JUDGMENT : DINESH MEHTA, J. Instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the judgment/order dated 11.06.2004 passed by the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer, whereby the reference made by Additional District Collector, Tonk, vide order dated 22.02.2001, has been allowed and the mutation entry no. 471 in favour of father of the petitioner Sh. Ganga Ram in relation to the land measuring 3 bighas 15 biswas in revenue village Tonk, has been set aside. 2. The facts, in brief, leading to this litigation to this court are that 3 Bighas 15 Biswas of land of Khasra No. 6959 situated in Tehsil Tonk has been mutated in the name of Gangaram in the year 1960, as a result of order dated 03.02.1960 passed in settlement proceedings. Since then, the petitioners/their predecessor have been enjoying cultivatory possession over it. 3. A reference application came to be filed by the Tehsildar Tonk, for setting aside mutation entry no. 471, which came to be rejected by a detailed order dated 28.09.1989, passed by the Additional Collector Tonk, holding that Gangaram, father the petitioners, was cultivating the land for which he was conferred ‘khatedari’ rights by virtue of provision of Section 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short, ‘the Act of 1955’). The Additional Collector further observed that Gangaram was having possession over the land for last 51 years. 4. Tehsildar Tonk, relentlessly filed yet another application for reference for the same reasons, which however came to be accepted by the Additional Collector Tonk, by an order dated 22.02.2001 and accordingly a reference was made to the Board of Revenue Ajmer. 5. Said reference was registered as Reference no. 247/2001/LR Tonk and came to be allowed by the Board of Revenue vide order dated 11.04.2004. Learned Member of the Board set aside the mutation entry no. 471 recording the land in name of petitioners/petitioner's predecessor, while observing that the mutation entry no. 471 was in violation of Section 46(a) of the Act of 1955. Learned Member of the Board of Revenue completely brushed aside the argument on behalf of the petitioners that the petitioners are Khatedar tenant of the land and that second reference on the same issue was not maintainable, and observed that the principle of res-judicata is not applicable in the matters of reference. 6. Assailing the order of the Board of Revenue, Mr. 6. Assailing the order of the Board of Revenue, Mr. R.K. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the mutation in question has been made in favour of Gangaram father of the petitioners, in pursuance of the order no. 648 & 655 dated 03.02.1960, passed by Settlement Commissioner. He firstly submitted that the order of Settlement Commissioner passed way back in the year 1960, can not be set at naught by way of proceedings under Section 82 of the Land Revenue Act. His second argument was that there is no evidence on record to show that the land in question ever belonged to ‘Muafi Takiya Kalan Baitmam Saraste Okaf’. Thirdly he contended that Additional Collector, Tonk, had already rejected the reference on merit by a reasoned order dated 28.09.1989 and second reference for the same reasons, made vide order dated 22.02.2001, was illegal and the impugned order of the Board of Revenue dated 11.06.2004, passed in proceedings arising out of such illegal reference, is also illegal. His fourth argument was that reference for setting aside mutation entry after about 51 years is void and without jurisdiction in the light of catena of decisions of this court and that of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. His last argument was that without prejudice to all the above argument, even if it is presumed that land at some point of time belonged to ‘Muafi Takiya Kalan Baitmam Saraste Okaf’, or some seat of Muslim faith, it was then a Wakf property for which if any proceedings were warranted, the same could be taken in accordance with the provisions of Wakf Act, 1995. He further contended that there is no concept of Idol or Diety in Muslim faith and, as such, treating the land to be belonging to a ‘minor’ and holding it to be contrary to Section 46(a) of the Act of 1955, is ridiculous. 7. Learned Additional Government Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Dharmendra Pareek submitted that principle of res-judicata is not applicable in the proceedings of reference decided by the Additional Collector, as reference is only an opinion of the Additional Collector and the same is not barred by the principle of res-judicata. In response to the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner, that reference after about 51 years of the mutation was bad, Mr. Pareek submitted that there is no period prescribed for making a reference. In response to the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner, that reference after about 51 years of the mutation was bad, Mr. Pareek submitted that there is no period prescribed for making a reference. He however, could not show any evidence on record to prove that the land ever belonged to the ‘Muafi Takiya Kalan Baitmam Saraste Okaf’. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. It is a matter of concern that the revenue authorities have not brought on record any evidence to show that the contentious land belonged to ‘Muafi Takiya Kalan Baitmam Saraste Okaf’. Even if it is accepted that the land in question, at some point of time belonged to a seat of Muslim faith, it cannot be treated to belonging to a perpetual minor, as there is no concept of Idol or Diety in Islam. All properties of Muslim faith or religion are to be notified under Wakf Act and managed/controlled by the provisions of Wakf Act 1995. 10. It is apposite to reproduce relevant part of Section 46 of the Act of 1955, which reads as under:— “46. Letting or sub-letting in exceptional cases — (1) The restrictions imposed by Section 45 on letting by a holder of Khudkasht and on sub-letting by a tenant, shall not apply to— (a) a minor, or (b) a lunatic, or (c) an idiot, or (d) a woman who is unmarried or divorced or separate from her husband, or is a widow, or (e) a person incapable disability of cultivating his holding by reason of blindness or other physical disability or infirmity, or (f) a person who is a member of the armed force of the Union, or (g) a person who is suffering detention or confinement in prison, or (h) a person not exceeding twenty-five years of age, who is a student prosecuting his studies in a recognised institution:” 11. Learned counsel for the respondents-Revenue has not been able to show any law or provision according to which mosque or other seat of Muslim faith can be treated to be that of a minor. Muslim religion does not believe in Idol worshipping and hence, to treat the property of Vksd 'kdhZ ekQh rfd;kdyka c,reke ljLrs vksdkQ to be belonging to a minor under Section 46(a) of the Act of 1955, is fundamentally fallacious. 12. Muslim religion does not believe in Idol worshipping and hence, to treat the property of Vksd 'kdhZ ekQh rfd;kdyka c,reke ljLrs vksdkQ to be belonging to a minor under Section 46(a) of the Act of 1955, is fundamentally fallacious. 12. Section 46(a) per se is not meant for religious properties or seat of Idol. It is the extension of concept of an Idol, being perpetual minor, by which the sale of property held for and on behalf of Idol has been held to be hit by Section 46(a) of the Act of 1955. 13. It is relevant to refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Kalanka Devi Sansthan v. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal Nagpur ( (1969) 2 SCC 616 : AIR 1970 SC 439 ), in which their Lordships, while dealing with the definition of the word “to cultivate personally” under section 215(12) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, held in paragraph 4 of the report, as follows:— “4. Now it is well known that when property is given absolutely for the worship of an idol it vests in the idol itself as a juristic person. As pointed out in Mukherjee's Hindu Law of Religions and Charitable Trust at pp. 142-43, this view is in accordance with the Hindu ideas and has been uniformly accepted in a long series of judicial decisions. The idol is capable of holding property in the same way as a natural person. “It has a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued. Its interests are attended to by the person who has the deity in his charge and who is in law its manager with all the powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manager of the estate of an infant heir”. The question, however, is whether the idol is capable of cultivating the land personally. The argument raised on behalf of the appellant is that under Explanation I in Section 2(12) of the Act a person who is subject to any physical or mental disability shall be deemed to cultivate the land personally if it is cultivated by the servants or by hired labourer. The argument raised on behalf of the appellant is that under Explanation I in Section 2(12) of the Act a person who is subject to any physical or mental disability shall be deemed to cultivate the land personally if it is cultivated by the servants or by hired labourer. In other words an idol or a Sansthan that would fall within the meaning of the word “person” can well be regarded to be subject to a physical or mental disability and land can be cultivated on its behalf by servants or hired labourers. It is urged that in Explanation (I) the idol would be in the same position as a minor and it can certainly cultivate the land personally within the meaning of Section 2(12). It is difficult to accept the suggestion that the case of the appellant would fall within Explanation (I) in Section 2(12). Physical or mental disability as defined by Section 2(22) lays emphasis on the words “personal labour or supervision”. As has been rightly pointed out in Shri Kesheoraj Deo Sansthan, Karanji v. Bapurao Deoba, [1964] Mah. L.J. 589 in which an identically similar point came up for consideration, the dominating idea of anything done personally or in person is that the thing must be done by the person himself and not by or through some one else. In our opinion the following passage in that judgment at p. 593, 16 explains the whole position correctly: “It should thus appear that the legislative intent clearly is that in order to claim a cultivation as a personal cultivation there must be established a direct nexus between the person who makes such a claim, and the agricultural processes or activities carried on the land. In other words, all the agricultural operations, though allowed to be done through hired labour or workers must be under the direct supervision, control, or management of the landlord. It is in the sense that the words “personal supervision” must be understood. In other words, the requirement of personal supervision under the third category of personal cultivation provided for in the definition does not admit of an intermediary between the landlord and the labourer, who can act as agent of the landlord for supervising the operations of the agricultural worker. In other words, the requirement of personal supervision under the third category of personal cultivation provided for in the definition does not admit of an intermediary between the landlord and the labourer, who can act as agent of the landlord for supervising the operations of the agricultural worker. If that is not possible in the case of one landlord, we do not see how it is possible in the case of another landlord merely because the landlord in the latter case is a juristic person.” In other words the intention is that the cultivation of the land concerned must be by natural persons and not by legal persons.” 14. A recent Full Bench Judgment of this Court in Tara v. State of Rajasthan, 2015 (3) WLC (Raj.) 548 : 2015 (4) RLW 2721 suggests that the concept of Idol being perpetual minor is applicable only to Hindu Faith. The conclusion arrived at by the Full Bench can be gainfully quoted here, which reads thus:— “48. In order to summarize the answers, the questions framed by the Court and our decisions on the questions are stated as below:— “Question no. (i) Whether the land held in Jagir, by Hindu Idol (deity) as Dolidar or Muafidar cultivated by a person other than the Shebait/Pujari of the deity or by hired labour or servants engaged by its Shebait/Pujari as a tenant of the deity, such idol being treated as a perpetual minor, will still be regarded as land held in the personal cultivation of the deity or will such land be regarded as held in the tenancy by the person cultivating such land as tenant of a deity? Answer:— The question no. (i) is decided in favour of the State and against the Shebait/Pujari claiming the land to be saved by the Jagirs Act of 1952. The land held in Jagir by Hindu idol (deity) as Dolidar or Muafidar cultivated by a person other than the Shebait/Pujari of the deity personally or by hired labour or servants engaged by its Shebait/Pujari as a tenant of the deity, shall vest in the State, after the Jagirs Act of 1952. The Hindu idol (deity), even if it is treated to be a perpetual minor, could not continue to hold such land. Such land cannot be treated to be in its personal cultivation. The Hindu idol (deity), even if it is treated to be a perpetual minor, could not continue to hold such land. Such land cannot be treated to be in its personal cultivation. A tenant of such land cultivating the land acquired the rights of khatedar of the State. Such land under the tenancy of a person other than Shebait/Purjari of Hindu Idol (deity) became khatedari land of such tenant. The name of Hindu Idol (deity) from such land had to be expunged from the revenue records with Shebait/Pujuri 43 having no right to claim the land as Khatedar. Consequently, they had no right to transfer such lands, and all such transfers have to be treated as null and void, in contravention of the Jagirs Act 1952, and the land under such transfers to be resumed by the State. Question No. (ii) What are the rights of the Hindu Idol (deity) in the lands held by them in the name of its Shebaits/Pujari on the date of resumption of such Jagir, under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms & Resumption of Jagir Act, 1952? Answer:— The Hindu Idol (deity) in the lands held by them in the name of its Shebait/Pujari on the date of resumption of such Jagir under the provisions of the Jagirs Act of 1952 did not have any rights except in khudkasht land cultivated by Shebait/Pujari either by themselves or by hired labour or servant engaged by them for the benefit of the expenses of the temple including sewa puja. All those lands let out by them to the tenants or sub-tenants were resumed by the Jagirs Act of 1952 and that the Hindu idol (deity) lost all the rights in such jagir lands.” 15. It is not in dispute that the land was recorded in the name of the petitioner's father in the year 1960 pursuant to settlement proceedings, as such, on the basis of the principles enunciated by the Full Bench, the land had already been recorded in the name of Gangaram, who was cultivating the land. It is not the case of the revenue department that the land belonging to the Muslim seat has illegally been sold/transferred to the petitioner. 16. There is yet another infirmity in the order of reference in question, which was made after about 51 years, of possession. It is not the case of the revenue department that the land belonging to the Muslim seat has illegally been sold/transferred to the petitioner. 16. There is yet another infirmity in the order of reference in question, which was made after about 51 years, of possession. Said reference was highly belated and the impugned order passed by the Revenue Board, Ajmer on 11.06.2004, pursuant to such belated reference, is illegal and contrary to law laid down by the Full Bench judgment of this court in Tara, (supra), particularly in the light of discussion made in para 39, 40 and conclusion drawn in para 42, which read as under:— “39. Neither Section 232 of Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 nor section 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 prescribes any period for exercising the power by the competent authority for calling and examining the record. Where the period is not prescribed in the Statute for exercising the power, the power must be exercised within a reasonable time, except in case of fraud. The reasonable time has been held to be one to three years in State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghave Natha ( (1969) 2 SCC 187 : AIR 1969 SC 1297 ), Mansa Ram v. S.P. Pathak ( (1984) 1 SCC 125 : AIR 1983 SC 1239 ) and State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Co-operative Milk Producers Union Ltd. ( (2007) 11 SCC 363 ). 40. In a recent case in Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District v. D. Narsing Rao ( (2015) 3 SCC 695 ), it was held that where no time limit is prescribed under the Statute for invocation of powers, such power must be exercised within a reasonable period. If the power is allowed to be exercised after decades, it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties over immovable properties. The suo motu action cannot be taken after a long lapse of time. Absence of any period of limitation does not mean that the power can be exercised at any time, which will make the exercise of power arbitrary and oppose to the concept of Rule of Law. Relying on the decision in State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. The suo motu action cannot be taken after a long lapse of time. Absence of any period of limitation does not mean that the power can be exercised at any time, which will make the exercise of power arbitrary and oppose to the concept of Rule of Law. Relying on the decision in State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd. (supra), it was held that where no period of limitation is prescribed, the statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period, would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors. The Supreme Court further relied on its earlier decision in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy ((2003) 7 SC 667) in which in relation to Section 50-B(4) of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950 providing for suo motu power, it was held that in absence of necessary and sufficient particulars pleaded as regards fraud and the date or period of discovery of fraud and more so when the contention that the suo motu power could be 38 exercised within a reasonable period from the date of discovery of fraud was not urged, the High Court was right in not examining the question of fraud alleged to have been committed. The use of the words “at any time” in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act only indicates that no specific period of limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu power could be exercised. The exercise of power depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In case of fraud, this power could be exercised within a reasonable time from the date of detection or discovery of fraud. The words “at any time” must be understood as reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. ….. ….. 42. On the aforesaid discussion and in the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above, we decide the question no. The words “at any time” must be understood as reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. ….. ….. 42. On the aforesaid discussion and in the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above, we decide the question no. (v) in the manner that even if not time limit has been fixed for reference under Section 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 and under Section 232 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 in respect of the land held by a Hindu Idol (diety), a reference can be made within a reasonable time, which will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Even if the fraud is alleged, the power must not be exercised after unreasonable period, such as, after several decades claiming rights over the land.” 17. Adverting now to the third argument advanced by Mr. Mathur that second reference was impermissible in law. The reasoning given by the Board of Revenue and the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent that principle of res-judicata is not applicable in reference, though prima facie is unpalatable even if accepted as correct, in the assessment of facts of case in hand, as the Tehsildar had not preferred any appeal against order dated 28.09.1989, he had acquiesced and thus estopped from making yet another reference on the same set of facts. Apart from this, if multiple reference application are permitted to be made, it would lead to judicial indiscipline and anarchy as Right of parties would never get settled and the same would be fatal to administration of justice. 18. In this view of the matter, the subsequent application for reference filed by the Tehsildar Tonk, and the corresponding order of reference, made by the Additional Collector Tonk, on 22.02.2001, is held to be illegal and contrary to law. Consequent thereupon, the order dated 11.06.2004 passed by the Board of Revenue is also declared illegal. 19. Apart from the above, there are few more issues which need to be examined in the present case. Consequent thereupon, the order dated 11.06.2004 passed by the Board of Revenue is also declared illegal. 19. Apart from the above, there are few more issues which need to be examined in the present case. If the stand of the State of Rajasthan (Tehsildar) is taken into consideration that at some point of time the land in question belonged to ‘Muafi Takiya Kalan Baitmam Saraste Okaf’, then the land in question ought to have been declared as Wakf property under the provisions of the Wakf Act 1954 or the Wakf Act 1955. The question as to whether a particular property is Wakf property or not, has to be decided by the Wakf Tribunal under the provisions of Section 6 & 7 of the Wakf Act 1995. The jurisdiction of all courts in relation to such property is prohibited by virtue of sub-section-5 of section-6 of the Wakf Act, 1955, which is clear from the conjoint reading of Section-3(r), 6 & 7 of the Wakf Act 1995 which are reproduced here in below for ready reference:— “3(r) “wakf” means the permanent dedication by any person, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes— (i) a wakf by user but such wakf shall not cease to be a wakf by reason only of the user having ceased irrespective of the period of such cesser; (ii) a Shamlat Patti, Shamlat Deh, Jumla Malkkan or by any other name entered in a revenue record; (iii) “grants”, including mashrat-ul-khidmat for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and (iv) a wakf-alalaulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable, provided when the line of succession fails, the income of the wakf shall be spent for education, development, welfare and such other purposes as recognised by Muslim law, and “wakif” means any person making such dedication,” 6. Disputes regarding wakfs.—(1) If any question arises whether a particular property specified as wakf property in the list of wakfs is wakf property or not or whether a wakf specified in such list is a Shia wakf or Sunni wakf, the Board or the mutawalli of the wakf or any person aggrieved may institute a suit in a Tribunal for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal in respect of such matter shall be final: Provided that no such suit shall be entertained by the Tribunal after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the list of wakfs. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section and section 7, the expression “any person interested therein”, shall, in relation to may property specified as wakf property in the list of wakfs published after the commencement of this Act, shall include also every person who, though not interested in the wakf concerned, is interested in such property and to whom a reasonable opportunity had been afforded to represent his case by notice served on him in that behalf during the course of the relevant inquiry under section 4. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), no proceeding under this Act in respect of any wakf shall be stayed by reason only of the pendency of any such suit or of any appeal or other proceeding arising out of such suit. (3) The Survey Commissioner shall not be made a party to any suit under sub-section (1) and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against him in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rules made thereunder. (4) The list of wakfs shall, unless it is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), be final and conclusive. (5) On and from the commencement of this Act in a State, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted or commenced in a court in that State in relation to any question referred to in sub-section (1). 7. (5) On and from the commencement of this Act in a State, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted or commenced in a court in that State in relation to any question referred to in sub-section (1). 7. Power of Tribunal to determine disputes regarding wakfs.—(1) If, after the commencement of this Act, any question arises, whether a particular property specified as wakf property in a list of wakfs is wakf property or not, or whether a wakf specified in such list is a Shia wakf or a Sunni wakf, the Board or the mutawalli of the wakf, or any person interested therein, may apply to the Tribunal having jurisdiction in relation to such property, for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal thereon shall be final: Provided that— (a) in the case of the list of wakfs relating to any part of the State and published after the commencement of this Act no such application shall be entertained after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the list of wakfs; and (b) in the case of the list of wakfs relating to any part of the State and published at any time within a period of one year immediately preceding the commencement of this Act, such an application may be entertained by Tribunal within the period of one year from such commencement: Provided further that where any such question has been heard and finally decided by a civil court in a suit instituted before such commencement, the Tribunal shall not re-open such question. (2) Except where the Tribunal has no jurisdiction by reason of the provisions of sub-section (5), no proceeding under this section in respect of any wakf shall be stayed by any court, tribunal or other authority by reason only of the pendency of any suit, application or appeal or other proceeding arising out of any such suit, application, appeal or other proceeding. (3) The Chief Executive Officer shall not be made a party to any application under sub-section (1). (4) The list of wakfs and where any such list is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), the list as so modified, shall be final. (3) The Chief Executive Officer shall not be made a party to any application under sub-section (1). (4) The list of wakfs and where any such list is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), the list as so modified, shall be final. (5) The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter which is the subject-matter of any suit or proceeding instituted or commenced in a civil court under sub-section (1) of section 6, before the commencement of the Act or which is the subject-matter of any appeal from the decree passed before such commencement in any such suit or proceeding or of any application for revision or review arising out of such suit, proceeding or appeal, as the case may be. 20. As such all properties belonging to any Muslim faith, in one way or the other, are to be governed by the Wakf Act, 1995. Hence the issue raised and reference made by the Tehsildar claiming the land in question to be that of ‘Muafi Takiya Kalan Baitmam Saraste Okaf’ could not have been determined by the Revenue Courts. It is relevant to note that the Tehsildar had alleged that the mutation entry no. 471 was contrary to Sec. 46(a) of the Act of 1955 and by upholding such stand, the Board of Revenue has non-suited the petitioners. 21. The Courts below have completely over looked the fact that mutation entry no. 471 was only a record of rights, based upon order no. 648 & 655 dated 03.02.1960 passed by the Settlement Commissioner. As such, until & unless the order of Settlement Commissioner, a quasi judicial authority, is not challenged or questioned, the mutation entry no. 471 cannot be singularly cancelled. The Board of Revenue has therefore seriously erred in setting aside the mutation entry no. 471, without there being any challenge to its foundation, namely the order dated 03.02.1960 passed in the settlement proceedings. 22. There is yet another angle of looking at the controversy. Section 46 of the Act of 1955 by itself is not a provision which puts embargo or restriction on recording of the name of a Khatedar tenant, but it is an exception to Section 45. 22. There is yet another angle of looking at the controversy. Section 46 of the Act of 1955 by itself is not a provision which puts embargo or restriction on recording of the name of a Khatedar tenant, but it is an exception to Section 45. A combined reading of Sections 45 & 46 of the Act of 1955, reveals that the ‘khatedari’ rights cannot be leased out or sublet for a period exceeding 5 years, except in a case, when the land or the ‘khatedari’ rights belong to the persons mentioned in Section 46(1), which as follows:— (a) a minor, or (b) a lunatic, or (c) an idiot, or (d) a woman who is unmarried or divorced or separate from her husband, or is a widow, or (e) a person incapable disability of cultivating his holding by reason of blindness or other physical disability or infirmity, or (f) a person who is a member of the armed force of the Union, or (g) a person who is suffering detention or confinement in prison, or (h) a person not exceeding twenty-five years of age, who is a student prosecuting his studies in a recognised institution:” 23. As a matter of fact, it is the first proviso to Section 19, which denies accrual of ‘khatedari’ rights, if the land is held by persons mentioned in Section 46 of the Act of 1955. 24. As already observed, the land allegedly held by ‘Muafi Takiya Kalan Baitmam Saraste Okaf’ cannot be treated to be a land held by a minor and in view of the discussion made above, the authorities below have erred in holding the mutation entry to be in violation of Section 46(a) of the Act of 1955. 25. Viewed from these angles, the impugned order of the learned Board of Revenue dated 11.06.2004 suffers from manifest illegalities and the same cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 26. The writ petition is therefore allowed. The order dated 11.06.2004 passed by the Board of Revenue is quashed and set aside. Mutation entry no. 471 is restored. Tehsildar Tonk is directed to enter the subject land admeasuring 3 Bigha 15 Biswa of Khasra No. 6959 in revenue village Tonk, in favour of Legal Representatives of Gangaram, the petitioners herein.