JUDGMENT : 1. By this petition, the petitioner seeks direction to the respondents to pay him full amount of salary for the period of suspension from 19.08.1990 to 11.02.1992. The petitioner also claimed arrears of salary for the period from 13.03.1999 to 12.03.2001 on the ground that he was entitled to the age of superannuation of 60 years which he would have attained on 12.03.2001, but he was made to retire at the age of 58 years on 13.03.1999. The petitioner also claims all other consequential benefits including the deemed date of promotion. 2. The petitioner while working as Senior Assistant in the services of the National Textile Corporation at Model Mills, Nagpur, was dismissed from service after holding an enquiry by an order dated 11.02.1992. This was the subject matter of challenge by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 782 of 1992, which was allowed by the Division Bench of this Court on 18.04.2007, setting aside the order of termination and granting him reinstatement with 75% of back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of his superannuation. 3. The petitioner has filed a Chart at Annexure-8 on page 32 of the petition showing that the respondents have paid 75% of back wages for the period from 11.02.1992 to 12.03.1999 amounting to Rs.2,95,769/-; amount of gratuity of Rs.1,02,969/-; amount of leave with pay of Rs.4,759/- and the cost of petition of Rs.5,000/-. The payment of this amount by the respondents to the petitioner is not disputed. Out of total dues of Rs.3,78,543/- payable to the petitioner, the respondents admit to have deducted an amount of Rs.25,504/- towards the petitioner’s share in the provident fund along with an amount of Rs.4,450/- towards the profession tax. It is the case of the petitioner that in addition to this, an amount of Rs.30,182/- of employer’s share in the provident fund was also deducted from the amount payable to the petitioner. However, this fact is disputed by the respondents. 4. The petitioner claims that in view of the decision of this Court on 18.04.2007 in W.P. No. 782/1992, he was entitled to payment of full salary for the period from 19.08.1990 to 11.02.1992, during which period he was placed under suspension. However, the undisputed factual position is that he was not paid a full salary but was paid only subsistence allowance. However, the undisputed factual position is that he was not paid a full salary but was paid only subsistence allowance. The learned counsel Shri Mathew submits that after deducting the amount of subsistence allowance paid to the petitioner, the rest of the arrears of salary for this period should have been paid to the petitioner. It is also urged that deduction of total amount of Rs.60,136/- as shown in the Chart at Annexure-8 under the following heads was unwarranted. Employee’s share Rs.25,404/- Employer’s share Rs.30,182/- Profession Tax Rs. 4,450/-. It is the further claim of the petitioner that he was a workman and governed by the provisions of the Model Standing Orders under which he was entitled to the age of superannuation of 60 years, but he was superannuated on 13.03.1999 at the age of 58 years. He was, therefore, entitled to arrears of salary from 13.03.1999 to 12.03.2001. 5. Coming to the entitlement of the petitioner for payment of full salary for the period from 19.08.1990 to 11.02.1992 is concerned, we have gone through the judgment delivered by this Court on 18.04.2007 in Writ Petition No. 782 of 1992, which is relied upon by both the learned counsels for their rival submissions. We find that this judgment holds that the petitioner shall be entitled to relief of reinstatement with 75% of back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of his superannuation. It is not the direction issued by this Court that the petitioner would be entitled to all consequential benefits flowing from setting aside the order of dismissal and directing the reinstatement in service. 6. Shri Puranik, the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Bahujan Vikas Education Society and another vrs. Mrs. Vidya Devi and others, reported in 2006 LAB I.C. 2857 and paragraphs 17 to 20 therein are reproduced below; "17. Omission on the part of any Court or Tribunal to incorporate a direction to pay the backwages cannot be later on filed in any execution proceedings, or by any other executing authority who has not been vested by law any power to supplant any order of direction by denoting such deficiencies or omissions assuming that some such order ought to exist. In view that the position of law as reiterated in recent judgment in case of Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, AIR 2005 SC 768 (supra), which reiterates the clear proposition of law relying upon three earlier judgments, is a matter of binding precedent. 18. After hearing the case and before delivering the judgment, we had adjourned the case for a hearing on the aspect, for enabling the learned Advocate Mr. Sable to take instructions and to find out as to whether some settlement is possible where the Management can be asked to forego part of the amount paid by it, however, learned Advocate Mr. Sable has informed the Court that the respondent No.1 is not ready for any compromise on refund of amount. 19. The proposition advanced by learned Advocate that the order of backwages has to be express, and cannot be considered or construed to be passed by interpretation and necessary implication, is liable to be accepted. In view of this position, present petitioners' plea that the order of reinstatement, as can be read from the judgment of this Court, cannot be read to include order of backwages is correct and deserves acceptance by this Court. Moreover, this Court is not sitting in review at the behest of the teacher in the judgment passed in Writ Petition No. 584 of 1988 in 1990. The said judgment, which does not expressly grant backwages has, to be respected and acted upon as it stands. 20. This Court finds that the submission of learned Advocate for the petitioner that an order has to be read as it stands, and none can read it to include something which is in its mind is acceptable. On the submission of learned Advocate that an order of backwages has to be explicit, and it cannot be inferred by implication, this Court finds that the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in various cases supports the plea raised by the petitioner. In the result, on facts, this Court finds as follows : a. That the judgment of this Court on which the respondent No.1 has relied for the relief of reinstatement does not spell out that this Court has ordered "reinstatement with full back wages". b. Absence of mention of payment of full back wages has to be read as a conscious judicial act. b. Absence of mention of payment of full back wages has to be read as a conscious judicial act. c. The authorities of the Education Department are not competent to infuse something in the operative order of this Court, and in the result, Annexs. B and C are illegal and without jurisdiction. d. Respondent No.1 was not entitled to receive back wages. e. The amount received by the respondent No.1 under the order of Court is liable to be refunded." In view of the aforesaid position also, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief of payment of regular salary during the period of suspension. Even otherwise, the relief which ought to have been claimed in the earlier petition, if not claimed, will be barred by the principle under Order II, Rule 2 of C.P.C. and that of the constructive resjudicata. 7. We have gone through the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dharampal Arora vrs. Punjab State Electricity Board and another, reported in (2006) 13 SCC 593 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that once the termination is set aside, all orders from the date of chargesheet up to the date of the passing of the final order become a nullity and redundant. The said decision deals with the claim of the appellant for crossing efficiency bar with effect from 04.10.1974 instead of 01.04.1976. The Apex Court has considered the decision given in the Civil Suit, in the Appeal by the lower appellate Court and in Second Appeal by the High Court. It is held in the said judgment that the question of crossing of efficiency bar was specifically raised and it was dealt with in the said judgment and merely because there was no such direction in the operative portion of the order, the technicalities would not come in the way of the petitioner to claim the said relief. 8. In our view, the aforesaid judgment does not apply to the facts of this case for the reason that the petitioner is unable to point out to us any claim made in the earlier petition for regularization of the period of suspension from 19.08.1990 to 11.02.1992. This judgment itself directs the reinstatement of the petitioner with 75% of the back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of his superannuation. This judgment itself directs the reinstatement of the petitioner with 75% of the back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of his superannuation. After conclusion of the enquiry, the order of dismissal passed on 11.02.1992 and placed on record does not deal with the period of suspension of the petitioner. It was, therefore, open for the petitioner to have claimed for passing of an order for regularization of the period of suspension and in the absence of it, it is not possible for us to direct payment of full salary for the period of suspension. 9. Coming to the challenge to the deduction of the amount of Rs.60,136/-. We may note here that the respondents have denied to have deducted an amount of Rs.30,182/- towards employer's share in the provident fund deducted from the amount payable to the petitioner. Be that as it may, the stand of the respondent is that the petitioner has already withdrawn the amount of provident fund dues and Rs.1,85,296/- was paid to him by cheque dated 09.12.2007. The petitioner has not lost the said amount. We do not find any illegality in deducting the employee's share of providednt fund and the amount of profession tax of Rs.4,450/-. 10. Coming to the last contention of Shri Mathew, the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the age of superannuation, it is disputed by the respondents that the provisions of Model Standing Orders are applicable to the petitioner. According to them, the petitioner was working as Senior Assistant in supervisory capacity from the year 1980 and any claim on the basis of Model Standing Orders can be adjudicated by the Court of competent jurisdiction i.e. either by the Labour Court or the Industrial Court in the appropriate proceedings. In view of this, it is not possible for us to adjudicate such a dispute for the first time in exercise of our jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In view of above, we do not find any substance in this petition. The same is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.