ORDER : 1. Appellant vide this appeal under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 (for brevity "the Act, 2005") takes exception to order dated 16.05.2017 passed in W.P. No. 8660/2016. As the appellant was not a party in writ petition, but is adversely effected by the said order also seeks leave to file present appeal. The relevant facts giving rise to the controversy are that respondent No. 1 was initially appointed on 01.10.1990 as Aanganwadi Worker. It appears from material documents on record, more particularly Annexure R/1 filed along with the return in the writ petition that, the minimum educational qualification for appointment as Aanganwadi Worker was Class V which led the petitioner represent, vide Annexure R/1 at the time of initial appointment, and seek leave to file the copy of Class V mark-sheet, which as evident from said document was permitted taking into consideration the poor economic condition of the petitioner. However, it transpires from the submissions made on behalf of the parties that the petitioner, i.e. respondent No. 1 did not honour the undertaking. It also transpires from record Annexure R/3 and R/4 that while in service respondent No. 1 got herself twice examined by Medical Board for determination of her age; firstly, on 07.11.2015 and second time on 20.07.2016. In the report of the year 2015, respondent No. 1 was determined to be about 59 years and in the report of later year i.e. 2016 she was found to be of 58 years. Pertinent it is to note that this determination was despite that respondent No. 1's date of birth was recorded in her service book was 01.07.1950. 2. Pertinent it is to note that all these facts were adverted at by the State in its return in Writ Petition 8660/2016 and were not denied by respondent No. 1. Be that as it may. On discovery of the facts that the date of birth of respondent No. 1 in the document presented at the time of initial appointment was 01.07.1950 and that the respondent No. 1 got herself medically examined twice, once on 07.11.2015 and then on 20.07.2016 for determination of age whereon two different ages were recorded as 59 years and 58 years respectively, led the Project Officer, Integrated Child Development Project terminate the services with immediate effect by order dated 04.08.2016. 3. 3. Pertinent it is to note that the age of retirement of Aanganwadi Worker is 60 Years. And respondent No. 1 with the recorded date of birth of 01.07.1950 had already reached 60 years on 2010. As the post of Aanganwadi Worker fell vacant, the same was filled in by due process, and the present appellant was appointed by order dated 07.11.2016. Respondent No. 1 being aware of the fact that the applications were invited between 08.08.2016 to 14.08.2016 to fill the post raised objection on 26.08.2016 and on 08.09.2016. That the proceedings initiated on 08.08.2016 culminated in the appointment of present appellant by order dated 07.11.2016. That respondent No. 1 filed the Writ Petition on 09.12.2016. However, for the reasons best known to her she did not challenge the order dated 07.11.2016 but confined the challenge to the order dated 04.08.2016 on the ground that the same has been passed without affording the opportunity of hearing. The State Government, in its return, disclosed the entire facts regarding respondent No. 1's date of birth being recorded as 01.07.1950 and the manner she thus got her age determined by the medical board. 4. The State also adverted to the facts that in the year 2015 respondent No. 1 was adjudged as 59 years and in 2016 as 58 years. It was stated in the return that the impugned order was in substance not a punishment order but as she had attained 60 years on 01.07.2010 she was not entitled to continue in service. 5. Learned Single Judge on a finding that the impugned order is punitive and as no opportunity of hearing was granted set aside the order with the direction to afford an opportunity of hearing to respondent No. 1. It is pertinent to note that there is no direction for reinstatement of respondent No. 1, nor the order of appointment of present appellant has been tinkered with. 6. In the background of these facts, the question which arises for consideration is as to whether the appellant has any locus to challenge the impugned order. If the answer is in affirmative, the next question is whether the Writ Court is justified in the given facts to have interfered with the order dated 04.08.2016. 7. As regard to locus of the appellants, various decisions are cited at bar on behalf of both the parties. 8. If the answer is in affirmative, the next question is whether the Writ Court is justified in the given facts to have interfered with the order dated 04.08.2016. 7. As regard to locus of the appellants, various decisions are cited at bar on behalf of both the parties. 8. The appellant has relied upon State of Assam and Another vs. Basanta Kumar Das, AIR 1973 SC 1252 , Arun Tewari and Others vs. Zila Manasvi Shikshak Sangh, AIR 1998 SC 331, K.H. Siraj vs. High Court of Kerala and Others, AIR 2006 SC 2339 and Dharampal Singh vs. State of M.P. and Others, 2003 (3) MPLJ 5 . 9. Whereas respondent No. 1 has placed reliance on Poonam vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2016) 2 SCC 779 , unreported judgment dated 16.04.2014 passed in R.P. No. 380/2012, Jhunilal Yadav vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, order dated 06.09.2012 passed in W.P. No. 2670/2005, Komal Prasad Jharia vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others and order dated 25.07.2013 passed in W.P. No. 12045/2013, Jahar Ahirwar vs. State of M.P. and Others. 10. In State of Assam and Another vs. Basanta Kumar Das, AIR 1973 SC 1252 , it is held: "13. This was a case where the rule was statutory. It need hardly be emphasized that what applies to a statutory rule applies with greater force to mere executive instructions. This is a complete answer to the claim of the respondents in this case that as a result of the memorandum of 21-3-63 they got a right to continue in service beyond the age of 55 years. A Government servant has no right to continue in service beyond the age of superannuation and if he is retained beyond that age it is only in exercise of the discretion of the Government." 11. In Arun Tewari and Others vs. Zila Manasvi Shikshak Sangh, AIR 1998 SC 331, it is held: "12. All the original applicants before the Tribunal who have challenged these provisions for recruitment of Assistant Teachers under the Operation Black Board Scheme did not possess the requisite qualifications for being selected under the said scheme as Assistant Teachers. Their names do not figure among the lists forwarded by the concerned District Employment Exchanges. All the original applicants before the Tribunal who have challenged these provisions for recruitment of Assistant Teachers under the Operation Black Board Scheme did not possess the requisite qualifications for being selected under the said scheme as Assistant Teachers. Their names do not figure among the lists forwarded by the concerned District Employment Exchanges. Surprisingly, the applications filed by all these persons and/or groups before the Tribunal did not make the selected/appointed candidates who were directly affected by the outcome of their applications, as party respondents. The Tribunal has passed the impugned order without making them parties or issuing notice to any of them. The entire exercise is seriously distorted because of this omission. They have now filed the present appeals after they have been granted leave to file the appeals. In the case of Prabodh Verma and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, 1984 (4) SCC 251 at page 273, this court observed that in the case before them there was a serious defect of non-joinder of necessary parties and the only respondents to the Sangh's petition were the State of Uttar Pradesh and its concerned officers. The employees who were directly concerned were not made parties - not even by joining some of them in a representative capacity, considering that their number was too large for all of them to be joined individually as respondents. This Court observed that High Court ought not have decided a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents or at least some of them before it as respondents in a representative capacity. These observations apply with equal force here. The same view has been reiterated by this Court in Ishwar Singh vs. Kuldip Singh, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 179, where the Court said that a writ petition challenging selection and appointments without impleading the selected candidates was not maintainable. (Vide also J. Jose Dhanapaul vs. S. Thomas, 1996 (3) SCC 587 , paragraph 4). On this ground alone the decision of the Tribunal is vitiated. However, even on merit we do not find that the judgment of the Tribunal can be sustained." 12. In K.H. Siraj vs. High Court of Kerala and Others, AIR 2006 SC 2339 , it is held: "77. On this ground alone the decision of the Tribunal is vitiated. However, even on merit we do not find that the judgment of the Tribunal can be sustained." 12. In K.H. Siraj vs. High Court of Kerala and Others, AIR 2006 SC 2339 , it is held: "77. The writ petitions have also to fall on the ground of absence of necessary parties in the party array. Though the appellants/petitioners contend that they are only challenging the list to a limited extent, acceptance of their contention will result in a total rearrangement of the select list. The candidates will be displaced from their present ranks, besides some of them may also be out of the select list of 70. It was, therefore, imperative that all the candidates in the select list should have been impleaded as parties to the writ petitions as otherwise they will be affected without being heard. Publication in the newspaper does not cure this defect. There are only a specified definite number of candidates who had to be impleaded namely, 70. It is not as if there are a large unspecified number of people to be affected. In such cases, resort cannot be made to Rule 148 of the Kerala High Court Rules. That Rule can be applied only when very large number of candidates are involved and it may be not able to pin-point those candidates with details. In our view, the writ petitions have to fail for non-joinder of necessary parties also." 13. In Dharampal Singh vs. State of M.P. and Others, 2003 (3) MPLJ 5 , it is held: "18. Petitioner cannot be allowed to take the benefit of his own wrong as his actual date of birth was known to him. The petitioner without any authority, on the basis of manipulation done in the service book, and in he scholar register continued to work beyond his actual date of superannuation, therefore, he was liable to pay back excess amount of payment made to him. In fact, having secured the advantage in the aforesaid manner the petitioner should have been saddled with the interest which Government has not done and for that petitioner ought to have been indebted to the Government instead of raising ill-founded grievance before this Court. He was certainly liable to pay back the excess amount received by him for the period June 30, 1982 to June 30, 1994." 14. He was certainly liable to pay back the excess amount received by him for the period June 30, 1982 to June 30, 1994." 14. In Poonam vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2016) 2 SCC 779 , it is held: "38. The aforesaid decisions do not lay down as a proposition of law that in every case when a termination is challenged, the affected person has to be made a party. What has been stated is when one challenges a provision as ultra vires the persons who are likely to be affected, some of them should be made parties in a representative capacity. That has been the consistent view of this Court in service jurisprudence. Some other decisions, which have been relied upon, are directly connected with regard to the selection and selectees. On a perusal of the analysis made in J.S. Yadav, we are disposed to think that the Court has applied the principle pertaining to the constitutional validity by equating it with the interpretation of a provision, whether it is retrospective or prospective. That apart, the Court, as is evident from para 32 of the judgment, has noted that the prayer made by the appellant only related to the declaratory relief. The said decision has to be understood in the context. A ratio of a decision has to be understood in its own context, regard being had to the factual exposition. If there has been advertence to precedents, the same has to be seen to understand and appreciate the true ratio. The ratiocination in the said decision is basically founded on the interpretation of the statutory provision and the relief claimed. The Court has been guided by the fact that when the interpretation as regards the provision whether it is retrospective or prospective, the selected members are necessary parties. 45. In this context, we may refer to certain other authorities where there has been an expansion of the concept of necessary party. The Constitution Bench in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad vs. Gyan Devi has laid down that in a land acquisition proceeding, the local authority is a necessary party in the proceedings before the Reference Court and is entitled to be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and oppose enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in that regard. That apart, it has also been stated that in the event of enhancement of the amount of compensation by the Reference Court, if the Government does not file an appeal, the local authority can file an appeal against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the Court. That apart, the Court also opined that in an appeal by the person having an interest in the land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the Reference Court, the local authorities should be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice of the said appeal and that could apply to appeal in the High Court as well as in the Supreme Court. 46. In DDA vs. Bhola Nath Sharma, the question arose whether the Delhi Development Authority, at whose instance land of the respondent and others had been acquired, could be treated as a "person interested" within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and it was entitled to an opportunity to participate in the proceedings held before the Land Acquisition Collector and the Reference Court for determining the compensation. The two-Judge Bench referred to U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad and relied upon a passage from Union of India vs. Bhola Nath Sharma and eventually allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as that of the Reference Court and remitted the matter to the Reference Court to decide the reference afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties which shall necessarily include opportunity to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. 47. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions with the purpose that the company or the authority has been treated as a necessary party on the foundation that it meets the criterion provided in the definition clause and that apart ultimately it has to pay the compensation. Therefore, it has a right in law to participate in the proceedings pertaining to determination of the amount of compensation. Factual score, needless to say, stands on a different footing. 48. A few examples can be given so that the position can be easily appreciated. Therefore, it has a right in law to participate in the proceedings pertaining to determination of the amount of compensation. Factual score, needless to say, stands on a different footing. 48. A few examples can be given so that the position can be easily appreciated. There are provisions in some legislations pertaining to Gram Panchayat or Panchayat Samiti where on certain grounds the competent authority has been conferred the power to remove the elected Sarpanch or the Chairman, as the case may be on certain counts. Against the order of the Collector, an appeal lies and eventually either a revision or a writ lies to the High Court. After his removal, someone by way of indirect election from amongst the members of the Panchayats or the Panchayat Samiti is elected as the Sarpanch or the Chairman. The removed Sarpanch assails his order of removal as he is aggrieved by the manner, method and the reasons for removal. In his eventual success, he has to hold the post of the Sarpanch, if the tenure is there. The question, thus, arises whether the person who has been elected in the meantime from amongst the members of the Panchayat Samiti or Sabha is a necessary party. The answer has to be a categorical "no", for he cannot oppose the order of removal assailed by the affected Sarpanch nor can he defend his election because he has come into being because of a vacancy, arising due to different situation. 49. In the instant case, shop No. 2 had become vacant. The appellant was allotted the shop, may be in the handicapped quota but such allotment is the resultant factor of the said shop falling vacant. The original allottee, that is the respondent, assailed his cancellation and ultimately succeeded in appeal. We are not concerned with the fact that the appellant herein was allowed to put her stand in the appeal. She was neither a necessary nor a proper party. The appellate authority permitted her to participate but that neither changes the situation nor does it confer any legal status on her. She would have continued to hold the shop had the original allottee lost the appeal. She cannot assail the said order in a writ petition because she is not a necessary party. It is the State or its functionaries who could have challenged the same in appeal. She would have continued to hold the shop had the original allottee lost the appeal. She cannot assail the said order in a writ petition because she is not a necessary party. It is the State or its functionaries who could have challenged the same in appeal. They have maintained sphinx like silence in that regard. Be that as it may, that would not confer any locus on the subsequent allottee to challenge the order passed in favour of the former allottee. She is a third party to the lis in this context." 15. In the case at hand, admittedly, the grievance raised by respondent No. 1 was against the order dated 04.08.2016. Evidently, respondent No. 1 though was aware of the fact that the appointment of Aanganwadi Karyakarta having taken recourse to did not challenge the same. Rather it appears that she was more concerned with the allegations in the order being stigmatic. The said order is in following terms: ^^dk;kZy; ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh vkbZŒlhŒMhŒ,lŒ nfr;k xzkeh.k iap'khy dkyksuh ftyk nfr;k 475661 Øekad@vkbZlhMh,l@LFkkŒvkŒckŒ@2016&17@857 nfr;k] fnukad 4-8-2016 vkns'k Jherh 'kkjnk 'kekZ vkaxuckM+h dk;ZdrkZ dsUæ jtkSjk cky fodkl ifj;kstuk nfr;k xzkeh.k }kjk Á'kklu dks xqejkg dj mez de djkus ds laca/k esa ftyk fpfdRlky; nfr;k ls fnukad 07-11-2015 dks esfMdy cuok;k x;k ftlesa mez 59 lky n'kkZbZ xbZ gS rFkk iqu% fnukad 21-07-2016 dks mez de djkus ds laca/k esa esfMdy cuk;k ftlesa mez 58 n'kkZbZ xbZ gS rFkk vkids }kjk vkaxuckMh dk;ZdrkZ ds in ij HkRrhZ ds nkSjku ÁLrqr nLrkost esa tUefrfFk 01-07-1950 nh xbZ gSA blls ,slk Árhr gksrk gS fd vki tkucw>dj Á'kklu dks xqejkg dj mez de djkdj vkaxuckMh dk;ZdrkZ ds in ij cus jguk pkgrh gSaA vkidk mDr d`R; 'kkldh; fu;eksa ds foijhr gS ,oa 420 dh Js.kh esa vkrk gSA vr% vkidks vkaxuckMh dk;ZdrkZ ds in ls i`Fkd fd;k tkrk gSA ;g vkns'k rRdky ÁHkko ls ÁHkko'khy gksxkA ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh+ ,dhd`r cky fodkl ifj;kstuk nfr;k xzkeh.k&1 Áfrfyfi %& 1- ftyk dk;ZØe vf/kdkjh] ,dhd`r cky fodkl lsok ftyk nfr;k dh vksj ls lwpukFkZ laÁsf"kr gSA 2- i;Zos{kd o`Rr fla?kokjh] ifj;kstuk nfr;k dh vksj Hkstdj ys[k gS fd vksj lwpukFkZ ,oa vko';d dk;Zokgh gsrqA 3- lacaf/kr Jhefr 'kkjnk 'kekZ vkaxuckMh dk;ZdrkZ dsUæ jtkSjk cky fodkl ifj;kstuk nfr;k xzkeh.k dh vksj ikyukFkZA ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh ,dhd`r cky fodkl ifj;kstuk nfr;k xzkeh.k&1** 16. Careful reading of the order would reflect that the Competent Authority adjudged the conduct of respondent No. 1 as unbecoming and falling within the category of fraud. It is not that the Authority treating her to have attained the age of superannuation had retired her. Rather the services have been terminated. Thus, the order is punitive in nature. Being trite it is that an order which is punitive in nature must precede with an opportunity of hearing to the person who suffers the consequence. In the case at hand, there is no material on record to establish that respondent No. 1 was afforded an opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order. Thus, the order passed by the learned Single Judge when adjudged on the above analysis and the fact situation, it cannot be faulted with. Pertinent it is to note that though the order dated 04.08.2016 has been set aside; however, no direction has been given to reinstate respondent No. 1. Furthermore, the State Government has chosen not to challenge the order passed in the Writ Petition. However, they are under an obligation to cause an enquiry as directed and if it is found that respondent No. 1 has played fraud, the respondent/State shall take all such legal actions at their disposal. 17. Now, coming to the first question as to locus of the appellant to file the appeal. Section 2(1) of the Act, 2005 stipulates: "2. Appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a Judgment or order of one Judge of the High Court made in exercise of original jurisdiction - (1) An appeal shall lie from a Judgment or order passed by one Judge of the High Court in exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to a Division Bench Comprising of two judges of the same High Court: Provided that no such appeal shall lie against an interlocutory order or against an order passed in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India." 18. Thus, the provision though empowers any person to seek remedy of filing appeal; however, such person must be an aggrieved person. A person aggrieved is: A person who has suffered a legal grievance that is a man who has been wrongfully derived of something or to whom something has been refused wrongfully. United India Insurance Co. Thus, the provision though empowers any person to seek remedy of filing appeal; however, such person must be an aggrieved person. A person aggrieved is: A person who has suffered a legal grievance that is a man who has been wrongfully derived of something or to whom something has been refused wrongfully. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Jyotsnaben Sudhirbhai Patel and Others, (2003) 7 SCC 212 . 19. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, AIR 1976 SC 578 , it is held that: "36. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) person aggrieved, (ii) stranger, (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spooking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold. 37. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of persons aggrieved. In the grey outer-circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer-zone may not be persons aggrieved. 38. To distinguish such applicants from strangers, among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. In the grey outer-circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer-zone may not be persons aggrieved. 38. To distinguish such applicants from strangers, among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being considered a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals?" 20. Contention of the appellant is that she has been appointed after following due process and was thus a necessary party in W.P. No. 8660/2016. However, evident it is from the relief sought by respondent No. 1 that the appellant's appointment was not questioned. Respondent No. 1 also did not seek relief for reinstatement, as would have given rise to a cause to present appellant to be a necessary party in the writ petition. 21. In the case at hand, the appellant fails to establish of any prejudice being caused to her because of setting aside of the order dated 04.08.2016 as wound bring her in the category of a person being aggrieved. 22. 21. In the case at hand, the appellant fails to establish of any prejudice being caused to her because of setting aside of the order dated 04.08.2016 as wound bring her in the category of a person being aggrieved. 22. In view whereof, the contention raised on behalf of respondent No. 1 as to locus of the appellant in challenging the order dated 16.05.2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 8660/2016 deserves to be upheld. It is accordingly held that the appellant being not an aggrieved person has no locus to maintain the present appeal. Therefore, the challenge put forth by the appellant against the order dated 16.05.2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 8660/2016 deserves to be negatived. 23. Appeal is disposed of in above terms. There shall be no cost. 24. Before parting with the matter, we wish to express that we are appalled the manner in which the Medical Board is operating in the State of Madhya Pradesh. That the Medical Board vide its certificate dated 07.11.2015 observed that respondent No. 1 appears to be 59 years of age whereas another Medical Board in 2016 vide its certificate dated 20.07.2016 declared the same individual to be of 58 years. It appears that no rules or regulations are being adhered to by the Medical Board while conducting the ossification test of the individual. Neither any record has been kept by the Medical Board. It is also a cause of concern that merely on asking the Medical Board are examining the individuals without even thinking of its consequences. It is for the State Government to look into such malpractice at District Level and take steps to curb the same. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the Principal Secretary, Department of Public Health and Family Welfare, Government of Madhya Pradesh, for appropriate action.