JUDGMENT : M.R. Shah, J. 1. As common question of law and facts arise in both these applications, they are heard, decided and disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. Both these applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act have been preferred by the common applicant - assessee requesting to condone the huge delay of 1546 in preferring the respective Tax Appeals against the common judgment and order passed by the learned Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad "B" Bench Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as "the learned tribunal") in ITA No. 3383/Ahd/2010 for the Assessment Year 2007-08 and ITA No. 539/Ahd/2011 for the Assessment Year 2008-09. 2.1 It is the case on behalf of the common applicant - assessee that the impugned common judgment and order passed by the learned tribunal was received by the applicant - assessee on 03/08/2012. However, thereafter the applicant - assessee preferred rectification applications before the learned tribunal under Section 254(2) of the Income-Tax Act, as according to the applicant - assessee the learned tribunal committed an error apparent while upholding the disallowance of 20% of the commission paid to the payee under Section 40A(2)(b) of the Income-Tax Act as the applicant - assessee was advised that the said remedy of rectification applications was cheaper and better remedy. It is the case on behalf of the common applicant that the limitation for such a rectification applications was four years from the date of receipt of the order, and therefore, the applicant - assessee firm preferred Miscellaneous Applications on 24/12/2015, which came to be dismissed by the learned tribunal vide order dated 13/10/2016. The applicant - assessee firm preferred Special Civil Applications before this Court against the order passed by the learned tribunal in rectification applications on 03/03/2017, which came to be dismissed by the High Court on 06/03/2017 and thereafter the applicant - assessee firm preferred Appeals challenging the original common judgment and order passed by the learned tribunal on 14/03/2017. In the meantime, delay of 1564 days from the date of passing of the original common judgment and order passed by the learned tribunal has arisen, and therefore, it is the case on behalf of the common applicant that immediately after the rectification applications came to be dismissed on 13/10/2016 and thereafter the petitions came to be dismissed on 06/03/2017, Appeals have been preferred on 14/03/2017. It is submitted that therefore the delay has occurred due to genuine and bona fide circumstances, and therefore, it is requested to condone the delay in preferring the Tax Appeals. 3. Shri J.P. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the common applicant - assessee has heavily relied upon the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in support of the prayer to condone the delay in preferring the Tax Appeals; (i) N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 ; (ii) GMG Engineering Industries and Others Vs. SSA Green Power Solution and Others reported in (2015) 15 SCC 659 ; (iii) State of Goa and Others Vs. A.H. Jaffar and ons. reported in (1996) 7 SCC 79 ; (iv) Improvement Trust, Ludhiana Vs. Ujagar Singh and Others reported in (2010) 6 SCC 786 . 3.1 Shri J.P. Shah, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the common applicant - assessee has also relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Peterplast Synthetics (P) Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax rendered in (2014) 101 DTR (Guj.) 83. Making the above submissions and relying upon the above decisions, it is requested to allow the present applications and to condone the delay in preferring the Tax Appeals. 4. Both these applications are vehemently opposed by Shri Manish Bhatt, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue. It is submitted by Shri Manish Bhatt, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue that as such huge delay of 1564 days in preferring the Tax Appeals has not been sufficiently and properly explained. It is vehemently submitted by Shri Manish Bhatt, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue that as such the delay for the period between passing of the common judgment and order passed by the learned tribunal, which was received in the year 2012 and up to filing of the rectification applications, which were filed in the month of December, 2015 has not been explained at all. It is submitted that merely because four years time was available to the common applicant - assessee in preferring the rectification applications that does not mean that he can wait till the last date for preferring the rectification applications and thereafter prefer the Tax Appeals against the original order passed by the learned tribunal. It is submitted that merely because four years time was available to the common applicant - assessee in preferring the rectification applications that does not mean that he can wait till the last date for preferring the rectification applications and thereafter prefer the Tax Appeals against the original order passed by the learned tribunal. It is submitted that if really the common applicant - assessee was vigilant and so serious about filing the rectification applications it ought to have preferred the rectification applications at the earliest after receipt of the common judgment and order passed by the learned tribunal and there was no reason for the common applicant - assessee to wait till the last date for filing the rectification applications. It is therefore submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case the applicant - assessee cannot be permitted to take the plea that as the applicant preferred the rectification applications under Section 254(2) of the Income-Tax Act, which came to be dismissed in the month of October, 2016 and thereafter when the Tax Appeals have been preferred, the same be considered on merits. 4.1 It is further submitted by Shri Manish Bhatt, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue that even in the separate affidavit filed by the common applicant the applicant has categorically admitted that since the limitation was four years (to prefer the rectification applications) they were relaxed and they preferred Miscellaneous Application on 24/12/2015 on being reminded by their Chartered Accountant. It is submitted that the aforesaid conduct on the part of the applicant clearly demonstrates how much the applicant was serious and/or vigilant. It is therefore submitted that no case in made out to condone the huge delay of 1564 days in preferring the Tax Appeals. 4.2 Shri Manish Bhatt, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the revenue has heavily relied upon the following the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court in support of his prayer to dismiss the present applications. (i) Lanka Venkateshwarlu (D) by L.Rs. Vs. State of A.P. & Ors. reported in AIR 2011 SC 1199 ; (ii) Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors. reported in 2010 AIR SCW 4848; (iii) Postmaster General & Ors. Vs. Living Media India Limited & Anr. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 5. Heard the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. Vs. State of A.P. & Ors. reported in AIR 2011 SC 1199 ; (ii) Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors. reported in 2010 AIR SCW 4848; (iii) Postmaster General & Ors. Vs. Living Media India Limited & Anr. reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 5. Heard the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length. At the outset it is required to be noted that there is a huge delay of 1564 days in preferring the Tax Appeals. The impugned common judgment and order came to be passed by the learned tribunal in the month of July, 2012 and the order of the learned tribunal was received by the applicant - assessee on 03/08/2012, and therefore, the limitation for filing the Appeals expired on 28/12/2012. The Appeals have been preferred on 14/03/2017 i.e. beyond 1564 days. It is the case on behalf of the common applicant that as thereafter the applicant - assessee preferred the rectification applications under Section 254(2) of the Income-Tax Act, which came to be dismissed vide order 13/10/2016 and thereafter the applicant - assessee preferred Special Civil Applications before this Court, which came to be dismissed on 06/03/2017 and thereafter Tax Appeals have been preferred on 14/03/2017 challenging the original common judgment and order passed by the learned tribunal, and therefore, it is requested to condone the delay. However, it is required to be noted that the rectification applications came to be preferred by the applicant - assessee on 24/12/2015 i.e. after a period of approximately more than three years. There is no explanation whatsoever for the period between 03/08/2012 to 24/12/2015 except the explanation that the limitation for such an application is four years from the date of receipt of the order. The aforesaid can hardly be a ground/sufficient ground not to prefer the rectification applications at the earliest and to wait till the last date of filing the Miscellaneous Applications. In such a situation the applicant is required to explain the reason for not filing the rectification applications at the earliest. In the additional affidavit the applicant has stated that as the Charted Accountant advised to prefer the rectification applications and as the four years period was available the applicant was relaxed and thereafter they preferred the Miscellaneous Applications on 24/12/2015 on being reminded by the Chartered Accountant that their time is running out. In the additional affidavit the applicant has stated that as the Charted Accountant advised to prefer the rectification applications and as the four years period was available the applicant was relaxed and thereafter they preferred the Miscellaneous Applications on 24/12/2015 on being reminded by the Chartered Accountant that their time is running out. The aforesaid can hardly be a ground not to explain the delay for the period from the date of receipt of the order till the rectification applications are preferred. At the most the applicant can get the benefit of exclusion of time taken from the date of filing the rectification applications till the rectification applications came to be dismissed. However, still the applicant is required to explain the huge delay between the date of receipt of the order of the learned tribunal till the rectification applications are filed, which the applicant has failed to explain. Thus, it cannot be said that the applicant has sufficiently explained the huge delay of 1564 days. 5.1 We are conscious that ordinarily the Courts have liberally condoned the delay and are also expected to adopt justice oriented approach rather than giving any undue importance to the technicalities. We are also not oblivious of the fact that the delay is not to be explained by the litigant on literal sense on day to day basis. However, we cannot disregard the vital requirement of law that when there is no justification for delay, the substantial law of limitation cannot be marred advancing the cause of liberal approach. 5.2 It will not be out of place to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (D) by L.Rs. v. State of A.P. & Ors., reported in AIR 2011 SC 1199 wherein the delay was caused and there was insufficient explanation. The Apex Court set aside the order of the High Court in condoning the delay, by holding that the concept of liberal approach and justice oriented approach cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. In the words of the Apex Court- "26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as liberal approach, justice oriented approach, substantial justice cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. In the words of the Apex Court- "26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as liberal approach, justice oriented approach, substantial justice cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers." 5.3 The Apex Court in a decision, rendered in case of Balwant Singh [Dead] v. Jagdish Singh & Ors., reported in 2010 AIR SCW 4848 has given the test for a sufficient cause and what is to be seen is as to whether the party by the exercise of due care and attention could have avoided the delay. It reiterated that sufficient powers and discretion is available with the Courts for applying this law in a meaningful manner but sufficient cause would mean presence of legal and adequate reasons. It would be profitable to reproduce the relevant observations of the Apex Court in this case: "14. It reiterated that sufficient powers and discretion is available with the Courts for applying this law in a meaningful manner but sufficient cause would mean presence of legal and adequate reasons. It would be profitable to reproduce the relevant observations of the Apex Court in this case: "14. In the case of Union of India v. Tata Yodogawa Ltd., [1988 (38) Excise Law Times 739 (SC)], this Court while granting some latitude to the Government in relation to condonation of delay, still held that there must be some way or attempt to explain the cause for such delay and as there was no whisper to explain what legal problems occurred in filing the Special Leave Petition, the application for condonation of delay was dismissed. Similarly, in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. A.MD. Bilal and Co., [1999 (108) Excise Law Times 331 (SC)] : (1999 AIR SCW 4740), the Supreme Court declined to condone the delay of 502 days in filing the appeal because there was no satisfactory or reasonable explanation rendered for condonation of delay. The provisions of Order 22, Rule 9, CPC has been the subject matter of judicial scrutiny for considerable time now. Sometimes the Courts have taken a view that delay should be condoned with a liberal attitude, while on certain occasions the Courts have taken a stricter view and wherever the explanation was not satisfactory, have dismissed the application for condonation of delay. Thus, it is evident that it is difficult to state any straight jacket formula which can uniformly be applied to all cases without reference to the peculiar facts and circumstances of a given case. It must be kept in mind that whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly. Furthermore, it is also a well settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. In other words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted purposelessly. Furthermore, it is also a well settled canon of interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an interpretation to provisions which would render the provision ineffective or odious. Once the legislature has enacted the provisions of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of such an application, all these provisions have to be given their true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for. If we accept the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach and interpret these provisions (Order 22, Rule 9 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally, irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law. Liberal construction of the expression 'sufficient cause' is intended to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the Court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases where the Court must exercise its discretion against the applicant for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect 'sufficient cause' as understood in law. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, 1997] The expression 'sufficient cause' implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The word 'sufficient' means adequate enough, as much as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more than that which provides a plenitude which, when done, suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. These provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. We find it unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under either of these classes of cases. The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]." 5.4 In yet another recent decision of the Apex Court rendered in case of Postmaster General & Ors. vs. Living Media India Limited & Anr., reported in [ (2012) 3 SCC 563 ], in absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, the Court refused to condone the delay mechanically only because it was a Government Wing, by observing thus- "27. It is not in dispute that the persons concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us." 5.5 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan (Supra) by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant - assessee is concerned, at the outset it is required to be noted that the said decision came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the subsequent decision in the case of Living Media India Limited & Anr. (Supra). Even otherwise, considering the subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to hereinabove, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan (Supra) shall not be of any assistance to the applicant - assessee. (Supra). Even otherwise, considering the subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to hereinabove, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan (Supra) shall not be of any assistance to the applicant - assessee. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of GMG Engineering Industries and Others (Supra) is concerned, it is required to be noted that even in the said decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court has specifically observed that when there is no negligence, inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the appellants, the delay has to be condoned. In the said decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also observed that the discretion is to be exercised like any other judicial discretion with vigilance and circumspection. The discretion is not to be exercised in any arbitrary, vague or fanciful manner and the true test is to see that the applicant has acted with due diligence. Applying the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the said decision to the facts of the case on hand and as observed hereinabove that the applicant has failed to explain the delay for the period from the date of receipt of the order of the learned tribunal till the filing of the rectification applications and even according to the applicant as the time limit to file the rectification applications was four years they were relaxed and even thereafter also they preferred the rectification applications on being reminded by the Chartered Accountant that the time is running out, the aforesaid decisions shall not be of any assistance to the applicant. 5.6 Now so far as the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Peterplast Synthetics (P) Ltd. (Supra) is concerned at the outset it is required to be noted that the said decision shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 5.6 Now so far as the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Peterplast Synthetics (P) Ltd. (Supra) is concerned at the outset it is required to be noted that the said decision shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Before this Court the dispute was whether the rectification application submitted under Section 254(2) of the Income-Tax Act which was filed on the last day of preferring the applications and the period of limitation can be considered from the date of receipt of the order or not and to that the Division Bench observed that even if the rectification application/Miscellaneous Application is submitted on the last day of completion of four years from the date of receipt of the order, which is sought to be reviewed the same is required to be decided on merits and in such a situation the applicant - assessee is not required to give any explanation for the delay in filing the application for the period between the actual date of the receipt of the order, which is sought to be reviewed and the date on which the Miscellaneous Application is submitted. That is not the controversy in the present case. Under the circumstances, the said decision shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 6. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, when the applicant has failed to explain the huge delay of 1564 days, more particularly, has failed to explain the delay for the period from the date of receipt of the order of the learned tribunal and the filing of rectification applications and there is a huge delay of 1564 days, both these applications deserve to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. 6.1 In view of dismissal of the applications for the condonation of the delay, Tax Appeal (Stamp) No. 398/2017 and Tax Appeal (Stamp) No. 399/2017 also deserve to be dismissed on the ground of limitation and are accordingly dismissed.