JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner herein is a Senior Police Officer of IPS rank in Kerala. The first respondent herein brought a complaint against the police officer before the Special Court (Vigilance), Muvattupuzha, containing so many allegations, including amassment of wealth disproportionate to his known sources of income as a police officer, while working as Commissioner of Police at Ernakulam. On the said complaint, the court below directed a Quick Verification (preliminary enquiry). After a detailed enquiry into the various aspects of the matter including the meticulous details of the income and expenditure of the petitioner, the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the Ernakulam Special Cell of the Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau (VACB) submitted a report before the Court on 21.05.2015. The report of the VACB is that the acquisition of disproportionate assets made by the petitioner is only a negligible 0.25%, and the VACB reported that there is no scope for a prosecution under Section 13(1) (e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act). Notice of this report was given to the complainant. The report of enquiry was seriously objected by the complainant. The petitioner also entered appearance in the proceedings, and filed statement in support of the report of enquiry. 2. After hearing both sides, the learned Special Judge passed orders on 18.03.2017 rejecting the report of enquiry, and forwarding the complaint to the VACB with a direction to register a case against the petitioner under Sections 7 and 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The said order of the trial court dated 18.03.2017 on Crl.M.P.No.582/2016 (the complaint) is under challenge in this original petition brought under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. To order investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., and to reject the Quick Verification Report submitted by the VACB, the learned trial Judge made an assessment and valuation of his own, finding that there are some factual mistakes in the assessment and valuation made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police.
3. To order investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., and to reject the Quick Verification Report submitted by the VACB, the learned trial Judge made an assessment and valuation of his own, finding that there are some factual mistakes in the assessment and valuation made by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. The order passed by the court below is challenged by the petitioner mainly on the ground that the court below erred in jurisdiction, or committed error of jurisdiction in making assessment and valuation of its own for ordering investigation, or that without resorting to the proper procedure on a complaint received under Section 190 Cr.P.C., the learned trial Judge valued the assets of the police officer and assessed the income and expenditure in his own way, to order investigation. 4. On getting notice on admission the first respondent entered appearance before this Court, and filed a statement of objection containing objections as regards the factual aspects, and also raising a preliminary legal objection that the impugned order cannot be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As regards the prayer for interim stay of proceedings also the first respondent raised a legal objection that stay of investigation cannot be ordered by this Court in view of the prohibition contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act. After hearing both sides on the jurisdictional issue, and other legal objections raised by the first respondent, this Court passed an interim order on 28.03.2017 suspending the enforcement of the impugned order passed by the trial court for a period of two months, and posting the Original Petition for hearing in detail, on the issues raised. 5. Against the interim order passed by this Court on 28.03.2017, the first respondent approached the Honourable Supreme Court of India with Special Leave Petition No.3547/2017. The Honourable Supreme Court disallowed special leave, and requested this Court to hear the matter finally on 26.05.2017, or any other date immediately thereafter. Accordingly, the original petition was taken up for final hearing. Thereafter, the first respondent got the matter adjourned on two occasions, and by the time he filed an application as IA No.1081/2017 to implead the Union of India as additional respondent in the proceedings. The said application was dismissed by this Court on 29.06.2017, and the Original Petition itself was heard for final disposal. 6.
Thereafter, the first respondent got the matter adjourned on two occasions, and by the time he filed an application as IA No.1081/2017 to implead the Union of India as additional respondent in the proceedings. The said application was dismissed by this Court on 29.06.2017, and the Original Petition itself was heard for final disposal. 6. One preliminary objection raised by the first respondent is that the order passed by the court below directing investigation cannot be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and that if at all the petitioner is aggrieved by the said order, he will have to resort to other proceedings possible under the law, including the exercise of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent cited some decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court on the point. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the trend of the decisions on the scope and extent of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has undergone a change, and recently the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the High Court can interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and correct the jurisdictional errors committed by the subordinate Courts and Tribunals. The learned counsel submitted that when any instance of wrong exercise of jurisdiction, or error of jurisdiction in the exercise of the powers of any subordinate Court is brought to the notice of the High Court, such errors can very well be corrected, and the High Court can very well interfere in exercise of the supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. The other legal objection as regards stay of proceedings need not be discussed much at this stage because, the stay already granted by the Court, would expire with the final disposal of this original petition. However, that legal aspect was also raised and argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent. He cited Sathyanarayana Sharma v. State of Rajastan [ 2001(8) SCC 607 ] where the Honourable Supreme Court held that trial proceedings under the PC Act cannot be stayed in view of the prohibition contained in Section 19(3) (c) of the PC Act.
He cited Sathyanarayana Sharma v. State of Rajastan [ 2001(8) SCC 607 ] where the Honourable Supreme Court held that trial proceedings under the PC Act cannot be stayed in view of the prohibition contained in Section 19(3) (c) of the PC Act. When the Court asked whether the term “proceedings” meant under the Clause (c) would include investigation also, the learned counsel’s submission was that every proceeding including investigation is covered by the prohibition contained in Clause (c). The said decision is only on stay of trial proceedings under the PC Act. Clause (c) of Section 19(3) of the PC Act reads as follows; “No Court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground, and no Court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any enquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings”. 7. The word “proceedings” figures at two places in Clause (c). The said word at the first part cannot have a meaning different from that of the term at the second part. The “proceeding” meant under the second part is a proceeding where any interlocutory order is passed under the Act. Such interlocutory orders can be passed only by the Court functioning under the PC Act, including the appellate or revisional Court. If the meaning of the word “proceeding” at the first part is interpreted in terms of the meaning of the word at the second part, it is quite clear that the “proceeding” meant under the first part, regarding which also stay is prohibited, must be proceeding before any Court functioning under the PC Act. In short, the proceeding meant under Clause (c) must be a judicial proceeding. In the decision cited supra, the Honourable Supreme Court has not held that investigation process cannot be stayed under Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act. There can be situations where the police powers under the PC Act are misused or abused. This Court had occasions to come across many such instances where the VACB in Kerala registered crimes under the PC Act, and proceeded for investigation without any basis, and without understanding the scope of the provisions of the PC Act, or without understanding the scope of the term “misconduct” under Section 13(1) of the PC Act.
This Court had occasions to come across many such instances where the VACB in Kerala registered crimes under the PC Act, and proceeded for investigation without any basis, and without understanding the scope of the provisions of the PC Act, or without understanding the scope of the term “misconduct” under Section 13(1) of the PC Act. In such cases where an investigation proceeds baselessly, just to harass an individual, the Court cannot go helpless, and the Court will have to interfere. In appropriate cases of extreme abuse or misuse of police powers under the PC Act, the Court will have to interfere to prevent such investigative excess or harassment. Moidenkutty v. State of Kerala [ 2013(1) KLJ 728 ] has settled that the powers of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are not in any manner affected by Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act. 8. Now let me examine the other legal issue raised by the first respondent. The learned Senior Counsel for the first respondent submitted that when the petitioner has ordinary remedies under the Code of Criminal Procedure, if at all he is aggrieved by the order passed by the trial court, a petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India cannot at all be entertained, or that the High Court cannot exercise and extend its supervisory jurisdiction. In K.K.Srivastava etc v. Bhupendra Kumar Jain and others [AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1703], the Honourable Supreme Court held that when there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy by recourse to the normal judicial process, the High Court cannot exercise extraordinary powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In Miss Maneck Custodji Surjarji v. Sarafazali Nawabali Mirza [AIR 1976 Supreme Court 2446], the Honourable Supreme Court held that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of Constitution can be invoked or exercised only in extraordinary circumstances warranting such interference, and the High Court shall not extend it’s jurisdiction under the Article in cases where other adequate relief or remedy is possible.
In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd [(2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 97], the Honourable Supreme Court held that the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be exercised by the High Court to interfere with orders of lower courts and Tribunals, only in cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where, in the absence of intervention by the High Court, the grave injustice caused by the order of the Subordinate Courts and Tribunals would go unchecked and uncorrected. 9. In State Through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu Alias Afshan Guru and others [(2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases 641], the Honourable Supreme Court held thus in Paragraph 28; “28. Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised “as the cloak of an appeal in disguise”. 10.
It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised “as the cloak of an appeal in disguise”. 10. In Navjot Sandhu’s case the Honourable Supreme Court held that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised even when there is a bar under Section 397, or some other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code(Para 29). However, the Honourable Supreme Court explained that such power cannot be exercised if there is a statutory bar in some other enactment. The respondent would contend that the petitioner could have brought an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. But the stand taken by the petitioner is that the appropriate and the right remedy will be to seek interference of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, when the trial court has committed a gross error of jurisdiction, or has gone beyond it’s powers as an original court acting on a complaint received under Section 190 Cr.P.C. Now let me see whether the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner can be accepted, to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution. 11. In Salini Shyam Shetti and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 329], the Honourable Supreme Court formulated some principles on the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, after examining so many earlier decisions on the point. In the said decision, the Honourable Supreme Court explained the various circumstances and situations where the High Court can exercise its supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Honourable Supreme Court has cautioned that the High Court cannot act as a court of appeal over the orders of the subordinate courts and Tribunals in exercise of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, and explained that the mode of exercise of power of the High Court under Article 227 is entirely different from the mode of exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The circumstances wherein the High Court can exercise its supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution would include circumstances where there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the subordinate Courts and Tribunal, or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice, or where there has been violation of the principles of natural justice.
The circumstances wherein the High Court can exercise its supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution would include circumstances where there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the subordinate Courts and Tribunal, or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice, or where there has been violation of the principles of natural justice. The Honourable Supreme Court also settled that the power of Superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is in fact a part of the basic structure of the constitution, and that such power cannot be curtailed by any statute. In Clause (m) of Paragraph 49 of the judgment the Honourable Supreme Court held thus; “(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.” 12. In ], the Honourable Supreme Court held that the High Court can exercise its supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in cases where the order passed by the subordinate Court or Tribunal would cause grave injustice, or such power can be exercised in cases where the subordinate court or Tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have; such failure occasioning failure of justice, or where the jurisdiction, though available, is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction. 13. On an examination of the various decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court on the point, I find that the High Court can very well exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in cases where the subordinate courts and Tribunals have acted in excess of jurisdiction or in excess of the powers under the law, or where the subordinate Courts and Tribunals have committed some error of jurisdiction or jurisdictional excess in the discharge of the functions within the limits prescribed under the law.
Ofcourse, it is true that mere legal or factual errors in judgments or orders or procedure cannot be corrected by the High Court in exercise of the supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. For such exercise of powers, or to extend its supervisory arms of authority under Article 227 of the Constitution, there must be a situation where a subordinate court or Tribunal has acted beyond the scope of its jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction it has, or has perversely exercised the jurisdiction, resulting in grave injustice, or has committed some serious error in the exercise of its jurisdiction under the law. In the present case, what is urged by the petitioner is that by making its own assessment of income and valuation of the properties and assets for directing the VACB to register a crime and to investigate it, the learned trial Judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction, or the learned trial Judge committed gross error of jurisdiction causing hardship and injustice to the petitioner. The report submitted by the VACB after a thorough enquiry into the various aspects of the matter is that the extent of disproportionate assets is only a negligible 0.25%. 14. Special Courts under the PC Act are authorised to receive complaints under Section 190 Cr.P.C. All the procedural aspects applicable to the Court of a Judicial First Class Magistrate, will apply to the Special Courts also. In view of the directions of the Honourable Supreme Court in Lalitha kumari’s case, the court below ordered a preliminary enquiry before proceeding on the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., or under Section 200 Cr.P.C. Ofcourse, it was quite right, and in cases like this investigation cannot be straight away ordered under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The purpose of obtaining a report of preliminary enquiry is to ascertain whether there is any scope to proceed on the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., or under Section 200 Cr.P.C., or whether the complaint would deserve rejection at the threshold. The first option possible for a Court would be to reject the complaint if the Court identifies it as a dishonest complaint, or if the Court finds no material at all for a prosecution on the basis of the complaint.
The first option possible for a Court would be to reject the complaint if the Court identifies it as a dishonest complaint, or if the Court finds no material at all for a prosecution on the basis of the complaint. In a case where a report of enquiry is obtained by the Special Court, the Court can reject the complaint, if the report of preliminary enquiry would convince the Court beyond any reasonable doubt that there is absolutely no merit in the complaint, or that there is no reason at all for a prosecution, or if the Court finds that the complaint is in fact a dishonest one. In this case, the report of preliminary enquiry is practically in favour of the petitioner. But the learned trial Judge entertained his own doubts about the report, and proceeded to examine it in detail after giving notice to the complainant, and after obtaining objections from him. 15. Ofcourse, when a report of preliminary enquiry is filed in Court, the Special Court is not bound to accept it. If the Court finds that the report is not clear, or if the Court wants some more details, the VACB can be directed to make a proper enquiry, and to submit a proper report. In cases where further or additional materials will have to be furnished by the complainant for proceeding further on the complaint, when the Court is not inclined to accept the report immediately, the Court will have to direct the complainant to furnish the required materials in Court. 16. In this case, instead of directing the complainant to furnish the required materials, or to produce the materials and documents substantiating the allegations in the complaint, the learned trial Judge proceeded to make his own valuation of assets and assessment of income. 17. On a perusal of the impugned order, I find that the learned trial Judge entertained some doubt about the assessment and calculations made by the Deputy Superintendents of Police. Paragraph 9 of the impugned order shows that the learned trial Judge proceeded to make his own assessment in view of some discrepancies noted by him in the report of enquiry.
On a perusal of the impugned order, I find that the learned trial Judge entertained some doubt about the assessment and calculations made by the Deputy Superintendents of Police. Paragraph 9 of the impugned order shows that the learned trial Judge proceeded to make his own assessment in view of some discrepancies noted by him in the report of enquiry. If the trial court finds any discrepancy or infirmity or defect in the report of the VACB, or the findings therein, or if the court finds some mistakes in the assessment and valuation made by the reporting officer, the proper way must be to direct the enquiry officer to make a proper enquiry, and to submit a proper report. If there is any mistake or discrepancy in the report, that will have to be examined by the enquiry officer himself, he will have to conduct a further enquiry into those aspects, and submit a proper report. Instead of giving such a direction, the learned trial Judge himself proceeded to supply the omissions and correct the mistakes. This is quite unwarranted, and this is definitely an instance of excess of jurisdiction, or improper exercise of jurisdiction. 18. The learned trial Judge has found fault with the enquiry officer for having included payment of tax in the expenses. When the gross salary of the public servant is taken to assess the income during the cheque period, the amount of income tax paid by him will definitely have to be included in the expenses. Paragraph 9 of the impugned order itself shows that the salary taken by the enquiry officer for the assessment of the total income is the gross salary, and not the net salary. When only the net salary is taken, payment of income tax cannot be considered as expenses. 19. The court below has directed the VACB to register a crime under Section 7 of the PC Act also. On a reading of the complaint, I could not find anything prima facie or definite to invoke Section 7 of the PC Act. The initial order passed by the Court directing a preliminary enquiry was only to make an enquiry regarding the allegation of amassment of disproportionate of assets made by the petitioner while working as Commissioner of Police, Ernakulam. The complaint does not contain any definite and honest allegation under Section 7 of the PC Act.
The initial order passed by the Court directing a preliminary enquiry was only to make an enquiry regarding the allegation of amassment of disproportionate of assets made by the petitioner while working as Commissioner of Police, Ernakulam. The complaint does not contain any definite and honest allegation under Section 7 of the PC Act. When such an offence is alleged the complaint must contain and disclose how, where, when, and from whom the public servant accepted illegal gratification, and for what favour he accepted illegal gratification. Things must be honestly stated in the complaint, and it must be a complaint brought for honest prosecution. Courts must be able to identify true and genuine complaints brought for honest prosecution on the basis of definite materials and informations within the knowledge of the complainant, and dishonest complaints brought for political or personal ends. In this case, such a meticulous examination will have to be made by the court below to identify whether the complaint made by the first respondent is an honest complaint or a dishonest complaint. The complaint also contains some allegations regarding some foreign trips made by the public servant. However on the basis of materials and documents, the VACB has reported that every time permission of the Government was obtained by the petitioner for such trips, and that every time the expenses were met by the petitioner. 20. The important jurisdictional error pointed out by the petitioner, and noticed by this Court, is that instead of directing the complainant to produce the materials and documents substantiating the allegations made by him in the complaint, the learned trial Judge made his own assessment of income and valuation of assets, and directed the VACB to register a crime. When a Quick Verification Report is submitted in Court, and when it is objected by the complainant that it is not acceptable, the proper way, or the proper procedure is to direct the complainant to produce the required materials supporting the allegations made in the complaint. In this case, instead of making such a direction, the learned trial Judge made an assessment and valuation of the income and assets in his own way. Such an exercise can be undertaken by the trial court, and such valuation and assessment can be made by the trial Judge, only during trial while evaluating and examining the evidence adduced by the prosecution. 21.
Such an exercise can be undertaken by the trial court, and such valuation and assessment can be made by the trial Judge, only during trial while evaluating and examining the evidence adduced by the prosecution. 21. In a case where the allegation is under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act the prosecuting agency will have to examine so many materials including documents, bills, vouchers, etc. touching the income and expenditure of the public servant, and also the various properties and assets acquired by him. On an examination of the Quick Verification Report in this case, I find that the VACB has gone into all the minute aspects covering the income, expenses and acquisitions of the petitioner, and found that what is disproportionate is only a negligible 0.25 %. When such a report is there, the court below will have to very cautious in taking decision not to accept it, or to reject it. If at all the Court is not inclined to accept it, such a decision can be taken only judiciously on a consideration of the relevant materials, which the complainant would definite have to produce. The petitioner belongs to an affluent family. His wife is a Dental Surgeon. The financial background of the petitioner and his wife will have to be considered by the Court in assessing the report regarding the petitioner’s assets. The function which the trial court is expected to discharge during trial, cannot be discharged by the Court at the preliminary stage of examining a complaint. Such an exercise cannot be undertaken by the trial court at the very preliminary stage. The act of the learned trial Judge involves a serious error of jurisdiction. This act of the court below, and the order passed by the court below under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. require interference by this Court in exercise of the supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. If the impugned order is not corrected, and if the court below is not directed to discharge the functions properly under the law, an unnecessary investigation may proceed, causing hardship and harassment to the public servant. A prosecution brought or initiated under the PC Act cannot be casually approached by Courts. It is quite unlike a prosecution alleging assault or some other offences. Even an unnecessary investigation may cause blemish, on the career of a public servant.
A prosecution brought or initiated under the PC Act cannot be casually approached by Courts. It is quite unlike a prosecution alleging assault or some other offences. Even an unnecessary investigation may cause blemish, on the career of a public servant. Once such a blemish is caused, it would be very difficult to erase it. Before ordering investigation on a complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Special Court must examine not only the complaint, but also the other materials substantiating the allegations in the complaint. Such orders cannot be mechanically passed by the Special Courts. This Court has come across many such complaints mechanically forwarded by Courts under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for investigation. “Complaint mania” has become a social menace in Kerala. It is quite unfortunate that the Special Courts also contribute to such a menace. Every Special Judge functioning under the Prevention of Corruption Act must be conscious of his duties and obligations, and also the nature of his functions as a Special Judge. What matters is not just that the complaint alleges an offence. The complaint must disclose an offence. The term ‘disclose’ does not simply mean, that the complaint alleges or reveals an offence. Simply on a complaint which is not supported by any material, investigation cannot be ordered by the Special Courts under the PC Act. The Court must be satisfied that an offence is ‘disclosed’ by the materials including documents, circumstances, etc. substantiating the allegations in the complaint. 22. In the light of the principles settled by the Honourable Supreme Court as regards the scope and necessity of supervisory powers, I find that the impugned order passed by the court below requires interference. In the result, this Original Petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by the court below dated 18.03.2017 in Crl.M.P.No.582 of 2016 is set aside, and the court below is directed to take decision afresh on the complaint. The court below is directed that if what is required is a proper report of enquiry after correcting the discrepancies and mistakes, if any, in the report, such a direction shall be made. Or if the Court is not inclined to accept the report on a thorough examination of it, the court below shall direct the complainant to produce the documents and materials in his possession, substantiating the allegations in the complaint.
Or if the Court is not inclined to accept the report on a thorough examination of it, the court below shall direct the complainant to produce the documents and materials in his possession, substantiating the allegations in the complaint. In case the complainant failed to produce the required documents and materials appropriate orders can be passed by the court on the complaint. Anyway, whether the complainant produced the required materials or not, orders afresh shall be passed by the court below on an examination of the Quick Verification Report and other materials including the complaint meticulously, to see whether there is any scope to proceed for a prosecution under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. Proceedings on the complaint shall be expedited, and appropriate decision shall be taken without any delay.