choose to mount the box or to lead evidence in support of his pleadings. In view of the insurmountable odds against him on account of the various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as above, it is ineluctable that this claim for forfeiture of the entire amount can in no manner be countenanced. 25. Presumably, faced with these odds, the appellant has, in this appeal, taken a contention that the amount shown in Exhibit A1 as advance amount is not an advance but an earnest money deposit. He appears to be taking advantage of the declarations relating to the difference between an advance and earnest money deposit in some of the judgments above, including Maula Bux (supra) to say that the amount, being earnest money deposit, would not be under the sweep of Section 74 and therefore, that he is entitled to forfeit the entire amount, notwithstanding what is stated in the said Section. 26. These submissions, we are afraid, cannot now hold water on account of the affirmative declaration of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kailash Nath Associates (supra), as has been extracted above. The Hon’ble Court has clearly dispelled with any confusion between the two views recorded above and there cannot be any doubt, from a full reading of the judgment, that only reasonable compensation would be available to the person who complains of breach, unless the earnest money deposit represents a pre-estimated assessment of the actual loss that would be suffered by the person. It is clear from the judgment that only if the loss, that may be occasioned to the person complaining of breach, which is an honest estimate of the actual loss, is recorded in the agreement even at the time of entering into it, can it be treated as the earnest money leading to a forfeiture. 27. The concept of earnest money has been thus distilled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judgments above, can only be accepted to be that sum of money, which is a pre-estimate of the actual damage that may be caused to a party in event of breach of the agreement and which is fixed by both the parties even at the time when the agreement was entered into. Even this pre-quantification, has to be found to be reasonable and to be a genuine pre-estimate of the damages by the court. It is only in the event that the court feels that what is fixed in the contract represents the actual damages that is pre-estimated by the parties that the court will allow it to be completely forfeited. 28. In the case case at hand, Exhibit A1 agreement for sale shows that an amount of Rs.10 lakhs was paid as advance by the respondent. The agreement, which is in Malayalam, provides that if the respondent commits any default in honouring the terms of the agreement, the amount accepted by the appellant as advance will be forfeited towards his loss. It is on the basis of this covenant in the agreement that the appellant says that the entire amount ought to have been allowed to be forfeited by him. 29. We are afraid, on the foundation of law as declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and by this Court as afore recorded, the contention of the appellant cannot find forensic approval. This is because, the appellant has not pleaded or proved the actual damage caused to him nor has he even made an attempt to show the nature of the damage that he claims. It is merely a statement in the pleadings that since he did not obtain the sale consideration in time, he was not able to invest it in his business and that he was forced to take further loans. It is merely a statement in the pleadings that since he did not obtain the sale consideration in time, he was not able to invest it in his business and that he was forced to take further loans. These submissions have not been proved or established by cogent evidence and the court below was, therefore, justified in refusing to accept these contentions and in ordering return of the money paid by the respondent. We are aware that the court below has concluded that rescission of the contract at the hands of the respondent was not on account of any factors that were attributable to the appellant. However, this by itself will not entitle the appellant to forfeit the advance amount received by him. His contention that the amount is earnest money deposit also cannot be sustained, since as is obvious from the agreement itself, the said amounts were not accepted by the appellant as a bona fide pre-estimate of the damages or loss that he would have suffered on the agreement being breached by the respondent. 30. No amount of force or pursuance in the submissions of the appellant can alter the nature of the agreement and we are only guided by the way it is written and the manner in which it was entered into. We have no doubt in our mind, going by a reading of Exhibit A1, that the amounts accepted by the appellant is not an earnest money deposit but only an advance of the sale consideration. That being so, obviously, the court below has not erred in holding that the respondent is entitled to return of the advance amount, concluding rightly that the money does not represent earnest money deposit. 31. That being said, the learned counsel for the appellant tried to convince us otherwise, citing five other judgments. 32. The first of them being the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1973 SC 1098 ). Interestingly, this judgment, in fact, speaks to the contrary and affirms the decision in Maula Bux (supra) that in the absence of evidence that any loss or damage has been suffered, the deposit cannot be forfeited. 33. The second case cited is National thermal Power Corporation Limited v. Ashok Kumar Singh and Others ( (2015) 4 SCC 252 ). Interestingly, this judgment, in fact, speaks to the contrary and affirms the decision in Maula Bux (supra) that in the absence of evidence that any loss or damage has been suffered, the deposit cannot be forfeited. 33. The second case cited is National thermal Power Corporation Limited v. Ashok Kumar Singh and Others ( (2015) 4 SCC 252 ). We have read this judgment in detail but we see that the facts of that case are not similar to the one involved in this appeal. That judgment relates to breach in the pre-contractual stage and not with respect to breach of contract. The declaration of law in that judgment would not, therefore, be of any avail to the appellant, since the Hon’ble Supreme Court has said that the amounts deposited as earnest money will be liable to forfeiture if the persons withdraw from entering into a contract without any reasonable cause. 34. The learned counsel then requested our attention to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.S.N.L. v. Reliance Communication Ltd (2011 AIR SCW 525). This is a long judgment but the ratio therein is completely contrary to the assertions of the appellant. The issue in this judgment was relating to the ‘interconnectivity agreement’ between the BSNL and private licencees giving connectivity to each other in their circles and the allegation that the loss to the BSNL was due to wrong routing or masking of calls by private licencees. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in the facts of that case that forfeiture of certain amounts was not penal in nature but represents the pre-estimate of reasonable compensation. Obviously, this ratio is squarely against the appellant. 35. The learned counsel has also referred to the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.L. Devender Singh and others v. Syed Khaja ( AIR 1973 SC 2457 ) and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and another v. Motorola India Private Limited ( (2009) 2 SCC 337 ). We cannot see how these judgments would inure to the benefit of the appellant, since the former is one where the Hon’ble Court has said that mere stipulation of an amount in the event of breach of a contract will not deny action for specific performance of the agreement and in the latter, the Hon’ble Court was dealing with issues relating to adjudication of penalty. This cannot, in our firm view, benefit the appellant whatsoever. This cannot, in our firm view, benefit the appellant whatsoever. 36. The compendium of all that we have seen above, especially with respect to the various judgments that we have noticed in the earlier portion of this judgment, makes our opinion firm that where a sum is named in a contract as the liquidated amount payable by way of damages, the party complaining breach, will be entitled to receive as compensation such amounts only if it is found to be genuine and fixed as a pre-estimate of the damages by the parties and found to be reasonable by the court. In all other cases, the sum shown as liquidated amount payable as damages would not be liable to be forfeited by the party complaining of breach, unless he/she shows to have faced a detriment by way of actual loss or damages and the courts will be justified in awarding only reasonable compensation, but not exceeding the amount so stated. This is the same position when an amount is shown as penalty. This is the law that has now been crystalised by the various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and we are, therefore, obviously, bound by the binding precedents. 37. The facts of this case ineluctably establish that advance was paid by the respondent to the appellant and since the appellant has been unable to prove that any actual loss was occasioned or suffered by him, we are certain in our mind that the court below has acted within its jurisdiction and well within the contours of the law, relating to such transactions, in decreeing the suit, thus allowing the respondent to recover the amount shown as advance in Exhibit A1 agreement. We, therefore, have no hesitation in confirming the decree passed by the trial court and dismissing this appeal. We do so. In the peculiar facts and circumstances that have been presented in this case, we deem it appropriate not to order costs and direct the parties to suffer their respective costs in this appeal.