JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. Instant Regular Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against the impugned judgment and decree dated 24.05.2005 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, Mandi, District Mandi in Civil Appeal No.30/2002, 153/2004, affirming therein judgment and decree dated 18.01.2002, passed by learned Sub Judge, 1st Class, Chachiot at Gohar in Civil Suit No.152/98, where by suit for declaration having been filed by the appellant-plaintiff has been dismissed. 2. Briefly stated facts, as emerged from the record, are that the plaintiff filed a suit against Ramu, predecessor-in-interest of respondents No.1 to 5 and Kalu, respondent No.6 (here in after referred to as ‘defendants’) seeking declaration to the effect that Will dated 11.4.1996 executed by deceased Suramu in favour of the defendants is null and void and the plaintiff is owner in possession of the land as detailed in Para-2 of the plaint (here in after referred to as the ‘suit land’) with a consequential relief of restraining the defendants from interfering or dis-possessing the plaintiff from the suit land or alienating the suit land and in the alternative seeking possession of the suit land. It is averred in the plaint that the plaintiff is the son of the deceased Narainu and grandson of the deceased Suramu, who was owner in possession of the suit land. It is the claim of the plaintiff that the suit property was ancestral property, which was to be inherited by the father of the plaintiff and thereafter by the plaintiff according to Hindu Succession Act. It is averred by the plaintiff that the defendants, by playing fraud, approached Suramu, grandfather of the plaintiff, and got a Will executed in their favour. It is further averred that the deceased was not in a fit state of mind to execute the impugned Will and the contents of the Will were not explained to him. Moreover, no witnesses of the locality were present at the time of execution of the Will dated 11.4.1996 and hence the impugned Will is null, void and not binding upon the plaintiff. Moreover, no witnesses of the locality were present at the time of execution of the Will dated 11.4.1996 and hence the impugned Will is null, void and not binding upon the plaintiff. It is the claim of the plaintiff that the defendants, by playing fraud, got bequeathed the suit land in their favour depriving the plaintiff of his right of succession and the plaintiff is still owner in possession of the suit land and the defendants, under the garb of Will, are now interfering in the possession of the plaintiff. 3. The defendants resisted and contested the suit by filing written statement. The defendants have denied that the plaintiff is son of Narainu, but have stated that the mother of the plaintiff; namely Jethi; brought the plaintiff with her to the house of Narainu, when Narainu had brought her to his house and no marriage took place between Narainu and Jethi. It has been admitted by the defendants that the deceased Suramu was owner in possession of the suit land but have stated that the suit land has been inherited by the defendants through a Will and now the defendants are owners in possession of the suit land. The defendants have denied that the suit land was ancestral, but stated that it was self-acquired property of the deceased Narainu. It has also been denied that the defendants have played fraud upon the deceased Narainu, but stated that the Will was duly executed by the deceased Narainu in favour of the defendants in a sound state of mind voluntarily and the defendants were serving the deceased. It is averred that the plaintiff after the marriage started residing in the house of his in-laws and he never served the deceased. Defendants denied that the suit land is in possession of the plaintiff. It is also denied that the impugned Will is null and void. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:- “1. Whether the Will dated 11.4.1996 executed by late Suramu was obtained by the defendants by playing fraud and as such the Will is not binding on the plaintiff? OPP. 2. Whether the property in the suit qua the party is ancestral in its nature, if so its effect? OPP. 3. Whether Smt.Jethi was married wife of late Sh. Narainu? OPP. 4. Whether the suit for mere declaration is not maintainable? OPD. 5. OPP. 2. Whether the property in the suit qua the party is ancestral in its nature, if so its effect? OPP. 3. Whether Smt.Jethi was married wife of late Sh. Narainu? OPP. 4. Whether the suit for mere declaration is not maintainable? OPD. 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD. 6. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court-fees and jurisdiction? OPD. 7. Relief”. 5. Subsequently, vide judgment and decree dated 18.01.2002, learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, appellant-plaintiff filed an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’) before the learned Presiding Officer, Mandi, District Mandi, who, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 24.05.2005, dismissed the appeal preferred by the plaintiff by affirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. In the aforesaid background, the present appellant-plaintiff filed this Regular Second Appeal before this Court, details whereof have already been given above. 7. This second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “(1) Whether the execution of the will in question is shrouded by suspicious circumstances, which have remained unexplained? 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record of the case carefully. 9. Mr. Vinod Gupta, learned counsel representing the respondent-defendant, while supporting the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned Court below, forcefully contended that the present appeal is not maintainable, as the judgment and decree are based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record. Learned counsel further contended that the present appeal deserves to be dismissed in view of the fact that both the learned Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and have returned concurrent findings of fact and law. Though learned counsel representing the defendants has placed reliance upon a number of judgments, this Court deems it proper to take into consideration latest judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma’s case supra, where in it has been held as under:- “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for reappreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs’ right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” (p.269) 10. Perusal of the aforesaid judgment suggests that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. This Court, after having taken note of observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment supra, sees no reason to differ with the arguments having been made by learned counsel representing the defendants that in normal circumstance concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below should not be interfered with by the High Courts, rather, High Courts, while exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, are restrained from re-appreciating the evidence available on record. But, aforesaid judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court nowhere suggests that there is complete bar for High Courts to upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below, especially when finding recorded by Courts below appears to be perverse. 11. It is well settled by now that a finding of fact itself may give rise to a substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event the findings are based on no evidence and/or while arriving at the said findings, relevant admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or legal principles have not been applied in appreciating the evidence, or when the evidence has been misread. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chandna Impex Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi, (2011)7 SCC 289 , Where in the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “14. In Hero Vinoth Vs. Seshammal, (2006)5 SCC 545 , referring to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co.Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 , as also a number of other decisions on the point, this Court culled out three principles for determining whether a question of law raised in a case is substantial. One of the principles so summarised, is : (Hero Vinoth case, SCC p.556, para 24) "24. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to ‘decision based on no evidence’, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding". (p.294) 12. Hon’ble Apex Court in D.R. Rathna Murthy vs. Ramappa, (2011)1 SCC 158 , has specifically held that High Court can interfere with the findings of fact even in the second appeal, provided the findings recorded by Courts below are found to be perverse. It has further been held in the case supra that there is no absolute bar on the reappreciation of evidence in those proceedings; however, such a course is permissible in exceptional circumstances. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “9. Undoubtedly, the High Court can interfere with the findings of fact even in the Second Appeal, provided the findings recorded by the courts below are found to be perverse i.e. not being based on the evidence or contrary to the evidence on record or reasoning is based on surmises and misreading of the evidence on record or where the core issue is not decided. There is no absolute bar on the re-appreciation of evidence in those proceedings, however, such a course is permissible in exceptional circumstances. (Vide Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa, (2000)6 SCC 120 ; Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed, (2001) 7 SCC 189 and Bharatha Matha & Anr. v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010)11 SCC 483 .)” (p.162) 13. Hon’ble Apex Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By LRs., (2001)3 SCC 179 , has held that appellate Court ought not to interfere with the findings of trial Judge on a question of fact unless the latter has overlooked some peculiar feature connected with evidence of a witness or such evidence on balance is sufficiently improbable so as to invite displacement by appellate Court. 14. Careful reading of aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court clearly suggests that there is no blanket bar for High Courts to upset the concurrent findings of Courts below, especially when it emerge from the record that (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. Hon’ble Apex Court in Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) through LRs and Others vs. K.V.P. Shastri (Dead) through LRs and Others, (2013)15 SCC 161 , has held as under: “35. The learned counsel for the defendants relied on the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006)5 SCC 545 , wherein the principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC were summarized in para 24, which is extracted below : (SCC pp.555-56) “24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. There fore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. There fore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” We have to place reliance on the afore-mentioned case to hold that the High Court has framed substantial questions of law as per Section 100 of the CPC, and there is no error in the judgment of the High Court in this regard and therefore, there is no need for this Court to interfere with the same.” (pp.174-175) 15. It is quite evident from the aforesaid exposition of law that even concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below can be interfered with/upset by the High Courts, while exercising power under Section 100 CPC, if it is convinced that findings recorded by Courts below are not based upon any evidence and same are perverse. At this stage, it may be noticed that during the proceedings of the case, learned counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff was able to point out certain material irregularities/illegalities committed by Courts below, while examining/analyzing the evidence adduced on record by both the parties and as such this Court deems it proper to examine the pleadings/evidence adduced on record by the respective parties in support of their respective claim so that correctness and genuineness of arguments made by learned counsel to the effect that judgments passed by Courts below are wholly perverse, is ascertained. 16. Mr. G.R. Palsra, learned counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff, while terming judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below to be not sustainable, vehemently argued that both the Courts below have misread, mis-interpreted and mis-construed the oral as well as documentary evidence, as a result of which erroneous findings have come on record to the detriment of plaintiff, who, by leading cogent and convincing evidence, successfully proved on record that Will Ex.DA is a result of fraud and is shrouded by suspicious circumstances. While inviting the attention of this Court to the Will Ex.DA, Mr.Palsra contended that recital made in the aforesaid Will suggests that testator Suramu had no son, as such, he bequeathed his property in favour of defendants, who happened to be his brother and nephew respectively, whereas, evidence led on record by defendants clearly proves on record that testator Suramu had one son; namely; Narainu, who was lateron married to Smt. Jethi Devi. Mr.Palsra, strenuously argued that mere recital in the Will Ex.DA with regard to testator having no son is itself a suspicious circumstance and as such both the Courts below gravely erred in not accepting the plea having been raised by the plaintiff. 17. Learned counsel further contended that if statements having been made by the defendants witnesses are read juxtaposing each other, it clearly suggests that there are material contradictions with regard to place of scribing the Will as well as signature/thumb impression allegedly put by the testator Suramu on the alleged Will Ex.DA. 18. 17. Learned counsel further contended that if statements having been made by the defendants witnesses are read juxtaposing each other, it clearly suggests that there are material contradictions with regard to place of scribing the Will as well as signature/thumb impression allegedly put by the testator Suramu on the alleged Will Ex.DA. 18. In the aforesaid background, this Court carefully perused Will Ex.DA, allegedly executed by testator Suramu in favour of defendants, perusal whereof suggests that Suramu, who at that relevant time, was 80 years old, executed a Will bequeathing thereby entire movable and immovable property in favour of his brother and nephew i.e. defendants herein. There is specific recital in the Will Ex.DA that testator Suramu has no issue and he is being looked after by Shri Ramu and Kalu (brother and nephew). To ascertain correctness of arguments having been made by Mr.G.R. Palsra, this Court carefully perused evidence led on record by both the parties, perusal whereof clearly suggests that Narainu was a son of testator Suramu. 19. All the defendants witnesses have categorically admitted that testator Suramu had one son; namely; Narainu. DW-1 Kalu Ram in his examination-in-chief also acknowledged factum with regard to marriage of Narainu with Jethi. He specifically deposed that plaintiff; namely; Netar Singh, was brought by Jethi, who was earlier married to one Souju. This witness also stated that Netar Singh is a son of Souju. In his cross-examination DW-1, while admitting that Narainu was son of Suramu, again reiterated that Netar Singh was born out from earlier marriage of Jethi. However, he categorically stated that he has no record to prove that plaintiff Netar Singh was born out of earlier marriage of Smt. Jethi. Similarly, it clearly emerge from his statement that plaintiff Netar Singh had been residing in the house of Narainu son of Suramu for the last 28 years. He also admitted in his cross-examination that he did not see marriage of Jethi with Souju. Since it stands duly proved on record that Narainu was son of Suramu, who had admittedly expired prior to testator of Will, there appears to be some force in the arguments of Shri Palsra that there was no occasion, as such, for testator to state in Will that he has no son. Since it stands duly proved on record that Narainu was son of Suramu, who had admittedly expired prior to testator of Will, there appears to be some force in the arguments of Shri Palsra that there was no occasion, as such, for testator to state in Will that he has no son. As has been taken note above, DW-1 Kalu Ram has specifically stated in his examination-in-chief as well as in cross-examination that testator Suramu had one son; namely; Narainu, who had been living with one lady namely; Jethi. 20. At this stage, it may be noticed that learned Court below had framed the following specific issue: “Whether Smt.Jethi was married wife of late Shri Narainu? OPP”. 21. Learned Court below, on the basis of material evidence adduced on record, categorically held Smt.Jethi to be the wife of Narainu. Moreover, to prove the aforesaid issue, plaintiff examined PW-1 Shri Khazan Singh, who produced a copy of Parivar Register Ex.PA, where in Smt.Jethi has been registered as wife of Narainu. Learned Court below, taking note of the fact that Ex.PA is public record and important piece of evidence, returned the finding that Smt. Jethi was wife of Narainu. Afore said finding on fact recorded by Court below was never assailed by the defendants by way of any proceedings and as such it attained finality. It also emerge from the impugned judgment passed by learned first appellate Court that even learned first appellate Court, taking note of the evidence adduced on record, came to the conclusion that plaintiff; namely; Netar Singh is son of Narainu Ram and Narainu Ram was son of Suramu. But it is not understood that why learned first appellate Court failed to return specific finding, if any, qua the issue of omission, if any, on the part of the testator to state that Narainu was his son, while getting Will Ext. DA scribed. 22. Apart from above, Shri Palsra invited the attention of this Court to the statement of DW-4 Shri Hari Singh, who in his cross-examination categorically stated that deceased Suramu had signed the alleged Will, where as perusal of Will Ex.DA suggests that there is a thumb impression of Suramu. DA scribed. 22. Apart from above, Shri Palsra invited the attention of this Court to the statement of DW-4 Shri Hari Singh, who in his cross-examination categorically stated that deceased Suramu had signed the alleged Will, where as perusal of Will Ex.DA suggests that there is a thumb impression of Suramu. True, it is, that DW-1 and DW-3 in their statements stated that testator Suramu had appended his thumb impression on the Will, but version put forth by the aforesaid witnesses appears to be incorrect in the light of specific statement of DW-4 Hari Singh, who categorically stated that deceased Suramu signed the alleged Will. Similarly, DW-3 Param Dev, who scribed the Will, categorically deposed that alleged Will was written by him in the courtyard of office of the Tehsildar, where as attesting witness DW-2 Moti Ram stated that alleged Will was written at his shop. Contradiction in the statements of DW-3 and DW-4 with regard to appending of thumb impression or signatures on the Will could be ignored by Court in the light of statements having been made by DW-2 and DW-1, but definitely contradictions, with regard to place of scribing of Will in the statements of DW-3 Param Dev and attesting witness DW-2 Moti Ram could not be ignored by Courts below, especially in view of other suspicious circumstances pointed out by the plaintiff in his plaint, which otherwise have been taken note of by this Court in the earlier part of judgment. It has specifically come in the statement of DW-2 Moti Ram that Will was written at his shop where ‘Arji Nabees’ used to sit, but DW-3 Param Dev categorically stated that Will was written by him in the courtyard of office of Tehsildar in the presence of defendant; namely; Ramu and Kalu Ram i.e. beneficiaries of the Will. 23. This Court, after having noticed aforesaid material contradictions, as have been discussed hereinabove, is inclined to agree with the contention put forth by Mr.G.R. Palsra that material suspicious circumstances, which were duly proved on record, were ignored by the Court below while upholding the validity of Will Ex.DA. Plaintiff by way of suit in question challenged the veracity of Will Ex.DA and described the same as a forged and fake document prepared by the defendants forcibly using undue influence upon the deceased Suramu. Plaintiff by way of suit in question challenged the veracity of Will Ex.DA and described the same as a forged and fake document prepared by the defendants forcibly using undue influence upon the deceased Suramu. Plaintiff also set up a plea in the plaint that deceased Suramu, while executing Will Ex.DA, was not in sound, disposing state of mind. 24. Needless to say that law regarding nature and onus of the proof of the Will is by way of propounder and in that regard the manner, in which the evidence is required to be appreciated, has been duly prescribed in the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in H.Venkatachala Iyengar vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and others, AIR 1959 SC 443 . 25. Guidelines framed in H.Venkatachala Iyengar case (supra) were further reiterated by Constitutional Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee and Others vs. Subodh Kumar Banerjee since deceased and after him his legal representatives and others, AIR 1964 SC 529 . The Court held: “4. The principles which govern the proving of a will are well settled; (see H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma, 1959 (S1) SCR 426 : 1959 AIR(SC) 443) and Rani Purniama Devi v. Khagendra Narayan Dev, 1962 (3) SCR 195 : 1962 AIR(SC) 567). The mode of proving a will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The onus of proving the will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Court accepts the will as genuine. Where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same. Even where there are no. such pleas but the circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court. Where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same. Even where there are no. such pleas but the circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the dispositions made in the will being unnatural improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances or there might be other indication in the will to show that the testator's mind was not free. In such a case the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicion should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes part in the execution of the will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the Court would grant probate, even if the will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations. It is in the light of these settled principles that we have to consider whether the appellants have succeeded in establishing that the will was duly executed and attested. (Page-531) 26. Though normally onus to prove the execution and validity of the Will lies upon the propounder but in case when it is alleged by the opposite party that Will is not genuine document, onus shifts on the person who alleges the Will to be forged, to prove the same. 27. In Daulat Ram and Others vs. Sodha and Others, (2005)1 SCC 40 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held: “10. Will being a document has to be proved by primary evidence except where the Court permits a document to be proved by leading secondary evidence. Since it is required to be attested, as provided in Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it cannot be used as evidence until one of the attesting witnesses at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. In addition, it has to satisfy the requirements of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. In order to assess as to whether the Will has been validly executed and is a genuine document, the propounder has to show that the Will was signed by the testator and that he had put his signatures to the testament of his own free will; that he was at the relevant time in a sound disposing state of mind and understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and that the testator had signed it in the presence of two witnesses who attested it in his presence and in the presence of each other. Once these elements are established, the onus which rests on the propounder is discharged. But where there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to remove the suspicion by leading appropriate evidence. The burden to prove that the will was forged or that it was obtained under undue influence or coercion or by playing a fraud is on the person who alleges it to be so.” (Page 43) 28. In the case at hand, plaintiff, with a view to prove that Will Ex.DA is forged one and shrouded by suspicious circumstances, examined himself as PW-3A and successfully proved contents of the plaint. Plaintiff also examined PW-1 Shri Khazan Singh, Secretary of Gram Panchayat, Shili Bagi, who successfully proved on record Parivar Register. PW-2 Piare Lal, who also stated that plaintiff Netar Singh is son of Narainu, who was son of Suramu. PW-3 Sohan Lal specifically stated that Jethi was married to Narainu. This witness further stated that earlier Narainu used to take care of Suramu and thereafter he was looked after by plaintiff; namely; Netar Singh. Careful perusal of the aforesaid plaintiff witnesses clearly suggests that Narainu was son of testator Suramu and Narainu had married Jethi. There is nothing on record placed by the defendants suggestive of the fact that Netar Singh was not the son of Narainu and he was brought by Jethi at the time of her marriage with Narainu, rather DW-1 Kalu Ram, in his statement as has been taken note above, categorically admitted that he saw the plaintiff residing with Narainu for the last 28 years. There is nothing in the cross-examination of plaintiff witnesses, which have been carefully examined by this Court, from where it can be inferred that the defendants were able to shatter the testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses on the issue of marriage of Narainu with Jethi and plaintiff being their son. Similarly, as has been discussed in detail, DW-1 Kalu Ram specifically admitted Narainu to be son of Suramu and as such learned Court below fell in grave error while ignoring the aforesaid admissions having been made by the defendant; namely; Kalu Ram. Since Narainu was son of Suramu, there was no occasion as such for the testator Suramu to state in Will Ex.DA that he has no son and as such it casts suspicion with regard to genuineness and correctness of Will Ex.DA. 29. Apart from above, as has been discussed hereinabove, there are material contradictions in the statements of the defendants witnesses with regard to signatures/thumb impression of the testator on the Will as well as place of scribing of the Will. It also emerge from the statements of defendants witnesses that at the time of scribing of Will, both the defendants Kalu Ram and Ramu were present and as such possibility of getting the Will scribed by defendants cannot be ruled out. 30. After having carefully perused pleadings, evidence adduced on record vis-à-vis impugned judgments and decrees passed by Courts below, this Court is persuaded to conclude that Will Ex.DA is shrouded by suspicious circumstances and could not be held to be a valid document, as has been held by Courts below. 31. At this stage, this Court deems it necessary to take note of the fact that during the pendency of the present appeal, appellant-plaintiff moved an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking therein permission to place on record certain public documents. In their application, which is available at page-50 of the paper book, plaintiff contended that though learned trial Court, specifically framed issue No.2 to the effect that, “Whether the suit property is ancestral in nature?”, but inadvertently and despite due diligence no documentary evidence in this regard could be placed on record by plaintiff as he had no knowledge about the revenue record/Jamabandi pertaining to the year 1952-53 which is in Urdu as well as also mutation Nos.182 and 28, dated 24.5.1953 and 22.3.1973 respectively. As per plaintiff, factum with regard to aforesaid mutations No.182 and 28 attested on 24.5.1953 and 22.3.1973 respectively came to his notice recently and accordingly he procured relevant documents i.e. copies of Jamabandies for the years 1948-49, 1952-53 and Misalhaquiat Bandobast Jadid. This Court vide order dated 22.8.2016, taking note of the fact that public documents, as referred hereinabove, are material documents for just decision of the RSA as such in order to impart substantial justice inter se parties, allowed the application and permitted the plaintiff to place on record the same subject to costs. Documents, as mentioned above, later on came to be exhibited as Ex.PA, Ex.PB and Ex.PC, Hindi translation of the same are Ex.PD, Ex.PE, Ex.PF, Ex.PG and Jamabandi Ex.PH. Though perusal of order dated 22.8.2016 suggests that time was granted to defendants for rebuttal evidence, if any, to the additional documents placed on record by the appellants in RSA, but this Court was unable to lay its hand to evidence, if any, led on record in rebuttal by the defendants. Even during arguments being made before this Court at the time of final hearing, learned counsel representing the defendants was unable to place on record any evidence in rebuttal, if any, to the documents taken on record by this Court i.e. Ex.PA to Ex.PH while allowing the application moved on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. 32. Mr. G.R. Palsra, while inviting the attention of this Court to the aforesaid documents, forcibly contended that suit property, as claimed to have been bequeathed in favour of defendants by testator Shri Suramu vide Will Ex.DA, could not be bequeathed/transferred by way of Will being ancestral property. Perusal of Ex.PD i.e. Jamabandi for the year 1948-49 suggests that Suramu, testator of Will Ex.DA, was son of Dasu and Dasu had two sons namely; Jethu and Suramu (testator) and accordingly after death of Dasu, Jethu and Suramu (testator) came to be recorded as owners qua the share of Dasu. Ex.PE, Ex.PF and Ex.PG further suggests that share of Jethu son of Dasu, who had died issueless, was also recorded in favour of Suramu (testator) on 14.2.1973 and since then Suramu was the sole owner of the property inherited by him from his father; namely; Dasu. 33. Ex.PE, Ex.PF and Ex.PG further suggests that share of Jethu son of Dasu, who had died issueless, was also recorded in favour of Suramu (testator) on 14.2.1973 and since then Suramu was the sole owner of the property inherited by him from his father; namely; Dasu. 33. Perusal of Ex.PH clearly suggests that Khasra numbers, as mentioned in Jamabandi for the years 1948-49 Ex.PD, 1952-53 Ex.PB and Ex.PE, Ex.PF and Ex.PG, were the old numbers, which were lateron changed to New Khasra Nos.418, 432, 435, 887, 915/1 kittas 5 measuring 4-18-0 bighas and Khasra Nos.419, 420, 422, 427, 442, 664, 684, 693, 696, 747, kittas 10, measuring 2-11-1 bighas and land comprised under Khasra Nos.421, 423, 426, 443, 444, 447, 665, 745, 748, kittas 9, measuring 1-12-8 bighas and land comprised in Khasra Nos.431, 441, 449, 663, 682, 685, 746, kittas 7, measuring 2-2-17 bighas and land comprised under Khasra Nos.446, 448, 451, kittas 3, measuring 1-1-3 bighas and land comprised under Khasra Nos.751, 752, 755, kittas 3, measuring 1-8-9 bighas situate in Mauja Shilibaggi, Hadbast No.502, Illaqua Banga, Tehsil Thunag, District Mandi, H.P. 34. This Court, after having carefully perused documents placed on record as Ex.PA to Ex.PH by way of additional evidence, finds considerable force in the arguments of Mr.Palsra that no Will, if any, could be executed by testator Suramu, bequeathing thereby ancestral property in favour of the defendants, which he had acquired from his father; namely; Shri Dasu. Though learned trial Court had framed specific issue qua the nature of suit property, but, since plaintiff failed to place on record documentary evidence in support of his claim, issue came to be decided against the plaintiff. 35. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that this Court vide order dated 22.8.2016 allowed the application having been filed by the plaintiff for leading additional evidence. But, as has been taken note above, no evidence in rebuttal was led on record by the defendants, as such, this Court, after having carefully perused contents of the additional evidence led on record, is inclined to accept the contention of learned counsel representing the plaintiff that nature of suit property is ancestral. But, as has been taken note above, no evidence in rebuttal was led on record by the defendants, as such, this Court, after having carefully perused contents of the additional evidence led on record, is inclined to accept the contention of learned counsel representing the plaintiff that nature of suit property is ancestral. Once nature of this suit property has been held to be ancestral, Will Ex.DA, if any, qua the same has no legal force and as such same cannot be termed to be a valid document, as has been erroneously held by Court below. After having bestowed its thoughtful consideration to the evidence led on record by the plaintiff vis-a-vis impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, this Court is persuaded to agree with the contentions of learned counsel representing the plaintiff that Will Ex.DA is shrouded by suspicious circumstances and as such same cannot be held to be a valid document. Substantial question is answered accordingly. 36. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made here in above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as by this Court, this Court sees valid reason to interfere in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below, which are apparently not based upon correct appreciation of evidence and Courts below have drawn wrong inference from the proved facts by applying law erroneously and as such same are set aside and suit filed by the plaintiff is decreed. Decree sheet be prepared, accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.