JUDGMENT : GURPAL SINGH AHLUWALIA, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal has been filed under Section 374 of Criminal Procedure Code against the judgment and sentence dated 17-9-2003 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge (Past Track Court), Datia in Sessions Trial No. 126/2000 by which the appellants have been convicted under Section 307/34 of I.P.C. and have been sentenced to undergo the rigorous imprisonment of 4 years and a fine of Rs. 500/- with default imprisonment. The appellant No. 2 - Ayodhya has expired during the pendency of this appeal and therefore, his name was deleted as the appeal filed by him had stood abated. 2. The necessary facts for the disposal of the present appeal in short are that on 7-8-2000 at about 12 P.M., the appellants in furtherance of their common intention caused injuries to Murari and Mulayam by Parsa, Barchhi, Ballam and axe. The complainant Murari, who is an injured witness, lodged a F.I.R. on 7-8-2000 at Police Outpost Sinawal, Distt. Datia against the appellants that, he along with his brother was going to his fields. They were stopped by his neighbour Rajesh and other appellants. Rajesh was armed with Farsa, whereas Ayodhya was armed with axe, Chandu was having Barchhi whereas appellant Chunna was having Ballam. The appellants challenged the complainant and asked that where they are going? When the complainant replied that he is going to his field, then the appellant Rajesh assaulted the complainant by means of a Earsa on his head, whereas Ayodhya assaulted by means of an axe which caused injury above the left eye. Chandu caused injury on the left hand of the complainant by means of a Barchhi whereas Chunna caused injury on the left side of the head of the complainant by means of a ballam. Thereafter, all the four persons started assaulting him as a result of which the complainant received several injuries. His brother Mulayam tried to save him and he too was assaulted by the appellants. The incident was witnessed by Udai Singh Kushwah, Ram Singh, Ramswaroop etc. The appellants also extended the threat to their life. On this report, the police registered the F.I.R. against the appellants for offence under Sections 341, 294, 324, 506 Part II, 34 of I.P.C. 3. The injured witnesses were sent for medical examination. The statements of the witnesses were recorded. The accused persons were arrested. Weapons were seized. The appellants also extended the threat to their life. On this report, the police registered the F.I.R. against the appellants for offence under Sections 341, 294, 324, 506 Part II, 34 of I.P.C. 3. The injured witnesses were sent for medical examination. The statements of the witnesses were recorded. The accused persons were arrested. Weapons were seized. The Police after completing the investigation, filed a charge sheet against the appellants for offence under Sections 341, 294, 324, 506 Part II, 307, 34 of I.P.C. 4. The Trial Court by order dated 13-10-2000 framed charges under Sections 307 of I.P.C. or in the alternative under Section 307/34 of I.P.C., 323 of I.P.C. or in the alternative under Section 323/34 of I.P.C. 5. The appellants abjured their guilt and pleaded not guilty. 6. The Prosecution in order to prove its case, examined Murarilal (P.W. 1), Mulayam Singh (P.W. 2), Udai Singh (P.W. 3), Jagdish Prasad (P.W. 4), Dr. D.R. Kulhariya (P.W. 5), J.P. Parashar (P.W. 6), M.L. Parihar (P.W. 7), and Dr. Vinod Rawat (P.W. 8). The appellants examined Dev Singh (D.W. 1) in their defence. 7. The Trial Court by Judgment and Sentence dated 17-9-2003 convicted the appellants under Section 307 of I.P.C. or in the alternative under Section 307/34 of I.P.C. for making an attempt to commit murder of Murari and Mulayam and sentenced them to undergo the rigorous imprisonment of 4 years and a fine of Rs. 500/- with default imprisonment and acquitted for offence under Section 323 or in the alternative under Section 323/34 of I.P.C. for causing simple injuries to Udai Singh. 8. Challenging the correctness and proprietary of the judgment passed by the Trial Court, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellants, that there is nothing on record to suggest that the injuries caused by the appellants were dangerous to life and therefore, the appellants at the most could have been convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C. It is further submitted that as the appellants and the complainant party were on inimical terms, therefore, they have been falsely implicated. It is further submitted that even otherwise, the jail sentence of period already undergone by the appellants would meet the ends of justice. 9. Per contra, it is submitted by the Counsel for the State that multiple incised, penetrating wounds were caused to the injured persons. It is further submitted that even otherwise, the jail sentence of period already undergone by the appellants would meet the ends of justice. 9. Per contra, it is submitted by the Counsel for the State that multiple incised, penetrating wounds were caused to the injured persons. For establishing the guilt of an accused under Section 307 of I.P.C., the nature of injuries is immaterial, and if it is shown that the appellants had an intention and knowledge to cause death of the injured, then it would be sufficient to hold the accused persons guilty of making an attempt to commit murder of the victim. It is further submitted that deterrence is one of the important factor of sentencing policy and looking to the number of assaults, as well as the vital parts of the body on which the injuries were caused by the appellants, the Trial Court already has adopted a very lenient view and therefore, the period already undergone by the appellants is not sufficient to meet the ends of justice. 10. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 11. Dr. Vinod Rawat (P.W. 8) had medically examined Murarilal (P.W. 1) and Mulayam (P.W. 2). Dr. Vinod Rawat (P.W. 8) had found the following injuries on the body of injured Murarilal (P.W. 1):- "(1) Incised wound V shaped 3" x 1/8" x bone deep over the right side of forehead. (2) Incised wounds (A) 2" x 1/4" x 1/8" (B) 1" x 1/8" x 1/4" on the left corner of left eye. (3) Incised wound 4" x 1/8" x bone deep on the right parietal bone of skull. (4) Laceration with contusion (A) 2" x 1/2" x 1/4" (B) 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/4" elbow of left hand. (5) Punctured wound 1/2" x 1/2" x 1 1/2" depth right upper arm near elbow joint. (6) Abrasion 1/4" x 1/2" on left knee. (7) Laceration 1 x 1/4" x 1/4" on the left parietal bone." The M.L.C. Report of Murarilal (P.W. 1) is Ex. P.20. Dr. Vinod Rawat (P.W. 8) had found the following injuries on the body of injured Mulayam (P.W. 2):- "(1) Incised wound 2"x 1/8" x bone deep on the left side of forehead. (2) Incised wound 2" x 1/8" x bone deep on the left parietal bone of skull. P.20. Dr. Vinod Rawat (P.W. 8) had found the following injuries on the body of injured Mulayam (P.W. 2):- "(1) Incised wound 2"x 1/8" x bone deep on the left side of forehead. (2) Incised wound 2" x 1/8" x bone deep on the left parietal bone of skull. (3) Incised wound 3" x 1/8" x bone deep on the occipital bone of skull. (4) Lacerated wound 2" x 1/4" x 1/2" on left occipital bone of skull. (5) Lacerated wound 1 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/2" on left occipital side of skull. (6) Incised wound 4" x 1/4" x bone deep on left parietal bone of skull near mid-line. (7) Incised wound 2" x 1/8" x bone deep on left parietal bone of skull. (8) Incised wound 2" x 1/8" x 1/2" on the left shoulder. (9) Contusion with swelling on left upper arm 3" x 1/2" left upper arm. (10) 5 contusions on back of chest ranging between 4" x 1/2" back. (11) Incised wound 4" x 1/4" x bone deep right parietal bone of skull. (12) Incised wound 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/4" on the left leg behind ankle joint over foot. (13) Let hand wrist swelling and contusion 2" x 1" left hand wrist. (14) Contusion with swelling 1" x 1/4" left shoulder (15) Incised wound 1/2" x 1/2" on back of chest." The M.L.C. Report of Mulayam (P.W. 2) is Ex. P.21. 12. Dr. Vinod Rawat (P.W. 8) in reply to query sent by S.H.O., Police Outpost Sinawal had opined that the injuries sustained Murari (P.W. 1) and Mulayam (P.W. 2) were dangerous to life. The reports are Ex. P.23 and P.24 respectively. 13. As the Trial Court has acquitted the appellants for causing simple injuries to Udai Singh, therefore, the M.L.C. Report of Udai Singh is not being considered. 14. Thus, it is clear, that the complainant Murarilal P.W. 1) had sustained as many as 7 injuries including Incised, Lacerated, Punctured wounds whereas Mulayam (P.W. 2) had sustained as many as 15 injuries including Incised, Lacerated wounds with multiple abrasions. According to Dr. Vinod Rawat (P.W. 8) the injuries caused to the injured witnesses were dangerous to life. 15. The next moot question for determination is that who is the author of the injuries caused to the injured Murari, and Mulayam. 16. According to Dr. Vinod Rawat (P.W. 8) the injuries caused to the injured witnesses were dangerous to life. 15. The next moot question for determination is that who is the author of the injuries caused to the injured Murari, and Mulayam. 16. Murarilal (P.W. 1) has stated that on 7-8-2000, at about 12:00-12:30 p.m., he along with his brother Mulayam were going towards their fields. When they reached near the school, then all the four accused persons met with them. Rajesh was having Farsa, whereas Ayodhya was having Axe, Chandu was having Barchhi and Chunna @ Badriprasad was having Ballam. The accused persons asked that where the complainant is going. When the complainant replied that he is going to his fields, then the accused persons alleged that whether the fields belong to the father of the complainant and started abusing him. When the complainant objected to it, the appellant Rajesh assaulted on the head of complainant by means of a Farsa, Ayodhya assaulted by means of axe above the left eye, Chandu assaulted by means of Barchhi causing injury on his right hand and Chunna assaulted by means of a ballam causing injury on his head. The complainant tried to run away from the spot. He was caught hold by the appellants and when his brother Mulayam came to save him, he too was assaulted, as a result of which he too sustained multiple injuries. Udai Singh tried to save them but he too was assaulted by the appellants, as a result of which he ran away. Ram Singh and Ramswaroop intervened in the matter and saved them. He lodged the F.I.R. Ex. P.1. He was sent to Hospital, Datia. The cloths were seized by the police in the hospital by seizure memo Ex. P.2. This witness was cross examined. It was admitted that civil disputes are going on between the accused as well as complainant party. It was further stated that the accused persons were claiming that the father of Murari (P.W. 1) had sold the land to the father of the accused, whereas this witness was denying the same. It was further stated that after his brother Mulayam (P.W. 2) fell down on him, then the remaining assault had landed on him. The incident took place for about 30 minutes. 17. Mulayam (P.W. 2) has also supported the prosecution case and has stated on the similar lines. It was further stated that after his brother Mulayam (P.W. 2) fell down on him, then the remaining assault had landed on him. The incident took place for about 30 minutes. 17. Mulayam (P.W. 2) has also supported the prosecution case and has stated on the similar lines. This witness was cross examined. In cross examination, this witness denied that the agricultural field, where he was going, is the subject matter of the civil suit. He further denied that he had beaten the appellant Ayodhya and police had also investigated the matter. He has further stated that in order to save Murari, he had fallen on him. About 20-25 injuries were sustained by him out of which about 13 injuries were caused on his head. The police outpost was just 1 km away from the place of incident and the police had reached the spot immediately after the incident. 18. Murarilal (P.W. 1) and Mulayam (P.W. 2) were cross examined in very short and nothing could be elicited from their evidence, which may make their evidence unreliable. Even otherwise, both of them are the injured witnesses, and therefore, their presence on the spot cannot be doubted. 19. Udai Singh (P.W. 3) who had also reached on the spot and had sustained some injuries. He has also supported the prosecution story and had stated about the assault on Murarilal (P.W. 1) and Mulayam (P.W. 2). He further stated that Chandu had assaulted on his hand from the handle side of the ballam and Chinna had assaulted on his hand from the blunt side of Barchhi. The spot map, Ex. P.4 was prepared at the instance of this witness. In cross examination, this witness has admitted that at the time of incident, he was in his house and after hearing the noise he reached on the spot. He saw that Mulayam (P.W. 2) was lying on Murarilal (P.W. 1). He further admitted that he had seen assault on Mulayam (P.W. 2) by the appellants. However, the Trial Court has disbelieved the evidence of Udai Singh. 20. Jagdish Prasad (P.W. 4) is the witness of seizure. The police had seized blood stained as well as plain earth from the spot vide seizure memo Ex. P.5. The appellant Badriprasad had made confessional statement and had disclosed that he had kept the Ballam in his house. The confessional statement is Ex. 20. Jagdish Prasad (P.W. 4) is the witness of seizure. The police had seized blood stained as well as plain earth from the spot vide seizure memo Ex. P.5. The appellant Badriprasad had made confessional statement and had disclosed that he had kept the Ballam in his house. The confessional statement is Ex. P.6 and the seizure memo of Ballam is Ex. P.7. The appellant Badri was arrested vide arrest memo Ex. P.8. The appellant Ayodhya had made confessional statement and had disclosed that he had kept the axe in his house. The confessional statement is Ex. P.9 and the seizure memo of axe is Ex. P.10. The appellant Ayodhya was arrested vide arrest memo Ex. P.11. The appellant Rajesh had made confessional statement and had disclosed that he had kept the Fars in his house. The confessional statement is Ex. P.12 and the seizure memo of Farsa is Ex. P.13. The appellant Rajesh was arrested vide arrest memo Ex. P.14. The appellant Chandu had made confessional statement and had disclosed that he had kept the Barchhi in his house. The confessional statement is Ex. P.15 and the seizure memo of Barchhi is Ex. P.16. The appellant Chandu was arrested vide arrest memo Ex. P.17. In cross examination it was stated by this witness, that the appellant Ayodhya was arrested on the date of incident itself, whereas the remaining appellants were arrested after 10-12 days. The appellants were interrogated one by one. Nothing could be elicited from his cross examination, which may make his evidence unreliable. 21. K.P. Parashar (P.W. 6) had written the F.I.R. This witness has stated that on 7-8-2000, the injured Murari (P.W. 1) had come to the Police outpost along with his brother Mulayam (P.W. 2). Both were in injured conditions. The complainant had lodged the F.I.R. Ex. P.1. Both the injured were sent to hospital and the F.I.R. was sent for registration to the Police Station. The spot map, Ex. P.4, was prepared on the instructions of the injured witness Udai Singh. The plain and blood stained earth was seized from the spot vide seizure memo Ex. P.5. He recorded the statements of Murarilal and Mulayam in the Hospital. The blood stained cloths of the injured Murari and Mulayam were seized vide seizure memo Ex. P.2. The spot map, Ex. P.4, was prepared on the instructions of the injured witness Udai Singh. The plain and blood stained earth was seized from the spot vide seizure memo Ex. P.5. He recorded the statements of Murarilal and Mulayam in the Hospital. The blood stained cloths of the injured Murari and Mulayam were seized vide seizure memo Ex. P.2. This witness was cross examined, however, nothing could be elicited from the cross examination of this witness, which may make his evidence unreliable. 22. M.L. Parihar (P.W. 7) is the investigating officer. This witness has proved the confessional statements and the seizure of weapons from the appellants. In cross examination, it was admitted by this witness, that all the four accused persons were residing in a single house. The appellants had brought the weapons from their house. The appellants had hidden the weapons in different rooms. It was admitted that the appellant Ayodhya had also some injuries on his body. In arrest memo Ex. P.11, he had mentioned about the injuries sustained by Ayodhya. 23. Thus, from the evidence of the witnesses, it is clear that when the complainant and his brothers were going to their fields, they were challenged by the appellants and when the complainant replied that he is going to the fields, then they were mercilessly beaten by the appellants by means of deadly weapons like Ballam, Barchhi, Axe and Farsa. The injuries sustained by the injured Murari (P.W. 1) and Mulayam (P.W. 2) fully corroborates the ocular evidence of the injured witnesses. 24. It was contended by the Counsel for the appellants that as none of the injuries were dangerous to life, therefore, no offence under Section 307 of I.P.C. is made out. The submission made by the Counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted. 25. The Supreme Court in the case of Parasuram Pandey Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2004) 13 SCC 189 has held as under: "15. To constitute an offence under Section 307 two ingredients of the offence must be present: (a) an intention of or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (b) the doing of an act towards it. For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention. For the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose of carrying out the intention. The section clearly contemplates an act which is done with intention of causing death but which fails to bring about the intended consequence on account of intervening circumstances. The intention or knowledge of the accused must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. In the absence of intention or knowledge which is the necessary ingredient of Section 307 there can be no offence "of attempt to murder". Intent which is a state of mind cannot be proved by precise direct evidence, as a fact it can only be detected or inferred from other factors. Some of the relevant considerations may be the nature of the weapon used, the place where injuries were inflicted, the nature of the injuries and the circumstances in which the incident took place." The Supreme Court in the case of Jage Ram and Others Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2015) 11 SCC 366 has held as under:- "12. For the purpose of conviction under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution has to establish (i) the intention to commit murder; and (ii) the act done by the accused. The burden is on the prosecution that the accused had attempted to commit the murder of the prosecution witness. Whether the accused person intended to commit murder of another person would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that fatal injury capable of causing death should have been caused. Although the nature of injury actually caused may be of assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be adduced from other circumstances. The intention of the accused is to be gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of the accused, parts of the body where the injury was caused and the nature of injury and severity of the blows given, etc. 13. In State of M.P. v. Kashiram (2009) 4 SCC 26 , the scope of intention for attracting conviction under Section 307 IPC was elaborated and it was held as under: (SCC pp. 13. In State of M.P. v. Kashiram (2009) 4 SCC 26 , the scope of intention for attracting conviction under Section 307 IPC was elaborated and it was held as under: (SCC pp. 29-30, paras 12-13) "12. ... 13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt. 14. This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil (1983) 2 SCC 28 , Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. (2004) 3 SCC 793 and R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka (2004) 9 SCC 27 . ******** 16. Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case. The circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or minor will not by itself rule out application of Section 307 IPC. The determinative question is the intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and not the nature of the injury.' See State of M.P. v. Saleem (2005) 5 SCC 554 , SCC pp. 559-60, paras 13-14 and 16. 13. 6. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N. (1991) 3 SCC 471 (Saleem case (2005) 5 SCC 554 SCC p. 558, para 6)" 26. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N. (1991) 3 SCC 471 (Saleem case (2005) 5 SCC 554 SCC p. 558, para 6)" 26. Thus, if the facts of the present case are considered in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, then it would be clear that the appellants had caused multiple injuries to the injured witnesses on the vital parts of their body. Thus, the number of assaults, the nature of weapons used by the appellants and the situs of the injuries, clearly establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants had an intention to kill or had knowledge that death will be caused. Even otherwise, the Doctor Vinod Rawat (P.W. 8) had also opined that the injuries were dangerous to life. 27. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellants are guilty of making an attempt to commit murder of Murarilal (P.W. 1) and Mulayam (P.W. 2). Hence, the conviction of the appellants for offence under Section 307 of I.P.C. or in the alternative under Section 307 read with Section 34 of I.P.C. by the judgment dated 17-9-2003 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Datia in Sessions Trial No. 126/2000, is hereby upheld. 28. So far as the question of sentence is concerned, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellants that the incident had taken place in the year 2000 and 17 long years have passed and the appellants have already undergone the mental agony of facing trial as well as the Appeal, therefore, the period of 6 months which has already been undergone by the appellants is sufficient to meet the ends of justice. To buttress his contentions, the Counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgments passed in the case of Neelam Bahal and another Vs. State of Uttarakhand reported in (2010) 2 SCC 229 , Naushad Ahmad Vs. State of M.P. Reported in 2006 Cr.L.R. (M.P.) 604, Ashok Mishra Vs. State of M.P. Reported in 2013 (2) JLJ 156 , Kapil and others Vs. State of M.P. Reported in 2015 (11) MPWN 17, State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Nandkishore and others reported in 2005 Cr.L.R. 331. 29. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellants on the question of sentence. 30. State of M.P. Reported in 2013 (2) JLJ 156 , Kapil and others Vs. State of M.P. Reported in 2015 (11) MPWN 17, State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Nandkishore and others reported in 2005 Cr.L.R. 331. 29. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellants on the question of sentence. 30. So far as the judgments passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Neelam Bahal (Supra), by High Court in the cases of Naushad Ahmad (Supra) and Ashok Mishra (Supra) are concerned, the Courts had come to a conclusion that in place of offence under Section 307 of I.P.C., the accused persons were guilty of committing lesser offence and accordingly, the jail sentence of period already undergone was awarded. So far as the judgments passed in the case Kapil (Supra) and Nandkishore (Supra) are concerned, they cannot be treated as a precedent on the question of sentence, as the sentencing policy was not taken into consideration. 31. It is true that the incident took place in the year 2000 and one of the appellants namely Ayodhya has already expired, but the manner in which the incident took, the number of injuries caused by the appellants, the weapons used and the situs of the injuries, clearly show that the appellants had acted in a most merciless manner. Deterrence is one of the important aspect of the sentencing policy. 32. The Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Narain Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2013) 7 SCC 77 has held as under: "14. Primarily it is to be borne in mind that sentencing for any offence has a social goal. Sentence is to be imposed regard being had to the nature of the offence and the manner in which the offence has been committed. The fundamental purpose of imposition of sentence is based on the principle that the accused must realise that the crime committed by him has not only created a dent in his life but also a concavity in the social fabric. The purpose of just punishment is designed so that the individuals in the society which ultimately constitute the collective do not suffer time and again for such crimes. It serves as a deterrent. The purpose of just punishment is designed so that the individuals in the society which ultimately constitute the collective do not suffer time and again for such crimes. It serves as a deterrent. True it is, on certain occasions, opportunities may be granted to the convict for reforming himself but it is equally true that the principle of proportionality between an offence committed and the penalty imposed are to be kept in view. While carrying out this complex exercise, it is obligatory on the part of the court to see the impact of the offence on the society as a whole and its ramifications on the immediate collective as well as its repercussions on the victim. 15. In this context, we may refer with profit to the pronouncement in Jameel v. State of U.P. (2010) 12 SCC 532 , wherein this Court, speaking about the concept of sentence, has laid down that it is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The sentencing courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence. 16. In Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat (2006) 2 SCC 359 the Court has observed thus: (SCC p. 362, para 7) "7. ... Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: 'State of criminal law continues to be--as it should be--a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society.' Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration." 17. In State of M.P. v. Babulal (2008) 1 SCC 234 , two learned Judges, while delineating about the adequacy of sentence, have expressed thus: (SCC pp. 241-42, paras 23-24) "23. In State of M.P. v. Babulal (2008) 1 SCC 234 , two learned Judges, while delineating about the adequacy of sentence, have expressed thus: (SCC pp. 241-42, paras 23-24) "23. Punishment is the sanction imposed on the offender for the infringement of law committed by him. Once a person is tried for commission of an offence and found guilty by a competent court, it is the duty of the court to impose on him such sentence as is prescribed by law. The award of sentence is consequential on and incidental to conviction. The law does not envisage a person being convicted for an offence without a sentence being imposed therefor. 24. The object of punishment has been succinctly stated in Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn., Vol. 11, Para 482), thus: '482. Object of punishment.--The aims of punishment are now considered to be retribution, justice, deterrence, reformation and protection and modern sentencing policy reflects a combination of several or all of these aims. The retributive element is intended to show public revulsion to the offence and to punish the offender for his wrong conduct. The concept of justice as an aim of punishment means both that the punishment should fit the offence and also that like offences should receive similar punishments. An increasingly important aspect of punishment is deterrence and sentences are aimed at deterring not only the actual offender from further offences but also potential offenders from breaking the law. The importance of reformation of the offender is shown by the growing emphasis laid upon it by much modern legislation, but judicial opinion towards this particular aim is varied and rehabilitation will not usually be accorded precedence over deterrence. The main aim of punishment in judicial thought, however, is still the protection of society and the other objects frequently receive only secondary consideration when sentences are being decided." (emphasis in original) 18. In Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 7 SCC 54, while dealing with the philosophy of just punishment which is the collective cry of the society, a two-Judge Bench has stated that just punishment would be dependent on the facts of the case and rationalised judicial discretion. Neither the personal perception of a Judge nor self-adhered moralistic vision nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. Neither the personal perception of a Judge nor self-adhered moralistic vision nor hypothetical apprehensions should be allowed to have any play. For every offence, a drastic measure cannot be thought of. Similarly, an offender cannot be allowed to be treated with leniency solely on the ground of discretion vested in a court. The real requisite is to weigh the circumstances in which the crime has been committed and other concomitant factors. 19. The aforesaid authorities deal with sentencing in general. As is seen, various concepts, namely, gravity of the offence, manner of its execution, impact on the society, repercussions on the victim and proportionality of punishment have been emphasised upon. In the case at hand, we are concerned with the justification of life imprisonment in a case of rape committed on an eight year old girl, helpless and vulnerable and, in a way, hapless. The victim was both physically and psychologically vulnerable. It is worthy to note that any kind of sexual assault has always been viewed with seriousness and sensitivity by this Court." The Supreme Court in the case of Raj Bala Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2016) 1 SCC 463 has held as under :- "4. We have commenced the judgment with the aforesaid pronouncements, and our anguished observations, for the present case, in essentiality, depicts an exercise of judicial discretion to be completely moving away from the objective parameters of law which clearly postulate that the prime objective of criminal law is the imposition of adequate, just and proportionate punishment which is commensurate with the gravity, nature of the crime and manner in which the offence is committed keeping in mind the social interest and the conscience of the society, as has been laid down in State of M.P. v. Bablu (2014) 9 SCC 281 State of M.P. v. Surendra Singh (2015) 1 SCC 222 and State of Punjab v. Bawa Singh (2015) 3 SCC 441 . ******* 16. A court, while imposing sentence, has a duty to respond to the collective cry of the society. The legislature in its wisdom has conferred discretion on the court but the duty of the court in such a situation becomes more difficult and complex. It has to exercise the discretion on reasonable and rational parameters. The discretion cannot be allowed to yield to fancy or notion. The legislature in its wisdom has conferred discretion on the court but the duty of the court in such a situation becomes more difficult and complex. It has to exercise the discretion on reasonable and rational parameters. The discretion cannot be allowed to yield to fancy or notion. A Judge has to keep in mind the paramount concept of rule of law and the conscience of the collective and balance it with the principle of proportionality but when the discretion is exercised in a capricious manner, it tantamounts to relinquishment of duty and reckless abandonment of responsibility. One cannot remain a total alien to the demand of the socio-cultural milieu regard being had to the command of law and also brush aside the agony of the victim or the survivors of the victim. Society waits with patience to see that justice is done. There is a hope on the part of the society and when the criminal culpability is established and the discretion is irrationally exercised by the court, the said hope is shattered and the patience is wrecked. It is the duty of the court not to exercise the discretion in such a manner as a consequence of which the expectation inherent in patience which is the "finest part of fortitude" is destroyed. A Judge should never feel that the individuals who constitute the society as a whole is imperceptible to the exercise of discretion. He should always bear in mind that erroneous and fallacious exercise of discretion is perceived by a visible collective." 33. Thus, if the facts of the present case are considered, then it would be clear that the Trial Court has already adopted a very lenient view by awarding the jail sentence of rigorous imprisonment of 4 years. The jail sentence cannot be reduced to the period already undergone by the appellants. Accordingly, the jail sentence of rigorous imprisonment of 4 years, as awarded by the Trial Court is hereby maintained. 34. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence dated 17-9-2003 passed by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Datia, in Sessions Trial No. 126/2000 is hereby affirmed. 35. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds and surety bonds are cancelled. They are directed to immediately surrender before the Trial Court to undergo the remaining jail sentence. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.